West Africa
Mineral Sector Strategic Assessment (WAMSSA)

An Environmental and Social Strategic Assessment for the Development of the Mineral Sector in the Mano River Union

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Environment and Natural Resources
Management Unit of the Africa Region (AFTEN), and
Environment Department (ENV)
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Acronyms, Initialisms, and Abbreviations

AES  Évaluation environnementale et sociale
AICD  Diagnostic des infrastructures nationales en Afrique
AICD  Africa Infrastructure Country Diagnostic
AMGP  African Mineral Governance Project
APL  Prêt pour politique adaptable (Adaptable Policy Loan)
APL  Adaptable Program Loan
ASM  Artisanal and Small Scale Mining
AU  African Union
BSRG  Beny Steinmetz Resources Group
CASM  Communities and Small-Scale Mining
CD  Corridor de développement
CDD  Community Driven Development
CDM  Corridor de Développement de Maputo
CEDEAO  Communauté Economique des Etats de l’Afrique de l’Ouest
CEPESL  Creating an Enabling Policy Environment in Sierra Leone
CLSG  Côte d’Ivoire, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Guinea
COCPO  World Bank Oil, Gas and Mining Policy Unit
CSO  Civil Society Organization
D4D  Diamonds for Development
DC  Development Corridor
DFID  Department for International Development
ECOWAS  Communauté Économique des États Ouest-Africains
ECOWAS  Economic Community of West African States
EIES  Évaluation des impacts environnementaux et sociaux
EITI  Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative
EITI++  Initiative de transparence des industries extractives
EITI++  Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative Plus Plus
EPFI  Equator Principle Financial Institution
ESIA  Environmental and Social Impact Assessment
ESMP  Environmental and Social Management Plan
GDP  Gross Domestic Product
GEF  Global Environment Facility
GEMAP  Governance and Economic Management Assistance Program (Liberia)
GMP  Groupe multipartenaires
ICMM  International Council on Mining and Metals
IDS  Initiative de développement spatial
IFC  Société financière internationale
IFC  International Finance Corporation
KPCS  Kimberly Process Certification Scheme
LEITI  Liberian Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative
MDC  Maputo Development Corridor
MDG  Millennium Development Goal
MLCPE  Ministry of Lands, Country Planning and Environment
MNTCP  Mt. Nimba Transboundary Conservation Park
MRU  Mano River Union
MSG  Multi-Stakeholder Group
MTAP  Mining Technical Assistance Project
NaCEF  National Commission for Environment and Forestry
NEPAD  New Partnership for Africa’s Development
NGGL  Newmont Ghana Gold Limited
NGO  Non-Governmental Organization
ONG  Organisation Non Gouvernementale
OSC  Organisations de la Société Civile
OSIWA  Open Society in West Africa
PAGM  Programme africain de gouvernance minière (African Mineral Governance Program)
PGES  Plan de gestion environnemental et social
PGM  Platinum Group Metals
PIB  Produit intérieur brut
PSIA  Poverty and Social Impact Assessment
PWYP  Publish what you pay
PWYP  Publish What You Pay
SADC  Communauté de développement d’Afrique australe (Southern Africa Development Community)
SADC  Southern Africa Development Community
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<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tr>
<td>SDI</td>
<td>Spatial Development Initiative</td>
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<tr>
<td>SDP</td>
<td>Spatial Development Program</td>
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<tr>
<td>SEA</td>
<td>Strategic Environmental Assessment</td>
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<tr>
<td>SESA</td>
<td>Strategic Environmental and Social Assessment</td>
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<tr>
<td>SLEPA</td>
<td>Sierra Leone Environmental Protection Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SME</td>
<td>Small and Medium Enterprise</td>
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<tr>
<td>SSM</td>
<td>Small Scale Mining</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPA</td>
<td>Tonnes per Annum</td>
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<tr>
<td>UA</td>
<td>Union Africaine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UEMOA</td>
<td>Union Economique et Monetaire Ouest-Africaine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNAMSIL</td>
<td>United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Program</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNMIL</td>
<td>United Nations Mission in Liberia</td>
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<tr>
<td>URM</td>
<td>Union de la Rivière Mano</td>
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<tr>
<td>USAID</td>
<td>US Agency for International Development</td>
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<td>WAEE</td>
<td>West Africa Electricity Exchanges</td>
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<td>WAEMU</td>
<td>West African Monetary Union</td>
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<td>WAMF</td>
<td>West Africa Mining Forum</td>
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<td>WAMSSA</td>
<td>West Africa Minerals Sector Strategic Assessment</td>
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<tr>
<td>WAPP</td>
<td>West Africa Power Pool</td>
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<td>WSSD</td>
<td>World Summit on Sustainable Development</td>
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Executive Summary

Introduction
1. The West African Mineral Sector Strategic Assessment (WAMSSA) is a strategic environmental and social assessment intended to identify policy, institutional, and regulatory adjustments required to integrate environmental and social considerations into mineral sector development in Africa. The study focused on three Mano River Union (MRU) countries, Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone, all categorized as mineral-rich countries which earn — or could earn (in the case of Liberia) — significant revenues from exports of bauxite, iron ore, rutile, gold, and diamonds. WAMSSA featured an analytical component, and an extensive consultation process designed to initiate a policy dialogue on improving mineral sector governance and enhancing the benefits of mineral sector development for the MRU region.

2. This report summarizes the findings of the WAMSSA process, and provides a series of recommendations to address environmental, social, and governance priorities highlighted by analytical and consultation components of the assessment. The recommendations are intended to provide guidance to the African Mineral Governance Program (AMGP) and Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative Plus Plus (EITI++) initiatives that are gathering momentum in the region.

WAMSSA objectives
3. WAMSSA’s objectives were to: (i) identify the regional policy, institutional, and regulatory adjustments required to integrate social and environmental considerations into mineral sector development; and (ii) formulate recommendations that enhance the wider environmental and social benefits of mining sector development regional infrastructure and economic diversification are also developed.

4. In meeting these objectives, WAMSSA aimed to deliver these outcomes: (i) provide critical and insightful input to inform design and implementation of the proposed African Mineral Governance Program; (ii) contribute to informed engagement and participation by West African governments; regional institutions such as ECOWAS, WAEMU, and the Mano River Union (MRU); international finance institutions; development partners; the mining industry; NGOs; CSOs; and local mining communities in a regional dialogue on mining and sustainable development; and (iii) support the World Bank’s dialogue with clients about joint identification of strategic opportunities for regional coordination and harmonization of environmental and social frameworks, and strengthen institutions and governance associated with mining development.

African Mineral Governance Project (AMGP)
5. A key objective of WAMSSA was to inform the development of the World Bank’s African Mineral Governance Project. AMGP intends to assist Africa countries with harmonizing regional and sub-regional mineral sector policies. It aims to view mineral sector opportunities and constraints from a regional perspective, recognizing that single-country approaches may not yield the most benefits within the region. AMGP includes a series of overlapping horizontal Adaptable Policy Loans (APLs), to be made
available to individual African countries but coordinated through sub-regional organizations such as ECOWAS and SADC. Two MRU countries, Liberia and Sierra Leone, are expected to participate in the first phase of the program, while Guinea and Côte d’Ivoire are potential candidates for Phase 2.

6. The program includes four components: (i) good governance and sustainable mineral sector management, including development of common principles and strengthening policy and regulatory frameworks, institutional strengthening and human resources development, and artisanal and small-scale mining; (ii) geological and mining information systems and investment promotion; (iii) enabling benefits and value addition to national and regional economies, including ancillary infrastructure development along mineral corridors and upstream and downstream links; and (iv) project management, including setting up and supporting National Implementation Units and Regional Coordination Units.

7. The WAMSSA study affirmed AMGP’s regional harmonization approach to mineral sector development, and provides recommendations to address environmental, social, and overarching mineral sector governance priorities identified during the WAMSSA analytical and consultation process.

**WAMSSA process — Analysis and participatory dialogue**

8. WAMSSA is a policy dialogue backed by analytical work. It combined several types of analysis with a participatory consultation process that involved multiple rounds of consultations with governments, mining companies, civil society, communities, and experts at the national and regional levels. The figure below shows a diagram of the overall process.

- Stakeholder consultations were held in the three target countries (Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone, including one-on-one interviews, focus group meetings of institutional stakeholders (government, industry, and civil society organizations), and surveys of grassroots communities affected by mining.
- These meetings identified critical issues, which were then fed into national workshops where the critical issues were prioritized.
- These consultations were complemented by research and analysis, including situation analysis of mining infrastructure clusters, stakeholder analysis, scenario analysis, and institutional analysis.
- The results of the national workshops and additional analysis were presented and discussed at a regional validation workshop, where recommendations and an action matrix were discussed and validated.

9. The combination and iteration of analytical and consultative work was a lengthy and complex process, but it yielded useful results. Through multiple interactions with the WAMSSA study team, stakeholders were given an opportunity to both provide original insights and react to findings of the team as it conducted its analysis.

10. This participatory approach was deemed important enough by workshop participants and the WAMSSA Steering Committee that they recommended a similar multi-stakeholder participation mechanism be continued with the follow-on Africa Mineral Governance Program.
Flowchart of the WAMSSA process for participatory policy dialogue and analysis, which aimed to inform the design of the proposed Africa Mineral Governance Program (AMGP)

Potential and constraints for regional sustainable development driven by mining growth

11. **Mining is a key development opportunity for the Mano River Union (MRU) countries** of West Africa (Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone). All three are categorized as mineral-rich countries and have economies that depend heavily on revenue generated from mineral exports. Iron ore, bauxite, gold, and diamonds are common to all three, with rutile and platinum group minerals also present in Sierra Leone. There is an opportunity to increase the contribution of the mining sector to GDP and exports given the large untapped mineral resources and the large percentage of low-value raw materials (relative to processed materials) or partially processed materials exported from the MRU. Despite the slowdown in the global mining sector in 2008-2009, there is continued and growing interest in investing in the mineral sector in the MRU countries by foreign investors, including large-scale Western mining companies and Chinese firms. Many of these companies have shown a willingness to invest in infrastructure for both their own operations and to enable some level of ancillary economic development.

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1. Recently joined by Côte d’Ivoire, which was not included in the WAMSSA study.
12. Despite the high mineral potential in the MRU, the sub-region is emerging from over a decade of civil war in Sierra Leone and Liberia. Infrastructure, economic activities, and government institutions were destroyed during the war years and are only now being slowly rebuilt. The current transportation and power infrastructure in the MRU is poor overall and inadequate for mining development or other economic uses.

13. The sub-region’s governments and development partners view mining as one of the key sectors that can drive rebuilding infrastructure and serve as a catalyst for economic and social development in the sub-region. There are a number of ways that mining can contribute to social and economic development. Expectations are rising that mining can boost employment opportunities especially in rural areas, assist with infrastructure development (e.g., roads, rail, electricity, water supply, etc.), and promote development of upstream and downstream activities with positive knock-on effects for communities.

14. However, the benefits of mining depend on good governance in the mining sector. In this context, all three governments have recently undertaken efforts to reform their mining policies, and while they are eager to attract large-scale mining investment, they also seek to increase shared benefits and improve companies’ environmental and social performance and contribution to local community development.

Benefits of adopting a ‘mineral-infrastructure’ cluster approach

15. There are a number of mineral belts running through the MRU sub-region, where there are multiple deposits of low-value, high-bulk minerals (such as iron ore or bauxite) located near each other. These ‘mineral clusters’ have the geological potential to support high-tonnage long-life mining/mineral-processing projects, which in turn create the justification for infrastructure investments. Because the infrastructure needed to bring the minerals to ports from some of these belts may run hundreds of kilometers, this creates an opportunity for mining infrastructure to be used by and serve to stimulate other economic activities around the mineral cluster, as well as along so-called ‘resource corridors’ or ‘development corridors’ (DCs) or through which the infrastructure runs.

16. It is against this backdrop that WAMSSA identified a ‘mineral-infrastructure’ cluster approach. Mining can become a driver of sustainable development in the MRU sub-region if single project-oriented development is substituted with a mineral-infrastructure cluster-oriented approach for planning and investment. Given the potential to expand multiple large-scale mining projects across the MRU region in coming years, viewing these mining projects and related infrastructure needs in clusters provides a way to address the common, overlapping environmental, social, economic, and sector governance issues raised by such projects. It also offers synergies that can lower risks and cost to any one operator, if a workable governance mechanism for such shared infrastructure can be developed.

Transborder environmental issues

17. A cluster-based approach also recognizes that developing multiple projects near national borders inevitably creates transborder environmental and social impacts that need to be addressed in a sub-regional context. The Upper Guinea Forest Ecosystem runs through all three MRU countries, as do a number of major river basins. Therefore it is likely that any impact on the flora, fauna, water, or other natural resources in one country
is bound to have an impact in the neighboring country. As such, regional approaches are needed to plan protection and management of these resources, especially in areas where mining, logging, or other economic activities threaten biodiversity and health of the ecosystem. To the extent that mining is likely to occur in or near these transboundary zones, such as in the Nimba region of Guinea, Sierra Leone, and Côte d’Ivoire, or near the Mano River watershed along the Liberian-Sierra Leonean border, governments, industry, and other partners need to adopt regional transboundary strategies to identify, monitor, and manage the environmental and social impacts of mining and infrastructure development. Habitat and biodiversity loss, water pollution in transboundary watersheds, and mining-induced population in-migration cannot adequately be managed solely within the borders of a single country.

**Other examples of regional and cluster approaches**

18. The strategy of using large mineral deposits to anchor large infrastructure investments and enable ancillary economic development, in some cases across national borders, first gained momentum in Africa in Southern Africa.

19. A recent report commissioned by the World Bank (Jourdan, 2009) as a follow-on to an earlier analysis completed for NEPAD (Jourdan, 2008), makes the case for leveraging large deposits or clusters of deposits of low-value, high-bulk minerals (such as iron ore, bauxite, or coal). Such leverage could catalyze infrastructure investments, which in turn can create development corridors and other spatial development initiatives (SDIs). This integrated model for development is built around poles or clusters of natural resources which are then linked to ports and international markets by transportation and power infrastructure aligned along development corridors. This infrastructure is ‘oversized’ relative to mining project needs, enabling other economic activities to benefit from the infrastructure, including small-scale industries or agriculture that could supply the mines or use the infrastructure to distribute their goods elsewhere in the country or abroad.

20. The Maputo Development Corridor (MDC), running between South Africa and Mozambique, was one of the first of these regional spatial development initiatives. The initiative focused on rehabilitating an old rail corridor running between Johannesburg and Maputo, along with investments in the high-voltage power lines and a toll road running along the same corridor. Additional investments along the corridor were made in a BHP Billiton Mozal Aluminium Smelter in Maputo, upgrades to the port or Maputo, a gas pipeline, as well as additional industrial parks and tourism facilities. The success of this effort has led the African Union (AU) to look to duplicate this approach elsewhere in Africa. Other examples of this cluster and corridor approach include the Steelpoort Valley platinum mine cluster in South Africa, and the Moatize coal mine in Malawi, which use public and private partnerships to provide transportation and other infrastructure development along with social investments that enable other economic development activities along the corridors.

21. There has also been a wider move to adopt the use of DCs, SDIs, and regional approaches to develop infrastructure within the development community. One such initiative is the Africa Infrastructure Country Diagnostic (AICD). Supported by the AU, other African regional organizations, donor agencies, and coordinated by the World Bank, AICD was designed to improve public understanding and knowledge of physical
infrastructure in Africa. It has collected data and analyses on main network infrastructure, including energy, transport, irrigation, water, and sanitation, and information and communications technologies from across the continent. AICD is intended to provide a baseline for prioritizing investments, designing policy reforms, and measuring improvements in infrastructure services in Africa (Foster, 2008). These online resources (found at www.infrastructureAfrica.org) can assist with spatial planning and resource corridor development in MRU countries and others in the region.

22. While it would take time for the MRU countries to reach the level of industrial development and economic activity seen in Southern Africa, the necessity of creating transportation infrastructure to link inland mineral deposits with ports creates an opportunity to kick-start the process. At a minimum, opening mining rail lines to previously ‘stranded’ existing or potential economic activities that lie along the corridors (such as agriculture or logging), and for transportation of other goods and people can have positive economic impacts in the sub-region.

Cluster and development corridor approach — Lessons learned

23. While there are potential benefits to adopting the mineral-infrastructure cluster approach, it was not without its problems, many of which are germane to the MRU situation. As one report on the African experience with development corridors and SDIs notes, there were a number of ways the Maputo Development Corridor fell short of expectations (Thomas, 2009).

24. Specific difficulties encountered on the MDC project that may of relevance to the MRU include a failure to develop an adequate legal and institutional framework in Mozambique before the project began. There was also insufficient Mozambican capacity to assess the implications of specific investment projects, and early engagement with affected local communities in Mozambique was deemed inadequate by those communities. In South Africa, the initial enthusiasm for the project gave way to disappointment among communities and prospective investors because many of the smaller proposed business ventures planned for the corridor proved not to be bankable. And lastly, negative environmental impacts and governance issues arose in some areas along the corridor once activities began (Thomas, 2009).

25. The study identified other challenges to making DCs and SDIs work, including political instability in a region; poor political buy-in by key players (e.g., heads of state or other powerful players), lack of government or other institutional capacity to develop and manage the process, weak investment climate and poor regulatory environments, a weak domestic private sector that may be unable to take advantage of opportunities created by foreign investment, premature marketing of a corridor for investment before projects are ready for banking, and donor interests that may be too narrowly focused on one aspect of an SDI project to the exclusion of other opportunities (Thomas, 2009).

26. All of these issues are potential risks in the MRU countries, and should be anticipated in any regional development plans. Also, given the tendency for infrastructure to be completed before all the institutional arrangements and local links are established, proponents of mineral-infrastructure clusters and development corridors for the MRU should seek to strengthen policy and institutional capacity and engage communities before the construction components of a project begin.
The identification of potential mineral opportunities in the MRU sub-region was undertaken by overlapping the various information gathered on mineral deposits, current and planned mining company projects, infrastructure needs and opportunities, and environmental and socioeconomic considerations. In doing so, it was possible to identify a number of mineral belts where the close presence of a number of sites with the same key, high-bulk mineral resources create a cluster situation. A regional approach to infrastructure development would provide the most significant environmental, social, and economic return. Because a number of these clusters, and the watersheds and ecosystems where they are located cross national borders, they are likely to have transboundary social and/or environmental impacts that could be most effectively managed through a regional approach.

Three distinct sub-regional mining-infrastructure cluster opportunities were identified. The most promising is the group of large iron ore deposits in southeastern Guinea and Nimba and Lofa counties in Liberia, which was also identified by the Jourdan study (Jourdan, 2009). A second promising cluster is the iron ore and gold deposits in or near transborder watersheds and protected forests along the Sierra Leone-Liberia border. A third area with less certain potential for cluster-based development is the bauxite deposits found in central Guinea and northern Sierra Leone. The three clusters are shown in the map below.
Consultation process identified critical issues and key priorities

29. WAMSSA consultation activities occurred in parallel with the analytical components. The situation and stakeholder analyses and early stages of the consultation process produced a list of 12 critical issues that fell into three categories — environmental, social, and overarching governance issues. They were considered critically important by consultation participants because if not addressed they are perceived to have strong negative effects on the potential for mining-led sustainable development in the sub-region.

30. Despite the initial intended focus of WAMSSA solely on environmental and social issues, there were strong currents of social accountability and frustration with the quality of governance that bubbled up throughout the consultation process. This was coupled with a sense that these issues need to be tackled before the environmental and social concerns can be properly addressed — fully one-half of the 12 critical issues were governance issues.

31. The importance of governance issues continued into the prioritization process that took place at the national workshops. There ‘institutional’ stakeholders (defined as representatives of government, industry, and civil society organizations based in the national capital cities) in each country selected their top five priorities from this list of 12 issues. The results were combined across countries, along with the five top priorities identified in the grassroots community surveys. Because of overlaps in the lists, a final list of seven key priorities was selected.

WAMSSA priorities as identified by stakeholders

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Priorities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Environmental</td>
<td>• Deforestation and loss of biodiversity (institutional stakeholder priority)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Land degradation and need for reclamation (community stakeholder priority)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social</td>
<td>• Poverty in mining areas (institutional stakeholder priority)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Governance</td>
<td>• Insufficient transparency/consistency of decision making (institutional and community stakeholder priority)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Lack of capacity (institutional and community stakeholder priority)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Disenfranchisement of local communities (institutional and community stakeholder priority)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Rent-seeking behavior (community stakeholder priority)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

32. Community stakeholders were generally more concerned with social accountability issues and land degradation. Institutional stakeholders agreed with the communities on many of the governance weaknesses but also saw deforestation, biodiversity loss, and poverty in mining areas as important.

33. Further stakeholder discussions during the national and regional workshops affirmed the value of adopting a regional and cluster-based approach to mining and infrastructure development. It should include both participatory bottom-up approaches to development planning, as well as a progressive convergence of common regional environmental and social policies and standards.
Institutions, systems, and capacities to address the priorities

34. The WAMSSA analytical work and consultation process confirmed that there are critical institutional, policy, legal, and regulatory gaps associated with the identified priority issues, especially those pertaining to governance. Significant improvements need to be made in these areas — resolving the confusion of roles and responsibilities among various ministries, improving transparency and consistency of decision making, addressing lack of institutional capacity, and inadequate implementation, monitoring, and enforcement of environmental and social policies and regulations.

35. In many cases there are laws, policies, or procedures on the books, but they are not followed due to jurisdictional battles among ministries or lack of capable personnel and resources to do the work. Increased attention and pressure at the regional and local levels may provide new impetus to solving these issues, or provide even more gridlock.

36. All three countries have mining project Environmental and Social Impact Assessment (ESIA) and Environmental and Social Management Plan (ESMP) requirements, including public participation and consultation requirements, which are required for obtaining mining licenses. However, it is unclear how actively these requirements are followed and what if any enforcement of ESMPs occurs after licenses are granted. While large-scale mining companies tend to follow their own corporate practices or IFC standards on environmental and social impact mitigation, smaller mining companies and artisanal miners do not.

37. Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone all participate in the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI), which promotes revenue transparency in the mining sector. Liberia has published two revenue reconciliation reports, and in October 2009 became the first African country to complete the EITI validation process. The Liberian EITI program includes extensive consultation and outreach to stakeholders on revenue transparency issues and is a model to be followed by other countries. Sierra Leone and Guinea have made less progress with their EITI programs. Sierra Leone has yet to complete its first report, while Guinea has produced one revenue report, but it requested and received a one-year suspension of its EITI membership in early 2010 due to the political turmoil taking place in the country at the time.

38. There is a need for improved institutional capacity and governance mechanisms, not only within the confines of developing national policy, but also to deal with the cumulative challenges posed by mining cluster and integrated infrastructure development at the sub-regional level. Attacking these problems from the top down through regional harmonization, and from the bottom up through increased participation by local government and community stakeholders may offer new opportunities to address these issues.

39. Sub-regional and regional organizations are becoming more involved in mining policy and governance issues, including MRU, ECOWAS, WAEMU, and AU. To date most of their work has been formulating a vision and framework to harmonize sector development. However, their mandates and abilities to help implement and enforce new mineral governance initiatives appear limited, although this could change under AMGP.

40. Unless the critical gaps between governance needs and capacity gaps at the regional, national, and local levels are addressed, cluster-based mining growth risks
failing to deliver sustainable development benefits. In addition, rising and inadequately met popular expectations for sharing benefits and social accountability could foster social disruption and internal conflict.

41. Given the significant institutional and other stakeholder capacity weaknesses that exist at all levels, the implications for AMGP are that its capacity building component may be more urgent and critical for improving mineral sector governance and development planning than its policy-reform component. Building capacity early in the AMGP project can empower and enable stakeholders to better ‘own’ their environmental, social, and governance priorities and apply their own solutions to resolve them.

Recommendations

42. The recommendations that follow are the distillation of what has been learned in both the analytical and consultative components of the WAMSSA process. They are organized around four strategic themes, including environmental, social, and overarching governance components. These recommendations are primarily intended as guidance for the AMGP, EITI++ teams, and others who are undertaking national or regional efforts to improve mineral governance in the MRU.

WAMSSA recommendations

Recommendation 1 — Adopt a strategic, cluster-focused, permanent multi-stakeholder framework to address mineral sector policy and development decisions.

- 1a. Assess priority regional and national mineral clusters to become the primary focus of mineral sector infrastructure and governance improvements.
- 1b. Create permanent regional, national, and local multi-stakeholder bodies to help develop and monitor appropriate policy frameworks.

Recommendation 2 — Strengthen environmental governance.

- 2a. Address mining-induced deforestation, loss of biodiversity, and water pollution.
- 2b. Reduce mining-induced land degradation and increase reclamation of mining lands.

Recommendation 3 — Increase local-level benefits in mining areas.

- 3a. Integrate mineral sector projects into local development plans in order to address poverty.
- 3b. Create training, employment, local supplier, and sustainable alternative livelihood opportunities.

Recommendation 4 — Improve social accountability and mineral sector governance.

- 4a. Eliminate lack of transparency and consistency in policy formulation and decision making.
- 4b. Provide capacity building and institutional strengthening to all stakeholder groups (government, civil society, industry, etc.).
- 4c. Minimize disenfranchisement of community from development decision-making processes.
- 4d. Minimize conditions that lead to rent-seeking behavior and distorted benefit-sharing.

Discussion of recommendations

43. Adopt a strategic, cluster-focused, permanent multi-stakeholder framework to address mineral sector policy and development decisions. Governments, working with industry, donors, civil society, and other key stakeholders should assess priority regional and national mineral clusters and make them the primary focus of improvements for mineral sector infrastructure and governance. Also, a permanent multi-stakeholder
constituency is needed to maintain the policy dialogue on critical mineral governance and mining-infrastructure development decisions. Therefore, regional, national, and local multi-stakeholder bodies should be created to provide ongoing input and feedback on appropriate policy frameworks and development activities.

44. In order to continue and expand on the policy dialogue begun by WAMSSA, a multi-stakeholder framework is proposed that would include a series of multi-stakeholder bodies formed at all levels to ensure transparent stakeholder participation and social accountability for mining development decisions. International organizations, line ministries at the national level, and local government bodies would be a form of secretariat to develop policy and planning efforts, but they would be informed by and accountable to multi-stakeholder groups that would provide valuable input and feedback on priorities and proposed initiatives. The groups could be formed from existing groups or bodies at each level, such as regional civil society consortia, national EITI committees, and local community-based organizations, or created as new entities where appropriate (figure below).

45. **Strengthen environmental governance.** Any cluster-based mining development strategy must address mining-induced deforestation, loss of biodiversity, and water pollution, as well as reduce mining-induced land degradation and increase reclamation of mining lands. The cumulative environmental and social impacts of multiple projects are often manifested across national borders and need to be considered in planning — projects may share watersheds or migrants may cross borders in search of mining employment.

46. **Increase local-level benefits in mining areas.** Mineral sector projects need to be integrated into local development plans to address poverty. Local grassroots constituencies need to be consulted on infrastructure and other development initiatives to ensure their buy-in and the long-term sustainability of such investments. Industries, governments, and donors need to collaborate to create training, employment, local suppliers, and sustainable alternative livelihood opportunities that are mining-derived but intended to create long-term, post-mining sustainable livelihoods.

47. **Improve social accountability and mineral sector governance.** Good governance initiatives such as EITI and other reform efforts need to be stepped up to reduce or eliminate the lack of transparency and consistency in policy formulation and decision making. Capacity building and institutional strengthening need to be increased and made available to all key stakeholder groups at all levels. Disenfranchisement of communities from development decision-making processes needs to be reduced through devolution of participatory decision-making power to communities. All key stakeholder groups need to be engaged and mobilized in increased efforts to minimize conditions that lead to rent-seeking behavior and distorted benefit-sharing.

**WAMSSA implications for AMGP**

48. While the business case for specific MRU mineral-infrastructure clusters will need to be developed, there is growing support for integrated development and regional approaches to economic development and infrastructure planning such as those proposed by WAMSSA. Regional bodies and development partners are increasingly showing interest in using Development Corridor (DC) and Spatial Development Initiative (SDI)
planning concepts to gain maximum synergies from infrastructure investments to stimulate regional economic growth. Within the MRU countries, AMGP’s planned efforts to develop regional common principles and policy and regulatory frameworks, and to provide institutional strengthening, should support identification and development of viable mineral-infrastructure corridors as a cornerstone of support to those countries.

Proposed multi-stakeholder framework for regional mining sector development

Regional Institution (ECOWAS, UEMOA, etc.)

Regional Multi-stakeholder Steering Committee (civil society, private sector, academia, donors)

Regional Codes
Regional Standards
Regional Policies

Mining Secretariat

National Multi-stakeholder Committee (EITI or EITI++)

Mines Ministries

National Standards
National Policies

Local Government (prefectures, traditional chiefs, etc.)

Local Multi-stakeholder groups (Local development committees, CBOs)

Regional Harmonization

Advisory and Social Accountability Role

Local development planning and implementation

Prioritization of governance issues through consultation with WAMSSA stakeholders ties in well with AMGP components devoted to improving policy and regulatory frameworks and strengthening institutional and community-level capacity. The ability to better assess, monitor, and manage mining-induced environmental and social issues will flow from development of stronger institutions and policy frameworks. Also, the transborder nature of environmental and social impacts that arise from individual mining projects and mineral clusters that lie near country borders requires regionally harmonized approaches if they are to be properly addressed.

Given the significant institutional and other stakeholder capacity weaknesses that exist at all levels, AMGP’s capacity-building component is critical to improving mineral sector governance and development planning. Building capacity early in the AMGP rollout can empower and enable stakeholders to better ‘own’ their environmental, social, and governance priorities and apply their own solutions for resolving them.

WAMSSA implications for the EITI++ value chain approach

Many of the WAMSSA findings and recommendations resonate with the objectives of the World Bank’s Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI)++
value chain approach to addressing governance issues in the mining sector.\(^2\) The WAMSSA analysis and recommendations especially speak to Links 1 and 2, improving institutional, policy, and regulatory frameworks for mineral sector governance and social accountability, and to Link 5, providing sustainable infrastructure and economic opportunities to affected communities. However, the issues raised and proposed actions in the following sections touch on all five links in one way or another.

52. It is envisioned that findings of the WAMSSA study can serve as a reference for EITI++ teams as they conduct the value chain analysis in MRU countries, because EITI++ supported sustainable development activities may be able to benefit from access to mining sector-financed infrastructure. Also, teams developing national EITI++ strategies will need to liaise with AMGP and other regional development proponents to ensure that national EITI++ plans consider any proposed regional development initiatives, such as mineral-infrastructure cluster or corridor development. Conceivably this could add a transborder, sub-regional, or regional dimension to national plans addressing issues arising in any of the five links in the value chain. Also the regional, national, and local multi-stakeholder groups proposed by WAMSSA for AMGP could serve as fora for developing and ensuring buy-in for projects initiated under national EITI++ programs (or regional EITI++ initiatives, if these develop).

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2. EITI++ is a comprehensive initiative to improve governance in extractive industries that was launched by the World Bank in April 2008. It provides a framework for identifying obstacles to effective governance along the entire chain of managing EI resources — from granting access to those resources, to monitoring operations, to collecting EI revenues, to improving economic management decisions, to spending resources effectively for sustainable growth and poverty reduction.
Operationalizing WAMSSA

53. A number of key near-term actions are proposed to help AMGP and EITI++ teams operationalize WAMSSA recommendations at the national and cluster levels. The WAMSSA team also developed a separate action matrix of initiatives to be planned at the regional level, but implemented at regional, national, and local levels over a longer timeframe. The recommended national and cluster-level actions are described here.

**Recommendation 1 — Adopt a strategic, cluster-focused, permanent multi-stakeholder framework to address mineral sector policy and development decisions.**

- **1a.** Assess priority regional and national mineral clusters to become the primary focus of mineral sector infrastructure and governance improvements.

54. **National level.** The AMGP team needs to hold consultations to ensure buy-in from powerful key stakeholders on the regional and cluster approach to mineral-infrastructure development. The cluster(s) need to be selected, preferably through a consultative process fed by research on various cluster candidate zones. These efforts should tie in to existing regional cooperation initiatives (e.g., the Guinea-Liberia interministerial commission looking at transborder rail options for the Nimba iron ore projects). **Cluster level.** Strategic Environmental Analyses (SEAs) need to be conducted to pinpoint local environmental and social issues, including cluster-specific transborder and cumulative impacts. A Cluster Management Unit to run the cluster initiative should be created. This unit would be responsible for everything from investment promotion to construction and facilities management to customer relations, and is a separate entity from the cluster-level MSG described below.

- **1b.** Create permanent regional, national, and local multi-stakeholder bodies to help develop appropriate policy frameworks.

55. **National level:** Consult with key stakeholders to ensure buy-in on the multi-stakeholder group (MSG) framework for ongoing consultation and policy dialogue. The national MSG needs to be established, and work plans developed. **Cluster level:** A similar process needs to be followed at the cluster level, and communications mechanisms established to disseminate information on cluster development to affected communities. Training and capacity building in key skills should be provided to enable national and cluster-level MSGs to succeed.

**Recommendation 2 — Strengthen environmental governance.**

- **2a.** Address mining-induced deforestation, loss of biodiversity, and water pollution.

56. **National level.** Develop and sign a multi-country treaty for transborder environmental protection, using a transborder cluster (e.g., Nimba iron ore cluster) to pilot a model agreement. **Cluster level.** Delineate protected areas, recruit and train park wardens and communities in necessary skills (environmental monitoring, ecotourism management, etc.). Create cluster-focused water catchment management forums to manage mining and community water use and pollution issues affecting a specific cluster.
• **2b. Reduce mining-induced land degradation and increase reclamation of mining lands.**

57. **National level.** Strengthen national SEA, Environmental and Social Impact Assessment (ESIA), Environmental and Social Management Plan (ESMP), and mine closure regulations and enforcement capabilities **Cluster level.** Involve and equip local MSG and communities to participate in development and monitoring of SEAs, ESIAs, ESMPs, and closure plans.

**Recommendation 3 — Increase local-level benefits in mining areas.**

• **3a. Integrate mineral sector projects into local development plans to address poverty.**

58. **National level.** Share Poverty Reduction Strategy, Millennium Development Goal plans, and other national development planning tools and information with mining companies so as to align government and company objectives at the national and cluster levels. Use EITI++ value chain analysis to identify Link 5 sustainable development opportunities that can be implemented in mining areas. **Cluster level.** Enable existing or new local participatory community development processes to ensure that mining and infrastructure opportunities are included in local development plans. Work with mining companies, governments, and NGOs to ensure that mining and infrastructure development options are understood by and acceptable to cluster-area communities

• **3b. Create training, employment, local supplier, and sustainable alternative livelihood opportunities.**

59. **National level.** Build local employment and procurement requirements and enforcement provisions into standard mining concession contracts. Build national government or NGO capacity to provide business development services in cluster areas (e.g., small business development, microcredit). **Cluster level.** Work with mining and construction firms to develop pre-construction employment and local supplier recruitment and training programs targeting local cluster-area residents, building on existing company programs where possible.

**Recommendation 4 — Improve social accountability and mineral sector governance.**

• **4a. Eliminate lack of transparency and consistency in policy formulation and decision making.**

60. **National level.** Support more transparent and consistent government processes to enforce environmental and social regulations, tying in to broader regional policy/regulatory harmonization initiatives planned with AMGP. This includes clarifying roles and responsibilities among government ministries and agencies about environmental, social, and land access issues. Delineate common environmental and social responsibilities to be followed by all mining companies. **Cluster level.** Create cluster and/or community-level information centers where local communities can learn about policies, laws, and their legal rights about mining-induced land access, and environmental and social issues. Enable local MSGs to serve as a catalyst for local good governance initiatives.
• 4b. Provide capacity building and institutional strengthening to all stakeholder groups.

61. **National level.** Conduct institutional capacity and skills assessment for key ministries involved in mining and infrastructure to support WAMSSA, AMGP, and EITI++ objectives. Tie capacity-building programs to proposed AMGP regional centers of excellence. Develop training programs to address identified needs, which may include environmental evaluation and monitoring, participatory decision making, conflict resolution, etc. Provide needs assessment and capacity building for national MSG and other civil society organizations active in the mining sector. Provide needs assessment and capacity building for national and sub-regional training facilities to develop skills needed by mining industry, government, and NGO management and staffs. **Cluster level.** Conduct similar assessment and capacity building for cluster-level MSG, government, civil society, and other community stakeholders. Also strengthen existing or develop new cluster-level training facilities to provide training to mining sector employees and other community residents.

• 4c. Minimize disenfranchisement of community from development decision making processes.

62. **National level.** Include cluster-level MSG representatives in national planning and decision meetings. Create inter-ministerial planning team that has regular community outreach and engagement as part of its mandate. Implement national EITI++ sustainable development programs at the cluster level. **Cluster level.** Help cluster-level MSGs establish regular program to share information and solicit local community input for development planning. Help create local participatory budgeting processes to engage communities in national and local government financial decision making. Establish communications and dispute mechanisms to hold government and industry accountable for decisions and actions. Work with large-scale and artisanal miners to minimize conflict over land use and find ways to work together.

• 4d. Minimize conditions that lead to rent-seeking behavior and distorted benefit-sharing.

63. **National level.** Increase support to and build capacity of national revenue transparency organizations (e.g., EITI, Publish What You Pay [PWYP]). Strengthen and make more transparent government policy and regulatory processes and accountability mechanisms, including whistleblower and whistleblower protection rules. **Cluster level.** Support cluster-level participation in EITI and PWYP initiatives. Help create local participatory budgeting processes to make national and local government financial decision-making processes more transparent. Make government-industry mining and infrastructure transaction information (e.g., contracts, tax payments, etc.) available to communities through information centers.

**Political economy challenges**

64. The political economy challenges to implementing the national cluster-focused recommendations and activities proposed above are considerable but not insurmountable. While the nuances of regional vs. national or cluster vs. individual project-driven approaches may be difficult for many stakeholders to fully grasp, most stakeholders appear to agree that the status quo has not delivered the benefits of mineral sector
development. They welcome new approaches, whether driven by top-down regional or bottom-up community- and cluster-based initiatives. Political will and stability at the highest levels of government appear to be the biggest potential enablers — or blockers — of implementation of WAMSSA recommendations. Other political economy challenges relating to the four key strategic recommendations are discussed below.

