Unlike prudential regulations that are put in place prospectively to develop banks, procedures for dealing with banks in distress are generally determined on an ad hoc basis. Often the lack of clarity in the policy framework creates incentive for bank managers, shareholders, depositors, and regulators that undercut prompt resolution of financial distress. The result is often inaction, the accumulation of bad debt, and ultimately the assumption of...
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ПОДРОБНАЯ ИНФОРМАЦИЯ
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1995/02/28
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Журнальная статья
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14303
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1
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1
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1995/02/01
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Incentives and the resolution of bank distress
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high levels of protection
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