This paper analyzes rent seeking for agricultural import quotas and the associated waste of resources when politically contestable licenses are allocated to either or both importers and exporters. In a two -stage simultaneous contest where firms rent seek for licenses and then bargain over the import/export price, it is shown that (1) rents are not dissipated completely because of uncertainty in allocation of rights, (2) the dissipation ratio increases...
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2003/01/01
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2010/07/01
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Rent seeking with politically contestable rights to tariff-rate import quotas
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rent seeking
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