65. The single biggest challenge is the need for buy-in and active support from the highest levels of political and government leadership (such as that shown by Liberia’s President for her government’s improved financial management initiatives). Key ministers and their top technical and policy-making advisors will need to be brought on board as well. Regional harmonization and cluster development activities, which largely involve exchanges between technical experts, may prove easier to launch than the MSGs. However a careful balance of technical expertise and political acumen will be needed to develop mineral-infrastructure cluster plans that can accommodate regional, national, and local expectations of what such cluster development can deliver.

66. The MSGs will by their nature require buy-in and productive collaboration from a much broader array of constituents at all levels. Collaboration across government, industry, and civil society stakeholders worked well in the WAMSSA consultation process, perhaps because of shared interests in maximizing national and community benefits from mining activities. But more permanent MSGs will need to grapple with thorny decisions and unanticipated problems that will arise in the development process. Establishing transparent processes for selection of MSG members, facilitating early trust-building exercises, and developing team building and conflict resolution skills among all the players will be critical to MSG success. Also important is the need to select capable and respected MSG leaders and meeting facilitators. The Liberian EITI MSG provides a useful model for how to address many of these issues.

67. Powerful stakeholders at the national, cluster, or local levels who may oppose or try to bend the regional cluster-based development process in their favor could include politicians or private interests who perceive a loss of influence or access to resources if the new approach succeeds. Efforts will need to be made through the consultative processes to constructively engage their support for the new initiatives. In some extreme cases they may need to be isolated or removed from the process by more senior decision makers if it is clear they have no intention of cooperating.

68. While environmental governance has been weak to date in the MRU countries, the WAMSSA consultation process indicated a willingness by all stakeholder groups to improve performance. The biggest hurdle appears to be lack of adequate government capacity to enforce and/or strengthen existing environmental protection. Large-scale mining companies are generally more favorable to and better able to support environmentally responsible practices than smaller, under-resourced mining companies and artisanal miners, but there still needs to be a government or independent watchdog capability in place to ensure compliance. There also is a need to overcome bureaucratic institutional — and in some cases powerful individual — competing interests as to which government ministry or agency is ultimately responsible for environmental, social, and land access issues in the mining sector. Local community use of natural resources, especially as mining-induced in-migration occurs, can have its own negative effects, and
efforts need to be made to educate communities on why adopting responsible and sustainable natural resource management practices is in their own best self-interest.

69. Few stakeholders appear opposed to increasing benefits to local communities affected by mining and infrastructure projects. Rather, the challenge is to identify comprehensive and consistent frameworks for community development, employment, and local link programs that include community and CSO input, as well as that of industry and government, in their design. Most importantly, these schemes need to be collectively defined and launched early enough in the process (e.g., pre-construction) to overcome corporate pressure on local operations to rapidly import goods and labor to meet aggressive construction timelines. The IFC CommDev unit, working with ICMM and a number of major mining companies in the MRU and elsewhere in Africa, has developed some useful models to be considered by AMGP for addressing this issue.

70. Improving the transparency and consistency of government policies and decision-making processes requires engaging, changing, or isolating institutional or individual blockers of such initiatives. The WAMSSA consultation process indicated a willingness among many government technical staff to act responsibly — if the political and institutional environments allow it. Pressure from external stakeholders, including more senior government authorities, civil society, and development partners may be needed to counteract blocking forces.

71. There is also broad stakeholder support for capacity-building efforts because it enables managers and staff to better carry out their responsibilities. Proper training and adequate resources are powerful incentives and enablers of good governance practices. However, capacity-building efforts need to be based on institutional needs, and aimed at strengthening capabilities, not just meeting individuals’ training requests. This holds true for national- and cluster-level government, civil society, and community capacity-building efforts. The following graphic represents the potential effects of the proposed regional and cluster-focused approach for various stakeholder groups, as well as their relative ability to influence the implementation process.

Critical success factors

72. Finally, there are several factors that are critical to the success of addressing the issues and priorities identified by WAMSSA.

73. Stakeholders, especially communities affected by mining, need to be empowered and included in the policy dialogue. Including their views in the decision-making process can improve the chance for more sustainable outcomes, lessen the risk of social tension and civil conflict, and provide an outside force to maintain social accountability pressure on government. Creation of the MSGs is one way to accomplish this, although there also must be other ways to more broadly include community members in information gathering, discussions, and decision making, perhaps with the MSGs serving as the conduit between policy and decision makers and grassroots communities.
74. **Institutional strengthening and capacity building must be a first and primary priority.** Many of the environmental and social policies in the MRU countries are adequate, but they remain un- or under-enforced because adequate skills, capacity, and resources to enforce them are lacking. Capacity building is a slow process, and should be started as early in any AMGP or EITI++ project as possible. In this way, those whose capacity is being strengthened and engaged can play a stronger role in the development, execution, and longer-term sustainability of the project itself.

75. Planning for future mineral governance initiatives needs to be well coordinated with ongoing efforts by other development partners, not only in the mining sector (such as the ECOWAS mining directive, and USAID’s CEPESL artisanal mining policy project in Sierra Leone), but also with policy and program initiatives in infrastructure development, environmental management and biodiversity conservation, health and socioeconomic development, and overall human resource development within the public and private sectors. This means closer collaboration not only among donors, but also among donors and the growing number of CSOs and NGOs working on governance and sustainable development issues of relevance to the mining sector and/or its affected communities.

76. Past initiatives to improve mineral sector governance and development have identified critical issues and proposed useful solutions, but often there is insufficient follow-up. Examples include the Sierra Leone SESA, the D4D artisanal mining initiative for the MRU countries, and the IFC Community Development Framework initiative in Guinea. For a variety of reasons, many of the recommendations and programs put forward by these initiatives have not been yet implemented. AMGP and EITI++ should consider reviewing and incorporating the best ideas that came out of these studies into their programs. Similarly, there is a developing body of experience on regional development initiatives, including mineral sector-driven SDI and development corridors.
such as the Maputo Development Corridor and Mozlink SME project, which can inform AMGP or EITI++. WAMSSA consultation stakeholders were adamant that WAMSSA recommendations not suffer a fate similar to other previous studies. They want the MSG consultation mechanism and policy dialogue begun with WAMSSA to continue so as to provide ongoing social accountability that ensures improved mineral sector governance, as well as more equitable sharing of mineral sector development benefits in their countries.
Résumé exécutif

Introduction
77. L’« Évaluation stratégique du secteur minier ouest-africain » (West African Mineral Sector Strategic Assessment, WAMSSA) a été menée afin d’identifier les politiques et les ajustements institutionnels et réglementaires nécessaires à l’intégration des aspects sociaux et environnementaux dans le développement du secteur minier en Afrique. L’étude s’est concentrée sur les trois pays membres de l’Union de la Rivière Mano (URM), soit la Guinée, le Libéria et la Sierra Leone, tous considérés comme des pays riches en minerais et qui tirent -- ou pourraient tirer (dans le cas du Liberia) des recettes importantes de l’exportation de la bauxite, du minerai de fer, du rutile, de l’or et des diamants. L’évaluation WAMSSA comprenait une composante analytique et un processus de consultation extensif qui devaient permettre d’amorcer un dialogue politique sur l’amélioration de la gouvernance du secteur minier et l’accroissement des bénéfices tirés du développement de l’exploitation minière dans la région de l’URM.

Objectifs de l’évaluation WAMSSA
79. Les objectifs de l’évaluation WAMSSA étaient: (i) d’identifier les ajustements politiques, institutionnels et réglementaires nécessaires à la prise en compte des aspects sociaux et environnementaux dans le développement du secteur minier; et (ii) de formuler des recommandations identifiant les bénéfices sociaux et environnementaux globaux potentiellement tirés de l’exploitation minière, et ceci dans un contexte de développement des infrastructures et de diversification économique.
80. Une fois atteints, ces objectifs devaient permettre à l’évaluation WAMSSA de livrer les produits suivants : (i) opinions critiques et judicieuses permettant d’éclairer le design et la mise en œuvre du PAGM; (ii) informations suscitant un engagement et une participation éclairée des gouvernements africains, des institutions régionales, telles que la Communauté Économique des États Ouest-Africains (ECOWAS), l’Union Économique et Monétaire Ouest-Africaine (UEMOA) l’Union de la Rivière Malo (URM), les institutions financières internationales, les partenaires au développement, l’industrie minière, les Organisations Non Gouvernementales (ONG), les Organisations de la Société Civile (OSC) et des communautés locales dans un dialogue régional sur l’exploitation minière et le développement durable; et (iii) appuis au dialogue entre la Banque mondiale et ses clients.

3. La version française des recommandations et actions détaillé se trouve dans la section 5.8.
sur les questions d’identification conjointe d’opportunités stratégiques de coordination régionale et d’harmonisation des cadres d’intervention environnementaux et sociaux ainsi que de renforcements institutionnels et de gouvernance associés au développement minier.

Programme Africain de Gouvernance Minière (PAGM)


82. Le Programme comprendra quatre composantes: (i) bonne gouvernance et gestion durable du secteur minier, incluant la formulation de principes communs, le renforcement des cadres politiques et réglementaires, le renforcement institutionnel, le développement des ressources humaines et finalement la gestion de l’exploitation minière artisanale et à petite échelle; (ii) systèmes d’information géologique et minière et promotion des investissements; (iii) appuis à l’augmentation des bénéfices et de la valeur des économies nationales et régionales, incluant le développement d’infrastructures auxiliaires le long des corridors miniers et de liens en amont et en aval du secteur; (iv) gestion du projet, incluant la mise en place et l’appui aux Unités d’Exécution Nationales et aux Unités de Coordination Régionales.

83. L’étude WAMSSA a confirmé la pertinence de l’approche du PAGM en matière d’harmonisation régionale du développement minier et a fourni certaines recommandations permettant d’aborder les priorités environnementales, sociales et de gouvernance générale du secteur identifiées au cours du processus analytique et consultatif mené par l’étude.

Processus WAMSSA, analyse et dialogue participatif

84. L’étude WAMSSA reste en fait un dialogue politique appuyé d’un travail analytique. Elle a en effet combiné plusieurs types d’analyse à un processus consultatif participatif qui impliquait plusieurs consultations successives avec les gouvernements, les compagnies minières, la société civile, les communautés et les experts nationaux et régionaux. Le diagramme ci-dessous rend compte du processus suivi.

- Consultation des parties prenantes dans les trois pays ciblés (Guinée, Liberia et Sierra Leone), incluant la conduite d’interviews personnelles, de rencontres avec
des groupes de discussion composés de parties prenantes institutionnelles (représentants des gouvernements, de l’industrie et des organisations de la société civile) et d’enquêtes auprès des communautés de base affectées par les opérations minières.

- Utilisation des résultats de ces rencontres dans l’identification des questions cruciales, puis leur discussion au cours d’ateliers nationaux chargés de les classer par ordre de priorité.

- Recherches et analyses complémentaires à ces consultations, notamment analyse situationnelle des grappes d’infrastructures minières, analyse des parties prenantes, analyse des scénarios et analyse institutionnelle.

- Présentation et discussion des résultats des ateliers nationaux et des analyses additionnelles lors de la tenue d’un atelier régional de validation au cours duquel les recommandations et une matrice opérationnelle ont été discutées et validées.

**Figure 1. Processus WAMSSA pour un dialogue participatif et analyse**

85. Le processus de combinaison et d’interaction entre le travail consultatif et la recherche analytique s’est avéré long et complexe, mais a permis l’atteinte de résultats utiles. Les parties prenantes ont pu, à travers leurs multiples interactions avec l’équipe chargée de l’étude WAMSSA, émettre des avis initiaux et réagir aux constatations faites par l’équipe pendant la conduite de son analyse.
86. Les participants à l’atelier et le Comité de Pilotage du WAMSSA ont considéré cette approche participative suffisamment importante pour recommander la mise en place d’un mécanisme participatif multipartite similaire au sein du PAGM à venir.

**Potentiel et contraintes au développement durable régional généré par la croissance minière**

87. L’exploitation minière constitue une opportunité de développement clé pour tous les pays d’Afrique de l’Ouest appartenant à l’Union de la Rivière Mano (URM) (Guinée, Libéria et Sierra Leone4). Ces trois pays sont en effet considérés comme riches en minéraux et ont des économies qui dépendent en grande partie des recettes générées par les exportations minières. Ils possèdent tous trois des réserves de minerai de fer, de bauxite, d’or et de diamants, mais on trouve également du rutile et des minéraux de la famille du platine en Sierra Leone. Les opportunités d’augmentation de la contribution du secteur minier au Produit intérieur brut (PIB) et aux exportations sont donc réelles, notamment en raison de l’importance des ressources non exploitées et du fort pourcentage de matières brutes ou partiellement transformées (par comparaison aux matières transformées) et à faible valeur actuellement exportées par les pays de l’URM. Malgré le ralentissement du secteur minier en général en 2008-2009, les investisseurs étrangers, y compris d’importantes compagnies minières occidentales et certaines firmes chinoises, ont manifesté un intérêt continu et croissant envers le secteur minier des pays de l’URM. Plusieurs de ces compagnies se sont montrées disposées à investir dans la mise en place des infrastructures nécessaires leurs propres opérations, mais également porteuses d’un développement économique connexe.

88. Malgré le fort potentiel minier des pays de l’URM, il faut rappeler que la sous-région sort à peine de plus d’une décennie de guerre civile au Libéria et en Sierra Leone. Les infrastructures, les activités économiques et les institutions gouvernementales ont été détruites au cours des années de conflit et font actuellement l’objet d’une lente reconstruction. Les infrastructures de transport et d’énergie des pays de l’URM sont en général médiocres et ne permettent ni le développement minier ni celui d’autres activités économiques.

89. Les gouvernements de la sous-région et les partenaires au développement voient l’exploitation minière comme l’un des secteurs clés qui pourraient permettre la reconstruction des infrastructures et servir de catalyseur au développement économique et social de la sous-région, et ceci de différentes façons. On espère en effet de plus en plus que l’exploitation minière pourra augmenter les opportunités d’emploi, particulièrement dans les zones rurales, contribuer au développement d’infrastructures (par exemple routes, voie ferrée, électricité, approvisionnement en eau, etc.) et encourager le développement d’activités en amont et en aval de l’exploitation minière qui auraient des répercussions positives dans les communautés.

90. Cependant, les bénéfices miniers dépendent de la bonne gouvernance du secteur. À cet égard, les trois gouvernements ont récemment entrepris des efforts de réforme de leurs politiques minières et, même s’ils souhaitent vivement attirer vers ce secteur des investissements importants, ces pays cherchent également à augmenter le partage des

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4. Récemment rejoints par la Côte d’Ivoire qui n’était pas incluse dans l’étude WAMSSA.
bénéfices et à améliorer la performance environnementale et sociale des compagnies ainsi que leur contribution au développement des communautés locales.

Bénéfices tirés de l'adoption d'une approche par grappe aux « infrastructures minières »

91. On trouve dans les nombreuses ceintures minières traversant la sous-région de l’URM plusieurs dépôts de minéraux importants mais à faible valeur (tels que le minerai de fer et la bauxite) situés à proximité l’un de l’autre. Ces « grappes de minéraux » ont un potentiel géologique suffisant à la conduite de projets d’exploitation et de transformation minières de tonnage important et de longue durée, un fait qui permettrait de justifier les investissements importants faits dans les infrastructures. Puisqu’elles couvrent des centaines de kilomètres, les infrastructures nécessaires à l’acheminement des minéraux vers les installations portuaires pourraient en effet servir à d’autres activités et stimuler leur développement non seulement autour des grappes minières mais aussi tout au long des « corridors de ressources » ou « corridors de développement » (CD) traversés.

92. A partir de ce contexte, l’étude WAMSSA a identifié une approche par grappe aux « infrastructures minières ». L’exploitation minière pourrait en effet devenir porteuse de développement durable dans la sous-région de l’URM si le développement basé sur des projets individuels était remplacé par une approche à la planification et aux investissements basée sur des grappes d’infrastructures minières. Puisque, dans les pays de l’URM, le potentiel d’expansion de plusieurs projets miniers à grande échelle sera important à court terme, le fait de considérer ces projets miniers et les besoins en infrastructures y afférent par grappes permettra d’aborder de façon globale les questions environnementales, sociales, économiques et de gouvernance minière communes soulevées par la multiplication des projets. Si un mécanisme de gouvernance applicable à un tel partage des infrastructures était développé, il deviendrait alors possible de créer des synergies susceptibles de diminuer les risques et les coûts encourus par un seul opérateur.

Questions environnementales transfrontalières

93. L’approche par grappe reconnaît implicitement que la présence de plusieurs projets à proximité de frontières nationales génère inévitablement des impacts sociaux et environnementaux transfrontaliers qui devraient être considérés dans une perspective sous-régionale. L’Écosystème Forestier de la Haute Guinée et plusieurs bassins de rivières importantes traversent les trois pays de l’URM. Par conséquent, il est probable que tout impact sur la faune, la flore, l’eau ou les autres ressources naturelles dans l’un des pays aura des répercussions dans les pays voisins. Les approches régionales sont donc en tant que telles essentielles à la planification de la protection et de la gestion de ces ressources, particulièrement dans les zones où l’exploitation minière, la coupe du bois ou d’autres activités économiques menacent la biodiversité et la santé de l’écosystème. Si l’il y a conduite d’exploitation minière dans ou près de ces zones transfrontalières, par exemple dans la région Nimba de la Guinée, de la Sierra Leone et de la Côte d’Ivoire, ou près de la frontière maritime de la rivière Mano entre la Libéria et la Sierra Leone, les gouvernements, l’industrie et les autres partenaires devraient adopter des stratégies régionales transfrontalières d’identification, de suivi et de gestion des impacts environnementaux et sociaux générés par le développement minier et des infrastructures. Il ne serait en effet pas possible de gérer adéquatement la perte de la biodiversité et des
habitats, la pollution des eaux transfrontalières et la migration des populations induite par l’exploitation minière à l’intérieur de frontières nationales.

**Autres exemples d’approches régionales et par grappe**

94. En Afrique, c’est tout d’abord en Afrique du Sud que la stratégie consistant à utiliser les dépôts importants de minéraux pour ancrer des investissements substantiels dans les infrastructures et susciter un développement économique connexe, dans certains cas au-delà des frontières nationales, a été développée.

95. Un rapport récent commandé par la Banque mondiale\(^5\) suite à une analyse précédente réalisée pour le NEPAD\(^6\) plaide en faveur de l’utilisation de l’effet de levier créé par les dépôts importants ou les grappes de dépôts de minéraux de faible valeur (tels que le minerai de fer, la bauxite ou le charbon) comme catalyseurs d’investissements dans les infrastructures, investissements qui peuvent en retour créer des corridors de développement et susciter des initiatives de développement spatial (IDS). Ce modèle intégré de développement repose sur des pôles ou grappes de ressources naturelles (par exemple les dépôts de minéraux) qui sont acheminées vers les installations portuaires et les marchés internationaux par des infrastructures énergétiques et de transport situées dans les corridors de développement. La taille de ces infrastructures déborde les besoins des projets miniers, ce qui permet à d’autres activités économiques de les utiliser, notamment les petites entreprises et les agriculteurs qui pourraient approvisionner les exploitations minières ou encore utiliser ces infrastructures pour la distribution de leur production dans le pays ou à l’étranger.

96. Le Corridor de Développement de Maputo (CDM), qui traverse l’Afrique du Sud et le Mozambique reste l’une des premières initiatives de développement spatial régional. L’initiative visait la réhabilitation d’un ancien corridor ferroviaire reliant Johannesburg à Maputo ainsi que la construction, le long du même corridor, de lignes de haute tension et d’une route à péage. On a également procédé, toujours dans ce même corridor, à des investissements additionnels dans les hauts-fourneaux de l’aluminerie de BHP Billiton Mozal à Maputo, dans la remise à niveau du port de Maputo, et dans la construction d’un gazoduc, de parcs industriels supplémentaires et d’installations touristiques. Le succès remporté par cette initiative a incité l’Union Africaine à examiner les endroits, ailleurs en Afrique, où cette approche pourrait être reproduite. Les grappes minières de platine de la Steelport Valley en Afrique du Sud et l’exploitation minière du charbon de Moatize au Malawi sont d’autres exemples de cette approche par grappe et corridor puisqu’ils utilisent les partenariats publics-privés dans le développement du transport et d’autres infrastructures et procèdent à des investissements sociaux pour la conduite d’activités de développement économique le long de ces corridors.

97. La communauté du développement a de plus en plus tendance à adopter, dans ses initiatives de développement des infrastructures, les concepts de corridors de développement, d’IDS et d’approche régionale. On peut mentionner à cet égard le

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98. Même s’il faudra longtemps avant que les pays de l’URM atteignent le niveau de développement industriel et d’activité économique de l’Afrique du Sud, la nécessité de mettre en place des infrastructures de transport entre les dépôts miniers et les installations portuaires reste certainement une occasion de donner le coup d’envoi au processus. La seule ouverture des lignes de chemin de fer minières d’une part aux activités économiques existantes ou potentielles jusqu’à maintenant laissées en rade et situées le long des corridors (par exemple le logement et l’agriculture) et d’autre part au transport des biens et personnes permettrait de générer des impacts économiques positifs dans la sous-région.

Approche par grappe et corridor de développement : leçons apprises

99. Même si l’adoption de l’approche par grappe associant exploitation minière et développement d’infrastructures est ultimement porteuse de bénéfices, celle-ci n’est pas sans problèmes et certains d’entre eux risquent tout à fait d’apparaître dans les pays de l’URM. D’ailleurs, comme mentionné dans l’un des rapports portant sur l’expérience africaine en matière de corridors de développement et d’IDS, plusieurs des attentes placées dans le MDC ne se sont pas concrétisées.

100. Les difficultés rencontrées par le projet de MDC qui risquent de se reproduire dans les pays de l’URM comprennent l’échec dans le développement par le Mozambique d’un cadre institutionnel et légal adéquat avant le démarrage du projet ainsi que son manque de capacité à évaluer les implications de projets d’investissement spécifiques. De plus, les communautés indigènes du Mozambique affectées ont jugé inadéquats les premiers engagements pris avec elles. En Afrique du Sud, l’enthousiasme initial pour le projet a fait place à la déception dans les communautés et chez les investisseurs potentiels lorsque plusieurs des entreprises qui voulaient s’implanter le long du corridor ont été considérées non bancables. Finalement, des problèmes d’impacts environnementaux négatifs et de

gouvernance sont apparus dans certaines zones situées le long du corridor après le démarrage des activités

101. L’étude a également identifié quelques autres obstacles au fonctionnement des CD et des IDS, notamment : l’instabilité politique dans une région ; une faible implication politique par les partenaires clés (par exemple les chefs d’état ou d’autres acteurs investis de pouvoir), le manque de capacité gouvernementale ou institutionnelle à mettre en œuvre et gérer le processus, un piètre climat d’investissement et un contexte réglementaire inadéquat ; un secteur privé intérieur déficient qui pourrait s’avérer incapable de tirer avantage des opportunités créées par les investissements étrangers, le marketing prématuré d’un corridor d’investissement, soit avant que les projets soient prêts à être financés; et finalement une trop forte concentration des intérêts des donateurs sur l’un des aspects d’un projet d’IDS au détriment des autres opportunités.

102. Toutes ces questions représentent des risques potentiels dans les pays de l’URM et devraient être considérées dans les plans de développement régional. De plus, compte tenu de la tendance à terminer les infrastructures avant que tous les arrangements institutionnels et mises en relation locale aient été finalisés, les partisans de l’utilisation des grappes d’exploitation minière/développement d’infrastructures et des corridors de développement dans le cas de l’URM devraient voir au renforcement de la capacité institutionnelle et politique et s’assurer de l’engagement des communautés avant que les composantes concernant les infrastructures ne soient mises en œuvre.

Identification des grappes d’exploitation minière/développement d’infrastructures de l’URM

103. L’identification des potentialités d’exploitation minière dans la sous-région de l’URM a été menée en recoupant différentes informations sur les dépôts miniers, les projets en cours et planifiés des compagnies minières, les besoins et opportunités en matière d’infrastructures et différentes considérations environnementales et socioéconomiques. Ce processus a permis d’identifier un certain nombre de ceintures minières à l’intérieur desquelles la proximité de plusieurs sites recelant de grandes quantités des mêmes ressources minières clés crée une grappe et par conséquent un contexte qui permettrait de maximiser les retombées environnementales, sociales et économiques d’une approche régionale en matière de développement des infrastructures. En raison de leur nombre, et du fait que les lignes maritimes et écosystèmes dans lesquels elles sont situées traversent les frontières nationales, ces grappes risquent de générer des impacts sociaux et /ou environnementaux qui seraient certainement mieux gérés par le biais d’une approche régionale.

104. Trois grappes d’exploitation minière/développement d’infrastructures distinctes ont été identifiées dans la sous-région. Les grappes de dépôts de minerai de fer présents dans le sud-est de la Guinée et dans les comtés Nimba et Lofa du Libéria, dépôts également identifiés par l’étude de Jourdan constituent la perspective la plus prometteuse. Les dépôts de minerai de fer et d’or dans ou à proximité des lignes de

11. P. Jourdan, décembre 2009
partage des eaux transfrontalières et des forêts protégées le long de la frontière entre la Sierra Leone et le Libéria forment la seconde grappe prometteuse. La troisième zone, qui présente un potentiel plus incertain en matière de développement basé sur des grappes, est constituée des dépôts de bauxite présents en Guinée centrale et dans le nord de la Sierra Leone. Ces trois grappes sont illustrées dans la figure suivante.
Figure 2. Localisation des grappes d’exploitation minière/développement d’infrastructures offrant des opportunités
Questions cruciales et priorités clés identifiées lors du processus de consultation

105. Les consultations menées par l’étude WAMSSA se sont déroulées parallèlement aux composantes analytiques. Les analyses de la situation et des parties prenantes et les premières étapes du processus de consultation ont permis de dresser une liste de douze questions cruciales relevant de trois catégories : questions environnementales, questions sociales et questions de gouvernance globale. Elles ont toutes été considérées très importantes par les participants au processus de consultation parce que ces derniers ont jugé que si elles n’étaient pas réglées, ces questions risquaient d’avoir des impacts négatifs importants sur le potentiel d’un développement durable de la sous-région induit par le secteur minier.

106. Même si l’intention initiale avait été de consacrer l’étude WAMSSA uniquement aux questions environnementales et sociales, le processus de consultation a été marqué par la forte expression de problèmes d’imputabilité sociale et de frustrations face à la qualité de la gouvernance. De plus, la formulation de ces problèmes reposait sur l’impression que ces questions devaient être réglées avant que les aspects environnementaux et sociaux ne puissent être abordés. D’ailleurs, la moitié des douze questions cruciales identifiées au cours des consultations ont trait à la gouvernance.

107. L’importance des questions de gouvernance s’est confirmée lors du processus de priorisation mené dans le cadre des ateliers nationaux. À ce moment, les parties prenantes « institutionnelles » (ici les représentants du gouvernement, des industries et des organisations de la société civile basées dans les capitales nationales) de chaque pays ont retenu, à partir de la liste des douze questions, les cinq priorités jugées les plus importantes. Les résultats ont été agrégés, puis joints aux cinq priorités identifiées au cours des enquêtes auprès des communautés de base. À cause des chevauchements, la liste finale comprend sept priorités environnementales, sociales et de gouvernance globale.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Catégorie</th>
<th>Priorités</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Environnement</td>
<td>• Déforestation et perte de la biodiversité (priorité des parties prenantes institutionnelles)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Dégradagation des terres et possibilité de réclamations (priorité des parties prenantes communautaires)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aspects sociaux</td>
<td>• Pauvreté dans les zones minières (priorité des parties prenantes institutionnelles)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gouvernance</td>
<td>• Manque de transparence/logique dans le processus de décision (priorité des parties prenantes institutionnelles et communautaires)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Manque de capacités (priorité des parties prenantes institutionnelles et communautaires)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• Absence de droit de vote des communautés locales (priorité des parties prenantes institutionnelles et communautaires)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Comportement de recherche de rente (priorité des parties prenantes communautaires)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Tableau 1. Priorités WAMSSA
Les parties prenantes communautaires se sont montrées davantage préoccupées par les questions d’imputabilité sociale et de dégradation des terres. Les parties prenantes institutionnelles étaient d’accord avec elles sur plusieurs des faiblesses en matière de gouvernance, mais ont également considéré la déforestation, la perte de biodiversité et la pauvreté dans les zones minières importantes.

Les discussions subséquentes entre les parties prenantes pendant les ateliers nationaux et régionaux ont confirmé la pertinence de l’adoption d’une approche régionale et par grappes à l’exploitation minière et au développement d’infrastructures, approche qui demanderait à la fois une démarche de planification du développement à partir de la base et la convergence graduelle de politiques et normes sociales et environnementales régionales communes.

**Institutions, systèmes et capacités à prendre en compte les priorités**

Le travail analytique et le processus de consultation menés par l’étude WAMSSA ont confirmé la présence de lacunes institutionnelles, politiques, légales et réglementaires importantes dans la capacité à résoudre les questions prioritaires identifiées, particulièrement celles qui ont trait à la gouvernance. Il faudrait donc procéder des améliorations appréciables dans les domaines suivants : Résolution de la confusion et clarification des rôles et responsabilités des différents ministères, amélioration de la transparence et de la cohérence du processus de décision, lutte contre le manque de capacité institutionnelle et de mise en œuvre, amélioration du suivi et de la mise en vigueur des politiques et réglementations sociales et environnementales.

Dans plusieurs cas, les lois, politiques et procédures ont déjà été adoptées mais ne sont pas appliquées en raison de luttes de juridiction entre les ministères ou du manque de personnel et de ressources pour faire le travail. Une attention accrue et les pressions exercées aux niveaux local et régional pourraient servir d’incitatif à la résolution de ces questions ou encore ajouter à l’impasse.

Tous ces pays ont des exigences préalables à l’obtention d’un permis d’exploitation minière, notamment la tenue d’une Évaluation des impacts environnementaux et sociaux (EIES), la préparation d’un Plan de gestion environnemental et social (PGES) et des obligations de consultation et de participation publique. Cependant, on ne sait pas vraiment si ces exigences sont remplies ou si les PGES sont effectivement mis en vigueur après que les permis d’exploitation aient été accordés. Même si les grandes compagnies minières se conforment généralement à leurs propres pratiques corporatives ou aux normes de la Société financière internationale (IFC) en matière de réduction des impacts environnementaux et sociaux, les compagnies de moindre importance et les mineurs artisanaux ne le font pas.

La Guinée, le Liberia et la Sierra Leone participent tous trois à l’Initiative de transparence des industries extractives (EITI++) qui fait la promotion de la transparence des recettes tirées du secteur minier. Le Libéria a publié deux rapports de conciliation des recettes et a été, en octobre 2009, le premier pays à compléter le processus de validation EITI. Le programme EITI du Libéria repose sur des consultations approfondies et des prises de contact rapproché avec les parties prenantes sur les questions de transparence des recettes et constitue à cet égard un modèle qui devrait être suivi par les autres pays. Les programmes EITI de la Sierra Leone et de la Guinée sont beaucoup moins avancés.
La Sierra Leone n’a pas encore complété son premier rapport et même si la Guinée a fourni son premier rapport, elle a demandé et obtenu au début de 2010 une suspension d’un an de sa participation à l’EITI en raison de l’agitation politique qui secouait le pays à ce moment.

114. Les mécanismes de gouvernance et d’amélioration institutionnelle doivent être améliorés, non seulement dans les limites des politiques nationales de développement, mais aussi afin de pouvoir faire face aux nombreux défis posés par le développement sous-régional des grappes minières et des infrastructures y afférent. Le fait d’aborder ces problèmes d’une part à partir du haut à travers l’harmonisation régionale et d’autre part à partir de la base par le biais d’une participation accrue des gouvernements locaux et parties prenantes communautaires peut certainement encourager la création de nouvelles possibilités de résolution des problèmes posés.

115. Les organisations régionales et sous-régionales, notamment l’URM, ECOWAS, l’UMOA et l’UA, s’impliquent de plus en plus dans les questions de politique et de gouvernance minières. Jusqu’à maintenant, le travail de ces groupes s’est surtout résumé à la formulation d’une vision et d’un cadre d’harmonisation du développement du secteur. En effet, les mandats et les capacités d’appui à la mise en œuvre et au respect des nouvelles initiatives de gouvernance minière de ces organisations sont actuellement limités, une situation qui pourrait changer avec l’opérationnalisation du PAGM.

116. Si les lacunes cruciales en matière de gouvernance et de capacité aux niveaux régional, national et local ne sont pas comblées, la croissance minière basée sur les grappes risque non seulement de ne pas générer les bénéfices de développement attendus, mais aussi de soulever dans la population des attentes en matière de partage des bénéfices qui ne seraient que partiellement comblées, une situation qui ferait de l’imputabilité sociale un facteur de perturbations sociales et de conflits internes.

117. En raison de la faiblesse actuelle des capacités des institutions et des autres parties prenantes régionales, nationales et locales, la mise en œuvre de la composante renforcement des capacités du PAGM paraît actuellement plus urgente et plus déterminante pour l’amélioration de la gouvernance du secteur minier et la planification du développement que la composante consacrée aux réformes politiques. Un renforcement des capacités au tout début du PAGM pourrait en effet favoriser la faculté et la capacité des parties prenantes à mieux « s’approprier » les priorités environnementales, sociales et de gouvernance et à résoudre les problèmes à partir de leurs propres solutions.

Recommandations

118. Les recommandations suivantes sont le reflet des connaissances acquises au cours des étapes analytiques et consultatives du processus WAMSSA. Elles ont été regroupées autour de quatre thèmes stratégiques et incluent les composantes environnementales, sociales et de gouvernance globale. Les recommandations restent essentiellement des conseils susceptibles de guider les équipes du PAGM et de l’EITI++ comme les autres acteurs concernés dans la mise en œuvre des activités régionales et nationales destinées à améliorer la gouvernance minière au sein de l’URM.
Recommandations de l’étude WAMSSA

Recommandation 1 : Adopter un cadre stratégique multipartite, permanent et axé sur les grappes chargé de traiter des questions relatives aux décisions en matière de politiques et de développement du secteur minier.

- Évaluer les grappes minières régionales et nationales prioritaires susceptibles de constituer le point central des améliorations en matière de gouvernance et d’infrastructures sectorielles
- Mettre en place des instances régionales, nationales et locales permanentes et multipartites chargées d’appuyer l’élaboration et le suivi de cadres de politiques appropriés.

Recommandation 2: Renforcer la gouvernance environnementale et la gestion du secteur minier

- Solutionner les problèmes de déforestation, de perte de biodiversité et de pollution de l’eau induits par l’exploitation minière
- Réduire la dégradation des sols causée par l’exploitation minière ou les activités auxiliaires et augmenter les réclamations relatives aux terrains miniers

Recommandation 3: Réduire la pauvreté et accroître les bénéfices locaux dans les zones minières

- Intégrer les projets du secteur minier dans les plans de développement locaux afin qu’ils contribuent à la lutte contre la pauvreté
- Créer des opportunités de formation, d’emploi, d’émergence de fournisseurs locaux et de moyens d’existence alternatifs et durables

Recommandation 4: Améliorer l’imputabilité sociale et la gouvernance du secteur minier

- Éliminer le manque de transparence et de cohérence dans la formulation de politiques et la prise de décisions
- Renforcer les capacités et consolider les organes institutionnels de tous les types de parties prenantes (gouvernement, société civile, industries, etc.)
- Réduire l’importance de la privation des droits des populations au cours des processus décisionnels liés au développement
- Limiter les conditions qui encouragent un comportement de recherche de rente et de partage déloyal des bénéfices

Discussion des recommandations

119. Adopter un cadre stratégique multipartite, permanent et axé sur les grappes chargé de traiter des questions relatives aux décisions en matière de politiques et de développement du secteur minier. Les gouvernements devraient, lors de leurs travaux avec les industries, les donateurs, la société civile et les autres parties prenantes clés, évaluer les grappes régionales et nationales prioritaires et en faire des pivots
d’implantation des infrastructures minières et des améliorations en matière de gouvernance. De plus, la présence d’une force multipartite permanente serait nécessaire à la poursuite du dialogue politique sur les décisions cruciales relatives à la gouvernance et au développement des infrastructures minières. Par conséquent, il devrait y avoir création d’organismes composés de parties prenantes régionales, nationales et locales qui seraient susceptibles de fournir des apports continus et de réagir sur les cadres de politiques et les activités de développement.

120. Un cadre multipartite a été proposé afin que le dialogue politique initié par l’étude WAMSSA puisse être poursuivi et développé. Ce cadre comprendrait un ensemble de groupes multipartenaires mis en place aux niveaux régional, national et local et permettrait d’assurer la participation transparente des parties prenantes et l’imputabilité sociale des décisions en matière de développement minier. Les organisations internationales, les ministères sectoriels nationaux et les instances gouvernementales locales formeraient une sorte de secrétariat chargé du développement de politiques et de la planification, secrétariat qui serait alimenté par les groupes multipartenaires devant lesquels il serait imputable en matière d’information et de réaction sur les priorités et les initiatives proposées. Les groupes multipartenaires pourraient, lorsqu’approprié, soit être constituées à partir des groupes ou organismes existants à chaque niveau, notamment les consortiums régionaux de la société civile, les comités nationaux de l’EITI et les organisations communautaires à la base, ou soit encore être créés en tant que nouvelles entités. Voir la figure ci-après.

**Figure 3. Proposition de cadre multipartite pour le développement du secteur minier**
121. **Renforcer la gouvernance environnementale et la gestion du secteur minier.**
Toute stratégie de développement minier basée sur des grappes devrait prendre en compte les problèmes de déforestation, de perte de biodiversité et de pollution de l’eau dus à l’exploitation minière et s’assurer de la réduction de la dégradation des sols et d’une augmentation des réclamations des terrains miniers. Les impacts sociaux et environnementaux cumulatifs générés par plusieurs projets, qui sont souvent transfrontaliers en raison du partage des lignes de partage maritimes ou de la migration d’un pays à l’autre de populations à la recherche d’emplois dans les mines, doivent être pris en considération au moment même de la planification stratégique.

