Skip to Main Navigation

Madagascar - Second Governance and Institutional Development Project : implementation completion and results report (Английский)

The Second Governance and Institutional Development Project for Madagascar received a moderately unsatisfactory development outcome with high risk to development outcome. Both the Bank and the Borrower received moderately unsatisfactory ratings for their performances in the project. The project was restructured once. Most of the activities funded under the project had experienced substantial delays in implementation and slow disbursements as the consequence of: (i) the political crisis prevailing in the country, (ii) the suspension of all disbursement to the project account, and (iii) the application of the OP/BP 7.30 dealing with de facto government. The project also had to be aligned with the country and sector context as well as with the Bank Interim Strategy (ISN) for Madagascar. Changes introduced during the restructuring of the project included: (i) extension of the closing date by two years; (ii) revision of the project development objective (PDO) and the results framework; (iii) modification of the components and activities; (iv) revision of the implementation arrangements; and (v) reallocation of proceeds. The formally revised PDO was to strengthen the recipient’s public financial management and social accountability at the central government and at the municipal levels. Several lessons were taken from this project including the following: (1) project design - including restructuring - must better reflect prior analytical work, country and institutional context, existing capacity and the time necessary to implement reforms, (2) implementation arrangements adapted to the country context over the life of a project and extensive communication are necessary for a smooth implementation of a project, (3) the Bank needs more flexible policies and procedures to adapt project design when the initial project context is changing drastically and the project design proves to be too complex and/or ambitious, (4) leadership and commitment are necessary to implement reforms, and (5) support to CSOs and municipalities during the crisis period yielded better results than support at the central level although its impact was limited by design flaws.

Подробная Информация

Файлы Для Скачивания

ПОЛНЫЙ ОТЧЕТ

Официальная версия документа (может содержать подписи, и т.д.)