The authors analyze whether financial compensation is preferable to the current system of dispute settlement in the World Trade Organization that permits member countries to impose retaliatory tariffs in response to trade violations committed by other members. They show that monetary fines are more efficient than tariffs in terms of granting compensation to injured parties when there are violations in equilibrium. However, fines suffer from an enforcement...
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ПОДРОБНАЯ ИНФОРМАЦИЯ
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2006/04/01
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Рабочий документ в рамках исследования вопросов политики
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WPS3873
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1
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1
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2006/03/24
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Disclosed
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Tariff retaliation versus financial compensation in the enforcement of international trade agreements
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bond
ФАЙЛЫ ДЛЯ СКАЧИВАНИЯ
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Официальная версия документа (может содержать подписи, и т.д.)