122. **Réduire la pauvreté et accroître les bénéfices locaux dans les zones minières.**
Les projets miniers devraient être intégrés dans les plans de développement local si l’on veut assurer leur contribution à la lutte contre la pauvreté. Les populations locales devraient être consultées sur les infrastructures et autres initiatives de développement si l’on souhaite s’assurer de leur adhésion et de la pérennité des investissements effectués. Les industries, les donateurs et les gouvernements devraient collaborer à la création d’opportunités de formation, d’emploi, d’entreprises de fournisseurs locaux et de moyens d’existence alternatifs et durables liées à l’exploitation minière, mais pouvant constituer des sources de revenus à long terme, post minières et pérennes.

123. **Améliorer l’imputabilité sociale et la gouvernance du secteur minier.**
Les initiatives de bonne gouvernance telles que l’EITI et les autres efforts de réforme devraient être multipliés afin que le manque de transparence et de cohérence dans la formulation de poltiques et la conduite des processus de décision puisse être réduit, voire éliminé. Le renforcement des capacités et la consolidation institutionnelle devraient être accrus et accessibles à toutes les parties prenantes clés (gouvernement, société civile, industrie, etc.) actives aux niveaux régional, national et local. La privation des droits des populations au cours des processus décisionnels liés au développement devrait être réduite par le biais d’une délégation du pouvoir de décision aux communautés elles-mêmes. De plus, toutes les parties prenantes clés devraient être mobilisées et s’engager à faire des efforts accrus afin que les conditions favorisant une recherche de rente et un partage déloyal des bénéfices soient éliminées.

**Implications de l’étude WAMSSA pour le PAGM**

124. Même si la faisabilité financière des projets de grappes d’exploitation minière/développement d’infrastructures concernant l’URM reste encore à démontrée, l’appui au développement intégré et à une approche régionale de la planification du développement économique et des infrastructures recommandés par l’étude WAMSSA est actuellement croissant. Les entités régionales et les partenaires au développement sont en effet de plus en plus intéressés par une planification basée sur les concepts de CD et d’IDS qui permettent aux investissements dans les infrastructures de générer de plus grandes synergies et de stimuler la croissance économique locale. Dans les pays de l’URM, les appuis que le PAGM entend accorder au développement de principes régionaux communs, aux cadres politiques et réglementaires et au renforcement institutionnel devraient permettre l’identification de corridors d’exploitation minière/développement d’infrastructures viables et pouvant servir de pierre angulaire aux appuis accordés.
125. La priorisation des questions de gouvernance par les parties prenantes consultées par l’étude WAMSSA correspond tout à fait aux composantes du PAGM consacrées à l’amélioration des cadres politiques et réglementaires et au renforcement de la capacité institutionnelle et communautaire. Le développement d'institutions et de cadres politiques de meilleure qualité apparaît en effet essentiel à une meilleure maîtrise de l’évaluation, du suivi et de la gestion des questions environnementales et sociales induites par le développement minier. Par ailleurs, en raison de la nature transfrontalière des impacts environnementaux et sociaux générés par les projets miniers individuels et les grappes minières opérant près de frontières nationales, il faudrait avoir recours à des approches régionales harmonisées pour que ces questions soient correctement traitées.

126. De plus, en raison de la faiblesse actuelle des capacités des institutions et des parties prenantes régionales, nationales et locales, la mise en œuvre de la composante renforcement des capacités du PAGM pourrait sans aucun doute s’avérer déterminante dans l’amélioration de la gouvernance du secteur minier et de la planification du développement. Un renforcement des capacités effectué dès le début de la mise en œuvre du PAGM devrait en effet favoriser une meilleure capacité des parties prenantes à « s’approprier » les priorités environnementales, sociales et de gouvernance et à résoudre les problèmes sur la base de leurs propres solutions.

**Implications de l’étude WAMSSA pour l’approche par chaîne de valeur de l’EITI++**

127. Plusieurs des conclusions et recommandations de l’étude WAMSSA sont similaires aux objectifs de l’Initiative de Transparence des Industries extractives (EITI++) qui propose une approche par chaîne de valeur aux questions de gouvernance du secteur minier. L’analyse et les recommandations faites par l’étude WAMSSA sont particulièrement pertinentes aux Liens 1 et 2 de cette chaîne de valeur, qui concernent l’amélioration des cadres institutionnels, politiques et réglementaires liés à la gouvernance du secteur minier et à l’imputabilité sociale. Elles touchent également le Lien 5, qui prévoit la fourniture d’infrastructures pérennes et d’opportunités économiques aux communautés touchées, et tous les liens d’une manière ou d’une autre, comme le démontreront les questions soulevées et les activités proposées dans les sections subséquentes.

128. On prévoit que les constats fait par l’étude WAMSSA serviront de référence aux équipes EITI++ dans l’analyse de la chaîne de valeur dans les pays de l’URM. Les activités de développement durable appuyées par l’EITI++ pourraient en effet certainement tirer profit de l’accès aux infrastructures financées par le secteur minier. Par ailleurs, les équipes chargées du développement de stratégies nationales EITI++ devront également travailler en collaboration avec le PAGM et les autres acteurs du développement régional afin que les plans nationaux EITI++ prennent en considération les initiatives de développement régional, telles que les grappes d’exploitation minières.

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12. L’EITI++ est une initiative globale d’amélioration de la gouvernance des industries extractives lancée par la Banque mondiale en avril 2008. Elle fournit un cadre d’identification des obstacles à une gouvernance effective tout au long de la chaîne de gestion des ressources des industries extractives — depuis l’accès à ces ressources en passant par le suivi des opérations, la collecte des recettes des industries extractives, l’amélioration des décisions de gestion économique et la dépense efficace des recettes pour une croissance durable et la réduction de la pauvreté.
minière/développement d’infrastructures ou les corridors de développement. En théorie, ceci pourrait ajouter une dimension transfrontalière, sous-régionale ou régionale aux plans nationaux consacrés aux questions soulevées par l’un des cinq Liens de la chaîne de valeur. De plus, les groupes multipartites régionaux, nationaux et communautaires proposés par l’étude WAMSSA pour la mise en œuvre du PAGM pourraient servir de forums de développement et assurer l’appropriation des projets initiés dans le cadre des programmes nationaux EITI++ (ou des initiatives EITI++ régionales, si elles voient le jour).

La chaîne de valeur en matière de gestion des ressources naturelles de l’EITI++

Figure 4. Les cinq Liens de l’EITI++

Opérationnalisation suite à l’étude WAMSSA

129. L’étude WAMSSA a suggéré des actions clés à court terme qui permettraient aux équipes de l’EITI++ et du PAGM d’opérationnaliser ses recommandations dans les pays et les grappes minières. L’équipe WAMSSA a également élaboré une matrice d’actions distincte des initiatives à planifier au niveau régional, mais dont la mise en œuvre se ferait aux niveaux régional, national et local sur une plus longue période. Les actions à mener au niveau des pays et des grappes minières sont décrites ci-dessous.

Recommandation 1 : Adopter un cadre stratégique multipartite, permanent et axé sur les grappes chargé de traiter des questions relatives aux décisions en matière de politiques et de développement du secteur minier

- Évaluer les grappes minières régionales et nationales prioritaires susceptibles de constituer le point central des améliorations en matière de gouvernance et d’infrastructures sectorielles.
130. **Au niveau national,** l’équipe du PAGM devrait procéder à des consultations qui lui permettraient de s’assurer de l’engagement des parties prenantes décisionnelles clés envers un développement minier et des infrastructures basé sur une approche régionale et par grappes. Celle(s)-ci devrait (ent) être sélectionnée (s) par le biais d’un processus consultatif alimenté par des recherches sur les zones porteuses de grappes actuellement à l’étude et mené en coordination avec les initiatives régionales de coopération en cours (par exemple, la commission interministérielle Guinée-Libéria qui examine les options de transport ferroviaire transfrontalier dans le cadre des projets de minerai de fer de la région Nimba). **Au niveau des grappes minières,** il faudra procéder à des **Analyses Environnementales Stratégiques (AES)** afin d’identifier avec précision les problèmes environnementaux et sociaux locaux, notamment les impacts transfrontaliers cumulatifs générés par les grappes. Il faudra également mettre en place une Unité de Gestion des Grappes dotée des moyens nécessaires au fonctionnement d’une telle initiative. Cette unité, qui serait responsable de tous les aspects, de la promotion des investissements à la construction, gestion des installations et relations avec la clientèle, serait une entité différente du groupe multipartenaires (GMP) décrit ci-dessous.

- Mettre en place des instances régionales, nationales et locales permanentes et multipartites chargées d’appuyer l’élaboration et le suivi de cadres de politiques appropriés.

131. **Niveau national:** Consulter les parties prenantes clés pour s’assurer de leur adhésion au cadre de fonctionnement du GMP en matière de consultation continue et de dialogue politique. Il faudra ensuite définir les besoins nationaux du GMP et élaborer les plans de travail. **Niveau des grappes minières:** il faudra procéder à une démarche similaire et mettre en place des mécanismes de communication pour la diffusion, dans les communautés touchées, des informations concernant le développement des grappes. Il faudra également assurer la formation et le renforcement de capacités clés qui permettront aux GMP situés au niveau national et des grappes d’opérer avec succès.

**Recommandation 2 : Renforcer la gouvernance environnementale et la gestion du secteur minier.**

- Solutionner les problèmes de déforestation, de perte de biodiversité et de pollution de l’eau induits par l’exploitation minière

132. **Niveau national:** Mettre au point et signer un traité multinational de protection environnementale transfrontalière et utiliser une grappe minière transfrontalière (par exemple, la grappe de minerai de fer de la région Nimba) pour l’application pilote du modèle de traité. **Niveau des grappes minières:** Délimiter les aires protégées, recruter et assurer la formation des gardiens de parcs et des communautés dans les domaines requis (suivi environnemental, gestion de l’écotourisme, etc.). Créer un forum de gestion du captage des eaux dans le contexte des grappes minières qui permette de régir l’utilisation de l’eau par les mines et les communautés et de régler les problèmes de pollution affectant une grappe spécifique.

- Réduire la dégradation des sols causée par l’exploitation minière ou les activités auxiliaires et augmenter les réclamations relatives aux terrains miniers
133. **Niveau national**: Renforcer le potentiel réglementaire et de mise en vigueur des AES nationales, des EIEA, des PGES et Plans de Fermeture de Mines. **Niveau des grappes minières**: Impliquer et outiller les GMP et les communautés afin qu’ils puissent participer au développement et au suivi des AES, EIEA, PGES et Plans de Fermeture.

**Recommandation 3 : Réduire la pauvreté et accroître les bénéfices locaux dans les zones minières**

- Intégrer les projets du secteur minier dans les plans de développement locaux afin qu’ils contribuent à la lutte contre la pauvreté

134. **Niveau national**: Partager les informations et outils de planification liés à la Stratégie de Réduction de la Pauvreté, aux Objectifs de Développement du Millénaire et aux autres plans nationaux avec les compagnies minières de façon à harmoniser les objectifs du gouvernement avec ceux des compagnies, ceci tant au plan national qu’au niveau des grappes minières. Utiliser l’analyse de la chaîne de valeur de l’EITI++ pour l’identification des actions de développement durable (Lien 5) qui pourraient être mises en œuvre dans les zones minières. **Niveau des grappes minières**: Faciliter le déroulement des processus participatifs de développement communautaire en cours ou planifiés afin que l’exploitation minière et les infrastructures soient prises en compte dans les plans de développement local. Collaborer avec les compagnies minières, le gouvernement et les ONG afin de s’assurer que les options de développement minier et des infrastructures soient bien comprises et conviennent aux communautés situées à proximité des grappes minières.

- Créer des opportunités de formation, d’emploi, d’émergence de fournisseurs locaux et de moyens d’existence alternatifs et durables

135. **Niveau national**: Intégrer dans les contrats types de concession minière des exigences en matière d’emploi local et de passation de marchés ainsi que leurs mécanismes d’application. Renforcer la capacité du gouvernement national ou des ONG à fournir des services de développement entrepreneurial dans les zones situées à proximité des grappes minières (par exemple développement de petites entreprises, microcrédit). **Niveau des grappes minières**: Initier, avant le démarrage de la construction et en collaboration avec les firmes d’exploitation minière et de construction, le recrutement d’employés et de fournisseurs locaux ainsi que des programmes de formation ciblant les habitants des zones situées à proximité des grappes minières, ceci en utilisant si possible les programmes existants des compagnies.

**Recommandation 4: Améliorer l’imputabilité sociale et la gouvernance du secteur minier**

- Éliminer le manque de transparence et de cohérence dans la formulation de politiques et la prise de décisions

136. **Niveau national**: Appuyer une mise en vigueur plus transparente et plus cohérente des réglementations environnementales et sociales nationales. Cet appui devrait être mené en lien avec les initiatives régionales d’harmonisation politique et réglementaire à plus grande portée planifiées par le PAGM. Il devrait également
comprendre la clarification des rôles et responsabilités des différents ministères et organismes gouvernementaux sur les questions environnementales, sociales et d’accès à la terre. Identifier les responsabilités environnementales et sociales communes des compagnies minières. **Niveau des grappes minières :** Mettre en place des centres d’information regroupés et/ou communautaires dans lesquels les populations locales pourraient trouver de l’information sur les politiques, les lois et les droits légaux relatifs aux questions environnementales, sociales et d’accès aux terres liées à l’exploitation minière. Permettre aux GMP de jouer le rôle de catalyseurs en matière d’initiatives de bonne gouvernance.

- **Renforcer les capacités et consolider les organes institutionnels de tous les types de parties prenantes**

137. **Niveau national :** Évaluer les capacités institutionnelles et les compétences des ministères clés concernés par le secteur minier, celui des infrastructures et les objectifs de l’étude WAMSSA, du PAGM et de l’EITI++. Lier les programmes de renforcement des capacités aux centres régionaux d’excellence proposés par le PAGM. Développer les programmes de formation sur la base de besoins spécifiques, notamment en matière d’évaluation et de suivi environnemental, de processus de décision participatifs, de résolution de conflits, etc. Évaluer les besoins et renforcer les capacités des GMP nationaux et des organisations de la société civile actives dans le secteur minier. Évaluer les besoins et renforcer les capacités des centres de formation nationaux et sous-régionaux afin de développer leur capacité à répondre aux besoins des gestionnaires/employés des compagnies minières, des gouvernements et des ONG. **Niveau des grappes minières :** Procéder à des évaluations et à des renforcements des capacités des GMP, des gouvernements, de la société civile et des autres parties prenantes communautaires actifs au niveau des grappes minières. Voir également au renforcement ou à la création de centres de formation opérant au niveau des grappes minières et susceptibles de donner des formations aux employés du secteur minier et aux communautés locales.

- **Réduire l’importance de la privation des droits des populations au cours des processus décisionnels liés au développement**

138. **Niveau national :** Inclure des représentants des GMP actifs au niveau des grappes minières dans les réunions de planification et de décision nationales. Mettre en place une équipe de planification interministérielle chargée entre autres de l’information et de l’engagement communautaires. Mettre en œuvre des programmes nationaux EITI++ de développement durable autour des grappes minières. **Niveau des grappes minières :** Aider les GMP logés au niveau des grappes minières à mettre en place des programmes réguliers de partage d’informations et de sollicitation de la participation communautaire à la planification du développement. Appuyer la mise en œuvre de processus participatifs de budgétisation locale qui permettront d’inclure les communautés dans les processus de décision financière menés par les gouvernements national et local. Mettre en place des mécanismes de communication et de résolution de conflits permettant de rendre le gouvernement et les compagnies imputables des décisions et des activités. Travailler de concert avec les mineurs artisanaux et opérant à plus large échelle à la réduction des conflits liés à l’utilisation des terres et identifier des mécanismes qui permettraient de travailler de façon conjointe.
- Limitier les conditions qui encouragent un comportement de recherche de rente et de partage déloyal des bénéfices

139. **Niveau national:** Augmenter les appuis et le renforcement des capacités des organisations luttant pour la transparence des recettes nationales (EITI++, Publish what you pay (PWYP)). Renforcer et augmenter la transparence des processus politiques et réglementaires des gouvernements ainsi que les mécanismes d’imputabilité, incluant l’identification de sonnettes d’alarme et de règles de protection. **Niveau des grappes minières :** Appuyer la participation des instances actives au niveau des grappes dans les initiatives EITI++ et PWYP. Appuyer l’initiation de processus participatifs locaux de budgétisation susceptibles de rendre les mécanismes entourant les décisions financières des gouvernements national et local plus transparentes. Faciliter la disponibilité, dans les centres d’information accessibles aux communautés, des informations relatives aux transactions entre le gouvernement et les compagnies minières, notamment en matière d’exploitation et d’infrastructures (par exemple les contrats, les montants des taxes, etc.).

**Défis politico-économiques**

140. Les défis politico-économiques liés à la mise en œuvre des recommandations et activités nationales axées sur les grappes minières mentionnées précédemment sont considérables mais surmontables. Même si plusieurs parties prenantes ont une certaine difficulté à saisir pleinement les nuances entre les approches nationales versus régionales ou par grappe versus par projet individuel, la plupart d’entre elles semblent d’accord sur le fait que le statu quo n’a pas permis de tirer du développement du secteur minier les bénéfices attendus. Elles sont donc ouvertes à de nouvelles approches, basées sur des initiatives soit régionales et donc orientées du haut vers le bas (top-down), soit communautaires et donc orientées du bas vers le haut (bottom-up) ou encore basées sur les grappes minières. Cependant, la volonté politique et la stabilité aux plus hauts niveaux gouvernementaux sont certainement les éléments facilitateurs — ou facteurs de blocage— les plus importants pour la mise en œuvre des recommandations de l’étude WAMSSA. Les autres défis politico-économiques liés aux quatre recommandations stratégiques clés sont discutés ci-dessous.

141. Comme mentionné plus haut, l’obtention d’un engagement et d’un appui actif des plus hautes instances de direction politique et gouvernementale (tel que démontré par le Président du Libéria sur les initiatives d’amélioration de la gestion financière de son gouvernement) reste sans aucun doute le plus grand défi à la mise en œuvre réussie d’une approche régionale basée sur les grappes et d’un cadre consultatif multi-niveaux et multipartenaires. Il faudra également, dans cette perspective, voir à l’implication des ministères clés et de leurs conseillers techniques et politiques. Les activités d’harmonisation régionale et de développement des grappes, qui impliqueront surtout des échanges entre les experts techniques, seront probablement plus faciles à mettre en œuvre que les GMP. Il faudra cependant s’assurer, dans l’élaboration des plans de grappes d’exploitation minière/développement d’infrastructures, d’un équilibre prudent entre l’expertise technique et le sens politique, ceci afin que ces plans répondent adéquatement aux attentes régionales, nationales et locales relatives aux bénéfices potentiels générés par un tel développement.
142. En raison de leur nature, les GMP feront appel à l’engagement et à la collaboration productive de plusieurs types de membres, qui agiront aux niveaux régional, national et des grappes minières. La collaboration entre les parties prenantes du gouvernement, de la société civile et de l’industrie a bien fonctionné au cours des consultations menées par l’étude WAMSSA, peut-être en raison des intérêts communs à maximiser les bénéfices nationaux et communautaires tirés des activités minières. Cependant, des GMP plus permanents devront certainement débattre de décisions épineuses et faire face aux problèmes imprévus qui surgiront au cours du processus de mise en œuvre. L’établissement de procédures transparentes de sélection des membres des GMP, la facilitation dès le départ d’exercices de mise en confiance et le développement des capacités de résolution de conflits et de travail en équipe chez tous les acteurs seront déterminants pour le fonctionnement réussi des GMP. Il est également important que des dirigeants compétents et respectés et des facilitateurs de réunions soient recrutés. Le GMP EITI du Libéria constitue un modèle qui pourrait être utilisé dans la résolution de plusieurs des problèmes mentionnés.

143. Certaines parties prenantes investies de pouvoirs au niveau du pays, des grappes ou encore des communautés pourraient s’opposer ou tenter d’influencer en leur faveur le processus de développement basé sur les grappes minières. Il pourrait par exemple s’agir de politiciens ou de détenteurs d’intérêts privés qui craignent une perte d’influence ou d’accès aux ressources si la nouvelle approche est un succès. Il faudra donc certainement utiliser le processus consultatif afin d’assurer l’engagement de ces partenaires envers les nouvelles initiatives. Dans certains cas extrêmes, et s’il apparaît clair qu’ils n’ont aucune intention de coopérer, certains de ces acteurs pourraient cependant être éloignés ou retirés du processus par des décideurs de plus haut niveau.

144. Malgré la faiblesse actuelle de la gouvernance environnementale dans les pays de l’URM, le processus de consultation mené par l’étude WAMSSA a permis de constater que toutes les parties prenantes souhaitaient améliorer leur performance. Le manque de capacités gouvernementales adéquates nécessaires à la mise en vigueur et /ou au renforcement des mesures de protection environnementale constitue présentement l’obstacle le plus important. De plus, les compagnies minières de grande envergure sont généralement plus favorables ou plus aptes à appuyer des mesures liées à la responsabilité environnementale que des compagnies de moindre importance, dotées de peu de ressources, et les mineurs artisanaux. Néanmoins, la mise en place d’une instance gouvernementale ou indépendante susceptible de jouer le rôle de chien de garde en matière de conformité apparaît essentielle. Il faudra également dépasser les intérêts institutionnels bureaucratiques – et dans certains cas des individus puissants – concurrents lorsqu’il s’agira de déterminer quel ministère ou quel organisme sera en bout de ligne responsable des questions environnementales, sociales et d’accès à la terre liées à l’exploitation minière. Par ailleurs, l’utilisation que les communautés locales font des ressources naturelles, particulièrement dans un contexte de migration intra-nationale induite par le développement minier, peut également avoir des impacts négatifs. Il faudra donc mener des activités qui permettront de s’assurer que les communautés sont conscientes du fait que l’adoption de pratiques environnementales responsables et durables est dans leur propre intérêt.
145. Il y a chez les parties prenantes peu d’oppositions à l’accroissement des bénéfices que les communautés affectées pourraient tirer des projets de développement minier et des infrastructures. Le défi réside donc surtout dans l’identification, au cours du design de ces projets, de cadres de développement communautaire complets et cohérents et de programmes d’emploi et de mise en relation locale qui tiennent compte des apports des communautés, des OSC, des gouvernements et de l’industrie. Cependant, il est encore plus important que ces plans soient collectivement définis et mis en œuvre suffisamment tôt (par exemple à l’étape de pré-construction). Ceci permettrait de faire face aux pressions exercées par les compagnies qui, soumises à des échéances rapprochées, souhaitent procéder à une importation rapide de biens et travailleurs extérieurs pour la conduite des opérations locales. Le PAGM devrait d’ailleurs examiner sur ces questions les modèles utiles élaborés par l’Unité CommDev de l’IFC, qui travaille avec l’ICMM et plusieurs compagnies minières importantes de l’URM et ailleurs en Afrique.

146. Comme mentionné plus haut, l’amélioration de la transparence et de la cohérence des politiques gouvernementales et des processus décisionnels dépend de l’engagement, de la modification ou si nécessaire du retrait des instances institutionnelles ou individuelles agissant comme facteurs de blocage. Le processus de consultation mené par l’étude WAMSSA a permis de constater que plusieurs membres du personnel technique étaient disposés à agir de façon responsable, si l’environnement politique et institutionnel le permettait. Cependant, il pourrait s’avérer nécessaire d’avoir recours aux pressions de parties prenantes externes, notamment de cadres supérieurs du gouvernement, de membres de la société civile, ou des partenaires au développement dans la lutte contre les forces adverses.

147. Les parties prenantes appuient également en majorité la tenue d’efforts de renforcement des capacités, puisque ceux-ci permettent aux gestionnaires et au personnel de mieux assumer leurs responsabilités. Une formation adéquate et des ressources suffisantes constituent en effet des incitatifs puissants qui favorisent la mise en pratique d’une bonne gouvernance. Cependant, les efforts consacrés au renforcement des capacités devraient être basés sur les besoins institutionnels et viser le renforcement des capacités des institutions en tant que telles et non pas celles d’individus en particulier. Ceci s’applique tout autant aux renforcements effectués aux niveaux gouvernementaux et des grappes minières qu’à ceux dispensés à la société civile et aux communautés.

148. Le graphique suivant décrit les impacts potentiels de l’approche régionale et par grappes minières sur les différents types de parties prenantes, ainsi que leur capacité relative à influencer le processus de mise en œuvre.
Facteurs de succès déterminants

149. Finalement, le succès de la démarche de résolution des questions et priorités soulevées par l’étude WAMSSA dépend de plusieurs facteurs cruciaux.

150. Les parties prenantes, en particulier les communautés affectées par l’exploitation minière doivent être dotées des moyens d’action nécessaires et participer au dialogue politique. La prise en considération de leurs points de vue dans le processus décisionnel pourrait améliorer la probabilité de résultats plus durables, diminuer les risques de tensions sociales ou de guerre civile et permettre la constitution d’une force externe susceptible d’exercer des pressions sur le gouvernement en matière d’imputabilité sociale. La création des GMP représente un moyen d’atteindre cet objectif, bien qu’il existe certainement d’autres formules qui permettraient d’inclure davantage les communautés dans la collecte d’informations, les discussions et les processus décisionnels, peut-être par le biais d’un mécanisme dans lequel les GMP agiraient comme intermédiaires entre les instances politiques et décisionnelles et les communautés de base.

151. Le renforcement institutionnel et le renforcement des capacités doivent être considérés primordiaux et hautement prioritaires. Comme souligné précédemment, outre le fait que plusieurs des politiques environnementales et sociales des pays de l’URM sont inappropriées, elles restent souvent lettre morte ou sont inadéquatement mises en vigueur en raison d’un manque de compétences, de capacités et de ressources. Le renforcement des capacités demande du temps et devrait donc être initié dès
l’opérationnalisation d’un projet du PAGM ou de l’EITI++. Par conséquent, les acteurs dont la capacité aura été renforcée et qui seront impliqués pourront jouer un rôle plus important dans l’élaboration, l’exécution et la pérennité à long terme du projet lui-même.

152. **La planification des initiatives à venir en matière de gouvernance minière devrait être coordonnée avec les efforts en cours des autres partenaires au développement.** Ceci devrait s’appliquer non seulement au secteur minier (par exemple les directives minières de l’ECOWA et le projet CEPESL de politiques relatives à l’exploitation minière artisanale de l’USAID en Sierra Leone), mais aussi aux politiques et programmes de développement des infrastructures, de gestion environnementale et de protection de la biodiversité, de développement sanitaire et socio-économique ainsi que de développement général des ressources humaines dans les secteurs publics et privés. Cette coordination demandera une collaboration plus étroite non seulement entre les donateurs, mais aussi entre ces derniers et le nombre croissant de consortiums d’OSC et d’ONG actifs dans les secteurs de la gouvernance et du développement durable pertinents au secteur minier et /ou aux communautés qu’il affecte.

153. **Les initiatives antérieures d’amélioration de la gouvernance du secteur minier et du développement ont identifié des questions déterminantes et proposé des solutions utiles, qui n’ont cependant pas souvent été prises en compte.** On peut mentionner ici par exemple l’Évaluation environnementale et sociale stratégique de la Sierra Leone, l’Initiative D4D d’exploitation artisanale dans les pays de l’URM, et l’Initiative de cadre de développement communautaire de l’IFC en Guinée. Pour de nombreuses raisons, plusieurs des recommandations et programmes proposés par ces initiatives n’ont toujours pas été mis en œuvre. Le PAGM et l’EITI++ devraient donc réexaminer les meilleures idées mises de l’avant par ces études et les introduire dans leurs programmes. Dans le même esprit, le nombre croissant d’expériences de développement régional, notamment en matière d’IDS basées sur le secteur minier et de corridors de développement, par exemple le Corridor de développement de Maputo et le projet PME Mozlink du Mozambique, constitue un bassin d’informations qui pourraient éclairer les aspects environnementaux sociaux et politiques des objectifs de gouvernance minière améliorée du PAGM et de l’EITI++. Par ailleurs, les parties prenantes consultées par l’étude WAMSSA ont été catégoriques sur le fait que ses recommandations ne devaient pas subir le même sort que celles des études antérieures. Elles souhaitent que le mécanisme de consultation par GMP et le dialogue politique amorcés avec l’étude WAMSSA se poursuivent et permettent une imputabilité sociale continue, une meilleure gouvernance du secteur minier et un partage plus équitable des bénéfices du développement du secteur minier dans les pays concernés.
1. Introduction

1.1 Background

154. The Mano River Union (MRU) countries of West Africa (Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone)\(^{13}\) are mineral-rich countries with economies that are dominated by revenue generated from mineral exports. This is reflected in the contribution of the mining sector to total Gross Domestic Product (GDP). For example, in Guinea mining contributed 25 percent of GDP in 2008, and in Sierra Leone earnings from the export of diamonds, bauxite, and rutile accounted for 76.5 percent of total export earnings in 2006. In the past, MRU attracted a number of investors and people who have vested interests in the mineral sector (WAMF, 2008; Control Risk, 2008). This interest in the mineral wealth of the MRU has strengthened once again. For instance, prospecting by multi-national firms in the region has been increasing dramatically since 2006, with several thousand prospecting licenses issued. Large bauxite and alumina reserves have been found in Sierra Leone and Guinea, while large gold and iron ore reserves have been found in Liberia.

155. There is an opportunity to increase the contribution of the mining sector to GDP and to exports given the large untapped mineral resources and the large percentage of low-value raw materials (relative to processed materials) or partially processed materials that are exported. The MRU is aiming to ensure that development of these mineral endeavors is coordinated with the economic and social development of the sub-region. There are a number of ways that mining can contribute to social and economic development. For example, mining can boost employment, especially in rural areas, help with infrastructure development (e.g., electricity, water supply, roads, etc.), and promote development of downstream activities with positive follow-on effects for communities, among other benefits.

156. The benefits of mining depend on the monitoring and enforcement of laws and regulations at mining operations. All three governments have recently undertaken to reform their mining policies, and while allowing an increase in large-scale mining investments, they are considering ways to increase shared benefits and improve companies’ environmental and social performance, as well as contributions to local community development.

157. Donors, especially in the case of Sierra Leone and Liberia, have funded and are currently funding the rehabilitation and revitalization of strategic infrastructure (road and rail networks, telecommunications, and electricity) in an effort to rebuild the economies in the region. Many of these infrastructure investments support the mineral potential of the countries and aim to provide a platform through which mineral resources may be exploited.

158. The mining and minerals processing sectors provide a platform for social and economic development because mineral-led development can help diversify development through secondary investments in related sectors. To achieve this objective, among other

\(^{13}\text{Recently joined by Côte d'Ivoire.}\)
activities being planned, the World Bank undertook the West Africa Minerals Sector Strategic Assessment (WAMSSA) environmental and social assessment, which aims to:

- Identify the regional policy, institutional, and regulatory adjustments required to integrate social and environmental considerations into minerals sector development; and
- Formulate recommendations that enhance the wider environmental and social benefits of mining sector development in regional infrastructure development and economic diversification.

159. WAMSSA is a well-timed initiative of the World Bank because it informs the African Mineral Governance Project, which has the potential to implement outcomes from the First Ordinary Session of the AU Conference of Ministers responsible for Mineral Resources Development (convened at the level of ministers, 16-17 October, 2008 at the AU Headquarters, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia).

160. The African Mining Vision 2050 was introduced at the 2008 AU conference and aims to ensure “Transparent, equitable and optimal exploitation of mineral resources to underpin broad-based sustainable growth and socio-economic development”. The following agreements arising from the conference are of specific interest to AMGP and WAMSSA:

- There should be more investment in the mining sector in order to increase the level and quality of products;
- Revenues generated by the mining sector should be better managed and more fairly distributed resulting in significant socioeconomic development;
- Mineral wealth should be used to promote resource-based industrialization and diversification; and
- Exploitation of mineral resources should be a lever of growth and help eradicate poverty for the well being of Africa’s populations.

161. These measures include several components — technological, regulatory, institutional, capacity building, harmonization of mining policies, enlisting contributions from the private sector and civil society, mechanisms for consultations and sharing of experience, and the establishment of a network of African mining countries according to resources. The results of these actions are expected to give rise to “a sustainable and well governed minerals sector with well managed resource rents, distributed and smartly invested with emphasis on intergenerational equity, environmental and material stewardship and corporate social responsibility (CSR) respected; safe, healthy and advanced as well as empowered stakeholders” (African Union, 2008).

162. A key objective of WAMSSA was to inform the development of the World Bank’s African Mineral Governance Project (AMGP). The AMGP intends to help African countries harmonize regional and sub-regional mineral sector policies, agendas, and actions. Two MRU countries, Liberia and Sierra Leone, are expected to participate in the first phase of the program, while Guinea and Côte d’Ivoire are potential candidates for Phase 2 (Box 1).
Box 1. African Mineral Governance Project (AMGP)

The AMGP is a World Bank-funded program designed to help African countries harmonize regional and sub-regional policies, agendas, and actions. It is intended to view mineral sector opportunities and constraints from a regional perspective, recognizing that single-country approaches may not yield the most benefits from mineral sector development within the region. Therefore, the program looks to regional approaches and solutions to mineral sector development and governance to increase efficiency by both governments and the private sector, reduce costs through synergies, mitigate cross-border negative externalities, and exploit opportunities for economies of scale to develop mining, infrastructure, and related economic activities.

AMGP consists of a series of overlapping horizontal Adaptable Policy Loans (APLs) to be made available to individual African countries, but coordinated through sub-regional organizations such as ECOWAS and SADC, which would host a regional implementation and coordination unit under the auspices of the African Union’s African Mining Partnership. At least two MRU countries, Liberia and Sierra Leone, are expected to participate in the first phase of the program. There are four proposed AMGP components:

Component 1. Good governance and sustainable mineral sector management, including:
- Develop common principles and strengthen policy and regulatory frameworks, such as developing regional guidelines and tools for revenue collection and redistribution, environmental management frameworks, community development and consultation and participation mechanisms; and policy, legislation, and regulatory reforms, including contract negotiations, transparency, EHS and PPP regulations, etc.
- Strengthen institutions and develop human resources, including capacity building for control, monitoring and compliance mechanisms, map needed skills, prioritize and design training programs, set up centers of excellence and strengthen community skills.
- Support artisanal and small-scale mining, including harmonize ASM frameworks to mitigate cross-border smuggling, enable value addition, and provide extension services for miners.

Component 2. Geological and mining information systems and investment promotion, including:
- Develop geological and mining information systems to create joint information standards, rules and procedures, mapping and geoscience activities, and support sub-regional geodata information hubs.
- Promote investment in mineral sector opportunities, including develop promotional materials and events, and training.

Component 3. Enable benefits and value addition to the national and regional economies, including:
- Ancillary infrastructure development, including facilitate regional/transnational regional planning for infrastructure development along mineral corridors, and spatial analysis of integrated geological, mineral, infrastructure, environmental, and economic activities.
- Strengthen links, which includes mapping existing needs and supply chains, identifying comparative advantages and opportunities, establishing regional databases of market information, establishing producer forums to enhance local procurement, and capacity building and supplier development programs.

Component 4. Project management includes setting up and support for both national implementation units and regional coordination units.

1.2 **Objectives of the assessment**

WAMSSA was initiated as part of a dialogue with MRU countries in the context of potential mining reforms to be supported by the regional AMGP. WAMSSA aims to:

- Identify the regional policy, institutional, and regulatory adjustments required to integrate social and environmental considerations into minerals sector development, and
- Formulate recommendations that enhance the wider environmental and social benefits of mining sector development in regional infrastructure development and economic diversification.

To meet these objectives, WAMSSA aims to deliver these outcomes:

- Provide critical and insightful input to inform the design and implementation of AMGP, including strategic environmental and social issues and multi-sectoral links of mining growth that would enhance the mineral sector’s contribution to sustainable development in West Africa.
- Contribute to informed engagement and participation of multiple stakeholders, including West African governments, regional institutions such as ECOWAS, Mano River Union (MRU), NEPAD, international finance institutions, development partners, the mining industry, NGOs and CSOs, and local mining communities in a regional dialogue on mining and sustainable development.
- Support the World Bank’s dialogue with clients to jointly identify strategic opportunities for regional coordination and harmonization of environmental and social frameworks, and strengthen institutional and governance associated with mining development.

1.3 **Approach**

In order to achieve the objectives outlined above, the World Bank assembled a team of experts to carry out the study, which was delivered in four sequential phases:

- Phase 1. Launched the project at two meetings in Conakry, Guinea, a West African conference on mining and sustainable development, and the first meeting of the WAMSSA Steering Committee. A resulting inception report outlined the approach and methodologies to be employed in the study.
- Phase 2. Focused on collection of background information (through stakeholder engagement and desktop-level data collection) and aimed to identify key opportunities and constraints for regional mineral sector development through a mineral clustering approach.
- Phase 3. Presented the findings of Phase 2 to national-level stakeholders with a view to ensure that outcomes are in line with expectations and that a regional approach makes logical sense, along with the determination of appropriate scenarios for mineral development and an institutional analysis for implementing sustainable development associated with the minerals sector.
• Phase 4. Convened a final round of consultations, including a regional validation meeting and final meeting of the WAMSSA Steering Committee to provide input into the final WAMSSA report.

1.3.1 PHASE 1 — WAMSSA INITIATION
166. Four team members attended the International Conference on Mining and Sustainable Development in Africa, held in Conakry (9-13 June 2008). The team conducted the WAMSSA project launch workshop at the conference with the intent to inform and engage conference attendees representing regional institutions, governments, industry, donors, academia, and civil society. The goal of the workshop was to share with key stakeholders the intended results of WAMSSA and to garner participant input on how to ensure other key stakeholder groups actively engage in the WAMSSA process.

167. Following the launch workshop and subsequent meetings with the World Bank and Project Steering Committee, an inception report was prepared to confirm the objectives of WAMSSA and the process that was to be followed. It is important to note that because WAMSSA is a first of kind activity and the process evolved over time, the final process is somewhat different to that initially envisioned.

