In this theoretical analysis, the "principal" can be the head of the tax collection agency (or "government" or even citizens), the "supervisor" can be the tax collector, and the "agent" can be the taxpayer. The principal, interested in controlling an agent's socially costly activity ("cheating"), hires the supervisor to save on monitoring costs. The agent may bribe the tax collector to suppress reporting, but bribery can be eliminated by the agency...
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ПОДРОБНАЯ ИНФОРМАЦИЯ
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1999/10/31
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Рабочий документ в рамках исследования вопросов политики
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WPS2204
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1
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1
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2010/07/01
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Corruption under moral hazard
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freedom of the press
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Официальная версия документа (может содержать подписи, и т.д.)