1.3.2 PHASE 2 — STAKEHOLDER ANALYSIS, SITUATION ASSESSMENT, AND REGIONAL PRIORITY SETTING
168. A number of tasks were undertaken in Phase 2, including:

• Identification and analysis of key stakeholders through literature review and focused one-on-one meetings, providing an analysis of the interests and incentives that influence key stakeholders;

• Focus group meetings with stakeholder groups (government, industry, and civil society) at the national level;

• Collation of baseline information about mineral opportunities, infrastructure, and social and environmental conditions, initially at the national level and then subsequently at the level of clustered mineral deposits; and

• Preparation of an interim report that included a snapshot of the existing situation in minerals and infrastructure development in the three MRU countries and its likely medium-term development over a five- to 10-year period; initial assessment of stakeholders likely to oppose or support a regional or mineral cluster approach, and an indication of critical environmental, social, and environmental issues as identified through the consultative process.

1.3.3 PHASE 3 — VERIFICATION OF REGIONAL PRIORITIES
169. The WAMSSA team organized three national workshops in Conakry, Freetown, and Monrovia to validate WAMSSA’s main findings, select WAMSSA’s priorities, and identify key policy and institutional adjustments to be incorporated in mining reforms of Mano River countries and AMGP.

170. A key goal of the national workshops was to select the WAMSSA priorities from among critical issues that were identified during the consultations and analysis. A second goal was to identify potential winners and losers and enabling and blocking factors to
improving mineral governance under two scenarios — increased local participation in development planning and increased regional harmonization of policies and planning.

1.3.4 PHASE 4 — WAMSSA REPORTING AND VALIDATION

171. The initial draft of the WAMSSA report was completed by the team for comment and validation by the Steering Committee members. Recommendations and comments were incorporated in the report, and key findings and recommendations were presented to a regional validation workshop, grouping participants of the focus groups, community surveys, and national workshops, and to the final meeting of the WAMSSA Steering Committee.

172. This document is the WAMSSA final report. It is intended for a broad audience of stakeholders, including the MRU country governments, regional institutions, development partners, and the regional program team, as well as mining companies, chambers of mines in West Africa, and NGOs and CSOs working on mining, environmental, and social issues in the region.

1.4 Structure of this report

173. The report is structured as follows:

- **Section 1 (Introduction)** focuses on orienting the reader to the purpose, objective, and approach of WAMSSA.

- **Section 2 (Cluster Approach to Mining-infrastructure Development in the Mano River Union)** provides an understanding of the exploitable mineral resources in the MRU using a mineral-infrastructure cluster approach as a reference. In doing so, the section identifies three mining infrastructure clusters. They are discussed considering potential mineral development projects and existing and proposed infrastructure (roads, railways, ports, power generation and transmission) in the region.

- **Section 3 (Environmental, Social, and Governance Priorities)** discusses the environmental, social, and governance critical issues associated with existing mining activities in MRU, as identified through research and the consultation process, which are relevant for sustainable development of the proposed clusters; and the consultation process by which priorities were selected for further analysis.

- **Section 4 (Assessment of Institutions, Governance Systems, and Capacities to Manage Priorities in Mining-Infrastructure Clusters)** identifies the legal, institutional, and governance gaps to address the priorities in the context of mining infrastructure cluster development.

- **Section 5 (Findings, Recommendations, and Action Plan)** presents findings and recommendations and outlines the proposed approaches to addressing the issues identified above, and identifies implementation modalities, including an Action Plan intended to operationalize the WAMSSA recommendations at the regional, national, and cluster levels.
1.5 **WAMSSA process for participatory dialogue and analysis**

174. WAMSSA is a policy dialogue backed by analytical work. The WAMSSA study combined analytical work with a participatory consultation process that involved several rounds of consultations at the national and regional levels. Figure 1 is a diagram of the overall process.

- Stakeholder consultations were held in the three target countries, including one-on-one interviews, focus group meetings of institutional stakeholders (government, industry and civil society organizations), and surveys of grassroots communities affected by mining.
- The outputs of these meetings, which served to identify critical issues, were then fed into national workshops, where the critical issues were prioritized.
- These consultations were complemented by research and analysis, including situation analysis of mining infrastructure clusters, stakeholder analysis, scenario analysis, and institutional analysis.
- The results of the national workshops and additional analysis were presented and discussed at a regional validation workshop, where recommendations and an action matrix were discussed and validated.

175. The combination and iteration of analytical and consultative work was a lengthy and complex process, but it yielded useful results. Through multiple interactions with the WAMSSA study team, stakeholders were given an opportunity to both provide original insights and to react to the findings of the team as it conducted its analysis. This participatory approach was deemed important enough by workshop participants and the WAMSSA Steering Committee that they recommended a similar multi-stakeholder participation mechanism be continued with the follow-on Africa Mineral Governance Program.
Figure 1. Flowchart of WAMSSA process for participatory policy dialogue and analysis, which aimed to inform design of the proposed Africa Mineral Governance Program (AMGP)

2.1 Key findings

176. Mining is a key development opportunity for the Mano River Union countries. The region has significant geological resources focused on a number of key commodities — iron ore, bauxite, gold, and diamonds are common to all of the countries, with heavy minerals and platinum group minerals concentrated in Sierra Leone.

177. **Infrastructure in the MRU is poor overall and inadequate** for mining development. With the exception of some dedicated rail lines and ports built by individual companies, infrastructure in potential mining areas is largely non-existent, or it is deteriorated and inefficient to meet the needs of mining companies and other potential users.

178. Mineral deposits (or ‘clusters’ of deposits located near each other or along a corridor) of low-value, high-bulk minerals (such as iron ore or bauxite) have the geological potential for deposits capable of supporting high-tonnage, long-life mining/mineral-processing projects. These projects are best suited for infrastructure investments, where infrastructure needed for mining can also stimulate other economic activities around the mineral cluster and along the infrastructure corridors.

179. **Mining can become a driver of sustainable development** if single project-oriented development is substituted with a ‘mining and infrastructure cluster-oriented’ approach for planning and investment. WAMSSA identified a number of key mining infrastructure clusters with sub-regional potential. Within one cluster area, the iron ore deposits located around Mount Nimba on the Liberia and Guinea borders, there are indications that mining companies and the respective governments are already looking at transborder cooperation for infrastructure development.

180. **Coordinated regional approaches to management** of environmental and social impacts are required because many of these mineral belts cross national borders. Sub-regional habitat and biodiversity loss, water pollution in transboundary watersheds, and mining-induced population in-migration cannot be contained or managed within the borders of single country.

181. **Implications for AMGP.** Within the MRU countries, AMGP efforts to develop regional common principles, policy and regulatory frameworks, and stronger institutions should support identification and development of viable mineral-infrastructure clusters and related infrastructure corridors as a cornerstone of its support to those countries. This approach appears to be supported by the growing interest of regional bodies and development partners in using of Spatial Development Initiative and Development Corridor planning concepts to gain maximum synergies from infrastructure investments.
2.2 Background

This section identifies potential sub-regional mining belts or corridors based on information on geological potential and exploration activities over a 10 to 15 year period, and the key associated infrastructure requirements to make such an expansion possible. The approach also looks at the key environmental and social aspects of the three countries, including areas where the potential is high for mineral exploration, and for adoption of a ‘mining infrastructure cluster’ approach. A mining infrastructure cluster is defined here as a group of mineral deposits that are situated close enough that with proper planning they can be serviced by common infrastructure (transport, power, water, etc.). Ideally, a coordinated focus on a defined geographic area allows for creation of a critical mass of integrated public-private sector and infrastructure development. A mining infrastructure cluster strategy would be designed and implemented in such a way that it would not only allow multiple mining projects to move into production, but the multi-use infrastructure and demand for goods and services spawned by the mines would allow for ancillary economic activities, including upstream and downstream links to develop and become sustainable over and beyond the life of the mining projects.

2.2.1 METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH

A brief discussion of the methodology to carry out the opportunities assessment of the scope is presented below. The methodology closely followed the approach taken by NEPAD (An Indicative Assessment to Determine Prospects for a NEPAD Spatial Development Programme).

- **Step 1. Mineral deposits and mining projects.** A base map was constructed using information from a variety of sources (including geological provinces, operating mines, major mineral occurrences, and potential new mining projects).
- **Step 2. Major features.** A number of geopolitical features, along with existing major road, rail, electrical transmission, and port infrastructure, were mapped in relation to the mineral deposits under discussion. Significant environmental (water bodies, biodiversity areas, etc.) and community elements were mapped on the same layer.
- **Step 3. Infrastructure projects.** This step entailed building a layer of information reflecting proposed road, rail, and electrical projects under investigation or implementation by national governments, donor agencies, and/or regional economic organizations such as ECOWAS and AU.
- **Step 4. Identification of mineral clusters.** By cross referencing these sources of information it was possible to build an initial understanding of the possible opportunities where clustering new projects would create sustainable opportunities in the region.
- **Step 5. More detailed assessment of mining infrastructure clusters.** An analysis was commissioned to assess the comparative economic implications of a sub-regional approach to mineral exploitation and infrastructure development with a specific focus on the East iron ore deposit cluster. The economic analysis focused at the strategic level on understanding the differential costs of developing regional facilities as opposed to taking a project-by-project infrastructure
development approach. Early in the analysis, it became clear that there was insufficient information to prepare a meaningful study because none of the projects had either developed and/or made available their feasibility studies that could be used as a baseline for the analysis. Information was sought at the regional level and from the individual mining companies in relation to the general nature of infrastructure planned for each of their facilities. It is likely that as individual feasibility studies progress, the information will become more freely available and an analysis will be possible. A further constraint to conducting this analysis was uncertainty because some mining companies were reluctant to release any information to the WAMSSA team. This is considered to be a significant limitation to the quantification of the benefits of a sub-regional approach.

- **Step 6. Scenario analysis development and consultation.** Research and consultations with stakeholders indicated that there were benefits to both adopting a regional harmonization approach to dealing with these issues, as well as advantages to increasing local government and community participation in these issues. A scenario analysis separated advantages or benefits and disadvantages or costs for each scenario (Regional Harmonization and Local Government/Community Participation) relative to the current status of the mining sector in the Mano River Union countries.

### 2.3 Mineral deposits and mining projects

#### 2.3.1 BACKGROUND

184. The economies of the MRU countries heavily depend on the mining and minerals sector; mining accounts for as much as 54 percent of foreign exports and up to 25 percent of GDP:

- Sierra Leone’s economy depends on diamond revenue, which accounts for 70 percent of mineral exports and 54 percent of total export value.
- Bauxite reserves in the region account for significant foreign revenue returns:
  - In Guinea (which holds 24 percent of global reserves), revenue from bauxite accounts for 20 percent of GDP and 90 percent with foreign direct investment (BHP Billiton, Rio Tinto/Alcoa/Alcan and RUSAL). While Guinean mining sector revenue fell in recent years due to the world economic crisis and domestic political turmoil, in February 2010 CBG, the country’s largest bauxite mining firm, said that bauxite orders for 2010 are starting to recover and have already exceeded last year’s total output by more than 10 percent. Mining revenues are likely to continue to grow in the coming years.
  - In Sierra Leone, export earnings from bauxite and rutile were 29 percent and 22.5 percent of mineral and total export earnings, respectively.
- Liberia has shown lesser growth in its mineral returns. The low level of performance of the mining sector was attributed to unrecorded cross-border trade and to previous diamond sanctions. It is likely that this trend has turned around due to investments in the mineral sector during the past two years.
2.3.2 COMMODITIES

185. The region has significant geological resources focused on a number of key commodities — iron ore, bauxite, gold, and diamonds are common to all of the countries with heavy minerals, and platinum group minerals are concentrated in Sierra Leone. Production figures for the commodities are not readily available. The available figures (Table 1) show that:

- In Guinea, bauxite production fluctuates significantly around the approximately 45,000 TPA level, while the most recent data for diamond and gold production indicates decreases in production. The Guinean government said it expected that total mining sector revenue for 2010 was 16 percent lower than in 2007.

- In Liberia, the mining sector recorded no growth during 2006 compared with a decline of 14.9 percent in 2005. This low level was attributed to unrecorded cross-border trade and to diamond sanctions imposed by the United Nations (Central Bank of Sierra Leone, 2007, p. 35). Gold and diamonds showed an increase in production. The increase in gold production in 2008 can be attributed to favorable gold prices in the first half of the year, while higher diamond production in 2008 can be attributed to further regulating the diamond industry in Liberia.

- In Sierra Leone, gold production significantly increased through 2008 due to favorable gold prices, while diamonds showed a marked decrease in production in the same year because reserves declined and there was a sharp decrease in prices.

2.3.3 FUTURE COMMODITY PROSPECTS

186. While the global economic slowdown had a significant impact on commodity prices and mining operations around the globe, the general sense in late 2009 was that demand will eventually come back. Gold prices continued to rise throughout 2009, while the demand and price of the other three commodities dipped and then began a slow rise through the year. Diamonds may be slower to recover than the metals, which are used in industrial processes. More detailed information on future commodity prospects is included in Annex 1.

2.3.4 MINING PROJECTS

187. There are a significant number of projects either already commissioned or implemented in the MRU (Figure 2). Specific projects for which information is available are described in Table 2.

2.3.5 MINING SECTOR DEVELOPMENT SHOULD FOCUS ON LOW-VALUE, HIGH-BULK MATERIALS

188. In the face of uncertain mineral markets, long-term opportunities for infrastructure development need to focus on those deposits that have the geological potential to support high-tonnage, long-life mining/mineral-processing projects. Focus should be on low-value, high-bulk minerals such as titanium (although not considered to be a regional resource), iron ore, and bauxite because these are most conducive to providing critical mass for the development of a cluster or corridor. On that basis, to identify key mineral deposits for cluster development, WAMSSA focused on those materials that would lend themselves to associated infrastructure development.
As noted in Annex 1, these minerals — while under strain at present — are likely to grow in the future through increased demand from China, the Middle East, and potentially India.

### Table 1. Commodity production figures in the MRU

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Commodity</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>2002</th>
<th>2003</th>
<th>2004</th>
<th>2005</th>
<th>2006</th>
<th>2007</th>
<th>2008</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Iron</td>
<td>Guinea</td>
<td>No production</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Liberia</td>
<td>No production</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sierra Leone</td>
<td>No production</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bauxite ('000 t)</td>
<td>Guinea</td>
<td>46,867</td>
<td>171,438</td>
<td>46,554</td>
<td>45,517</td>
<td>31,756</td>
<td>14,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Liberia</td>
<td>No production</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sierra Leone</td>
<td>No production</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gold ('000 ounces)</td>
<td>Guinea</td>
<td>16,815</td>
<td>16,622</td>
<td>11,100</td>
<td>25,097</td>
<td>18,147</td>
<td>No data</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Liberia</td>
<td>No production</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sierra Leone</td>
<td>No data</td>
<td>8,600</td>
<td>16,900</td>
<td>22,800</td>
<td>68,200</td>
<td>62,900</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diamonds ('000 carats)</td>
<td>Guinea</td>
<td>491</td>
<td>666</td>
<td>674</td>
<td>549</td>
<td>474</td>
<td>No data</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Liberia</td>
<td>No production</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sierra Leone</td>
<td>No data</td>
<td>693.1</td>
<td>668.81</td>
<td>582.33</td>
<td>603.7</td>
<td>371.29</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a. Excludes metallurgical bauxite for which no data were available
b. Sourced from Bauxite Resources Limited

Note: No figures are presented for mineral sands and/or platinum group elements as they are only mined in Sierra Leone and do not present a regional opportunity for mining infrastructure.

Smuggling makes it difficult to determine the accurate value of diamonds produced in the MRU countries.
Figure 2. Distribution of key mining and exploration opportunities in the MRU
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mineral</th>
<th>Sierra Leone</th>
<th>Guinea</th>
<th>Liberia</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Iron/iron ore</td>
<td>- Marampa Iron Ore Project London Mining Plc</td>
<td>- Simandou iron ore deposits (Rio Tinto but under discussion with Guinean government)</td>
<td>- Arcelor Mittal and GOL renegotiated Mining Development Agreement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Marampa Iron Ore Prospects African Minerals Ltd and Cape Lambert Iron Ore Ltd</td>
<td>- Mount Nimba iron ore project (BHP Billiton/Newmont)</td>
<td>- China Union Bong Mine (arrange sale and export of 300,000 metric tonnes of stockpiled direct-reduced iron)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Tonkolili Iron Prospect - African Minerals Ltd</td>
<td></td>
<td>- African Aura Mining and Severstal Resources developing Putu iron ore project in Eastern Liberia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>No known projects under investigation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bauxite</td>
<td>- Bauxite reserves estimated to be 12.4 million metric tonnes but current production capacity 1.2 million metric tonnes per year</td>
<td>- Russian Aluminium (RUSAL) became sole owner of Friguia bauxite &amp; Alumina complex</td>
<td>- Mano River Resources Inc. estimate resources at New Liberty Gold deposit to be 13.5 million metric tonnes at 3.18 grams of gold per metric tonne</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- SML Bauxite Mine - Titanium Resources Group (TRG) through Sierra Mineral Holdings Ltd (SMHL) took over Bauxite production in 2006</td>
<td>- RUSAL is committed to a 3-year expansion program (bauxite mine and 2.8 million metric tonnes per year alumina refinery)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Port Loko - Moydow Mines International Inc. and Gondwana Investments S.A. and TRG</td>
<td>- Global Aluminium Corp (GAC) developing a 2.8 million metric tonnes per year alumina refinery in Boke (expected to completed in 2009)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Cassidy Gold (Canada) holds interest in 7 concession areas of Kouroussa project (estimated to be 4.48 million metric tonnes at grade of 2.4 grams of gold per metric tonne)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- SAG, owned by AngloGold Ashanti Ltd and the government operate Siguiri gold mine (production increased 4% from 2005 to 2006)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Crew Gold Corp acquired 15% interest in Lefa Corridor (resource estimate is 150 tonnes)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Main diamond deposits located in Kerouane, Kissidougou and Macenta Prefectures</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Mano River Resources Inc and SearchGold developing an alluvial diamond mine</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diamond</td>
<td>- Production mainly sourced from alluvial deposits</td>
<td>- Activities concentrated in western region and in Nimba County</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Production increased by 72% from 2002 to 2006</td>
<td>- Mano River Resources discovery of six kimberlite pipes (5 diamondiferous)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Large areas of potentially diamondiferous gravel remain unprocessed due to thick overburden cover</td>
<td>- Mano River Resources plans to conduct drilling and surface-bulk sampling to establish macro-diamond grade and value of the pipes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Loss in revenue from unrecorded trade unknown</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Approximately one-third of total volume traded legally, two-thirds illegally</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
2.4 Major Infrastructure and environmental features

190. This section provides a general overview of infrastructure and environmental features of the Mano River Union. Annex 2 provides a nationalized (and more detailed) approach to the information presented below.

2.4.1 TRANSPORTATION LOGISTICS

2.4.1.1 Road network

191. The road network in the MRU is severely degraded due to neglect and/or lack of maintenance and upgrading (Figure 3). While the road network appears to be well distributed, a number of features are critical:

- Up to 30 percent of the region’s roads are impassable;
- Feeder roads are typically unpaved and were privately constructed by logging and mining companies and are currently heavily degraded; and
- The focus is on multi-lateral road upgrades in the main cities (Conakry, Monrovia, and Freetown) with limited planning for upgrades in the rural or mining areas.

192. Road network construction and rehabilitation was identified as a critical development requirement in the early 1990s throughout the region. Initiatives included:

- Two projects were initiated in the early 1990s — the Roads Rehabilitation and Maintenance project and the Freetown Infrastructure Rehabilitation project. Both were aimed at extensive road reconstruction and rehabilitation and focused on the road network and basic infrastructure in Freetown and surrounding areas.
- The Sierra Leone National Transport Strategy (2003-2007) strived to establish a transport management system that aims to ensure a reliable, affordable, and continuously improved transport service in Sierra Leone (CSP, 2007).
- Liberia Poverty Reduction Strategy (2008) aimed at improving the existing road network in Liberia, which includes:
  - Ensuring all primary roads are passable all year,
  - Working in partnership with private companies (such as mining, logging, and agricultural companies) to rehabilitate certain feeder roads,
  - Rehabilitating roads in Monrovia and the headquarters of the 15 counties,
  - Rebuilding capacity for sustained construction and maintenance of roads and bridges, and
  - Rebuilding the financing, planning, and management systems necessary to ensure the capacity to fund road construction and maintenance over time.
- Guinea has developed a number of local and national road upgrade programs aimed at making the accessibility of regional economic centers easier.
Figure 3. MRU road network
2.4.1.2 Rail network

193. As with the roads in the MRU, the rail system has been severely neglected for more than 15 years, rendering the system largely inoperable. The railway systems in the region are national, with no transboundary crossings Table 3). Further, the rail system in the region is typically privately owned and operated, with limited passenger usage.

194.

### Table 3. Railway facilities in the MRU

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Railway line</th>
<th>Brief description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yekepa - Buchanan</td>
<td>The 1,435 mm gauge railway runs straight across the country from the coastal plain at Buchanan to the mountains near the Guinea border at Yelena. The line is single track, but there are passing loops approximately every 20 km. Arcelor Mittal is investigating an upgrade of the railway to support their mining activities at Yekepa and potentially link with Mount Nimba.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monrovia – Janje</td>
<td>1,067 mm gauge and runs from Monrovia to Janje over a distance of 145 km.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monrovia - Bong</td>
<td>Runs from Monrovia port to the Bong mines over a distance of 78 km using a 1,435 gauge. The potential upgrades at Bong (through the acquisition by China Union) are proposed to include an upgrade of this line.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guinea – Northern line</td>
<td>1,435 mm gauge and carries about 12 million metric tonnes of bauxite from Boke per year to Port Kamsar.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guinea – Central line</td>
<td>A 1,000 mm gauge in a northwestern direction from Guinea linking to Dubreka and Fria bauxite mine.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guinea – Southern line</td>
<td>A 1,000 mm gauge from Conakry to Dabola, where it converts to a 1,435 mm gauge to serve the Tougue bauxite mine before terminating at Kankan. An upgrade to the line has been proposed to convert the entire length into a 1,435 mm gauge. A parallel 1,435 mm gauge runs from Conakry to Kindia bauxite mine.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sierra Leone</td>
<td>A number of railway lines were constructed in Sierra Leone from as early as 1897. The lines are typically very narrow gauge (762 mm) and as such not generally usable for a national system. The railways in the country have been in disrepair since 1974. A narrow gauge rail line that linked iron ore deposits in Marampa to Pepel port is due to be refurbished and possibly extended to Tonkolili by African Minerals, although it is unclear who will have access to the line and related port facilities.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

195. Only one new railway line is formally proposed in the region (Figure 4). The Trans-Guinean railway will be approximately 710 kilometers, linking Conakry (or alternatively a newly established deep water port to be built approximately 60 kilometers to the south of Conakry in the Benti-Matakan area-Port de Matakang), through Kindia, Dabola, and Kankan to the Simandou and Nimba areas. In transport terms, the Trans-Guinean railway could appear considerably more feasible if connected into a link south to Buchanan and Monrovia with traffic flowing in both directions. Should this line be built it could create opportunities to transport minerals from the Simandou/Mount Nimba iron ore deposits to Matakang and would enable the transfer of agricultural products.
Another line that has been discussed would provide rail access to Liberia’s Western Cluster mining concession, which would run from the mining areas to the west of Liberia to Robertsport. It is possible that the line could eventually link with Sierra Leone, providing an outlet for non-mining exports from southern Sierra Leone, as well as minerals.

2.4.1.3 Port in the three countries

Sierra Leone and Liberia both have ports with a depth of 16 meters at anchor and 10 meters at the cargo piers, while Port Kamsar in Guinea has a cargo pier depth of 13 meters, however its channel is only 9 meters. Sierra Leone has three ports, two very small ports at Pepel and Sherbo Island, and a small port at Freetown. The port at Pepel is run by the Marampa Iron Ore Mining Company, while the other two ports are run by the Sierra Leone Ports Authority. The Port of Freetown offers moderate ship repair facilities, while the Port of Sherbo Island can only undertake emergency repairs. The Port of Sherbo is a river port and is shallow with a maximum water depth of 7.6 meters at the cargo pier. The Port of Freetown and Pepel have a maximum depth of 16 meters and 12 meters, respectively. Liberia offers four small ports, two seaports, a harbor and a small pier, jetty, or wharf facility. Each port has its own port authority, with Buchanan and Monrovia offering limited ship repairs. Monrovia also has a small marine railroad and dry dock. The maximum water depths of the ports vary between 12 meters and 15 meters at anchor, with Port Buchanan the deepest at 15.2 meters. While the channel at Port Cape Palmas is deep (23.2 meters and over), the port itself only reaches a depth of 12.2 meters at the cargo pier. Guinea only has two small seaports which are run by their own port authorities. Port Conakry is shallow, reaching only 10 meters in the channel and at anchor, and includes a small marine railroad. A more detailed description of the various ports in the MRU is provided in Table 4.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Port location</th>
<th>Port name</th>
<th>Port authority</th>
<th>Port type</th>
<th>Size</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Conakry</td>
<td>Port of Conakry</td>
<td>Port Authority of Conakry</td>
<td>Seaport</td>
<td>Small</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Port Kamsar</td>
<td>Port of Port Kamsar</td>
<td>Office d’Amenagement de Boke (OFAB)</td>
<td>Seaport</td>
<td>Small</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Freetown</td>
<td>Port of Freetown</td>
<td>Sierra Leone Ports Authority</td>
<td>Pier, jetty, or wharf</td>
<td>Small</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pepel</td>
<td>Port of Pepel</td>
<td>Marampa Iron Ore Mining Co</td>
<td>Pier, jetty, or wharf</td>
<td>Very small</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sherbro Island</td>
<td>Port of Sherbro Island</td>
<td>Sierra Leone Ports Authority</td>
<td>River port</td>
<td>Very small</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Buchanan</td>
<td>Port of Buchanan</td>
<td>Buchanan Port Authority</td>
<td>Seaport</td>
<td>Small</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greenville</td>
<td>Port of Greenville</td>
<td>Greenville Port Authority</td>
<td>Harbor</td>
<td>Small</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Harper</td>
<td>Port of Cape Palmas</td>
<td>Cape Palmas Port Authority</td>
<td>Pier, jetty, or wharf</td>
<td>Small</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monrovia</td>
<td>Port of Monrovia</td>
<td>Monrovia Port Authority</td>
<td>Seaport</td>
<td>Small</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In addition to the ports described in Table 4, a newly established deep water port associated with the Trans-Guinea railway is proposed to be built approximately 60 kilometers to the south of Conakry in the Benti-Matakan
area-Port da Matakang. At the port a channel ‘turnout slot’ is proposed to be dredged to 20 meters with berthing capacity for two cape-sized vessels.

2.4.1.4 Electricity and energy

199. The MRU region energy production was significantly affected during the period of civil unrest. For this reason, the majority of the population uses resources such as wood, kerosene, palm oil, etc. for cooking and heating. The countries of the MRU are collectively in energy debt:

- Less than 10 percent of the population has access to reliable electricity;
- Major interventions to supply reliable energy only fall within the capital cities (for instance, electricity demand in Monrovia alone is between 30 and 50 megawatts, while the supply is only 2.65 megawatts; and
- There is limited grid infrastructure in the countries and region.

200. A number of interventions are planned in the region, including:

- Installation of three 7.56-megawatt diesel generating units at Blackhall Road (Sierra Leone) with a resulting 22.68 megawatts;
- A thermal project at King Tom Generating Station (10 megawatts);
- Bumbuna Hydroelectric Project, which was recently commissioned and will generate 20 megawatts with an intended increase to 50 megawatts before the end of 2009, to power Sierra Leone’s main hospital, prison, and Government agencies;
- Bekonger Hydroelectric Project;
- Bo-Kenema Power services Goma Hydroelectric facility; and
- Rehabilitate the Mt. Coffee hydroelectric facility.

201. Studies are underway to assess other hydropower potential and construct several mini hydropower facilities across the region and assess solar, wind, and biomass potential to harness non-renewable resources.

202. As present, mining operations in the MRU predominantly construct their own power facilities (including use of generators) or export raw minerals for processing. Arcelor Mittal, for instance, is considering construction of a 150 to 200 megawatt captured power plant for their operation in the Yekepa region.

203. Electricity production in Guinea is hampered by “payment arrears by large customers such as the state, a shortage of skilled staff, and a poorly maintained distribution network and electricity theft” (IMF Guinea, 2008). Forty percent of the annual power production is privately generated and used by mining companies because mining operations have high power requirements. The areas that have electricity are either mining centers or municipal areas. Very little electricity is available in the rural areas (PRSP Guinea, 2008). The potential for hydroelectric power generation in the future is high. Guinea has conducted a detailed analysis of hydropower potential that identified a number of potential sources with in excess of 2,600 megawatts on a geographically widespread basis.
204. A regional initiative, the West African Electricity Exchanges (WAEE), is aimed at a “cooperative power pooling mechanism for integrating national power system operations into a unified regional electricity market” (WAPP, 2009) (Figure 5), which will include a Côte d'Ivoire, Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Guinea (CLSG) power network. The developments to boost electricity will include:

- Rehabilitating the 60-megawatt Mount Coffee Hydropower facility that was severely damaged during the civil conflict;
- Developing several run-of-river hydropower prospects on the St. Paul River in Liberia;
- Exploring thermal supply options by important mining operators in Liberia; and
- Assessing supply options from indigenous resources within the CLSG power network. These include the HEP sites at Souapiti, Kassa B, Yiben, Benkongo, and the Mano River (on the border between Liberia and Sierra Leone) (WAPP, 2009).

2.4.2 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSTRAINTS

2.4.2.1 Biodiversity

205. The Upper Guinea Forest Ecosystem biodiversity hotspot extends from Guinea into Sierra Leone and eastward through Liberia, Côte d’Ivoire, and Ghana into western Togo. The ecosystem is a biologically rich and diverse assemblage, considered to be one of the world's priority biodiversity conservation areas because of its many endemic species. A few key features include:

- **Plants.** Home to an estimated 9,000 vascular plant species, about 20 percent (1,800 species) of which are thought to be endemic.
- **Birds.** Nearly 785 bird species, of which roughly 75 species and seven genera are endemic. The region’s bird species are threatened by extensive forest clearing throughout the hotspot. BirdLife International has recognized six endemic bird areas as partly or entirely within the hotspot.
- **Mammals.** The Guinean forests have nearly 30 distinct primate species, and are one of Africa’s most critical primate conservation areas. As many as six species are endemic to the Upper Guinea forests, and while the West African forests are famous for their primates, they are also home to seven endemic genera, including the rare pygmy hippopotamus and the Liberian mongoose. Other species include two species of duiker, Jentink’s duiker and the zebra duiker, endemic to the Guinean forest and two of the world’s rarest antelopes.
- **Reptiles.** While reptiles are not adequately documented in West Africa, preliminary analysis suggests that more than 200 species, one-quarter of which are endemic, are found in the region, including more than 100 species of snakes and all three species of African crocodiles.
- **Freshwater fish.** More than 510 freshwater fish are found, 35 percent of which are thought to be endemic. About a one-quarter of the world’s 350 species of killifish live here, one-half of which are endemic. Cichlid fishes are also prominent, with more than one-half of the over 60 species endemic to the hotspot.
Figure 5. Proposed developments associated with the West African Power Pool (WAPP)
• Amphibians. Amphibians are also poorly documented in the region, but it is estimated that almost 225 amphibians inhabit the hotspot, including more than 80 endemics. Many additional species are likely to be discovered; for example, 11 new frog species have been discovered in the last decade alone. It is clear the hotspot supports a high diversity of tree frogs. One distinctive endemic species is the Mount Nimba toad (*Nimbaphrynoides occidentalis*, CR), and the Goliath frog (*Conraua goliath*, EN).

206. In 1999 a West Africa conservation priority-setting workshop was organized by Conservation International, Global Environmental Facility, WWF, UNDP, ECOSYN, and BirdLife International. The workshop participants included 146 scientists, regional experts, and government officials from more than 90 institutions. The workshop verified the current state of biodiversity knowledge and established a consensus on regional conservation priorities across the ecosystem (Figure 6 and Table 5).

207. Based on this information, there is a number of high priority conservation areas under threat from mining (Table 5). These are highlighted with shading in Figure 6. Of those, the Upper Krahn-Bassa, Sapo-Putu Range, Grebo, Dieke, and Gola-Lofa-Mano complex are considered to be of exceptionally high biological importance. Among these are protected areas as shown (as polygons) in Figure 6. These areas are managed at a national level with biodiversity conservation as the overriding rationale for their existence. While the major value of these areas lies in biological conservation, a strong supporting reason, in many cases, is to enhance socioeconomic development, usually based on tourism. On the basis of the conservation status and management, development in these areas is likely to be limited.

208. However, the pressure to develop mineral deposits, even within protected areas (Figure 7), will remain, as evidenced by a dispute that arose when iron ore mining permits were granted in Sierra Leone’s Gola Forest. Stakeholders on both sides of the debate, including communities, local chiefs, and senior government officials, claimed their options offered the best socioeconomic benefits to the community. Ultimately the mining permits were cancelled in favor of forest conservation and promotion of ecotourism, but this may not always be the outcome in similar cases in the future.

2.4.2.2 Water resources

209. The MRU is home to abundant surface water resources with a number of significant transboundary river basins, most notably the Mano and Cavalla, which are shared among Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Côte d’Ivoire. The Lofa, Saint John, and Saint Paul drain Liberia and parts of Guinea. There is little information available about the availability of water in these catchments, water quality, or current extraction. Despite the paucity of information, it is probable that given the significant drainage in the MRU and the high rainfall conditions, water availability is unlikely to be a constraint to mineral sector development. Further, given the poor sanitation facilities available in the three countries and the limited environmental controls associated with economic activities, water quality is likely to be severely affected (specifically high bacteriological loading). The drainage network in the MRU is presented in Figure 8. Box 2 provides a perspective of water resources and impacts in Guinea.
Figure 6. Forest and aquatic ecosystem priority areas in the MRU
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location Region</th>
<th>Location Name</th>
<th>Area ID</th>
<th>Biodiversity features</th>
<th>Priority</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Northwestern region</td>
<td>Alcatraz</td>
<td>A12</td>
<td>Mangroves and coastal habitats, including estuaries very important for wetlands birds' migration from the north to the south.</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Bassin Congon</td>
<td>A11</td>
<td>Vegetation: clear and gallery forests Soil: alluvial, gravel and lateritic plains</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Boffa</td>
<td>A5</td>
<td>Vegetation: mangrove, clear coastal forest Soil: swampy, alluvial, hydromorphic, gravel</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Benty</td>
<td>A6</td>
<td>Vegetation: mangrove, clear coastal forest Soil: swampy, alluvial, hydromorphic, gravel; important zone for sea turtles (Loos Islands)</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Fouta-Djalon I</td>
<td>A10</td>
<td>Mountain forests, savannah, understory</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Fouta-Djalon II</td>
<td>A9</td>
<td>Mosaic of gallery and understory forests</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Fouta-Djalon III</td>
<td>A8</td>
<td>Dry forest and savannah, fauna</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Fouta-Djalon IV</td>
<td>A7</td>
<td>Dry forest and savannah</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Yelboya-Sulima Complex</td>
<td>A4</td>
<td>Mostly mangrove vegetation with coastal estuaries including important fishing villages, migratory bird areas. Area important for river transport: includes a proposed RAMSAR site -- the Sierra Leone River.</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sonfon-Loma-Tangi Complex</td>
<td>A3</td>
<td>Remote area important for endangered species such as Prinia Leontica, Picathartes gymnocephalus, Jentinks and Banded Duikers &amp; chimps. Hunting and agricultural activities occur on the periphery of the forest reserve. The area consists of several protected areas, like Loma Mts, Tingi Hills, Tana-Tonkoli forest Reserve -- extending into Guinea</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Gola-Lofa-Mano Complex</td>
<td>A2</td>
<td>The Gola Forest is the largest westernmost remaining tropical rain forest of the upper Guinea block. Tropical low land forest with rolling hills drained by large rivers such as: Mano, Lofa and the Mahoi. Cross border areas include Zime, Kumboro and Numboro.</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Lake Piso</td>
<td>A1</td>
<td>The area consists of mountain ranges, flat savannah, open or broken forest with sea and lake shores. Large lake with various species of fish and aquatic mammals.</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mount Nimba Range</td>
<td>Bia Complex</td>
<td>B8</td>
<td>Mountain zone astride Guinea and Liberia comprising wet tropical forest with rich biological floral and faunal diversity (mammals, birds, reptiles, insects).</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Fon-Tibe</td>
<td>B7</td>
<td>Degraded mountain zone located in Guinea comprising tropical forest more or less degraded, poorly drained, with good biological faunal diversity (mammals, birds).</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Dieke</td>
<td>B5</td>
<td>Mountain zone, located in Forested Guinea comprising wet tropical forest, drained by several rivers. Biological diversity rich in fauna (mammals in particular).</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mount Nimba</td>
<td>B3</td>
<td>Globally important biosphere reserve and heritage site consisting of mountain transnational zone overlapping Guinea, Ivory Coast and Liberia. Environment is typified by wet equatorial forest, drained by several rivers, very rich in plants, birds and reptiles.</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southwestern region</td>
<td>Cestos-Sehnkwen</td>
<td>C1</td>
<td>Wilderness area between Cester and Sehnkweh. River in north eastern Liberia, pristine from the coast 50 km inland port of the largest forest block of UG: Krohn. Bena National Forest.</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Upper Krahn-Bassa</td>
<td>C4</td>
<td>Lowland biodiversity</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sapo-Putu Range</td>
<td>C2</td>
<td>Lowland rainforest and forest on Putu range</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Grebo</td>
<td>C3</td>
<td>Lowland rainforest</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Gouin-Deve-Cavally</td>
<td>C7</td>
<td>Lowland evergreen rainforest with a few large inselbergs.</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Figure 7. Protected areas in the MRU
Box 2. Water resources in Guinea

Guinea is not a water-scarce country, although seasonal variations affect water levels such that valleys flood during the rainy season, but rivers seldom dry up. Guinea water resources contain high traces of iron ore, with most higher than the WHO limits (Guinea Alumina EIA, 2008). Iron ore deposits are located close to the surface and erode into the water. This is exacerbated in areas where mining operations are not well managed, and waste is not properly disposed of.

Other water resource impacts include:

- Increased siltation and erosion into water resources as forests are cleared and land uses change;
- Excavation of materials combined with a lack of backfilling results in pits and burrows that often fill with water, becoming stagnant pools and breeding grounds for diseases such as malaria and bilharzia; and
- River erosion and siltation causing secondary effects on downstream agricultural activities, water quality for domestic uses, and disruption of groundwater flow and quality.

2.4.3 TRANSBORDER ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES

210. The Upper Guinea Forest Ecosystem runs through all three MRU countries, as do a number of major river basins. Therefore, it is likely that any effect on the natural resources in one country is bound to have an effect in the neighboring country. As such, regional approaches are needed to plan protection and management of these resources, especially in areas where mining, logging, or other economic activity threaten the biodiversity and health of the ecosystem. To the extent that mining is likely to occur in or near these transboundary zones, such as in the Nimba region of Guinea, Sierra Leone, and Côte d’Ivoire, or near the Mano River watershed along the Liberian-Sierra Leonean border, governments and other partners need to adopt regional transboundary strategies to identify, monitor, and manage the environmental and social impacts of mining and infrastructure development. Habitat and biodiversity loss, water pollution in transboundary watersheds, and mining-induced population in-migration cannot adequately be managed solely within the borders of a single country.
Figure 8. MRU drainage network
2.4.4 SOCIOECONOMIC SNAPSHOT

211. The countries of the MRU are among the poorest in the world, with generally low levels of access to clean water, adequate healthcare, education, and economic opportunities.

2.4.4.1 Poverty in the three countries

212. Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone fall at or near the bottom of most indices of health, education, and other human development indicators. The UNDP Human Development Indices ranked Sierra Leone at the very bottom of its list — 179 out of 179 countries in 2008; Liberia ranked 176; and Guinea was at 167.

213. In Liberia, 63.8 percent of the population lives below the national poverty line (68 percent in rural areas), while 47.9 percent live in extreme poverty (56 percent in rural areas). In Guinea, incidence of poverty increased from 49 percent of households in 2002 to 54 percent in 2007 due to deteriorating economic performance, high inflation, and stagnant salaries (World Bank, 2008d, p. x). A 2006 World Bank poverty study (cited in World Bank, 2008d) found that one-third of households in Guinea are unable to cover their nutritional needs. In Sierra Leone, roughly 70 percent of people live under the poverty threshold of US$ 2 per day, with nearly 80 percent living below that line in rural areas (World Bank, 2006a). Life expectancy in the three countries is also low — 55 years in Guinea, 45 years in Liberia, and 42 years in Sierra Leone (UNDP, 2007, p. 232).

214. Poverty increased as a result of the civil wars in the two countries and the ensuing flows of refugees within the countries and across borders. Food security diminished and health and education systems collapsed. Liberia’s Lofa County, one of the epicentres of the civil war, went from reportedly being able to produce enough food for the entire country in the 1970s to having the highest number of food insecure people in the country, with 70 percent having poor or borderline food consumption levels (Government of Liberia, 2008, p. 12). Once the wars ended, many of the refugees and internally displaced persons did not return to their original homes, but rather settled in the major cities, where overcrowding and lack of infrastructure ensured a continued poverty-stricken existence.

2.4.4.2 Lack of employment opportunities

215. Agriculture is the major source of livelihood in the three Mano River Union countries, with the majority of people living outside urban areas engaged in subsistence agriculture. In Sierra Leone, subsistence agriculture occupies around 66 percent of the population (World Bank, 2008e, p. 9). In Liberia, agriculture employs 70 percent of people who have jobs (World Bank and AfDB, 2009, p. 14). Even in areas where mining can provide an income for a portion of the local population, agriculture will remain the main source of livelihood.

216. Liberia had a thriving mining industry prior to the civil war, with four large iron ore concessions contributing as much as 64 percent of total exports and 25 percent of the country’s GDP in the 1970s (World Bank, 2008, p. 61). But mining and rubber were enclave activities that only benefited a small portion of the population (World Bank and AfDB, 2009, p. 14). The majority of people in the country were engaged in subsistence agriculture.

AfDB, 2009, p. 3). They slowed in the 1980s and then collapsed entirely after 1989 when the war broke out. In Guinea, with bauxite and aluminum providing 60 percent of overall exports, and gold and diamonds providing another 25 percent and 6 percent of exports, respectively, large- and small-scale mines employ less than 1 percent of the population. In Sierra Leone mining is the second most important sector after agriculture, with estimates of up to 300,000 people directly employed in the sector, most of whom are artisanal miners (World Bank, 2008e, p. 4). An estimated 100,000 people work in the artisanal gold and diamond mining sector in Liberia, with as many as 1 million people involved in artisanal and small-scale mining in the Mano River Union sub-region, including Guinea, Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Côte d’Ivoire (Guseh and Yengbeh, 2008).

2.4.4.3 MRU sector-wide socioeconomic issues

217. There are a number of issues that are common to all three countries which are relevant to large-scale, small-scale, and artisanal mining. While they are issues in their own right, the lack of a clear policy framework that is capably implemented and enforced can lead to these other issues festering and creating lasting problems for governments, companies, and communities.

218. **Rent-seeking behavior and conditions that lead to weak governance.** All three countries have struggled with dysfunctional and under-resourced administrations, lack of adequate staffing, and poor training and enforcement of policies and regulations. Lack of adequate controls and oversight means that whatever revenue does flow through the system, at the national or local level it risks being siphoned off for personal interests. Likewise decision making processes for allocation of land or permits can be similarly subverted. The net effect of this behavior is to favor a small group of beneficiaries over other equally relevant stakeholders, which subverts the notion of open, transparent, and participatory processes to share benefits.

219. **Land tenure, allocation, and compensation issues.** The governments of all three countries own the mineral rights and have the power to decide how land is used. However, even within government there can be confusion over which ministry or agency ultimately decides who is entitled to use a certain piece of land. How individuals and communities are compensated for loss of land or crops due to mining in the three countries varies, but generally communities have little say in how land allocation decisions are made or equitable compensation. When large-scale mining companies are involved, they may implement their own methods and compensation amounts. With small-scale or artisanal miners, there may be no compensation offered to community members for damages to land or crops. Government ability to enforce what compensation laws do exist can be limited due to capacity constraints.

220. **Surface rents.** In principle all three countries require surface rents to be paid by miners to landholders. Surface rents are typically paid in advance every year, with portions of the rent split among various parties, including land owners, paramount chiefs, local councils, etc. Although the rates are set by law, the process by which the central government and local authorities (e.g., chiefs and local councils) decide on final allocations is unclear, leading to perceptions that the process is not transparent and does not include a broad enough group of stakeholders in the decision-making process.
221. **In-migration-driven social issues.** Large-scale mining operations often attract in-migration of jobseekers from outside the community, as do promising artisanal sites. These incoming workers will need housing, food, water, sanitation services, healthcare, and other basic needs. Communities are often pleased by the increased income the first wave of new arrivals injects into the economy. But as the in-migrant numbers swell, local socioeconomic and cultural patterns can be disrupted. The influx can strain local resources, and if not planned for by government or industry, can lead to rising social tension, clashes between new and longstanding residents, and increases in crime, use of drugs and alcohol, prostitution, gender-based violence, and HIV/AIDS and other sexually transmitted diseases. The fact that much of this in-migration may involve foreigners can create tensions with local populations. Governments have an interest in addressing large-scale movements of people, including cross-border migration, at the sub-regional level.

222. **Reclamation and rehabilitation of mining areas.** None of the three countries has extensive experience with rehabilitation and reclamation of mining areas. Artisanal miners typically move on, leaving vast areas of land damaged beyond the point of rehabilitation. Large-scale miners previously operating in Liberia and Sierra Leone abandoned their sites when the war came, leaving behind a host of environmental problems. In Guinea mining has been more or less continuous so there has not been the experience of a major mine closing. While there are laws requiring rehabilitation of mined-out areas, there is little government monitoring or enforcement. In one Sierra Leonean case, Sierra Rutile did some large-scale reclamation in 1990s but these areas have not been maintained nor have new areas been reclaimed since 1995. Only 80 hectares out of 13,000 have been reclaimed, and much of this was damaged by local inhabitants setting fires to harvest firewood. Experience in other mining countries shows that planning for reclamation and rehabilitation needs to be done in the early stages of launching a mining operation, including setting aside sufficient resources to pay for any eventual closure and required remediation.

2.4.5 **OVERVIEW OF ARTISANAL MINING IN THE MRU**

223. Artisanal mining is a major source of employment in the MRU, perhaps only second to agriculture in some areas. The sector also has the potential to generate additional employment opportunities through value-adding industries such as cutting and polishing rough diamonds, along with the resulting secondary industries. The overwhelming majority are casual laborers who are paid mainly in-kind, where wages comprise a daily food ration and a small cash allowance plus a small share in the sale price of any diamond they find. The presence of children and infants at ASM operations is common to all three countries, with women and children often being tasked with the transport of ore for crushing. In Guinea women crush ore with wooden mortars and pestles (sometimes with babies strapped to their backs), and concentrate the ore in small pools using rudimentary equipment. In some locations, more than one-half of the workforce is reportedly women, and although they apparently do not work in the shafts, there have been reports of children working underground. Tools used in ASM activities are self-made and very simple, and the gold recovery process is inefficient.

224. Activities are widespread through the MRU but most specifically associated with alluvial deposits of both diamonds and gold. As a result, there are significant water pollution issues where miners have used cyanide and mercury to extract diamonds and
gold. These chemicals are hazardous to fisheries and water supplies for rural dwellers. Artisanal mining also alters water flow, disturbing the water supply. Artisanal mining is particularly destructive to the land due to rudimentary mining and processing techniques such as uncontrolled pit digging with no routine backfilling, topsoil removal, and destruction of vegetation. The existing mining operations in the MRU are very often unregulated and mining companies and artisanal miners are able to mine wherever they locate minerals, and however they wish (i.e., no specific mineral waste dump requirements). Further, the artisanal and small-scale mining sector in the sub-region has been characterized by smuggling and other cross-border undercover activities. This is largely the result of different tax regimes occurring in adjacent countries causing the smuggling of diamonds into the country with the lowest taxes.

225. While recognizing that artisanal mining is a regional issue, there are also country specific issues as noted below.

226. **Liberia.** While recognizing that artisanal mining is a regional issue, there are also country specific issues as noted below.

227. The following initiatives around ASM have been implemented in Liberia:

- The Diamonds for Development (D4D) initiative aims to ensure that profits are returned to the area where the diamond was recovered. The Government and the UNDP assist ASM miners.
- Recently a dedicated facility was constructed in Monrovia to facilitate compliance with the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme (KPCS). It allows for the facilitation of diamond capture, evaluation, taxation, and export.
- Liberia has embarked on an awareness process for the KPCS, including meetings with stakeholders, although access to some of the ASM mining areas is difficult. This process includes staging dramas within the community about the KPCS and ASM in general.
- The Government has trained 67 mineral inspectors and 47 mineral agents. There are 35 mineral districts and 10 regional offices. Vendor forms and receipts are used, and only licensed miners and licensed buyers are allowed to operate within the diamond trade. Periodic reports are made to the KPCS.
- Liberia has set up a regional task force to regulate diamond mining.
- Conflicts and forced removal of ASM miners by large-scale mining companies is an issue in Liberia.

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16. Information on Liberia was presented by the Liberian Deputy Minister of Minerals, Planning and Development, Ministry of Lands, Mines & Energy (Hon A Kpandel Fayia) at the CASM Conference in Maputo, 2009.

17. The Kimberley Process is a collaborative effort between governments, industry, and civil society that aims to regulate the sale of conflict diamonds, defined as “rough diamonds used by rebel movements to finance wars against legitimate governments” (http://www.kimberleyprocess.com, 2009)
Liberia has further recognized the important role to be played by women in ASM. 228. **Sierra Leone**.\(^{18}\) ASM activities reportedly contributed to the war in Sierra Leone. In the 1980s, Sierra Leone was plagued with bad governance, with miners poorly paid and feeling dissatisfied. From 1990, mining communities generally supported the armed revolution in the form of ‘rebel’ miners. When the Peace Accord was signed at the end of the war in 2002, a Strategic Minerals Commission was established for Sierra Leone. However, mining is currently not supported by strong Government policy. Miners remain poorly paid and are often illiterate. As in Liberia, there are conflicts between ASM miners and large-scale mining concessions. This has resulted in two deaths, and the need for improvement has been identified.

229. The following initiatives around ASM have been implemented in Sierra Leone:

- The ASM sector is capable of supporting 150,000 to 200,000 miners, which offers significant employment opportunities, particularly for ex-combatants.
- There is a requirement for the regulation of health and safety, provision of accommodation, and the sharing of mining proceeds. A guideline was developed in 2004 which has been implemented in five regions. This has reportedly led to far better working conditions, with earnings increasing from US$ 0.50 per day to US$ 1.5 per day, and a shorter working day.
- The Government has introduced a program for communities, the Community Development Fund, (which makes use of large-scale mining license fees) to rehabilitate areas, provide clinics, and invest in agricultural programs.
- Fines or prison time are imposed if child laborers are identified on a concession. The Government has also initiated school-feeding schemes.
- Although the KPCS is being used in Sierra Leone, implementation has been very challenging. Most diamonds registered through this process are sourced from large-scale operations.
- The Sierra Leone United Mineworkers Union Grassroots Diggers Project was initiated in 2004. This project promotes advocacy of ASM activities, improved working conditions, and mainstreaming of ASM activities. Ninety-five percent of funding is provided by DFID, with 5 percent sourced from large-scale mining membership fees. Actions under this program have included workshops and awareness creation.

230. The global economic crisis has had an effect on ASM operations in Sierra Leone, with a decrease in the diamond price leading to movement of ASM diamond miners to exploite gold resources.

231. **Guinea**.\(^{19}\) ASM activities in Guinea are concentrated in Kouroussa, Siguiiri, Mandiana, and Dinguiraye. Upper Guinea alone has approximately 200,000 to 300,000

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18. Information on Sierra Leone was presented by the General Secretary of the Sierra Leone United Mineworkers Union (Mr Ezekiel Dyke) at the CASM Conference in Maputo, 2009.

ASM miners, with an estimated yield of 6 metric tonnes of gold per year, of which 2.3 metric tonnes are reportedly smuggled across the country’s borders, mainly to Mali.

232. ASM activities are not formalized beyond the requirement for a permit (for one year), and a ban on extensive use of electrical machinery. Mining concessions are defined by the national Ministry of Mines. There is reportedly strong enforcement to prohibit the use of mercury in the prefectures of Mandiana and Kourossa. Guinea exhibits a lack of support from authorities to establish effective educational and financing programs.

233. ASM miners work 8-hour days, and are forced to pay US$ 0.10 per day for entry to the site. Retrieved gold ‘specks’ are immediately sold to gold dealers known as ‘djatis’ at the mine sites who transport them to town for refining. Refining facilities are located in populated areas and neighbors are affected by poor air quality. Gold grains at this stage are still coarse, and the process is not effective. Sharing profits is very seldom equitable, with a shaft ‘owner’ deriving more income from ASM activities than the actual operators.

2.4.6 COEXISTENCE OF LARGE-SCALE, SMALL-SCALE, AND ARTISANAL MINING

234. With the possible exception of Guinea, to date there has not been much conflict between large-scale and small-scale miners. However, as mining development continues, this may become an issue for government, industry, and other stakeholders to address. Counties along the Liberian side of the Sierra Leone-Liberia border in particular have a history of artisanal and small-scale mining, but they are now seeing the arrival of larger-scale industrial mining operations. Care will need to be taken to minimize conflicts over access to land, especially where local populations have a history of digging in areas where new large operators have won concessions or are carrying out exploration activities.

2.5 Benefits of adopting a ‘mineral-infrastructure’ cluster approach

235. There are a number of mineral belts running through the MRU sub-region, where there are multiple deposits of low-value, high-bulk minerals (such as iron ore or bauxite) located near each other. These ‘mineral clusters’ have the geological potential to support high-tonnage, long-life mining/mineral processing projects, which in turn create the justification for infrastructure investments. Because the infrastructure needed to bring the minerals to ports from some of these belts may run hundreds of kilometers, this creates an opportunity for mining infrastructure to be used by and stimulate other economic activities around the mineral cluster and along so-called resource corridors or development corridors (DCs).

236. It is against this backdrop that WAMSSA identified a ‘mineral-infrastructure’ cluster approach. Mining can become a driver of sustainable development in the MRU sub-region if single project-oriented development is substituted with a mineral-infrastructure cluster-oriented approach for planning and investment.

237. The historical development model in which project developers ‘go it alone’ has resulted in a number of challenges for:

- Project developers, particularly in terms of infrastructure costs;
- Local communities where downstream opportunities are limited; and
Government structures which are challenged by the need to regulate on a piecemeal basis and to potentially invest in infrastructure where sustainable revenue streams depend on only one contributor.

238. The opportunities presented through a mineral-infrastructure cluster approach will be realized by providing a critical sustainable economic basis to catalyze downstream investment. For example:

- Mineral clusters would drive the sub-regional economy in the same direction as that of the developed resource-rich countries that used their resources as a basis for subsequent development, allowing for integrated growth and sustainable development using resources as a catalyst.
- The development of infrastructure that not only benefits the projects on which it is originally based but will provide longer-term benefits to improve socioeconomic conditions. The provision of this infrastructure then underpins the viability of numerous projects in other sectors.
- Not only does it assist in generating greater technological competence in the local workforce and increasing the contribution of high-tech exports to total exports, but it also ensures a long-term and sustained approach to management of a transient resource base. The competitiveness of the original resource base is maintained and broadened as it is gradually embedded into more and more sectors of the economy.

239. A cluster approach facilitates the formation of public-private partnerships that will in the long-term benefit local communities. Given the potential for expansion of multiple large-scale mining projects across the MRU region in coming years, viewing these mining projects and related infrastructure needs in clusters provides a way to address the common, overlapping environmental, social, economic, and sector governance issues raised by the accumulation of such projects. It also offers synergies that can lower risks and cost to any one operator, if a workable governance mechanism for such shared infrastructure can be developed.

240. A cluster-based approach also recognizes that developing multiple projects near national borders inevitably creates transborder environmental and social impacts that need to be addressed in a sub-regional context. These include problems associated with mining activity, including water and soil pollution affecting watersheds that run through several countries, as well as social problems caused by the movement of people within a country and across borders in search of mining-related employment. Many of the artisanal miners and job seekers who settle near large-scale mining sites come from other countries within the MRU sub-region and other West African countries. Habitat and biodiversity loss, water pollution in transboundary watersheds, and mining-induced population in-migration cannot adequately be managed solely within the borders of a single country.

2.5.1 PAST EXPERIENCE WITH REGIONAL AND CLUSTER APPROACHES

241. The strategy of using large mineral deposits to anchor large infrastructure investments and enable ancillary economic development, in some cases across national borders, first gained momentum in Africa in Southern Africa.
242. A recent report commissioned by the World Bank (Jourdan, 2009) as a follow-up to an earlier analysis completed for NEPAD (Jourdan, 2008), makes the case for leveraging large deposits or clusters of deposits of low-value, high-bulk minerals (such as iron ore, bauxite, or coal) to catalyze infrastructure investments, which can in turn create development corridors and other spatial development initiatives (SDIs). This integrated development model is built around poles or clusters of natural resources which are then linked to ports and international markets by transportation and power infrastructure aligned along development corridors. This infrastructure is ‘oversized’ relative to the mining project needs, enabling other economic activities to benefit from the infrastructure, including small-scale industries or agriculture that could supply the mines or use the infrastructure to distribute their goods elsewhere in the country or abroad.

243. The Maputo Development Corridor (MDC), running between South Africa and Mozambique, was one of the first of these regional spatial development initiatives. The initiative focused on rehabilitating an old rail corridor running between Johannesburg and Maputo, along with investments in the high voltage power lines and a toll road running along the same corridor. Additional investments along the corridor were made in a BHP Billiton Mozal Aluminium Smelter in Maputo, upgrades to the port or Maputo, a gas pipeline, as well as additional industrial parks and tourism facilities. The success of this effort has led the AU to look to duplicate this approach elsewhere in Africa.

244. The cluster approach also was used successfully in the Steelpoort Valley in South Africa, where a number of platinum mining companies formed a partnership along with various state organs to develop various sector plans relating to infrastructure development and social investment. Through the partnership a number of projects have been successfully completed, including road and water infrastructure development, integrated spatial planning where the interests of the mining companies and government bodies were clearly aligned and in which local bylaws have been promulgated (Lourens and Louw, 2009).

245. Other examples of this cluster and corridor approach include the Moatize Coal Project in Malawi, which uses a combination of public and private investments and partnerships to provide transportation and other infrastructure development along with social investments to enable other economic development activities along a corridor running through the Zambezi River valley from Malawi to the Mozambican port of Beira.

246. There has also been a wider move to adopt the use of DCs, SDIs, and regional approaches to develop infrastructure within the development community, starting with cataloguing infrastructure that is already in place. The Africa Infrastructure Country Diagnostic (AICD) is supported by the AU and other African regional organizations, donor agencies, and coordinated by the World Bank. AICD was designed to improve public understanding and knowledge of physical infrastructure in Africa. It has collected data and analyses on main network infrastructure, including energy, transport, irrigation, water and sanitation, and information and communications technologies from across the continent. AICD is intended to provide a baseline for prioritizing investments, designing policy reforms, and measuring improvements to infrastructure services in Africa (Foster, 2008).
All of the results can be viewed by sectors (e.g., railways, ports, power, etc.), themes (e.g., spending needs, spending patterns, efficiency measures, funding gaps, poverty and inequality, institutional reform, spatial development, and regional integration) or countries. The AICD website (www.infrastructureafrica.org) also offers four different types of tools for analytical work — databases, results tables, maps, and interactive models. AICD’s database does not cover oil and gas pipelines or private port and rail infrastructure dedicated to the exclusive use of particular mineral or industrial activities, although infrastructure shared by public and private users, or multiple private users (such as the multi-use rail and port facilities that might be established in the MRU) would be included. These online resources can help with spatial planning and resource corridor development in the MRU and between MRU countries and others in the region.

2.5.2 CLUSTER AND DEVELOPMENT CORRIDOR APPROACH — LESSONS LEARNED

While there are potential benefits to adopting the mineral-infrastructure cluster approach, it was not without its problems, many of which are germane to the MRU situation. As one report on the African experience with development corridors and SDIs notes, there were a number of ways the Maputo Development Corridor fell short of expectations (Thomas, 2009).
249. Specific difficulties encountered on the MDC project that may of relevance to the MRU include a failure to develop an adequate legal and institutional framework in Mozambique before the project began. There also was insufficient Mozambican capacity to assess the implications of specific investment projects. And early engagement with affected local communities in Mozambique was deemed inadequate by those communities. In South Africa, the initial enthusiasm for the project gave way to disappointment among communities and prospective investors because many of the smaller proposed business ventures planned for the corridor proved not to be bankable. And lastly, negative environmental impacts and governance issues arose in some areas along the corridor once activities began (Thomas, 2009).

250. The study identified other challenges to making DCs and SDIs work, including political instability in a region; poor political buy-in by key players (e.g., heads of state or other powerful players); lack of government or other institutional capacity to develop and manage the process; weak investment climate and poor regulatory environments; a weak domestic private sector that may be unable to take advantage of opportunities created by foreign investment; premature marketing of a corridor for investment before projects are ready for banking; and donor interests that may be too narrowly focused on one aspect of an SDI project to the exclusion of other opportunities (Thomas, 2009).

251. All of these issues are potential risks in the MRU countries and should be anticipated in any regional development plans. Also, given the tendency for infrastructure to be completed before all institutional arrangements and local links are established, proponents of mineral-infrastructure clusters and development corridors for the MRU should seek to strengthen policy and institutional capacity and engage communities before the construction components of a project begin.

252. While it would take time for the MRU countries to reach the level of industrial development and economic activity seen in Southern Africa, the necessity of creating transportation infrastructure to link inland mineral deposits with ports creates an opportunity to kick-start the process. At a minimum, opening mining rail lines to previously ‘stranded’ existing or potential economic activities that lie along the corridors (such as agriculture or logging), and to the transport of other goods and people can have positive economic impacts in the sub-region.

2.6 MRU mineral-infrastructure cluster identification

253. The identification of potential mining-infrastructure clusters in the MRU was undertaken by overlapping the mineral potential, infrastructure, environmental, and social information presented earlier in this section. In doing so, it was possible to determine that:

- The location of key, high-bulk mineral resources that would lead to mineral cluster development;
- Areas where a regional approach to infrastructure development would result in the most significant environmental, social, and economic returns; and
- Areas in which transboundary social and/or environmental effects could be most effectively managed through a regional approach.
As a result and with input from the WAMSSA Steering Committee, three distinct sub-regional cluster opportunities were identified (Figure 9):

- Iron ore deposit clusters in southeastern Guinea and Nimba and Lofa counties in Liberia;
- Iron ore and gold deposit clusters in or near transborder watersheds and protected forests along the Sierra Leone/Liberia border; and
- Central Guinea and northern Sierra Leone bauxite deposits.

A fourth sub-regional issue for the mining sector was identified. Potential artisanal and small-scale mining development is a critical sub-regional issue but is not geographically specific; therefore, the sub-regional ASM issues are discussed below but are not reflected on the map due to its widespread nature.

**2.6.1 EAST IRON ORE DEPOSIT CLUSTER — SOUTHEASTERN GUINEA AND NIMBA AND LOFA COUNTIES, LIBERIA**

This opportunity assumes the construction of a transborder railway running from the iron ore concessions of southeastern Guinea, past the iron ore deposits in Nimba County, Liberia, and down to the Liberian port of Buchanan. The projects are located around the Mount Nimba massif that straddles the borders of Guinea, Liberia, and Côte d’Ivoire. Two other iron ore projects in southeastern Guinea, the Rio Tinto Simandou iron ore project, located north of the BHP concession near the prefecture capitals of Nzérékoré and Beyla, and BSRG’s Simandou project, located just north and south of Rio Tinto’s concession, may also use this corridor to export their ore.

Mining projects likely to use this corridor include two iron ore projects in Nimba County, Liberia (the Arcelor Mittal iron ore concession near Yekepa and a possible BHP-Billiton iron ore project near Saniquellie), as well as the BHP-Billiton/Newmont Mining Nimba iron ore project in Lola prefecture in southeastern Guinea. BHP Billiton, which owns 41.3 percent of Mount Nimba mining concession, is currently conducting a concept study in the area (rich in fauna and flora and owned by the state, but 1,550 hectares are allocated for mining [Wright, 2003]). Drilling to date has identified high-grade and high-quality (low Al2O3 and P) mineralization desirable for the European and Asian markets. The resource has development alternatives of between 20 to 40 metric tonnes per year, with production starting as early as 2013 (bhpbilliton.com).

The renegotiated Mining Development Agreement between ArcelorMittal and the Government to mine the western iron ore deposits in Nimba County was signed and approved by the new Administration in December 2006 and later approved by the National Legislature. In 2005, Arcelor Mittal entered into a mining development agreement with the Government to mine of about 1 billion metric tonnes of iron ore reserves in Nimba County. The 25-year contract included rehabilitation of the Buchanan port and the 267-kilometer rail line to the old Yekepa mine, which was closed during the 1990s because of the civil war. ArcelorMittal did not plan to resume mining at Yekepa, although it did plan to reuse some of the remaining infrastructure at the mine. The first mining activities will take place instead at an abandoned mine in Tokadeh. The ore of the Tokadeh deposit was reportedly hematite ore with 45 to 55 percent iron content. The ore was to be processed as sinter feed instead of as lump or pellet. About 20,000 to 25,000
metric tonnes of iron ore, which was owned by the Government, remained at the Port of Buchanan. The Government had put the ore up for tender and ArcelorMittal was awaiting its removal to begin rehabilitation of the port. The rail line to Yekepa would be a single track operation with a capacity of 15 metric tonnes per year. Arcelor Mittal investment in the project will be about US$ 1 billion (Mittal Steel Company N.V., 2005; Metal Bulletin, 2006; Mining Journal, 2006a).

259. In the first phase of the project ArcelorMittal anticipates employing approximately 500 people. In future phases, it is proposing to establish a dedicated coal-fired power station generating between 150 and 200 megawatts. In early 2010, ArcelorMittal reported that it was in discussion with BHP Billiton over a possible combination of their respective units in Liberia and Guinea.

260. The Simandou iron ore deposit was estimated to be between 66 and 68 percent at resources over 1, 200 metric tonnes (Wright, 2003). Guinea iron ore deposits were only looked at from 1997 when Rio Tinto signed a letter of intent to undertake the evaluation and drilling of known deposits in the Simandou Range (Wright, 2003). Simandou Range is a 115-kilometer-long mountain range in southeastern Guinea within Beyla, Kerouane, and Macenta Guinea. In 2008 Rio Tinto’s expenditures in Simandou accelerated as the pre-feasibility study of the deposit begins to gather pace. Evaluation of this project, however, has been scaled back in light of the current economic crisis (Rio Tinto Press Release, 2009), as well as the political turmoil that has gripped the country since a military junta took over following the death of former President Lansana Conte in December 2008. Rio Tinto envisions the operations to begin by 2013 at a production rate of about 70 metric tonnes per year (Mittal Steel Company N.V., 2005; Metal Bulletin, 2006; Mining Journal, 2006a; Rio Tinto Press Release, 2009).
Figure 9. Location of sub-regional mining-infrastructure cluster opportunities
261. Once the project is running the Guinean Government would have the right to earn 20 percent interest in the project (Lugo, 2008). The International Finance Corporation (IFC) held a 5 percent interest in SIMFER (Rio Tinto is a wholly-owned subsidiary of SIMFER S.A). The IFC supported Rio Tinto and the Guinean Government in conducting the necessary feasibility, environmental, social, and transportation studies for the development of the Simandou project (IFC, 2006). In March 2010, Rio Tinto announced it was in discussions with Aluminum Corp of China (Chinalco) to have Chinalco make a US$ 1.37 billion investment for a 47 percent stake in a new holding company set up by Rio Tinto for the Simandou project. The Chinalco investment would be used to finance the next stage of project development, with additional Chinalco investments to be made later, Rio Tinto said.20

262. The Beny Steinmetz Resource Group (BSRG) was awarded a portion of Rio Tinto’s original concession by a previous military government in 2008. While this decision is still being contested by Rio Tinto, BSRG now has iron concessions lying north and south of Rio Tinto’s Simandou holdings, which could also benefit from the use of a rail corridor to a Liberian port.

263. Communities, forest areas, and watersheds on both sides of the border would be affected by the BHP and ArcelorMittal projects and the Simandou projects, while the rehabilitation of the rail line and port could have environmental and socioeconomic impacts on the communities — estimated at being in excess of 700,000 people who live along the corridor. Construction of a new rail line in southeastern Guinea linking one or several mine projects to the rehabilitated Liberian railway could increase transborder movement of goods and people in the area. This cluster makes use of the WAPP for energy requirements. These issues are expanded upon in Table 6.

264. Jourdan and others suggest that given the number of potential operations and the tonnage that will need to be carried, there may eventually be sufficient economic justification for two rail lines originating at the various Simandou concessions, one running from Simandou to BHP’s Guinean Nimba operation to Yekepa, Kitoma (another BHP Billiton site in Liberia) down to Buchanan; and one running from Simandou to Wologizi to Kpo to Bong (all iron ore deposits under exploration or development, and noted in the cluster described below) to Monrovia (Jourdan, 2009).

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Table 6. Analysis of sub-regional mining opportunities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Sub-regional opportunity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>East iron ore deposit cluster</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Projects</td>
<td>Bong County iron ore mines</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Wologisi and Wonegizi mountain ranges in northern Lofa County</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mano River Iron Ore deposits, western portion of the Bomu Hills Iron Ore deposits, and the Bea Mountain Iron ore deposits</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Bea Mountain gold project</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Nimini Hills gold prospect</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Teye River alluvial gold production near Yele town.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Nimini, the Pampana, and the Sonfon properties.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Friguia bauxite deposits in Guinea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Port Loko bauxite deposits in Sierra Leone</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anchor project</td>
<td>All of the projects listed above represent significant investments that have in excess of 20-year lifespan.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anchor project potential</td>
<td>The projects listed above (with the possible exception of the Bong and Cluff Gold projects are in the early stages of investigation).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The feasibility of the identified projects has already been proven and both show significant potential for further exploitation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infrastructure</td>
<td>Road, rail and port infrastructure to support this cluster are currently in poor condition. This includes the Buchanan-Yekepa railroad and associated access roads, and the Buchanan Port.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Road, rail and port infrastructure to support this cluster are currently in extremely poor condition or do not exist – for instance there is no rail linking Liberia with Sierra Leone. Port facilities at Free-town and Robertsport would require significant upgrade to accommodate additional export flows.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Rail and port infrastructure is an already recognised strong point for these projects although the development of the Trans Guinean railroad and the port at Matakam would further enhance the viability of the Friguia deposit.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Due to the challenges associated with securing mineral royalties from artisanal mining it is unlikely that the sector will generate revenue that will return significant benefits to fund infrastructure development in areas of ASM activity.
### Table 6. Analysis of sub-regional mining opportunities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>East iron ore deposit cluster</th>
<th>Central iron ore and gold deposit clusters</th>
<th>Central Guinea and northern Sierra Leone bauxite deposits</th>
<th>Artisanal mining</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Transport infrastructure: Potential</td>
<td>The cluster requires the go-ahead of the planned Buchanan-Yekepa railroad upgrade to be enhanced to accommodate the increased load generated from the Simandou and Nimba deposits. In addition, Buchanan port would need to be upgraded further to enable the export of the additional tonnage.</td>
<td>The cluster will require significant upgrading and new build for road, rail and port facilities. The construction of new roads and rail will prove a significant challenge due to the proximity of highly sensitive ecosystems.</td>
<td>The cluster would not require significant infrastructure upgrade (excepting for the issues already identified above).</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Power</td>
<td>Current availability: These clusters are not currently serviced with on-grid electrical facilities. Therefore, there is no large-scale capacity or transmission into the respective regions.</td>
<td>The area will be serviced by the WAPP. Additionally, there is significant opportunity for the establishment of hydropower on the Mano River and to capitalise on the proposed hydropower facility on the St Paul.</td>
<td>The implementation of the WAPP will provide the region with on-grid electricity. Further, there exists opportunity to develop hydropower resources in the region specifically associated with the Friguia deposit.</td>
<td>ASM sites are typically found in areas not currently serviced with on-grid electrical facilities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Environmental constraints</td>
<td>Biodiversity hotspots: The cluster is located within the Dieke and Mount Nimba exceptionally high priority areas.</td>
<td>The cluster is located within the Gola-Lofa-Mano Complex exceptionally high priority area.</td>
<td>There are no specific environmental constraints that would be affected by the exploitation of this cluster.</td>
<td>Significant fragmentation effects on forested areas through disturbance to flora (for fuel wood etc) and fauna (as a result of hunting for food and habitat destruction).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Water resources: The area is located within a transboundary watershed linking</td>
<td>The area is located within the transboundary watershed of the St Paul</td>
<td></td>
<td>Significant impacts at the sub-regional level relating to water</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 6. Analysis of sub-regional mining opportunities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>East iron ore deposit cluster</th>
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<th>Artisanal mining</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Guinea and Liberia and Mano River systems.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>course divergence and water pollution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Socioeconomic issues</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poverty in mining areas</td>
<td>Poverty in region increased during wars</td>
<td>Poverty in region increased during wars</td>
<td>Poverty in region increased during wars</td>
<td>Poverty in region increased during wars. Diamond mining slowed down with world economy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lack of employment opportunities</td>
<td>The bulk of the people located within these clusters are engaged in subsistence agriculture. The agricultural production in each of the clusters agriculture comprises in excess of 70% of the economic activity of the local populace.</td>
<td>Poor road infrastructure, no operating rail. Rail line in Liberia to be rebuilt by ArcelorMittal. Proposed TransGuinean rail line through southern Guinea faces financial hurdles</td>
<td>Poor road infrastructure. Rail facilities are operational for existing bauxite mines.</td>
<td>Artisanal miners encroach on productive agricultural land</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nonexistent or wrecked infrastructure</td>
<td>Poor road infrastructure, no operating rail. Rail line in Liberia to be rebuilt by ArcelorMittal. Proposed TransGuinean rail line through southern Guinea faces financial hurdles</td>
<td>Poor road infrastructure, no operating rail. Possible road or rail infrastructure to be refurbished by mining companies</td>
<td>Poor road infrastructure. Rail facilities are operational for existing bauxite mines.</td>
<td>Some areas may benefit from donor feeder road and farm-to-market road-building projects</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional integration potential</td>
<td>The cluster provides a regional opportunity for Liberia, Guinea and potentially Côte d’Ivoire (depending on the potential use of the Port of San Pedro).</td>
<td>The cluster provides a regional opportunity for Liberia and Sierra Leone</td>
<td>The cluster does not immediately lend itself to regional integration since both deposits are recognised as being viable in their own right.</td>
<td>Economic integration of disparate artisanal mining sites unlikely, however coordinated regional oversight could ameliorate border zone and transborder environmental, social and security issues</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
2.6.2 CENTRAL IRON ORE AND GOLD DEPOSIT CLUSTERS (SIERRA LEONE/LIBERIA BORDER)

265. Mining projects in Liberia that may use this corridor include the China Union Company iron ore concession at the site of the old Bong Mines in Bong County, as well as prospective iron ore and other mineral sites in the Wologisi and Wonegizi mountain ranges in northern Lofa County. The Liberian Government put the Western Cluster iron ore concessions up for tender, which included the remaining iron ore reserves at Kongo, the Western Bomi Hills, and the Bea Mountains. Liberia reopened bidding for the Western Cluster iron ore project in 2009, after it cancelled a previous concession awarded to Delta Mining Corp (Mining Journal, 2008 December 5). Approval for China Union’s US$ 2.6 billion agreement to develop the Bong iron ore project in Liberia occurred in 2009.

266. Construction of new mine sites and/or rehabilitation of existing mines and rail lines would affect the communities and ecosystems surrounding the mine sites and along the rail lines, possibly including the St. Paul River watershed. This infrastructure and mining activity would also increase the potential for cross-border movement of people and goods and in-migration around the mining areas. This opportunity assumes the development of new mines in western Liberia’s Grand Cape Mount County, which lies along the Mano River. The river also forms the border with southeastern Sierra Leone, and runs through a stretch of the disappearing Upper Guinea Forest ecosystem which lies on both sides of the border. The mining areas in Liberia include the Western Cluster, a concession that includes three iron ore deposits (Mano River, western portion of Bomi Hills, and Bea Mountain) and two abandoned mines.

267. Other mining projects in the area include Mano River Resources’ Bea Mountain gold project. These projects may involve the construction of rail lines to ports in Monrovia or to Robertsport on the far western Liberian coast. Road or rail networks in this region could eventually extend into southern Sierra Leone. The mining projects in Liberia could increase transborder and within-country migration, as well as put pressure on sensitive transborder ecological areas, including the Mano River watershed and the Gola Forest areas on both sides of the border. These forest areas are also the proposed site of an EU-funded Transboundary Peace Park for Sierra Leone and Liberia.

268. The extension of the cluster into Sierra Leone would increase the opportunities for the gold deposits in the Kangari Hills, the Sula Mountains, and in the Bo, Koinadougu, and Tonkolili districts. Opportunities in this area are under investigation/mining by Cluff Gold Plc through Baomahun Gold Ltd (situated 180 kilometers east of Freetown). Further opportunities include the Nimini Hills gold prospect situated 220 kilometers east of Freetown. Alluvial gold production will begin along the Teye River near Yele town. There are also a number of future prospects including through Mano River Resources Inc. at the Nimini, Pampana, and Sonfon properties.

269. Mano River Resources Inc. (MRR), through its wholly-owned subsidiary Bea Mountain Mining Corp., signed a US$ 700,000 contract with MODEM Engineering (MODEM) of Johannesburg for preparation of a bankable feasibility study for the New Liberty Gold Mine (NLG) deposit (formerly King George Larjor deposit; name changed in 2006) and for the Weaju gold deposit in western Liberia, each of which were to be developed initially as open pit operations. The New Liberty Gold (NLG) mine deposit is
an Archaen shear zone deposit, which is located about 90 kilometers from Monrovia. Total measured and indicated mineral resources at NLG were estimated to be about 13.5 million metric tonnes of ore at a grade of 3.18 grams of gold per metric tonne of ore. The mineral resource estimate was completed by Lower Quartile Solutions of South Africa (Mano River Resources Inc. 2006a, 2006d).

270. The Baomahun gold project with 100 percent ownership of Cluff Gold Plc through Baomahun Gold Ltd is 180 kilometers east of Freetown. The project is situated along the prospective Kangari Hills Greenstone Belt. As of June 2008 the reported resources were 14.02 million metric tonnes of ore at 3 grams of gold per metric tonne of ore for 1.35 million ounces of gold (Register of Africa Mining, 2009).

271. The Nimini Hills gold prospect (includes Komahun), with 60 percent ownership of Axmin Inc, is 220 kilometers east of Freetown. The property is in the Nimini Hills Archaean greenstone belt. As of October 2006 resources at Komahun were reported to be 4.87 million metric tonnes of ore at 2.5 grams of gold per metric tonne of ore for 0.39144 million ounces of gold (Register of Africa Mining, 2009).

272. London-based Target Resources plc, through its subsidiary Milestone Trading Ltd, said it would start alluvial gold production along the Teye River and its tributaries after ‘encouraging results’ from initial sampling. The company is preparing to start a gold operation in a prospective area near Yele town and it would immediately move to recover gold from the slimes discharged during diamond production in Kono (Mining Journal, 2009 March 11).

273. Other companies exploring for gold in the country included Vancouver-based Mano River Resources Inc. (MRR) in joint venture with Golden Star Resources Ltd. (GSR) of the United States, which explored for gold at the Nimini, Pampana, and Sonfon properties; and African Diamond plc of the United Kingdom, which held a mining license to rework the tailings from an old alluvial mining operation for which initial sampling showed the presence of both gold and platinum group metals (PGM), reportedly containing 0.24 to 0.57 grams of gold per metric tonne of ore and 0.01 grams of PGMs per metric tonne of ore (Mining Journal, 2006, p. 4, 8).

2.6.3 CENTRAL GUINEA AND NORTHERN SIERRA LEONE BAUXITE DEPOSITS (GUINEA/SIERRA LEONE)

274. This cluster capitalizes on the potential mineral value associated with the Friguia bauxite deposits located near the border between Guinea and Sierra Leone. The Friguia deposits and associated alumina refining complex were sold in April 2006 to Rusal. The deposit has the potential to produce 1.9 million metric tonnes of bauxite per year and 640,000 metric tonnes of alumina. While representing significant potential, the ownership of the deposit is currently under discussion between the Guinean government and Rusal and is further under environmental scrutiny, with Rusal recently paying an environmental tax to the Guinean government.

275. This cluster would capitalize on the further development of the Port Loko bauxite concession in northeast of Sierra Leone, a large tract of land of more than 650 square kilometers. Feasibility studies undertaken by Moydow indicate that individual blocks vary between 70,000 metric tonnes to more than 5 million metric tonnes. The Moydow
feasibility study indicates that one of the key attractive features of the Port Loko bauxite deposits is the presence of significant infrastructure in the region. Specifically, the rail line runs through the center of the Port Loko deposit to the port facility at Pepel, which has the capability of loading Panamax-size vessels at rates up to 4,000 metric tonnes per hour. Further, Moydow has identified the opportunity to develop the entire resource base at Port Loko and process the ore into alumina at a refinery based in Sierra Leone and has initiated discussions with third parties and the Government of Sierra Leone to evaluate the economics of a refinery and associated facilities to be based in the country.

276. While reflected as a cluster, it is possible that the Friguia and Port Loko deposits could be developed without the need for a cluster approach:

- The deposits are at sufficient distance from one another that they are unlikely to capitalize on joint infrastructure development (specifically, electricity).
- Both deposits already have access to developed port and rail infrastructure (although the upgrade of the central Guinea railway and the establishment of a port at Matakan with associated downstream alumina processing facilities would be an important factor in the further development of the Friguia deposits).
- Both deposits are of sufficient magnitude that they have or are already considering downstream bauxite processing.
- There are no transboundary environmental resources that are likely to be affected by the cumulative effects of developing the two deposits.

277. Table 6 provides an overview of the various projects within the three potential mining-infrastructure clusters and artisanal mining across the sub-region. Mining prospects are presented, as well as the infrastructure, environmental, socioeconomic, and regional integration aspects of the clusters.

278. The clusters identified above are regional. In addition to these, it is possible to cluster opportunities on a national basis. One such cluster, the Bauxite Mines and Alumina Refineries cluster in the prefecture of Boké, Guinea Maritime is described in more detail in Box 4. Given the focus of WAMSSA on regional initiatives, these national clusters are not evaluated in this report.

2.6.4 CAN ARTISANAL MINING BECOME A DEVELOPMENT OPPORTUNITY?

279. Artisanal mining in the MRU is widespread and a major source of employment, albeit largely in the informal sector. It can provide thousands of jobs for unskilled laborers, even if working conditions and potential income are less than ideal. In addition, the sector also has the potential to generate additional employment opportunities through value-added industries such as cutting and polishing rough diamonds, along with resulting secondary industries. Because it is a socioeconomic reality that is unlikely to go away or be replaced by other economic activities, artisanal mining should be viewed and managed by policy makers as an economic opportunity rather than a problem. With significant regional impacts from the artisanal mining sector, regional harmonization is critical to both maximize economic returns and minimize environmental and social effects.
Box 4. Bauxite mines and alumina refineries cluster in the prefecture of Boké, Guinea Maritime

A national Bauxite Mines and Alumina Refineries cluster has already been identified in Guinea (located on the adjacent map). The cluster includes the existing Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinée (CBG) large active bauxite mine located in Sangaredi and four potential new operations as follows:

**Guinea Alumina Corporation (GAC).** The project includes a bauxite mine, power plant, alumina refinery, and port facility. The mine, power plant, and refinery site are located about 20 kilometers west of the town of Sangarédi. Related infrastructure includes a new 14-kilometer railway spur from the refinery site to the existing main railway line from existing bauxite operations (CBG, managed by Alcoa / Rio Tinto Alcan) and the Kamsar port, a short spur connecting the main line to the alumina terminal, a water reservoir, and a red mud (waste by-product of alumina production) dam disposal facility. The refinery area is bordered on the east by the Kéwéwol River, the Tanène sub-prefecture to the west, Tchankoun-Tiouli village to the north, and National Route 22 to the south. The port is located at the town of Kamsar on the Rio Nuñez, about 124 kilometers southwest of the refinery.

**United Company Rusal’s Dian-Dian project.** The Dian-Dian project includes a potential bauxite mine (approx. 13.4 million metric tones per year) and a refinery (approx. 2.8 million metric tones per year) located on the concession lands. Associated facilities may include a new rail line to the coast; a greenfield port for shipping product from the mine/refinery; water supply reservoir for the refinery complex area; a power plant to provide electricity; housing for workers at both the refinery and port locations; and roads and related infrastructure.

**Alcoa-Rio Tinto-Alcan Kamsar refinery project.** The project concept includes a 1.5 million metric tones per year refinery and associated infrastructure. Bauxite is likely to be sourced from the expansion of CBG’s existing mines and be delivered by CBG to the Refinery. The project facilities and infrastructure may include a port site and rail siding from the main CBG line, as well as power supply and supplemental transportation infrastructure.

**BHP Billiton Boffa/Santou Project.** Little information is available on this project.

Recognizing the cumulative impact that these projects could present, the International Finance Corporation (IFC) called for proposals to conduct a Strategic and Sectoral Impact Assessment (SSIA) for the cluster. A strategic approach for the careful management of cumulative impacts in this sector has the
potential to mitigate significant negative effects as well as optimize the regional and national benefits of the sector’s projects. In promoting a sectoral/cluster approach the results of the SSIA could open the dialogue for biodiversity offsets and combined community development programs among multiple projects in the cluster, ensuring that private sector investment achieves greater development outcome than is possible through silo-like investments. The Strategic Assessment project has not been commissioned as yet.

280. UNDP’s Harmonization of Artisanal and Small-Scale Diamond Mining Policy, Legislative, and Regulatory Framework program is a step in that direction. A number of key recommendations arising from that initiative, several of which may prove challenging to implement, include:

- Ensuring consistency in mineral royalties at a level that is acceptable across the MRU (a figure of 8 percent was mooted);
- Creating a sub-regional diamond cutting and polishing industry;
- Harmonization of environmental regulations, including monitoring and rehabilitation fees with consistently enforced policies and regulations; and
- Ensuring that there is parity in gender and youth labor, i.e., that women and youth are paid similar wages to men in the sector, and that child labor is reduced or eliminated.

281. Because of the potential geographic overlap of mineral deposits that are of interest to both large-scale operators and artisanal miners, companies have a vested interest in working with governments, development partners, and local communities affected by artisanal mining to find ways to lessen conflict and increase economic opportunities for those who work in the artisanal sector, and their families. That is why artisanal mining is included in the discussion of mining-infrastructure cluster development as a fourth opportunity that can benefit from both regional harmonization and greater involvement of local governments and communities.

282. The AMGP program will include a component focused on artisanal mining, which supports the concept of trying to harmonize approaches to dealing with artisanal mining and its environmental and social impacts on a regional basis because it is such a fluid activity that does not recognize borders.

2.7 Implications for AMGP

283. Within the MRU countries, AMGP efforts to develop regional common principles and policy and regulatory frameworks, and to provide institutional strengthening, should support identification and development of viable mineral-infrastructure clusters and related infrastructure corridors as a cornerstone of its support to those countries. This approach appears to be supported by the growing interest of regional bodies and development partners in using the Spatial Development Initiative and Development Corridor planning concepts to gain maximum synergies from infrastructure investments.
3. Environmental, Social, and Governance Priorities for Minerals Development

3.1 Key findings

284. **Stakeholder consultations.** Building on the work of the cluster and stakeholder analyses, a series of stakeholder consultations was held in the three countries to engage key mining sector stakeholders in a policy dialogue to discuss **critical issues** and determine **key priorities** for mining-infrastructure development in the MRU sub-region.

285. **Key priorities.** Seven environmental, social, and governance issues were selected by institutional and/or community stakeholders as key priorities, through an extensive stakeholder consultation and policy dialogue process.

286. **Strong current of social accountability.** Despite the initial focus of WAMSSA on purely environmental and social issues, there was a strong current of social accountability and frustration with the quality of governance that bubbled up from the consultations, coupled with a sense that these issues need to be tackled before environmental and social concerns can be addressed. This is evidenced by the fact that four of the final seven priorities are governance issues that were identified through the consultative process.

287. **Participatory planning and common standards.** Further stakeholder discussions during the national and regional workshops affirmed the value of adopting a regional and cluster-based approach to mining and infrastructure development that includes both participatory bottom-up approaches to development planning, as well as a progressive convergence of common regional environmental and social policies and standards.

288. **Implications for AMGP.** Stakeholder prioritization of governance issues ties in well with AMGP components devoted to improving policy and regulatory frameworks and strengthening institutional and community-level capacity. The ability to better assess, monitor, and manage mining-induced environmental and social issues will flow from the development of stronger institutions and policy frameworks. Also, the transborder nature of environmental and social impacts that arise from individual mining projects and mineral clusters that lie near country borders require regionally harmonized approaches if they are to properly addressed.

3.1.1 Critical Issues Identified by the Analysis and Consultation Processes

289. While the WAMSSA situation analysis and assessment of mineral sector opportunities, including the definition of the mineral-infrastructure clusters, were in progress, a series of stakeholder consultations was held as part of an ongoing policy dialogue to identify key environmental and social priorities.

290. The team started the consultation with a list of issues derived from the situation analysis that were primarily environmental and social in nature, relating to pollution, employment, etc. However, it became clear in early key informant interviews, and was later confirmed in group consultation, that many of the issues that seemed most important to stakeholders were broader issues of governance. Stakeholders both inside and outside
the government decried what they saw as a severe lack of capacity and expertise, and generally poor governance abilities, including issues of transparency, inter-ministerial conflicts over roles and responsibilities, and frustration with an apparent pervasiveness of rent-seeking behavior. Stakeholders stressed that while social and environmental issues were important, there was no point in trying to address them until the fundamental underlying issues of poor governance were dealt with first. In addition, several other key governance-related messages that emerged were the sense of disappointment, disenfranchisement, or powerlessness felt by common citizens on decisions about mining sector development, as well as sharing the benefits anticipated from mining revenues.

Thus, despite the initial focus of the WAMSSA team on purely environmental and social issues, there was a strong current of social accountability that bubbled up from the consultations. As a result, the team expanded the list of potential environmental and social issues to include governance issues as well, many of which came directly from early stages of the consultative process.

These issues were then discussed with stakeholders in several different types of group fora. The full consultation and policy dialogue process is described later in this chapter and in more detail in Annex 4. The consultations included:

- Meetings of the WAMSSA Steering Committee to consider progress and provide feedback to the policy dialogue. This group included a representative from the mines ministry of each of the three countries, plus representatives from the MRU, ECOWAS, WAEMU, and the World Bank.

- Focus groups were held with so-called ‘institutional’ stakeholders in each of the three countries, which the team defined as representatives of organizations located or based primarily in the capital cities. This included government ministry officials with responsibilities related to the mining sector (e.g., from the mining ministry, as well as ministries responsible for environment, infrastructure planning, finance, etc.), industry representatives (mining companies, and mineral brokers and dealers), and national civil society organizations that claim to represent grassroots community interests at the national level.

- A series of surveys administered in mining or infrastructure development-affected communities (referred to as ‘community stakeholders’ by the team) across the region, targeting a cross-section of local stakeholders including local government employees, mining company workers, women, youth, etc.

Through an iterative process, a much longer list of issues was winnowed down to the 12 most commonly cited environmental, social, and governance issues (Table 7). The 12 issues were then presented and discussed at national workshops held in each country, which brought together all the institutional stakeholder groups that had participated in the focus groups. The discussion was preceded by a presentation of the three mineral-infrastructure clusters, and participants were asked to consider the issue in light of how they would play out at the cluster level. The results of the institutional stakeholder deliberations and the issues they selected were then combined with the issues that had been previously identified by community stakeholders in the survey process.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Categories</th>
<th>Issues</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Environmental Issues</td>
<td>• Deforestation and loss of biodiversity</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• Land degradation and reclamation of closed mines</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Water pollution</td>
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<tr>
<td>Socioeconomic issues</td>
<td>• Poverty in mining areas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Lack of employment opportunities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Nonexistent or wrecked infrastructure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Governance Issues</td>
<td>• Political fragility and instability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Insufficient transparency and consistency of government decision-making processes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Frustration with government performance and the lack of shared benefits from mining development</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• Lack of capacity</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• Disenfranchisement of local communities</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• Rent-seeking behavior and conditions that distort shared benefits</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

294. The national workshops resulted in seven of the 12 issues being selected by institutional and/or community stakeholders as key priorities. The other five issues were either deemed as less important, or in some cases were seen as sub-issues under the seven that were selected (e.g., water pollution was seen as one element of land degradation, or lack of employment opportunities was seen as a component of poverty). The seven issues that were retained from the national workshop consultations, described in more detail in the following section, included:

- Environmental priorities
  - Deforestation and loss of biodiversity (institutional stakeholder priority)
  - Land degradation and need for reclamation (community stakeholder priority)

- Social priorities
  - Poverty in mining areas (institutional stakeholder priority)

- Governance priorities
  - Insufficient transparency/consistency of decision making (institutional and community stakeholder priority)
  - Lack of capacity (institutional and community stakeholder priority)
  - Disenfranchisement of local communities (institutional and community stakeholder priority)
  - Rent-seeking behavior (community priority)

### 3.2 Key environmental and social priorities

295. The two environmental issues that were identified as priorities both have a strong transboundary dimension when considered in light of mineral-infrastructure clusters identified by the situation analysis. The cluster of iron ore projects that straddles the southeastern Guinea-eastern Liberia border is situated near the Mont Nimba UNESCO
World Heritage site, known for its rare and endangered species. The mining areas that lie along the Liberian side of the Liberia-Sierra Leone border fall within the watershed of the Mano River, which divides the two countries and is used by their two populations for fishing, agriculture, and drinking water.

3.2.1 BIODIVERSITY AND DEFORESTATION

296. The plant and animal life of the MRU countries is uniquely diverse, with high levels of biodiversity and high populations of species that are nearly extinct outside of the region. There are a number of high priority conservation areas under threat from mining. The uncontrolled expansion of the mining sector into these areas has resulted in loss of forest cover, soil erosion (especially the top layer), and particularly heavy siltation into river systems and tidal estuaries that can reduce coral and fish populations. Clearing vegetation leaves soils vulnerable to wind and water erosion, and reduces soil nutrients, affecting plant regeneration and agricultural potential of the soil. It will also alter the species composition and biodiversity of the area.

297. Flora and fauna are also threatened by habitat alteration, for example, records from the Sierra Rutile area and Sierra Mineral Holdings lease areas have indicated a loss of approximately 150 species of plants as a result of clearing vegetation. In Liberia, areas such as Yekepa, Bong, Mano River, and Bomi Hills Mines continue to experience extensive leaching and erosion from the removal of vegetation cover from long-shuttered iron ore operations. In addition to the actual mining process, establishing roads to access mining properties is another significant cause of deforestation. Lack of rehabilitation efforts and forest management is destroying habitats, and many animals and plants are being threatened and may face extinction (Hofstatter, 2001). This is a regional issue because it involves transborder ecosystem management implications in the Nimba cluster and the Sierra Leone-Liberia border cluster.

3.2.2 LAND DEGRADATION AND RECLAMATION OF CLOSED OR ABANDONED MINES

298. The greatest impact of mining is habitat alteration and land degradation during construction and operation activities as the land is cleared to build access roads, temporary camps for workers, workshops, waste management structures, etc. Previous iron ore mining operations, currently abandoned, have left a legacy of land degradation, and hence no one has been able to reclaim the land because it is badly degraded (UNCCD Country Report, 2002). The legacy of iron ore exploitation is erosion throughout Liberia and in the southeast portion of Guinea, and has in many cases destroyed ecosystems and a number of habitats. In addition, the removal of the overburden exacerbates soil erosion, especially because disposal is not regulated and is usually disposed of in low-lying areas, thus obstructing the normal flow of rivers and streams.

299. Unregulated waste dumping or the failure of structures such as tailings dams can cause chemicals to leach into water and negatively affect biodiversity and ecosystems. This also influences the security of downstream communities because soil productivity and water quality are reduced, influencing food security and affecting community health. The immense amounts of waste rock produced by mining are not always deposited in specifically designated areas with a good waste management system. One such example is the now-closed old Nimba Mine in Liberia where approximately 300 million metric
tonnes of mining waste were deposited in the surrounding forest. Other operations dumped mining waste in creeks and streams that disrupted river flow.

300. Small-scale and artisanal mining are particularly destructive to the land from rudimentary mining and processing techniques such as uncontrolled pit digging with no routine backfilling, topsoil removal, and destruction of vegetation. This is exacerbated by an influx of people into the area, which places pressure on flora (fuelwood, etc.) and fauna (hunting for food and habitat destruction), and an increase in waste material. Land degradation and lack of reclamation efforts by all types of mining operations can become regional issues where mining and its impacts affect a neighboring country or common watershed, such as two of the three clusters identified by WAMSSA.

3.2.3 POVERTY IN MINING AREAS

301. Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone are among the poorest countries in the world, as measured by most indices of health, education, and other human development indicators. Poverty increased as a result of the civil wars in Sierra Leone and Liberia and the ensuing flow of refugees within a country and across borders in all three countries. Mining contributed to poverty because a major element of the civil conflicts involved access to minerals and other natural resources. Mining draws people away from subsistence farming, but is insufficient to provide a stable income for a broad enough swath of the population to lift them out of poverty. In Sierra Leone, artisanal diamond mining has provided some means of poverty reduction in recent years, although employment has been falling as diamonds become harder to find and mechanization becomes increasingly necessary (World Bank, 2006a).

302. Some inhabitants of communities located near mines have benefited from jobs or provision of goods and services to the mining sector. In some cases, such as the communities located near the longstanding CBG bauxite mine in Guinea, artisanal mining sites in Kono district in Sierra Leone, and the former LAMCO mine in Liberia (near where ArcelorMittal is now seeking to operate a mine), economic conditions have arguably worsened since the advent of mining. In-migration of people seeking work in mechanized or artisanal mining leads to overcrowding in existing communities. This taxes local housing, water, and sanitation facilities, and increases health problems, crime, and the breakdown of traditional economic activities such as farming, and weakens traditional social and cultural structures. And when mining operations close, as was the case with LAMCO, or when they scale back operations suddenly, as occurred in 2008 with Sierra Rutile and Koidu Holdings, mining-derived income ceases or falls off significantly, increasing poverty in communities that may have abandoned other pursuits in hopes of gaining benefits from mining or mining-related activities. Community investments made by large-scale mining companies often lack community input, and rarely enable sustainable community development or creation of economic activities that can survive after closure of the mine.

303. Poverty in mining areas is a multi-country issue, requiring national or domestic actions. However, because of the migration between the three countries in search of mining work, especially movements spurred by artisanal mining opportunities, there may be a role for collective or coordinated action by the three countries to address poverty in mining areas as part of a coordinated policy harmonization effort. The artisanal gold and
diamond fields along the Sierra Leone-Liberia border draw migrants not only from the MRU countries, but from other nearby West African countries, including Mali, Senegal, Côte d’Ivoire, and others, thus a coordinated multi-national approach may be the best way to manage this flow of fortune seekers.

3.3 Key overarching governance priorities

304. Analytical work and consultation with institutional and community-level stakeholders in all three countries revealed a common set of frustrations and expectations with the way the mining sector is governed. These include a perceived lack of transparency and consistency of government decision-making processes for awarding concessions and mining development agreements, benefit sharing, and community investment. The common perception is that inconsistent and conflicting policies prevail in these areas, due in part to a perceived lack of clear roles and responsibilities among government ministries for defining and enforcing environmental and social policies relative to mining and infrastructure development. Self-interest, favoritism, and rent-seeking behavior are also seen as widespread, if not always publicly discussed. Lack of government capacity at the national and local levels was also cited as a problem, which results not only in inadequate enforcement and monitoring of environmental and social regulations, but also frustration over economic growth, poverty alleviation, and job creation in mining areas. Frustration in some cases seems to be fueling feelings of public anger against prevailing mining policies, which if allowed to build unchecked may have unpredictable political and social consequences given the political fragility and volatility in all three countries.

3.3.1 INSUFFICIENT TRANSPARENCY AND CONSISTENCY OF GOVERNMENT DECISION-MAKING PROCESSES

305. These issues exist at the community and cluster level, but their effects are also felt in the capital cities and around the country. These issues are described more fully in the section in Chapter 4 on institutional gaps. This is a multi-country problem that could benefit from common regional standards and approaches.

3.3.2 LACK OF CAPACITY

306. Lack of competent and adequate capacity is a problem throughout government at all levels, but it is felt acutely in ministries responsible for management of natural resources and the environment. Human resources are lacking to plan for and monitor compliance with government regulations on mining, infrastructure development, and environmental and social protection. Central government offices are under resourced, and lack personnel, transportation, and other resources needed to adequately monitor mining development. Shortages of trained staff in the field are even more acute, and local mines or other ministries representatives often lack basic transportation, access to computers or phones, etc. This can delay projects being vetted and approved and expertise needed to critically evaluate the risks of projects may be missing or overstretched. Lack of capacity also extends to the mining sector itself and to civil society organizations that increasingly play a role in advocating for the vulnerable. The dozen or more large-scale and small-scale mining companies planning to start or expand operations in these three countries in coming years will need large numbers of workers to build new facilities and run
operations. Likewise, communities and local civil society organizations often lack the capacity to adequately advocate for their needs and concerns to the mining companies or government. This is a **multi-country** issue that may benefit from **regional** training solutions or institutions to fill capacity gaps.

### 3.3.3 Disenfranchisement of Local Communities

307. Community and local government participation in planning has been largely absent in the decision-making processes. Even where public consultation may be mandated by law, if such consultations are held they are often largely one-way discussions, where a company or government informs the communities of decisions that have already been taken. Even in fora where stakeholders are allowed to speak about their concerns, there is not always a grievance mechanism or other follow-up with communities once a project is underway. Meanwhile, in recent years communities and civil society organizations that claim to represent them have been increasing their activism and militancy to be included in investment and development decisions that affect mining communities. Some disputes have turned violent. Dialogue and inclusive participatory approaches are needed to ensure development decisions provide sustainable benefits to communities.

308. Poor people have often been viewed as the target of poverty reduction efforts or community development projects. However, there is an increasing recognition by governments and their development partners that treating poor people as assets and partners in the development process is the key to poverty reduction, through Community-Driven Development (CDD).21 In resource rich, post-conflict countries like Sierra Leone, Liberia, and Côte d’Ivoire, there is also recognition that greater engagement of communities in development planning is a way to head off a return to the civil conflicts of the past, many of which were based on competition for access to land, minerals, timber, etc.22 Establishing a common sub-regional approach for governments, donors, and large-scale mining companies to deal with community expectations, opportunities, and threats is important, especially with a number of the mining companies operating in more than one country (e.g., BHP-Billiton, Mano River Resources, etc.). Efforts to develop community-driven development solutions can also increase social cohesion and inclusion of marginal or vulnerable populations within a community (ex-combatants, women, HIV-afflicted). This is a **multi-country** issue that can benefit from **sub-regional** standards, solutions, and approaches.

### 3.3.4 Rent-seeking Behavior and Conditions That Distort Shared Benefits

309. Self-interest, favoritism, and rent-seeking behavior are seen as widespread in these countries, if not always publicly discussed. Lack of adequate controls and oversight means that whatever revenues do flow through the system risk being siphoned off for personal interests. Likewise, decision-making processes to allocate land or permits can be

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22. Significant work has been done in this area to identify ways to engage communities in the development process, especially in post-conflict or conflict-sensitive environments. See IFC, 2007; World Bank, 2005; and World Bank, 2004a).
similarly subverted. This type of behavior is understood to be common in all three countries and can be found at all levels of government. The net effect is to favor a small group of beneficiaries over other equally relevant stakeholders, and subvert the notion of open, transparent, and participatory processes to share benefits. The sub-region’s governments have all publicly embraced high profile anti-corruption campaigns, including removing and holding accountable former ministers. Also, the local press in the three countries have been aggressive in recent years in covering these issues. After a spate of negative publicity over alleged rent-seeking behavior and backroom dealings surrounding mining licenses, several high ranking mines ministry officials in Liberia were recently removed. However, rent-seeking behavior is not limited to the mining sector; it is widespread across all aspects of government and the economy in these three countries, and will take a major effort to root it out. This is a multi-country issue with regional dimensions concerning cross-border smuggling of minerals.

3.4 Consultation processes to identify issues and select priorities

310. The diagnosis of mining activities in the MRU helped the WAMSSA team to identify key regional issues and opportunities associated with large-scale mining development activities, as well as small-scale and artisanal mining and related infrastructure links. It also helped to solidify the mining-infrastructure cluster as the appropriate focus for analysis for sub-regional mining development and governance improvements. This work drew on pre-existing studies as well as key informant interviews. An analysis was also conducted on key stakeholder groups that stand to benefit or be affected negatively from expansion of the mining sector and regional approaches to mining policy reforms (see Annex 3).23

311. Although there are some differences in the stakeholder mix in Liberia, Guinea, and Sierra Leone, the categories of groups are largely the same and many of the issues, interests, and influence are common across the three countries. The main result from this analysis is that stakeholders perceive a regional approach focused on development of mining-infrastructure clusters as generally positive for the region.

312. A constituency that may oppose policy harmonization and regional integration around mining in the sub-region has not been found, except for middle men who stand to lose privileges originating in the high level of informality affecting the domestic mining industry. There was also a sense that where a given national government might not be sufficiently motivated to improve its governance by itself, the peer pressure of being involved in a regional group and common commitments might make those improvements more likely to occur. This conclusion was supported by participants in the national workshops.

23. Stakeholder groups considered important to the mining sector in the sub-region include the mines ministry and other government ministries and agencies, multilateral and bilateral donor agencies, regional and sub-regional organizations such as the Mano River Union and ECOWAS, private-sector players including large-scale, small-scale, and artisanal miners, and construction firms; civil society, including international, sub-regional and national civil society organizations (CSOs) and non-governmental organizations (NGOs), mining communities, ex-combatants, and potentially vulnerable populations including women and youth.
3.4.1 STAKEHOLDER CONSULTATIONS

Building on the cluster and stakeholder analyses, a series of stakeholder consultations was held in the three countries to engage key mining sector stakeholders in a policy dialogue about the key priorities to be pursued under WAMSSA. The consultations included meetings of the WAMSSA Steering Committee to consider progress and provide feedback to the policy dialogue, a series of focus groups held with institutional stakeholders, and community surveys administered in mining or infrastructure development-impacted communities across the region.

3.4.2 INSTITUTIONAL STAKEHOLDER FOCUS GROUPS

As noted earlier, the team defined ‘institutional’ stakeholders as those drawn from large public or private organizations in the capital cities, including government ministries, mining companies, and the head offices of national civil society organizations. These institutional players are seen as playing a key role at the national level, and can also have an impact at the cluster level by virtue of decisions they make about individual projects. The WAMSSA team held focus group meetings for industry, government, and civil society in the capital cities of all three countries in December 2008 and January 2009. Local consultants and key informants helped to identify key contacts within each stakeholder group. Typically 20 to 25 persons were invited (mostly through their organizations) to participate in each stakeholder focus group, of whom 10 to 15 attended in most cases. Each focus group included only stakeholders from within a particular sector (e.g., industry, or civil society), so as to have a frank discussion of issues within a relatively homogeneous group. A total of 81 people participated in the nine focus groups, including 30 senior government officials, 17 mining industry stakeholders, and 34 civil society representatives. Stakeholders considered and prioritized sub-regional and national issues presented by the consultants, through a consensus-drive process.

3.4.3 COMMUNITY STAKEHOLDER SURVEYS

WAMSSA also sought input from community stakeholders to ensure adequate representation by the grass-roots and vulnerable (e.g., women and children, and youth). ‘Community stakeholders’ were defined as local stakeholders in communities where mining or related activities (rail corridors, port facilities) occur. A mining community survey was carried out, targeting 10 communities in the three MRU countries (three each in Liberia and Sierra Leone and four in Guinea), selected to represent the breadth, depth and diversity of communities affected by mines and/or infrastructure development. Within each community a cross-section of the local population was surveyed, including local government officials, community elders, traders, farmers, artisanal miners, women, and youth. See Annex 4 for a detailed description of community survey methodology and results.

The WAMSSA team mapped major mining communities in the three countries, with the help of local partners, to identify a representative set of communities to be surveyed. The objective was to identify a series of mining-area communities that capture the range of elements and issues that are representative of mining communities as a whole across the entire MRU region. Thus the team considered communities near an operating mine with a history of mine-community relations, mine sites abandoned during the civil wars but now being rebuilt, communities where artisanal or small-scale mining...
is present, and communities that have experienced significant within country or transborder in-migration. The team also included one site, Buchanan in Liberia, as an example of a community that will be affected by mining-derived infrastructure development (e.g., rehabilitation of a cross-country rail line and port facilities) but not mining itself. Other mining communities selected are also located on or near rail and port facilities. Table 8 shows the various characteristics used to select the target communities, which are shown in Figure 2.

317. The WAMSSA team worked with local partners to identify and field local survey teams in each country and tabulate the results. Each two-person team, a man and woman fluent in the local languages, was responsible for carrying out the surveys and tabulating the results. The WAMSSA study team provided the local survey team with survey interview guides and data collection sheets to conduct the surveys. The local survey teams contacted the communities in advance of the visits. Where local protocol dictated, they held informational meetings with community leaders and other community representatives to properly inform community members of the goals and approach of the survey, as well as to help select appropriate interview candidates. Great care was taken by the WAMSSA interviewers to respect traditional hierarchy and solicit the support of village/community authorities where necessary. The interviewers used local languages, and respected local practices such as the length of the discussion, time of day, and appropriate meeting venue in the community.

Table 8. Representative mining and/or infrastructure-impacted communities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Community</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Comments</th>
<th>Large-scale exploration</th>
<th>Abandoned large-scale mines</th>
<th>Artisanal &amp; SSM</th>
<th>Rails/ports</th>
<th>Poor conflict</th>
<th>Environmental impacts</th>
<th>Population</th>
<th>Artisanal diamonds</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bintimodia</td>
<td>Guinea</td>
<td>CBG workforce</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fria</td>
<td>Guinea</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>Near Fria Alumina plant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kafarande</td>
<td>Guinea</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X X</td>
<td>X X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td>Near Kamsar port and plant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sangaredi</td>
<td>Guinea</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td>CBG bauxite Minesite</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lofa Bridge</td>
<td>Liberia</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X X X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X X</td>
<td>SSM &amp; Artisanal diamonds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yekepa</td>
<td>Liberia</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>Arcelor Mittal iron ore</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Buchanan</td>
<td>Liberia</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td>Port/Rail facilities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Koidu town</td>
<td>Sierra Leone</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td>Koidu Kimberlite diamonds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moriba town</td>
<td>Sierra Leone</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td>Near Sierra Rutile mine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tongo</td>
<td>Sierra Leone</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Artisanal diamonds</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

318. The survey was administered to 22 to 25 respondents in each community, selected to represent the broad range of stakeholder groups to be found in that community. The respondents were drawn from a number of categories representing a cross-section of the communities, including local government officials and traditional leaders, miners, brokers, shopkeepers, farmers, women, youth, and ex-combatants. A total of 234 people responded to the surveys. Of these, around one-third (77) were women. The respondents were asked to prioritize social and environmental issues related to mining and infrastructure development from a list prepared by the WAMSSA team. They were also given the opportunity to identify other issues that they considered critical. These self-
identified issues largely tended to track the critical issues identified in the survey tool, or were widely varying personal concerns of individual respondents.

319. It should be noted that the surveyed communities are not found solely within the three mining clusters identified by the situation analysis, in part because the surveys were carried out before the analytical track had arrived at the cluster approach and selected specific clusters for consideration. Despite this, and for the reasons cited above, the communities surveyed are considered broadly representative of all mining communities found throughout the sub-region. However, a number of the communities do fall within the clusters or in areas of high artisanal mining activity. The Yekepa and Buchanan communities are found at either end of the development corridor linking iron ore Cluster 1 (southeastern Guinea-eastern Liberia) to the Port of Buchanan, Lofa Bridge is within the Cluster 2 Sierra Leone-Liberia border zone, while Koidu and Moriba Town have a heavy artisanal mining presence.

3.4.4 NATIONAL WORKSHOPS

320. As noted earlier, a list of 12 critical issues to be considered further by stakeholders in national fora was assembled. The WAMSSA team organized three national workshops in Conakry, Freetown, and Monrovia to validate WAMSSA’s main findings, select WAMSSA’s priorities, and identify key policy and institutional adjustments to be incorporated in mining reform of Mano River countries and AMGP.

321. A key goal of the national workshop was to select the WAMSSA priorities from among critical issues that were identified during the consultations and analysis. A second goal was to identify potential winners and losers and enabling and blocking factors that would improve mineral governance under two scenarios — increased local participation in development planning and increased regional harmonization of policies and planning. These scenarios were chosen because of WAMSSA’s focus on regional approaches to mineral governance, as well as evidence from the consultations that the lack of participation by communities in decision-making processes had implications for addressing other priorities.

322. In both cases the discussions were carried out in the context of the three identified mineral-infrastructure clusters in an attempt to ground the issues and scenarios in actual mining activities. The Nimba cluster, with its transborder infrastructure implications and the tension between national political concerns and regional collaboration, generated a lot of discussion, especially in the Guinea and Liberia national workshops.

323. The majority of workshop invitees were participants in the focus group meetings, and the national workshop brought together representatives from industry, government, and civil society in one meeting. The WAMSSA focal point in the Mines Ministry in each country, local consultants, and key informants helped to identify key contacts within each stakeholder group.

- Nearly 80 stakeholders participated in the three national workshops, with each workshop combining representatives of government, industry, and civil society from a single country.
- The groups reviewed the WAMSSA work to date and then selected top priority issues from the focus group and community survey work.
The group also identified potential winners and losers, as well as enabling and blocking factors to improve mineral governance under two scenarios — increased local participation in development planning and increased regional harmonization of policies and planning.

324. The findings that were presented to the workshops included information on the mineral-infrastructure cluster concept as well as descriptions of the three clusters that were identified by the team. Participants were encouraged to consider the prioritization of key issues, and scenario discussions in light of the specific clusters that had been identified by the team.

3.4.4.1 Selection of priorities

325. The process used to select the seven priorities involved a two-part process which is explained more fully in Annex 4. Participants in the national workshops discussed the issues and then indicated his or her top three priorities from the critical issues through a voting process. The top five (or six in case of a tie) priorities based on total votes were then presented to the group for validation. Logistical challenges precluded bringing a significantly representative number of community and grassroots stakeholders to the national workshops; however, grassroots community priorities were retained in the prioritization process by including the top five priorities selected by the community stakeholders from the surveys. Output from each national workshop included the top five or six institutional stakeholder priorities and the top six community survey priorities.

326. Table 9 shows how the various national workshops and communities prioritized their issues. The percentages shown under each country column reflect the percentage of participants in each of the national workshops who selected a particular issue as one of their top priorities. The highlighted percentages reflect the five issues (or six in case of a tie) receiving the highest percentage of votes in each country. The communities column shows the issues receiving the highest percentage of votes in the combined survey results in all three countries.

327. The results of the three national workshops were combined to determine which of the top five priority issues cut across the institutional stakeholder groups from the three countries. This list was combined with the top five issues from the community surveys to make a final list of environmental, social, and overarching governance priorities, which because of overlaps, number seven in all. The seven selected priorities were:

- Environment
  ✓ Deforestation and loss of biodiversity (institutional stakeholder priority)
  ✓ Land degradation and need for reclamation (community stakeholder priority)
- Social
  ✓ Poverty in mining areas (institutional stakeholder priority)
- Governance
  ✓ Insufficient transparency/consistency of decision making (institutional and community stakeholder priority)
  ✓ Lack of capacity (institutional and community stakeholder priority)
Disenfranchisement of local communities (institutional and community stakeholder priority)

Rent-seeking behavior (community stakeholder priority)

Table 9. Issue prioritization by institutional and community stakeholders

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Prioritized issue</th>
<th>Sierra Leone</th>
<th>Liberia</th>
<th>Guinea</th>
<th>Communities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Environmental</td>
<td>1. Deforestation &amp; loss of biodiversity</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>11</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. Water extraction &amp; pollution</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3. Land degradation &amp; need for reclamation</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>45 / 26³</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social</td>
<td>4. Poverty in mining areas</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>17</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5. Non-existent or wrecked infrastructure</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6. Lack of employment for local residents</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Governance</td>
<td>7. Political fragility</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>8. Insufficient transparency &amp; consistency of government decision-making processes</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>9. Frustration with government performance &amp; lack of shared benefits from mining development</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>10. Lack of capacity</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>11. Disenfranchisement of local communities</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>12. Rent seeking behavior &amp; conditions that lead to distorted benefit sharing</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a. Percentage of votes received for an issue by national workshop participants selecting it as one of their top priorities.

b. Percentage of community survey respondents identifying the issue as one of their top priorities. Community respondents were asked to select their top three priorities from among a list of 15 issues. Percentages shown in the this column are only for those issues receiving the most votes, and therefore do not total 100%.

c. Issue 3: “Land degradation & need for reclamation” was presented as two separate issues in Community Surveys: “Environmental degradation” (identified as priority by 45% of community respondents in three countries) and “Reclamation/rehabilitation of closed/abandoned mine sites” (selected as priority by 26% of community respondents)

Shaded = selected as priority in a country; Bold = Top institutional stakeholder priorities; Italics = Top community-level stakeholder priorities; Bold Italics = Top priority for both communities and institutional stakeholders

3.4.4.2 Comparing issues by country

328. The Sierra Leonean national workshop participants highlighted a lack of transparent decision making and poverty in mining areas as their highest priority items, followed by deforestation/biodiversity loss and land degradation/reclamation, with smaller percentages selecting lack of capacity and rent-seeking behavior. Workshop participants were disappointed in the Government’s ability to attract world class mining partners, or to compel the companies already active in the country to provide employment or promote economic development in their areas of operation, although the downturn in
mining activity in recent years was largely due to the world economic crisis. The severe environmental degradation caused by artisanal mining and Sierra Rutile’s operation, where no significant rehabilitation has been done, undoubtedly led to those two environmental issues also being seen as important.

329. In Liberia, participant votes were concentrated on a smaller number of issues than in Sierra Leone. Transparency of government decision making was also the top priority in Liberia, followed by disenfranchisement of local communities and deforestation. Participants in the Monrovia workshop expressed a high degree of cynicism about Government decision-making abilities and rent-seeking behavior, suggesting the two may be linked (although the latter issue garnered only 1 percent of votes). The post-war Government has raised expectations that the country’s economy would be rebuilt on mining and logging revenues, although neither of those sectors has really taken off to date. Government progress in remaking its extractive sector laws and concession processes has been slow, which may be a major source of the frustration expressed by participants.

330. In the Guinea workshop, participants spread their votes more evenly across all 12 issues, although poverty in mining areas was a top priority, followed by lack of capacity and deforestation/loss of biodiversity. Insufficient transparency in decision making and frustration with Government performance also garnered a significant number of votes. Guineans, having lived for many decades with large active mining activities on their soil, seem especially bitter that mining has not brought more prosperity to their country.

3.4.4.3 Differences among institutional and community priorities

331. While institutional stakeholders and community residents shared many of the same priorities, there was clearly some divergence (Table 10). Community stakeholders were generally more concerned with social accountability issues, including poor governance and inadequate community participation in decision-making processes, and the prevalence of rent-seeking behavior. However, the communities also cited land degradation and reclamation of mine sites as being important; many of the communities surveyed bear the scars of past mining activities that were never remediated.

332. Institutional stakeholders agreed with the communities on many of the governance weaknesses, including transparency and consistency of decision making, but also saw deforestation, biodiversity, and poverty in mining areas as important. The one issue where there was complete unanimity across the three national workshops and community surveys in the three countries was insufficient transparency and consistency of government decision-making processes.
Table 10. Comparison of institutional and community stakeholder priorities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Top institutional priorities (combined results of all three national workshops)</th>
<th>Top community survey priorities (combined results of all three country surveys)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Insufficient transparency and consistency of government decision-making processes</td>
<td>• Insufficient transparency and consistency of government decision-making processes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Poverty in mining areas</td>
<td>• Land degradation and need for reclamation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Deforestation and loss of biodiversity</td>
<td>• Disenfranchisement of local communities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Disenfranchisement of local communities</td>
<td>• Rent-seeking behavior and conditions that lead to distorted benefit sharing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Lack of capacity</td>
<td>• Lack of capacity</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3.5 Scenario analysis

333. As a complement to the cluster analysis discussed in the previous chapter, looking at current and near-term mineral prospects, the WAMSSA team also conducted several scenario analysis exercises to project costs and benefits and advantages and disadvantages of two scenarios: (i) regional harmonization, and (ii) local government and community participation. These two scenarios were important to the WAMSSA consultative process initiative, but for slightly different reasons. Interest in promoting regional approaches was part of the core mission of WAMSSA and the AMGP, while the interest in increasing local community participation in development decisions emerged from stakeholder interactions. The approach to looking at the two scenarios was an iterative process, with the team developing basic scenarios and then having stakeholders participate in national workshops to provide input and feedback on the various scenarios and their pros and cons.

334. The goal of the workshop exercise was to push stakeholders out of the mode of considering all problems and their solutions occurring solely at the national government level, but instead consider how they could be tackled at either the regional or local levels. It is important to note these two scenarios were not compared to each other. Rather, breakout groups in the workshops were assigned to either the regional or local scenario and asked to compare it to the status quo in the mining sector in their country. When the small groups reassembled to discuss their findings, there was strong support in the workshops to promote both more regional and local involvement in mineral sector governance and development decisions. More information on the scenario analysis exercises can be found in Section 4.3 of Annex 4; the scenarios themselves are described here.

3.5.1 REGIONAL HARMONIZATION SCENARIO

335. A regional harmonization scenario assumes that policy and project development (of both mining and associated downstream ventures) and infrastructure takes advantage of the cluster approach outlined above. The scenario assumes a greater deal of integration in planning between countries.

- The ability to take advantage of regional initiatives already underway such as fiscal harmonization, mining sector planning that can be linked to existing donor-backed cross-border ecosystem management projects, etc.
• Sub-regional planning of mineral development around mineral corridors and infrastructure associated with mineral sector development.

• Adoption of common sector, infrastructure, environmental and social policies.

• Creation of sub-regional/regional training and technical services capabilities (e.g., contract negotiations) to build capacity and establish common standards throughout the sub-region.

• Where mineral-infrastructure clusters have been identified that cross national borders, or where mining installations in one country could benefit from transport or power infrastructure provided by a neighboring country, the presumption would be that all planning is through some regional mechanism, rather than in stand-alone national plans.

3.5.2 LOCAL GOVERNMENT/COMMUNITY PARTICIPATION

336. The underlying conceptual framework of this scenario is that mining and infrastructure development initiatives in the MRU countries include a much greater level of participation in decision making by local government and affected communities. This increased engagement of local stakeholders has been cited time and again in countries with active mining sectors as a way to manage community expectations, reduce civil conflict and poor mine-community relations, and ensure that industry and government investments in the communities are well-spent and oriented toward poverty alleviation.

337. This scenario assumes enhanced local government and community participation in early stages of mining and infrastructure development planning and management, as well as setting and enforcing environmental and social policies as development plans are implemented.

338. In a local government and community participation scenario, a number of initiatives may be expected:

• Active engagement of communities and local government authorities (including, where relevant, traditional authorities, committees of elders, etc.) in participatory needs assessments to determine current status in the communities, including self-identified strengths, weaknesses, available resources, and socioeconomic development priorities.

• Devolution of planning and environmental management responsibilities to district and village levels to establish a bottom-up planning process.

• Allocation of a portion of mining revenues to the district and village levels.

• Participation by civil society in environmental and social follow-up and monitoring.

• Creation of employment and economic opportunities in mining regions that minimize distortions for an efficient allocation of resources.

• Capacity-building of local government, locally-based CSOs, and communities in participatory decision-making processes, conflict resolution, strategic planning, negotiating skills, civic responsibilities, etc. to make them stronger partners in the decision-making process.
• Capacity building in environmental and social service delivery (water quality monitoring, HIV/AIDS prevention, microfinance counseling, etc.) so that local governments, CSOs, and community groups can support or supplement industry or national government efforts in these areas.

• Where mineral-infrastructure clusters have been identified that cross national borders, or where mining installations in one country could benefit from transport or power infrastructure provided by a neighboring country, the presumption would be that communities on both sides of the borders, at mine sites, and along the infrastructure corridors, would be involved in planning processes from the very beginning.

3.6 Advantages and disadvantages of addressing priorities through a mining-infrastructure cluster approach

339. Analytical work and stakeholder consultations on the cluster approach, combined with the scenario analysis, yielded the information found in Tables 11 and 12, which were developed by the team with stakeholder input. Table 11 looks at the advantages and disadvantages of applying a regional, cluster-focused approach (columns 2 and 3), and/or advantages and disadvantages of applying a local government and community participation approach (columns 4 and 5) to mining and infrastructure development.

340. The analysis also suggests that a coordinated approach for mineral deposit and infrastructure development in the clusters could yield significant economic, environmental, and social opportunities. Table 12 looks at the advantages and disadvantages of adopting regional cluster-based approaches (columns 3 and 4) or local community and government participation approaches (columns 4 and 5) to addressing the environmental, social, and governance priorities identified by WAMSSA stakeholders.

3.6.1 DISCUSSION OF SCENARIOS

341. Given the focus on development of multi-country mineral clusters, the advantages of adopting a regional harmonization and planning approach to mining and infrastructure development outweighed the disadvantages, both in the stakeholder discussions and in the team’s assessment. This was also true for addressing environmental, social, and governance priorities. Similarly, the advantages of increasing local government and community participation in both mining and infrastructure development, and to address environmental social and governance priorities, overcame the disadvantages, although to a slightly lesser degree than with the regional scenario.

342. Table 11 indicates that while there could be challenges to bringing governments and industry together to implement a regional cluster-focused approach to mineral and infrastructure development, there are also significant potential advantages in terms of cost, operational efficiency for infrastructure, and minimizing environmental impacts from multiple projects. While these issues can be dealt with on a facility-by-facility basis, it is through their integration that cost savings will be realized and the environmental and socioeconomic benefits most clearly seen.

343. As Table 12 shows, adopting a cluster-based approach can have advantages for dealing with the seven priorities identified by stakeholder consultation and other analysis. However, there may also be trade offs, where the cumulative effects of initiating multiple
mining projects simultaneously could have harmful effects on the local environment and population. Also, vested interests may have an interest in slowing or derailing efforts to either provide more regional harmonization of government policies, or greater participation by local communities in development decisions. Efforts to adopt a cluster-based approach could also falter because of capacity limitations, which is itself one of the priorities that needs to be addressed by the new approach. However, the political economy associated with either approach could be problematic in making either or both work.

344. **Regional harmonization and cluster approaches** could be opposed by some large-scale mining companies that are used to going it alone. The process of developing a modern large-scale mine, with or without associated infrastructure, is a complex endeavor, and companies typically are eager to move swiftly through the process since the up-front costs can be substantial and delays can only add to them. As such, individual companies may be reluctant to link their timetables to those of other mining projects or multiple government bodies that might want to weigh in on their plans. Competitive pressures in the market may also make companies reluctant to share internal company information on production levels or timetables, which could hinder any kind of joint network planning. In order to bring such potential blockers on board, the AMGP team would need to demonstrate a strong business case to companies for such collaboration, as well as stimulate a demonstration of political will on the part of governments toward the companies they would have to work with. Governments would need to agree to some level of harmonization of their policies and regulations, and may even need to work out some form of compensation scheme to balance taxation and other regimes where the resources of one country may be reaching the market via the network of another country. Governments would also need to build a level of trust with the companies.

345. Workshop participants also identified other powerful constituencies that could oppose adopting a regional approach. These include self-interested players, be they corrupt government officials or unscrupulous companies that benefit from a status quo, or brokers and dealers who thrive in environments where there may be little scrutiny or transparency of how mining concessions, permitting, and development decisions are done. In the case of government officials, this could mean key individuals within an administration who could block movement toward a regional approach, either overtly or covertly. As for what the some workshop participants termed ‘bad companies’, those already operating in a country under questionable premises would put up the most resistance to changes, whereas similarly inclined newcomers might choose to avoid a country once such a new regional regime is in place. These stakeholders would either need to be converted to support the new regional approach, or isolated from the decision-making processes that would lead to such a scenario, if possible.

346. However, workshop participants generally thought that most stakeholders would benefit from and support adoption of a common regional approach. This included national and local governments as a whole (even if certain individual officials might be opposed), companies, communities, and local businesses. Some participants also expressed the view that having a regional framework would provide external watchdogs and regional moral suasion to keep pressure on governments and companies to deliver on their governance and development commitments.
347. The scenario that entails increasing local government and community participation was seen as potentially threatening to central government officials, who might not want to lose the autonomy they were used to under centralized planning systems. While there has been some movement to devolve government authority to provincial, county, and local levels in the MRU, in practice most of the decision-making power and resources still reside with the central government. And involving communities in the decision-making processes may also be viewed with suspicion by some government officials who see decision making as their role. And as with the regional scenario, there would always be individuals, whether at a local or national level, who might see their personal interests threatened by an expanded role for local communities.

348. There was also a sense among workshop participants that involving communities in decision-making processes could slow those processes, especially if local community representatives are not trained in participatory decision-making processes or do not adequately represent the interests of their constituencies. Thus some of these constituencies might inadvertently become blockers, even if they support their own increased role at the discussion table.

349. As with the regional harmonization scenario, the participants still thought the majority of stakeholders would benefit from and support increased local and community participation in decision making. However a number of participants agreed that there would need to be substantial awareness raising at both local and national levels, as well as capacity-building for government officials, civil society, and community representatives to allow them to play a meaningful role in decision-making processes.

3.7 Implications for AMGP

350. Prioritizing governance issues by stakeholders ties in well with AMGP components devoted to improving policy and regulatory frameworks and strengthening institutional and community-level capacity. The ability to better assess, monitor, and manage mining-induced environmental and social issues will flow from the development of stronger institutions and policy frameworks. Also, the transborder nature of environmental and social impacts requires regionally harmonized approaches if they are to be properly addressed.
### Table 11. Advantages and disadvantages to developing mining infrastructure using a regional mineral-cluster approach and increased local government and community participation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Activity</th>
<th>Advantages or opportunities of using integrated regional cluster planning approach</th>
<th>Disadvantages or risks of using integrated regional cluster planning approach</th>
<th>Advantages of increased local government/community participation</th>
<th>Disadvantages of increased local government/community participation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Mining development | - Governments can take holistic planning approach, easier to balance conflicting needs for equipment, facilities, funding, and human resources  
- In zones where multiple mining operations occur, planning and coordination between governments and companies can minimize conflicts or competition over land use, access to existing transport, power, and water resources between mining projects  
- Potential for scale efficiencies in development of transport, power, and water infrastructure  
- Shared power provision can create operational efficiencies  
- Development and deployment of local human resources  
- Individual companies and governments can share financial and other risks on projects | - Competing companies may resist sharing production and cost information critical to integrated planning  
- Public/private cooperation by multiple companies and government agencies for establishing and/or managing shared infrastructure is an unknown model in the MRU  
- Varying development timelines and financial requirements of companies and government may make coordination difficult – too fast or too slow for some  
- Cumulative effects of multiple simultaneous projects may create greater impacts than individual projects developed over longer time period | - Community participation in mining development will lead to greater awareness and acceptance of mining activities by community groups, lessening antagonism, and/or dissatisfaction with mining process.  
- Flow of benefits to community groups can increase by ensuring communities receive preferential employment driven through processes with local government bodies.  
- Local participation in downstream employment opportunities created by mining activities  
- Early engagement in decisions on involuntary physical and/or economic relocation could improve outcomes and reduce conflict | - Community participation is a lengthy and uncertain process which could delay the commissioning of mining operations.  
- Not all communities will benefit equally from multiple projects, may cause conflicts between communities within and across national borders |
| Mining cluster-induced infrastructure development | - Using shortest routes to port vs. longer national routes can reduce infrastructure costs and time to bring minerals to market.  
- Shared transport, electrical, and water supply infrastructure can bring lower construction costs, may be quicker to develop  
- Smaller footprint of shared transport, electricity and power vs. individual operations may lessen environmental impacts | - Reliance on transborder infrastructure could create security and political risks, specifically if political instability or social unrest in one country impacts operations or shared infrastructure | - Communities can have valuable input into location and nature of infrastructure that would be of most benefit to them.  
- Participation of communities in planning process can help increase ownership and sustainability of infrastructure | - Community participation is a lengthy and uncertain process which could delay decisions on infrastructure plans  
- Differing requirements and/or perspectives in community groups could lead to significant delays in the establishment of infrastructure |
Table 12. Advantages, disadvantages, and trade-offs to addressing priorities by using a regional cluster approach and increased local government/community involvement in development decisions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Priority issue</th>
<th>Advantages of using integrated regional cluster approach</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Environmental priorities</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Deforestation and loss of biodiversity (I)</td>
<td>• Consistent management of transboundary ecosystem resources</td>
<td>• Influx of people into multiple mining areas could result in increased poaching and deforestation, and forest fires, etc.</td>
<td>• Consistent application of environmental legislation and minimization of cross-border impacts</td>
<td>• Increasing community awareness of deforestation will lead to a decrease in deforestation associated with the influx of labour seeking community members</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Sub-regional sharing of infrastructure resources will result in a reduction of the need to build infrastructure resulting in lesser disturbance to ecosystem services</td>
<td>• Risk of increased loss of biodiversity resources through large-scale deforestation</td>
<td>• Sub-regional conservation management will ensure consistency in mineral governance and environmental disturbance, thereby not enhancing prospects for one country’s mine returns over another</td>
<td>• Further issues associated with conflict between community groups and environmental efforts will be avoided</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• More efficient use of already strained environmental management resources</td>
<td>• There are no disadvantages to a sub-regional harmonization in terms of avoiding deforestation, although there are challenges in transboundary management of biological resources in a coordinated manner</td>
<td>• Sub-regional remediation planning can facilitate better management of facilities and allow implementation of tighter controls on environmental management</td>
<td>• Community ownership in conservation areas with potential economic benefits through environmental offsets</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• More effective evaluation of cumulative impacts associated with mining development</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Processing waste may also be possible to extract other constituents such as cyanide and sulphides, thus reducing</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• The potential fragmentation effect of deforestation will be limited</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• An uncontrolled regional approach to mining development could result in vast tracts of land being degraded with subsequent knock on impacts to agricultural resources</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Consistent management of transboundary ecosystem resources</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Land degradation can become a sub-regional issue where mining activities in one country have a spillover into a neighboring country, such as along a transboundary river, or where artisanal miners move easily across borders to access deposits on both sides of the</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Sub-regional sharing of infrastructure resources with smaller total footprints, resulting in reduced disturbance to environment and ecosystem</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Community groups play active role in identifying quality of land remediation, rather than the current approach of a mine taking unilateral decisions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Land degradation and need for reclamation (C)</td>
<td>• Regional initiatives for reclamation would reduce individual mine costs and increase economic returns</td>
<td>• An uncontrolled regional approach to mining development could result in vast tracts of land being degraded with subsequent knock on impacts to agricultural resources</td>
<td>• Communities participate in monitoring and follow-up of environmental and social management plans for mining operations</td>
<td>• Involving community groups in identifying post-mining land-uses could lead to unreasonable expectations for rehabilitation effort.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• A regional approach would allow for coordinated efforts to determine end-of-mine preferential land use</td>
<td>• Regional approaches to rehabilitation presents ideal opportunity to consolidate pre-existing waste facilities into mega-facilities</td>
<td>• Communities could demand that all disturbed land be returned to agricultural use rather than for conservation or environmental benefit</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>• Regional approaches to rehabilitation presents ideal opportunity to consolidate pre-existing waste facilities into mega-facilities</td>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>toxidity of materials. Cluster and regional approach can address transboundary impacts of land degradation</td>
<td>border</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social priorities</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Poverty in mining areas (I)</td>
<td>• Increased economic opportunities and infrastructure development from development of multiple mines will be greater than from individual mines • Shared transport and power infrastructure can benefit other users • Economic activity from multiple projects can offer improved local and sub-regional access to employment, markets, trade, movement of goods and services • Coordinated multi-government support for cluster development will encourage mining companies to invest in mining and other ancillary economic activities • Linking mining clusters to transportation corridors will provide economic growth opportunities for communities in the clusters • Regional harmonization of policies can facilitate development of mineral clusters and cross-border transportation corridors • Regional approach to poverty alleviation strategies may be able to take more integrated comprehensive and large scale approach • Regional approach can address unequal benefit sharing and other issues in mining communities lying on or across national borders • Sharing of successful strategies and lessons learned for poverty reduction • Artisanal mining activity and population flows are fluid and borderless, virtually requires regional management of issues • Regional collaboration on security and cross-border traffic can improve quality of life for local residents</td>
<td>Challenges of getting multiple governments to agree on common poverty reduction priorities and strategies • Uneven implementation or enforcement of policies in the region could cause dissatisfaction in communities affected by such disparities • How to compensate for cross-border effects of regional approaches (e.g., economic impacts on Liberian side of Guinean ore traveling to port via Liberia)</td>
<td>Community-driven development approaches empower communities to become responsible for poverty alleviation • Collaboration between communities, companies and government can ensure that all development initiatives are aimed at poverty alleviation (e.g., income generation, improvements against health, sanitation, education MDGs, etc.) • Improved social cohesion, reduced risk of civil conflict and sustainability of development initiatives through collaboration</td>
<td>Consensus-building among multiple stakeholders is time-consuming, will require experienced dedicated community relations staff • Community and local civil society capacity strengthening may be required to allow active stakeholder participation • Significant government, company and/or NGO resources to develop and facilitate community capacities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overarching governance priorities</td>
<td>• Cluster approach and harmonization of fiscal, legal and regulatory regimes can lead to standardization of a</td>
<td>• All three countries may not agree to same approach and level of transparency on</td>
<td>• Increased consultations and communications about decision</td>
<td>• Without appropriate capacity building, local governments or</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Insufficient transparency/</td>
<td></td>
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<td>1. Consistency of decision making (I, C)</td>
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</table>
- Transparent approach to decision making on other financial issues, such as mining codes, concession agreements, etc. 
- Regional government collaboration provides opportunity to set high common regional standards for environmental and social management 
- Can establish common practices for communicating information and decision-making process to communities, based on best practice models used elsewhere 
- Creation of transparent and widely disseminated regional guidelines or standards provides moral pressure from the group for compliance by individual governments 
- If cluster approach and regional harmonization prioritize transparency and consistency of policy and decision making, likelihood of establishing these policies as common standard across all countries in sub-region will increase 
- Common schemes for consultation and communications can be established across projects and countries under regional harmonization approach | 
- Decision making, even if developing clusters collectively 
- Disparities in approaches will be noted by mining companies, CSOs, and communities. Some stakeholders may seek to exploit these differences 
- Governments loathe to publicly criticize each other’s internal management of affairs, due to national sovereignty concerns, may make it hard to ensure compliance by all three governments 
- Powerful interests that stand to lose from increased transparency of decisions may try to sabotage regional collaboration 
- There may be resistance from some stakeholders within a national government who see regional harmonization as a loss of national sovereignty | 
- Making at local level will increase transparency 
- Inclusion of local government and/or community in decision-making processes will make them active stakeholders in efforts to increase transparency and consistency of those decisions 
- Increased participation of local government or community in decisions will increase their buy-in on acceptance of decisions and their enforcement | 
- Communities can be just as inconsistent in decision making or lacking in transparency as national government bodies or other entities |
| 2. Disparities in approaches (I, C) | 
- Cluster-driven capacity will create opportunity for government and industry to work together on large-scale solutions 
- Adopting cluster-focused regional approaches or regional training institutions for addressing capacity issues can bring economies of scale and sharing of scarce pedagogical resources 
- Development of multiple mine sites will create mobility opportunities for workers, shifts focus of government and company capacity building efforts to look beyond individual projects to creating regional skills pool 
- Many of the skills developed for mining projects will be transferable to other industries, building overall human capital in the sub-region 
- Regional approach will favor sharing of successful strategies and lessons learned for increasing addressing capacity issues 
- Provide opportunity to set bar high for common standard for competencies and skillsets across all MRU countries | 
- Simultaneous development of multiple mine sites could lead to shortages of trained local labor, may require importing foreign workers, causing social tension among local residents 
- Governments (and/or companies) may not want to cooperate on sharing training resources 
- Language issues: regionally supported training will need to be done in two languages: English and French 
- Training programs will need to be started early to create workforce in time for ramp-up of operations | 
- Building capacity of communities will empower them to solve their own problems, and improve their ability to constructively engage government or industry on issues affecting their livelihoods and well-being 
- Trained community or local CSO capacity can assist understaffed government or other stakeholders (e.g. community or CSO monitoring of mining-related environmental issues) | 
- Some government or company officials may not like additional power such capacity building gives to communities 
- National government authorities may see local government and community capacity-building efforts as competing for resources to build capacity at national level |
### Table 12. Advantages, disadvantages, and trade-offs to addressing priorities by using a regional cluster approach and increased local government/community involvement in development decisions

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</table>
| 6. Disenfranchisement of local communities (I, C) | • Regional approach could ensure more uniform and consistent standards for how communities are included in decision-making processes. Can use best practices learned elsewhere as template for all three governments  
• Regional conflict resolution mechanisms and other early warning systems can be set up to head off trouble before it begins  
• Harmonized regional mechanisms for conflict resolution can anticipate cross-border, ethnic, or other civil disturbances | • Regional political considerations could overshadow local needs and concerns  
• Because of size and importance of projects, decision making could move farther away from local authorities and communities, not closer  
• Inconsistencies in national approaches to greater community involvement could lead to conflict between communities or between communities and government | • Common regional policies and approaches can be used for decentralization of authority, giving local governments greater role in development decisions affecting their communities  
• Working directly with communities would reduce or eliminate this disenfranchisement issue | • Engaging communities can be time-consuming, especially to reach consensus on major issues  
• Regional approaches may be too generic for some community-specific issues  
• Cluster-based and/or regional strategies or mechanisms will not work without local champions in communities |
| 7. Rent seeking behavior (C) | • Cluster-driven multinational efforts to work together on cross-border trafficking of goods and people could help reduce rent-seeking behavior  
• Adopting common regional standards and approaches on revenue transparency (like EITI) for governments and mining companies will lessen opportunities for rent-seeking behavior  
• Common or harmonized approaches to mining contract negotiations, tax conditions, environment and social obligations of companies, etc. will reduce role of individual discretionary power and rent-seeking behavior in negotiations  
• Opportunity for multiple governments to share successful strategies and lessons learned for curbing rent-seeking behavior and distorted benefit sharing | • Self-interested individuals will continue to try to take advantages of whatever systems are in place, regional, national, or otherwise  
• Creation of multiple large mining projects could increase temptation for some people to show rent-seeking behavior  
• Need political will of all governments involved in cluster activities to curb rent-seeking behavior  
• Regional approaches may not be fully adopted or enforced evenly across region, creating disparities in anti-corruption efforts  
• Rooting out rent-seeking behavior is easier in collaborative efforts involving all stakeholders  
• Engaging communities to monitor and publicize rent-seeking behavior by government or business officials can help reduce its incidence  
• Enlisting communities to fight rent-seeking behavior can empower them to take on other social problems | • Reducing endemic community-level rent-seeking behavior requires establishing accountability and consequences  
• May be hard to mobilize community anti-corruption efforts, if perception is that it is unstoppable |

(I) = selected by institutional stakeholder, (C) = selected by community stakeholder
3.8 Validation of findings and recommendations

351. Once the national workshops were completed, a preliminary set of findings and recommendations was prepared. While earlier rounds of consultations were intended to identify issues and set priorities, the WAMSSA process included a final consultation to present the draft results and conclusions to stakeholders. A summary of WAMSSA findings, recommendations, and a draft version of an action matrix was presented and discussed at a Regional Validation Workshop held in Freetown, Sierra Leone, grouping industry, government, donor, CSO, and community representatives, as well as at a final meeting of the WAMSSA Steering Committee.

3.8.1 REGIONAL VALIDATION WORKSHOP

352. The one-day regional workshop was held in Freetown, and organized in cooperation with the Mano River Union Secretariat, based in Freetown, in keeping with the sub-regional nature of the WAMSSA study.

353. The workshop was attended by about 40 participants, including stakeholders from Guinea, Liberia, Sierra Leone and members of the WAMSSA Steering Committee. Stakeholders invited to the workshop included participants from focus groups and national workshops held in each of the three countries as part of earlier WAMSSA consultation activities. Participants also included representatives of the three governments, mining industry, civil society, mining-affected communities, and donor agency representatives.

354. The main objectives of this workshop were to brief stakeholders on the key WAMSSA findings and recommendations, and solicit their input and validation of the findings as the final consultation component. Workshop participants endorsed the overall WAMSSA consultation process, as well as the four areas of recommendations. Workshop attendees also validated the action matrix through a series of multi-stakeholder breakout sessions that targeted specific recommendations. The breakout groups validated the long-term outcomes and identified who should be responsible for short-, medium- and long-term implementation of the activities to reach those outcomes.

355. Feedback from workshop participants supported regional harmonization of mining sector governance activities, but also strongly supported increased participation of community and civil society in governance and development decision-making processes. Participants also stressed that more attention needs to be paid to community and civil society concerns about mining development to enhance social accountability and transparency at all levels. More details on the final workshop can be found in Annex 4 of this report.

3.8.2 FINAL WAMSSA STEERING COMMITTEE MEETING

356. Following the Regional Validation Workshop, the WAMSSA Steering Committee held its third and final meeting. The Steering Committee grouped the Ministry of Mines WAMSSA focal points from Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone, plus representatives from the sub-regional and regional organizations (Mano River Union, ECOWAS, and WAEMU) for their review and comment. The Steering Committee members present at the meeting in Freetown were solicited for their views on the findings and
recommendations in this report, and on how to continue the policy dialogue and ensure that the WAMSSA recommendations are successfully disseminated and implemented.

357. At its final meeting, the Steering Committee expressed satisfaction with the WAMSSA process, including the focus on mining and infrastructure clusters as an appropriate framework to integrate a regional development strategy. The committee also endorsed the consultation process by which environmental, social accountability, and governance priorities were selected and addressed.

358. Steering Committee members and World Bank participants at the meeting recommended that the WAMSSA Steering Committee should be retained and expanded to include representatives from other countries such as Burkina Faso as a way to ensure that the recommendations are included in the African Mineral Governance Program. It was agreed that industry and civil society representatives should also be included in a new AMGP Consultative Group. This evolving and ongoing role of the Steering Committee fits well with the concept of a multi-stakeholder consultative framework proposed in WAMSSA Recommendation 1. More information on Steering Committee participation in WAMSSA can be found in Annex 4.

3.8.3 AFRICA MINERAL GOVERNANCE PROGRAM PREPARATION WORKSHOP

359. In December 2009, WAMSSA results were presented to stakeholders at a meeting held in Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso to launch the preparation of the Africa Mineral Governance Program. The meeting, organized by the World Bank, included representatives from government, civil society, and the private sector from ECOWAS countries, as well as representatives of regional organizations of the World Bank. The meeting acknowledged the work of WAMSSA, and the final communiqué issued by the meeting endorsed a number of concepts to be included in AMGP that tie in well with WAMSSA’s findings and conclusions. These include the importance of promoting regional harmonization and cooperation in mining development, support for capacity-building efforts within the sector, and greater inclusion of civil society and industry stakeholders in the development of mining sector policies and strategies.
4. Assessment of Institutions, Governance Systems, and Capacity to Manage Priorities in Mining-Infrastructure Clusters

4.1 Key findings

360. If the Mano River Union countries are to adopt a cluster-focused approach to mining and infrastructure development that is regionally harmonized and locally-based, several legal, institutional, and governance gaps need to be overcome.

361. There are critical institutional policy, legal, and regulatory gaps to dealing with priority issues. Significant improvements need to be made in the following areas — resolving the confusion and clarity of roles and responsibilities among various ministries, improving transparency and consistency of decision making to address lack of institutional capacity, and inadequate implementation, monitoring, and enforcement of environmental and social policies and regulations.

362. There is a need to improve institutional capacity and governance mechanisms, not only within the confines of developing national policy, but also to deal with the cumulative challenges posed by mining clusters and integrated infrastructure development at the sub-regional level. Attacking these problems from the top down through regional harmonization, and from the bottom up through increased participation by local government and community stakeholders, may offer new opportunities to address these issues.

363. Inadequate implementation, monitoring, and enforcement of environmental and social policies and regulations follows from the cumulative effects of institutional and capacity weaknesses noted above. In many cases there are laws, policies, or procedures on the books, but they are not followed due to jurisdictional battles among ministries, or lack of capable personnel and resources to do the work. Increased attention and pressure at the regional and local levels may provide new impetus to solve these issues.

364. Unless the critical gaps between governance needs and capacity gaps at the all levels are addressed, cluster-based mining growth may not only fail to deliver sustainable development benefits, but rising and inadequately met popular expectations to share benefits and achieve social accountability may foster social disruption and internal conflict.

365. Sub-regional and regional organizations are becoming more involved in mining policy and governance issues, including the MRU, ECOWAS, WAEMU, and the AU. To date most of these their work has been in formulating a vision and framework to harmonize development of the sector. However, these organizations’ mandates and ability to help implement and enforce new mineral governance initiatives appears limited.

366. Implications for AMGP. Given the significant institutional and other stakeholder capacity weaknesses at all levels, the AMGP capacity-building component is critical to improving mineral sector governance and development planning. Building capacity early
in the AMGP project can empower and enable stakeholders to better ‘own’ their environmental, social, and governance priorities and apply their own solutions to resolve them.

4.2 Introduction

This section discusses a number of institutions, governance systems, and capacities that could affect the ability of MRU governments and other players to implement a cluster-based approach to mining-infrastructure development and address the environmental, social, and governance priorities identified by WAMSSA.

4.3 Legal and regulatory framework

All three Mano River Union countries have national laws and regulations that govern environmental management in mining. Each country’s constitution recognizes the need to protect and promote human rights and property rights, and also establishes basic principles to guide the overall policy and legislative framework for environmental management in the mining sector. Mining laws are better established than environmental laws in all three countries. They are more specific, which makes them more easily enforceable, compared to environmental legislation. Mining laws are enforced through mining permits and contracts (including mining licenses, concession contracts, and/or mining development agreements). The common principle of mining laws in all three countries is the obligation imposed on mining companies and mining rights holders to prevent and manage negative environmental effects of their operations and activities.

The environmental requirements defined under the mining legislation are not necessarily reconciled with provisions of environmental management and protection-related legislation of each individual country (Table 13). Other environmental requirements may be found under sectoral legislation in the three countries. However, in cases where environmental regulations or decrees are in conflict with provisions in mining code or laws, the latter often take precedent. This presents a potential source of conflict and confusion for investors and mining rights applicants because environmental laws are generally more stringent than mining laws in terms of environmental safeguards.

Another potential source of conflict arises in the institutional arrangements. Generally, there is a lack of clearly defined roles and responsibility within the various relevant sectoral institutions. In addition, there is no proper coordination among the various relevant institutions in the review and approval of EIAs. Environmental legislation is relatively recent (in comparison to mining laws). As a result, there are no clearly defined institutional arrangements in terms of its administration and enforcement between the mining and the environmental sectors. Ambiguity and a lack of capacity in environmental institutional structures often render the mining agency or department the environmental regulatory body. From this perspective the institutional framework for environmental protection and social development in the mining sector remains fragile and weak.
Table 13. Mining legislation and specific environmental requirements in the Mano River Countries

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Guinea</th>
<th>Liberia</th>
<th>Sierra Leone</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Mining legislation</strong></td>
<td><strong>Environmental requirements in the mining laws</strong></td>
<td><strong>Environmental requirements in the mining laws</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Mining Code (Law 95/036 of June 30, 1995)</td>
<td>• “An application for exploitation permit must include an Environmental Impact Study and rehabilitation plan” (Articles 34-38 of the Mining Code).</td>
<td>• The applicant for mining rights is obliged to (i) prepare and submit an EIA as condition for granting a mining lease (if considered necessary to &quot;conserve the natural resources in or on the land over which the mineral right is sought or in or on neighboring land&quot; by the Secretary of State (ii) provide a proposal for &quot;progressive rehabilitation and reclamation of land disturbed by mining and the minimization of effects of mining on surface water and groundwater and on adjoining and neighboring lands&quot; (iii) restoration of areas damaged and “deleteriously affected” by exploration of mining operations, (iv) rehabilitation and reclamation of areas mined out by artisanal mining license holders (MMA, 1994)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Arrêté A98/5874/MRNE of August 10, 1998 on implementation of some provisions of the Mining Code</td>
<td>• In the case of a large industrial exploitation or a mining concession, contractual agreements may include additional environmental and social obligations (Article 11 of the Mining Code).</td>
<td>• The mining rights holder is required to pay compensation to owner or lawful occupier of any land disturbed by mining operations or any other damage as consequence of mining activities (Article 26 of the MMA, 1994).</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Mines and Mineral Act of 2000</td>
<td>• The mining right holder must (i) “restore the terrain of any land disturbed by exploration or mining to its prior state”; (ii) “ensure that all water polluted by its exploration or mining is restored to its prior state…” ; (iii) “engage in reforestation activities if responsible for large scale felling of trees during exploration or mining”; (iv) submit an EIA Study for any Class A or B Mining License, and, if required after the review of such EIS, “submit an EMP” (Sections 8.1 – 8.5 of the MMA).</td>
<td>• Mining companies are required to contribute 0.1% of their gross sales to an Agricultural Development Fund (Article 107 of 1994).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Public Procurement and Concession Act of 2005</td>
<td>• For ongoing mining operations, the Mining Minister shall, together with the mining right holder, conduct periodic EAs.</td>
<td>• The mining right holder must observe strict hygiene, health and safety rules and labor standards (Sections 16.1 - 16.6).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Regulations on the interim procedures for issuing exploration licenses (Reg 002 of August 2007)</td>
<td>• The mineral right holder shall, as part of its project’s feasibility study prepare an EIA to be submitted to the EPA with an Environmental Protection Plan (EPP), which shall be updated on a regular basis and subjected to disclosure and approval by the EPA. The Mining Minister approves the overall feasibility study for the proposed mining exploitation.</td>
<td>• Mining companies are required to contribute 0.1% of their gross sales to an Agricultural Development Fund (Article 107 of 1994).</td>
</tr>
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</table>

24. Information in this table is drawn from “Legal Frameworks for Environmental and Social Management of Mining Operations in Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone”, a July 2008 report from the Environmental and International Law Unit of the World Bank’s Legal Vice Presidency. (LEGEN).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Environmental laws and regulations</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>- Law 45/PRG/87 of May 28, 1987 related to the protection and improvement of the environment.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Law 96/010 of July 1996 on pollution taxes applicable to Classified Plants.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Decree 92-221/PRG/SGG related to the mandates and organization of the ministry of natural resources, energies and environment.</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Decree 201/PRG/SGG/89 related to the protection of marine area against all forms of pollution.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Decree 199/PRG/SGG/89 of November 1989 on EIA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Decree 200/PRG/SGG/89 of November 1989 on Classified Plants For the Protection of the Environment</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Decree 93/149 related to the National Council for Environment</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Decree of December 1997 on Hazardous Chemical Substances</td>
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<td>- Environment Protection and Management</td>
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<td>- Environment Protection Agency Act of 2002</td>
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<tr>
<th>Requirements for mining activities</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>- All mining activities are subject to an EIA, which must be part of the application for a mining right that cannot be processed until and unless the EIA is approved by the relevant authority (Articles 82-83 of Environmental Code)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Sea mining is also subject to prior EIA (EIA Decree).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Mining facilities are defined as classified plants and therefore subjects to a specific permitting procedure for the protection of the environment (Decree 200/PRG/SGG of 1989). This thorough permitting procedure includes an analysis of environmental impacts of the proposed facilities and public information and consultation through a public inquiry to be implemented by the environmental regulatory agency, after which the environmental regulatory agency may impose specific safeguards and obligations to protect the environment and affected persons and communities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Extractive industry operations must obtain an EIA permit before they commence. Applications for EIA permits must include information on (i) nature of the project and proposed activities, (ii) location and description of receiving environment (iii) material used, anticipated products and their likely environmental impacts. The environmental regulatory agency reviews the application and either (i) requires an Environmental Review (ER), (ii) and EIS, or (iii) issue a certificate of approval if the proposal is found to be of No Significant Impact. The EIA system provides for public disclosure and consultation. The EIA Committee conducts EIS review, coordinate with other government agencies and undertake public consultation and inquiries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- A technical committee shall be established to review transboundary impacts of mining operations and “enter into negotiations as appropriate” (2002 EPML).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- A valid environmental license is required for all extractive industries activities (Article 14 of EPA). The applicant must apply to the Environmental Agency that shall decide on the need to submit an EIA after considering criteria such as environmental impact on community, location and project scale, potential impacts on the local ecosystem, and cumulative impacts. Public comments following public consultation and the EIA study are submitted to the Board of the Environmental Agency, which advises the Director to issue an environmental license, or request additional information from the applicant, or deny the license if the project will have significant adverse effects on the environment. An environmental license may have additional environmental protection conditions attached to it.</td>
</tr>
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4.4 Public participation and consultation mechanisms

371. All three countries have public participation and consultation requirements tied to the execution of mining project Environmental and Social Impact Assessments (ESIAs), which are required to obtain mining licenses. However, it is unclear how actively these requirements are followed and what if any enforcement mechanisms are in place and active. Typically any consultation process carried out for the ESIAs is organized by the companies, and involves interactions with local government authorities and local communities, with little or no active input or direction of the activity by the national governments. It is also unclear what public participation processes exist or are used with any regularity once mining projects are underway, or for policy considerations.

372. There are some notable exceptions. In Liberia, a series of stakeholder consultation sessions was held by the Government around the country as part of drafting a new mining code. These meetings occurred as part of a Government policy-making process and were not linked to any particular mining project. In addition, the Liberian Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (LEITI) secretariat held a series of consultations around the country to explain the EITI model and revenue transparency concepts, and to allow stakeholders to interact with EITI officials as well as Government ministry representatives who were part of the consultation tour.

373. Access to environmental, social, and other information pertaining to mining activities varies by country. While in theory ESIAs are intended to be public documents, they are typically not readily accessible outside the ministry responsible for reviewing them. They are also voluminous technical documents that are virtually impenetrable to stakeholders lacking an advanced education.

374. The availability of project-level information and consultation processes largely depends on the mining companies. Where an international mining company follows corporate or international standards on public disclosure, there may be a fairly high level of stakeholder interaction and information disclosure. For example, Rio Tinto’s Simandou project, as part of meeting obligations for an IFC investment, produced a series of detailed documents, including an ESIA, Environmental and Social Management Plan, Regional Community Development Plan, and Public Consultation and Disclosure Strategy, all of which involved soliciting community and local government interaction and input. However, it is clear that even if Government requirements to produce such documents exist on paper, it is largely up to a company to determine what level of compliance it will undertake. Government ministries have limited capacity to assess these reports or enforce whatever commitments are made in them.

375. Absent a strong, proactive, on-the-ground enforcement capability by national governments, ongoing interactions between mining companies and local communities once an ESIA is completed vary by project sponsor. In some cases, regular meetings are held between the company and local communities. In other cases, there may be local spokespersons, or designated representatives who act in between company and community. Some companies may bypass this process altogether if they sense there is no enforcement capability. In other cases, even where there is interaction between companies and communities, other factors may work to limit the flow of information. Residents of the communities located near the ArcelorMittal site in Nimba County,
including ArcelorMittal employees, are reportedly reluctant to voice concerns about company activities in public, for fear of losing access to jobs or housing provided by the company (Murray, 2009).

376. Outside of regular government interactions with stakeholders, it should be noted that a number of stakeholder consultancy processes have occurred in the MRU countries as a result of donor and/or international civil society initiatives. A number of stakeholder consultations were held in mining regions in Sierra Leone and Liberia for the Diamonds for Development initiative and the Liberia Artisanal Mining PSIA, which were supported by UNDP and other donors. In addition, several World Bank-funded projects, including the Mining Sector Strategic Environmental and Social Assessment and the Justice for the Poor project, held several rounds of consultations within communities near commercial diamond and rutile mining activities and in artisanal mining communities in Sierra Leone. The current WAMSSA study also had a stakeholder consultation component, involving interactions with both institutional stakeholders in capital cities and local communities. However, there needs to be a way to ensure that the policy dialogue begun under WAMSSA and other consultation processes does not end once the study or project is completed. Stakeholders need to continue to be engaged through formal or informal mechanisms to ensure that policy recommendations are implemented. Chapter 5 of this report recommends a process by which this can occur.

4.5 Governance systems

4.5.1 Transparency and Accountability of Decision-Making Processes for Land Use, Compensation, and Dispute Resolution

377. The mines ministries in the three countries are the lead and dominant players (if not always the change agents) for governance of the mining sector. Because mining is considered a strategic economic activity in all three countries, these ministries, especially the top appointees, feel a lot of pressure about awarding concessions, permitting, and access to lands, etc. This can lead to personal interests taking precedence over good policy decisions, and in some cases to rent-seeking behavior, which in turn can lead to morale problems as well as personnel changes. The potential for self-interested behavior, up to and including favoritism and rent-seeking behavior, is ever present, longstanding, and difficult to root out in all three countries.

378. Insufficient consistency and transparency of decision-making processes is compounded by a lack of jurisdictional clarity and conflicting views of roles and responsibilities on such key matters as land allocation, environmental requirements, and handling of mining revenue. Manpower shortages, often starting barely a level or two below the minister or deputy minister and extending deep into the technical and field staff, are common to the three countries. The lack of adequate capacity, whether a sufficient number of personnel or gaps in technical expertise, can hamper a ministry’s ability to carry out its work even if the policies and procedures are clear and in place. This is as true in the field offices as it is in the central office. The ministries for mines in the three countries have primary responsibility for mining development, and are usually the initiators of mining-related infrastructure development projects, although they need to coordinate these with other relevant ministries.
As noted earlier, these institutional weaknesses have been previously identified by the Sierra Leone SESA and other previous research on governance shortcomings in the sub-region, and were confirmed for this study through further analysis and stakeholder interactions. Attacking these problems from the top down through regional harmonization, and from the bottom up through increased participation by local government and community stakeholders, may offer new opportunities to address these issues. The multi-level, multi-stakeholder framework for regional mining sector development proposed in Chapter 5 is a possible solution to this problem.

4.5.2 EITI IMPLEMENTATION, MINING REVENUE USE AND POTENTIAL GOVERNANCE FAILURES

Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone all participate in the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI). However, the organization, efficacy and momentum of national efforts to implement EITI vary greatly among the countries.

Liberia became an EITI candidate country in October 2006, and has gone the farthest of the three countries in implementing its EITI program (Box 5). Liberia EITI (LEITI) has a governing body known as the LEITI Multi-stakeholders Steering Group. This group is made up of representatives of the Government, the private sector including mining companies, the Liberian Timber Association, the Miners and Brokers Association, and civil society. Liberia is the first EITI country in the world to include forestry in its reporting along with the oil and mining sectors. The steering group is chaired by the Liberian Minister of Finance, and co-chaired by the Minister of Lands Mines and Energy. LEITI also has an independent four-person secretariat which is established and supported by the multi-stakeholder group, and which manages ongoing LEITI activities. LEITI’s first report was released in February 2009 in a launching ceremony presided over by the Liberian President Ellen Johnson Sirleaf. A second report was released in February 2010, covering not only mining companies, but also oil, forestry, and agriculture firms. LEITI also has conducted an extensive outreach campaign to engage stakeholders in mining communities on the concepts of revenue transparency and Government and industry accountability. LEITI has also conducted technical workshops to advise reporting stakeholders how to comply with the reporting process.

In July 2009, the Government of Liberia passed the LEITI Act, making it only the second country in the world (after Nigeria) to have dedicated EITI legislation. The EITI Act requires that all Government agencies and extractive companies comply with the EITI process (which is voluntary in most countries), and includes the rubber and forestry industries along with oil and mining. The Act requires not only the publishing of payments by individual companies, but also reporting on operating contracts and licenses. Liberia also became the first African country to go through the validation process in October 2009, meaning it is one of only two countries in the world to achieve ‘Compliant Country’ status. Outside the LEITI process, the Liberian media closely covers the mining sector, including awarding of mining contract tenders, and regularly reports on allegations of rent-seeking behavior that arise.

The World Bank is working with the Liberian Government to develop an EITI++ strategy that would use a value-chain approach to improve governance and sustainable economic growth and development benefits from the mining, oil, agriculture, and forestry sectors.
384. Guinea became a candidate member in April 2005. The National Committee is a multi-stakeholder group, headed by the Government, and which has undergone several reorganizations of its executive committee and sub-committees since its creation. The committee produced a first report in 2005, covering oil and mining industries, but it has yet to report on results for 2006 to 2009. Reporting by companies is voluntary, although six mining companies participated in the 2005 report, including all the major bauxite, alumina, and gold producers. An open letter from the Guinean affiliates of Transparency International and Publish What You Pay published in September 2009 decried the lack of funding from the Government to allow production of subsequent reports, and cited the risk that Guinea would not make its March 2010 deadline to achieve validation status. The group also requested that allegations of past rent-seeking behavior by Government officials in the mining sector be investigated, and that reporting requirements be made mandatory and extended to the timber and fishing industries. In early 2010, Guinea requested and received a one-year suspension of its membership due to the political turmoil taking place in the country at the time.

385. Sierra Leone started the process later than the other two countries. It became a candidate country in February 2008. The Sierra Leone EITI steering committee is chaired by the Minister for Presidential and Public Affairs and includes six ministries and Government agencies, Parliament, civil society, trade unions, the Chamber of Mines, and the media. The steering committee approved a work plan in 2008, began working on its first report, and was to set up a secretariat. Sierra Leone had a March 2010 validation date, although by the time that date arrived it was still in the early stages of a tendering process for a firm to carry out the validation exercise.

386. The fourth MRU member, Côte d’Ivoire, also became an EITI candidate country in May 2008, and preparations for a first report that focused on the oil sector began in April 2008. Thus any MRU-focused sub-regional harmonization initiatives related to revenue transparency, other principles, and/or reporting requirements derived from the EITI process could logically be extended to apply to all four MRU members. Côte d’Ivoire initiated its validation exercise tendering process in January 2010 to meet its May 2010 deadline.

387. While the EITI process goes a long way to encourage revenue transparency, EITI alone will not ensure proper use of mining revenues. Powerful individuals may still be able to influence decision-making processes by offering or taking payments under the table, although this becomes harder when the process is routine and publicly reported. A strong anti-corruption drive led by the Liberian President appears to be catching some improper behavior in awarding of contracts, illegal payoffs, etc., perhaps because people finally feel emboldened to report rent-seeking behavior when they see it. The Guinean military Government which took power in January 2009 alleged corruption by past mines ministers, but did not establish a regular process for eradicating the problem. There have also been allegations in the Sierra Leonean media and within civil society circles about questionable business practices in the mining sector, including who receives mining permits and under what circumstances. In March 2010, the Sierra Leonean President sacked a third minister for corruption allegations.
Box 5. Liberia Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative, a model EITI program

There are a number of elements to Liberia’s EITI process which may prove useful for other countries, including Guinea and Sierra Leone, to consider:

- LEITI has an independent secretariat, with a Head of Secretariat who is not a Government official. Government representation is ensured by the chairs, who are the Ministers of Finance and Mines, but the work of the multi-stakeholder group is driven by the secretariat itself.

- An active EITI multi-stakeholder committee, including Government, industry, civil society, and traditional leaders, holds regular meetings to discuss mining sector development and transparency issues, above and beyond their work of assessing Government and industry revenue reporting.

- Additional civil society groups not sitting on the multi-stakeholder committee meet regularly with the Publish What You Pay representatives to be briefed on EITI activities and to provide input for the steering committee meetings.

- Strong outreach and communications programs are underpinned by a multi-pronged communications strategy that includes radio, television, print media, billboards, other publicity materials, a website, and public consultations. The committee held public consultations around the country in mining communities.

- While the primary purpose of the public consultations, which are held around the country in mining communities, are to explain the EITI process, they also become a forum for transparent discussion of other mining sector issues because the EITI delegations included Government officials, industry representatives, and civil society organizations.

- LEITI has released two reports. The second Liberian EITI report includes payments from 71 extractive companies with revenues of more than US$ 35 million, and covers not only mining firms, but also oil, forestry, and agricultural operations.

- The enactment of the LEITI Act by the Government provides a stronger enforcement platform for the Government to demand revenue reporting transparency from industry and for civil society to demand similar transparency and social accountability from both industry and Government.

- In a sign that EITI is more than just a reporting exercise in Liberia, six companies operating in the mining and forestry sectors were fined US$ 1,000 each for failing to submit payment data to the Independent reconcilers during the reconciliation process.

388. Beyond reactions to EITI reporting on revenue transfers from mining companies to the government, civil society and government agencies in these countries do not have a lot of tools to manage what is done with mining revenues once they are collected by the government. In all three countries the majority of revenues are collected by the central government, although there are some provisions for a portion of that money to go back to mining communities. Even in Liberia, where LEITI takes a proactive approach to ensure stakeholder access to mining contracts, individual company reporting on revenues, etc., the focus is still primarily on the revenues that pass from industry to government hands, and not what is done with those revenues by the government once they have been collected. The Liberia and Guinea EITI processes include reporting on company contributions to society, but there is no mechanism to ensure what is done with the money. Local CSOs involved in the EITI process, including local affiliates of the international CSO Publish What You Pay, have advocated for more accountability for how mining revenues are used by the government. The EITI++ initiative is one possible vehicle for increasing strategic attention, visibility, and accountability applied to the use of mining revenues. If the AMGP project sets up multi-stakeholder bodies at all levels, these groups could play a role in helping to determine how such funds might be spent; at a minimum they could serve a watchdog role.
4.6 Overview of sub-regional organizations

4.6.1 ECONOMIC COMMUNITY OF WEST AFRICAN STATES
389. The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS, or CEDEAO for Communauté Économique des États de l’Afrique de l’Ouest in French), is a regional group of 15 West African countries, created in 1975. Member states include Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Côte d’Ivoire, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, and Togo. The goal of the organization is to create an economic and monetary union and single trading bloc across the former French, British, and Portuguese colonies that make up its membership by developing policies and programs that promote economic integration. ECOWAS activities are organized under a series of commissioners responsible for agriculture, environment and water resources, human development and gender, infrastructure, macroeconomic policy, political affairs, peace and security, and trade, customs and free movement, which includes oil and mining. ECOWAS has been actively involved in supporting the West African Power Pool and development of policies promoting regional road and rail infrastructure.

390. In May 2009 the ECOWAS Council of Ministers issued a directive on the harmonization of guiding principles and policies in the mining sector for its member countries. The directive includes articles on environmental protection obligations, rehabilitation of mine sites, local employment, transparency, public access to information, and sustainable development and local community interests. ECOWAS also supported the development of a regional mining code with assistance from Oxfam and other civil society organizations from across West Africa, including the MRU countries. Both these initiatives will be the focus of a series of consultations made by ECOWAS with governments and other stakeholders within the ECOWAS region to work out how they may be implemented. It is unclear what the enforcement mechanisms might be for such a regional code, however, the WAMSSA team agrees that this consultative approach to developing a regional harmonization framework for mining policy is the way to move forward.

4.6.2 WEST AFRICAN MONETARY UNION
391. The West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU, or UEMOA in French, for Union Économique et Monétaire Ouest-Africaine) was established to promote economic integration among countries sharing the West African CFA franc as a common currency. It groups eight ECOWAS member countries, including Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, Mali, Niger, Senegal, Togo, and Guinea-Bissau. Côte d’Ivoire is the only WAEMU member that also belongs to the MRU. As a customs and monetary union, WAEMU members have implemented macroeconomic policy convergence criteria, a customs union and common external tariff, and harmonized indirect tax regulations. It is also involved in developing regional structural and sectoral policies. ECOWAS and WAEMU together completed a regional Poverty Reduction Strategy for West Africa in 2006, although the link between this regional strategic plan and country national programs appears limited. Given the limited overlap between WAEMU and the MRU, it is unclear how important a role WAEMU might play in harmonizing MRU policies,
although it may have an effect on larger policy harmonization efforts across West Africa, or in implementation of AMGP.

4.6.3 MANO RIVER UNION

392. The Mano River Union (MRU) was formed as an association between Liberia and Sierra Leone in 1973 to promote sub-regional economic integration. Guinea joined the union in 1980, and Côte d’Ivoire joined in 2009. The MRU is named for the Mano River which begins in the Guinea highlands and forms a border between Liberia and Sierra Leone. The goal of the union is to encourage economic cooperation among its members. The organization became largely dormant during the civil wars in Sierra Leone and Liberia, however in recent years it has begun to rebuild its secretariat. It recently has been involved in sub-regional peace building activities, HIV-AIDS work with refugee populations, and other projects tied to post-war rebuilding. The organization has begun to add new staff and has been looking for donor support to revitalize previous projects as well as new ones. A Mano River Union Action plan, including a number of political and economic initiatives, is being revived.

393. A sub-regional transportation strategy that has been dormant for a number of years is being reviewed for possible revitalization. In 2009, the MRU sought funding from the African Development Bank for a project involving transboundary forest ecosystem management of the Upper Guinea forest ecosystem present in the four MRU countries. The project goal is to contribute to poverty reduction and sustainable livelihoods for local communities through conservation and sustainable management of the Upper Guinea forest system. The specific objective of the project is to strengthen the institutional capacity of the MRU and the four target countries to effectively manage the transboundary forest ecosystems and the environment in a sustainable manner. The project includes support for adjustments to legal and institutional frameworks for environmental governance and sustainable environmental management, as well as capacity building at the MRU and national, provincial, and local levels. Given the sub-regional, transboundary focus on environmental management, there may be synergies between this program and any environmental component of the AMGP.

394. The MRU can also serve as a platform to increase sub-regional harmonization of mining sector policies and activities, however, it will require considerable new financial and human resources and capacity-building of the institution itself to be able to take on such tasks.

4.6.4 INCENTIVES AND CONSTRAINTS FOR INTER- AND INTRA-COUNTRY COOPERATION ON ENVIRONMENTAL AND SOCIAL MANAGEMENT

395. As noted above, the capacity for environmental and social management of issues in the MRU countries is limited, especially at the regional (ECOWAS, WAEMU) and sub-regional (MRU) levels. ECOWAS primarily develops policy approaches, but does not have resources to actively manage or monitor any initiatives on the ground in the ECOWAS countries. A similar situation exists with the MRU secretariat. Regional or sub-regional policy initiatives are developed through interaction between the regional organizations and relevant ministries at the national level, but ultimately it is up to national governments to implement and enforce any new directives or policies. Donor support also has been somewhat limited for regional initiatives, although the World Bank
and UN agencies have been involved in several regional initiatives that involve other regional or national bodies. These include two GEF projects, the recently completed Senegal River Basin Project and the Niger River Basin Project. These projects focus on strengthening basin-wide capacities at all levels for transboundary land and water management, with the institutional focal points being the Senegal River Basin Authority and the Niger River Basin Authority, both of which have Guinea as a member. Donors are also supporting the West African Power Pool project, which aims to knit together the various national grids to increase access to steady reliable power for both commercial and residential use.

396. At the national level, the ability to manage environmental and social issues, including the key priority issues identified through the WAMSSA process, are hampered by capacity issues and lack of clear roles and responsibilities identified earlier in this report. The ministries and agencies responsible for environmental oversight and protection in each of the three countries are also key stakeholders in the mining sector because they all have responsibility for environmental oversight of proposed mining projects. However, in Guinea and Sierra Leone the environmental function has moved from ministry to ministry when governments have changed, making it difficult for these ministries to establish a clear mandate. Liberia has a stand-alone environmental authority, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), and there is a move to establish a similar body in Sierra Leone, although a previous effort to establish such an agency foundered when the Government changed hands. Government ministries and agencies lack the staff in central offices and especially in the field to be able to manage such issues, especially the follow-up needed once mining projects are past the ESIA stage and into construction and operations.

397. As with the mines ministries, a key issue in all three countries is lack of sufficient capacity (both in sheer numbers and competence) within the relevant ministries to adequately manage environmental challenges. This includes a lack of capacity for adequate and timely reviews of mining project environmental and social impact assessments (ESIAs), and especially for conducting monitoring and enforcement once a mining project is in the construction or operations phase. These ministries also face challenges with lack of clarity in defining roles and responsibilities, and territoriality shown among ministries when it comes to regulating access to land and natural resources, including minerals.

398. Capacity to police environmental compliance is extremely limited within the ministries or agencies responsible for mining and the environment. Often environmental or social issues arising from ongoing mining activities come to the attention of national authorities only once it has been reported by local communities, CSOs, or the media, by which time the central government can only react to the problems after the fact.

399. Ability to manage environmental and social issues is even more limited at the sub-national level in the three countries. Local government was virtually destroyed in Liberia during the civil war, and Sierra Leone’s local government structures were also severely weakened by its war, although there are efforts underway to rebuild local governance structures in both countries. However, in all three countries, local governments lack the resources or training to manage environmental and social issues within or outside the mining sector, even where decentralized governance gives them
nominal management responsibility. Develop of mineral-infrastructure clusters will need to include strengthening local government capacity.

4.6.5 INCENTIVES, CONSTRAINTS, AND INSTITUTIONAL CAPACITY FOR INTER-COUNTRY COOPERATION ON REGIONAL INFRASTRUCTURE AND CLUSTER DEVELOPMENT IN MRU COUNTRIES

400. While the MRU countries cooperated on economic and trade issues prior to the civil wars, there has not been much formal cooperation among the MRU countries on mining and mining-related infrastructure development. However, with the renewed push to make the MRU an active policy body, both mining and infrastructure development appear on the agenda of the MRU Secretariat’s Strategic Plan, although it is not clear when or how that will translate into active inter-governmental coordination for project planning and development.  

401. Nonetheless, in a late July 2009 meeting, the mines ministers of Guinea and Liberia agreed to work together to monitor and promote mineral development in their two countries. The two Governments agreed to create a Ministerial Commission chaired by the two ministers, and supported by a Joint Technical Committee made up of members of key sector ministries from both Governments to monitor and promote mineral development. Among the issues to be looked at by the commission and committee was a framework to collaborate on development and management of shared infrastructure to enable development of the Simandou Guinea and Nimba County Liberia projects. There has been a similar drive from Sierra Leone, where efforts to establish a National Minerals Agency have been linked with efforts to engage Liberia and Guinea on changing and harmonizing a diamond export tax. The ECOWAS initiative to harmonize mining regimes recently began and should further streamline sub-regional collaboration

402. While there is strong interest and self-evident confirmation that the three countries support a transborder approach at the highest level for cluster development, it is not clear whether that approach is commonly held by the key influencers. By way of example, undertaking an integrated approach to planning and implementation will require significant input from finance ministries and local government. In the case of the former, a coordinated approach would need to show strong national fiscal returns to ensure their participation and/or support for harmonization.

403. The benefits to local government in the three countries are not clearly evident. In all three countries, local government authorities have little influence over national or sub-regional policy making, however, they play a critical role in implementation of policies in the field. The role of local government and traditional authorities in the mining sector varies in each of the three countries, however, their primary responsibility is to ensure the well-being of their communities in the face of nearby mining sector development. Traditionally these local governments have had few resources to implement policy, and often the ones they receive appear to have been poorly managed. Local government in Guinea and Sierra Leone receives a portion of mining taxes and revenues intended to fund development of the affected communities. In Sierra Leone, paramount, section, and town chiefs have significant power over allocation of mining leases to artisanal and

mechanized small-scale mining operations (Sierra Leone SESA, World Bank, 2007). In recent years the Guinean central authorities have created several layers of local government, including the Conseils Préfectorals de Développement and Communautés Rurales de Développement (rural development communities). Mining companies can work directly with these local entities, which are nominally responsible for local development planning. In instances where returns are nationalized, which is likely where a sub-regional approach is adopted, returns to local government will not be clear and support may not be forthcoming.

4.6.6 POTENTIAL FOR GOVERNANCE FAILURES IN THE MINERAL PRODUCTION VALUE CHAIN

404. The potential for governance failure in the mineral production value chain is high. The following critical factors are derived from the descriptions above:

- A lack of capacity within all spheres of government and across governance competencies is acute. It is possible that this capacity shortage will lead to failures in implementation of policies, plans, and/or programs.
- The potential for national interests in both infrastructure development and fiscal return from mineral taxes may prevent the implementation of a sub-regional approach.
- Inconsistent or lack of transparency in decision making could result in lack of support and/or will cause the private sector to withdraw from investing in the MRU. This is especially of concern under the current economic climate where the private sector is very risk averse. Political instability remains an ongoing concern in the region and will further create uncertainty for private sector investment.
- Downstream investment in secondary minerals processing is likely to remain low until incentives are introduced and infrastructure delivery is underway.
- Lack of a clear indication of returns (either economically or in terms of infrastructure) at the local level could result in implementation failures.

4.7 Political economy of mineral sector reform

405. The risks of increased and combined regional and local participation in development activities is that new constituencies (at the regional and local levels) are being engaged and empowered to participate in the planning and decision-making processes that previously may have been the sole purview of national authorities. There may be resistance from traditional players who are used to controlling such processes and would not like to see their influence diluted or made accountable to others. More information on the political economy as it relates to specific national and cluster-level recommended actions can be found in Chapter 5, while more information on stakeholder interests and influence can be found in the Annex 3.

406. Potential winners (and therefore potential supporters or enablers of reform) would be all stakeholders who could benefit from:

- Increased regional harmonization and concerted actions by MRU governments on key issues, clearly defined transparent procedures, and decision-making processes;
- Good policies with accompanying procedures;
- Well-trained staff actively enforcing environmental, social, and planning teams in the appropriate ministries;
- Good inter-ministerial cooperation and clear roles and responsibilities;
- Increased information flow, communication, and coordination among all parties;
- Active inclusion of local government and communities in development decisions; and
- Increased benefit sharing with communities.

407. Thus winners would include almost all stakeholder groups, including national and local government officials, mining companies, NGOs, the media, communities, and vulnerable populations.

408. Potential losers (and therefore potential opponents who might try to block reforms) would be those stakeholders who currently benefit and would be threatened by change. This would include unscrupulous individuals in government or other sectors who practice favoritism or rent-seeking behavior, some companies who regularly skirt the law, and middlemen in the artisanal mining sector who operate outside legal channels. Other losers might be government ministries or individual civil servants who feel their influence is on the wane or their priorities are being neglected in favor of a special focus on the mining sector.

409. As noted elsewhere in this report, this issue was a major focus of discussion in the scenario analysis portion of the national workshops. Participants in small breakout groups were asked to identify potential winners and losers under a regional harmonization scenario and a local community development scenario. They were then asked to identify what factors might enable the transition for one or both scenarios, as well as those who might block it.

410. The potential for policy reforms (or their benefits) to be hampered, distorted, or captured by vested interests clearly exists. As noted above, there will always be individuals who try to find ways to exploit the weaknesses in a governance mechanism to their own advantage, and they will be sure to oppose or try to block changes.

411. If the solution to improved mineral governance is a regionally-backed effort to increase transparency and consistency of government decision making, strengthen capacity, and create stronger environmental and social protections for those affected by the mining industry, then the key to making it work is to have strong and public support at the very top leadership levels and a well organized and active civil society.

412. For example, while corruption reportedly has been endemic in Liberia, President Ellen Johnson Sirleaf has championed a strong push to stamp it out. Her public leadership on this issue has combined with a number of concrete reform measures to improve financial controls within the Government, and does appear to be having an impact on the problem. A number of recent arrests or firing of highly-placed Government officials for alleged rent-seeking behavior and influence-peddling has begun to chip away at the previous culture of impunity. If such high profile good governance efforts are adopted in the mining sector, especially if similarly championed and executed across the MRU
region, they could serve to neutralize or act as a counterweight to individuals who may try to slow efforts to improve mineral governance.

4.8 Environmental and social management at the cluster level

413. Each of the three countries has an EIA or ESIA requirement for mining projects, as well as for other projects that may have significant effects on the environment. Responsibility for the environment is handled slightly differently in the three countries. In Guinea, environmental matters are handled by the Ministry of the Environment. In Liberia, there is an independent environmental agency, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). In Sierra Leone, the function has resided primarily under the Ministry of Lands, Country Planning and Environment. An independent environmental body, the NaCEF was created in 2007, but it failed to become operational. The environmental management function was reabsorbed into the MLCPE. In 2008 a new law was passed creating the Sierra Leone Environment Protection Agency (SLEPA), which will be a regulatory body but still remain under the auspices of the ministry. It is still recruiting personnel to become fully operational.

414. Each of the three countries has a requirement that mining, oil and gas, and other projects having a significant environmental impact must file an environmental and social impact assessment. However, capacity to actually process those EIAs is very limited. Often the government relies on self-reporting by the companies because there may be no means for ministry officials to actually visit a site to verify what is reported in the EIA. In all three countries there is typically a multi-agency board that reviews applications, but once approval is given for project, there is extremely limited enforcement capacity.

4.8.1 IMPLICATIONS FOR MANAGING ENVIRONMENTAL AND SOCIAL PRIORITIES IN CLUSTERS

415. Simandou/Nimba mining-infrastructure cluster (southeastern Guinea/Nimba County). The implications for a mining-infrastructure cluster with multiple mine sites such as the iron ore cluster in southeast Guinea/eastern Liberia is that the governments depend on whatever environmental and social procedures and protections the large-scale mining firms have established. A number of large-scale mining companies that have made efforts to establish themselves as responsible corporate citizens are present in the MRU countries, including BHP-Billiton and Rio Tinto. Such companies may often have more strict internal policies than those requested by the government. In the case of Rio Tinto’s Simandou project, the IFC made an equity investment, so IFC performance standards come into play. Reliance on companies for self-governance certainly has its limitations, which manifest themselves differently at different phases of the project.

- In the early stages of exploration there may be little to no oversight from government officials, so the practices in place are those imported by the company itself.
- The EIA terms of reference are largely determined by the company, as is is level of effort to identify impacts and propose solutions to mitigate those impacts.
- Once a project is in a construction or operations phase, the management and monitoring of environmental and social issues is largely up to the company’s own internal systems and controls.
Closure and post-closure, if addressed at all by the company in its EIA or ESMPs, is determined by the company’s own policies for dealing with such issues.

Throughout the life cycle, government depends on companies to identify the issues, and even in some cases to provide the resources for government agents to monitor company activities, which raises issues of objectivity.

This means that environmental protections near a mine site and the socioeconomic and social impacts of a mining project on local communities largely depend on whatever systems the company has in place. Typically the company will determine the level of engagement with the community, how it chooses to involve the community in development decisions, and it may even determine how much money it will contribute to local community development.

All of these issues apply to individual project sites, but they also become even more acute in a multiple project mining-infrastructure cluster environment. As diligent as a company may be in monitoring its own environmental impacts, it may have little incentive to monitor how those impacts and those of neighboring mine sites affect surrounding ecosystems and communities. This would require a level of planning and coordination among companies and among the companies and the national governments that does not currently exist.

Mano River/Gola forest cluster (Sierra Leone/Liberia border). Generally speaking, the companies that are operating along the Liberia and Sierra Leone border in the Mano River watershed are smaller and have less capability and fewer resources available for environmental and social management than the giants such as BHP and Rio Tinto. Their commitment and ability to meet world class environmental standards remains to be seen. A key concern about the cluster of mines that is developing in this area is that even though they are individual operations, their effects on the surrounding environment is cumulative. In addition, many of these mines or potential mine sites lie near the Mano River and related watersheds, or can be found in or near the Gola forest, a rare remaining patch of (upper) Guinea forest that lies on both sides of the border.

Here the effects of individual mines can cross borders, and the uncoordinated development of iron ore, gold, and other types of mines can have cumulative negative environmental and social effects on border region ecosystems and nearby communities. Another layer of potential problems is that this region is an area where artisanal and large-scale mining risks be adjacent. This is likely to create tension over land use. There is little government capacity to actively manage environmental issues in these areas, so much of the responsibility falls to the companies. This area is also characterized by a mix of new larger firms and smaller local mining firms and artisanal operations. These artisans usually have little to no resources or capabilities to devote to environmental protection, meaning the risk of environmental and social impact is high.

Artisanal mining areas. Generally speaking, the governments in the Mano River Union have few systems that are set up and adequately managed to deal with artisanal mining. Often management of environmental and social issues created by artisanal mining falls to the local authorities, NGOs, or communities. Because there are no resources at this level, often nothing is done, so that areas which have been deforested
and dug up for small-scale or artisanal mining activities remain in the state they were left in when the miners abandoned the sites.

4.8.2 GAPS AT THE REGIONAL, NATIONAL, AND LOCAL LEVELS TO MANAGE PRIORITIES IN THE CONTEXT OF EACH CLUSTER AND ARTISANAL MINING

422. Regional level. At the regional level, efforts are only beginning to deal with environmental and other issues from mining within a multi-country framework. In July 2009, ECOWAS issued a common mining directive, the goal of which was to harmonize mining policies across the ECOWAS countries. This directive will then be discussed at the national level, and ECOWAS plans to collect information on individual national policies and attempt to find common ground on common policies that can be shared among the countries. A final stage is to actually develop common policies that would then be applied in all countries. The entire process is expected to run from 2009 through 2014. While it is being developed, countries will continue to largely address policy issues through a national lens. In addition, there is no enforcement mechanism in the directive to compel countries to follow the approach suggested in the directive. Even if there were enforcement or compliance provisions, there is no arm of ECOWAS that can enforce the directives guidelines. It is up to individual countries to police (or not) various aspects of what is contained in the directive, even once policies are enacted.

423. There are a number of CSO-led initiatives to reform mining policies and make government decision making and development projects in the mining sector more transparent and accountable. These include the Open Society in West Africa (OSIWA) study of regional capacity, and participation by Oxfam and other CSOs in the region to develop the ECOWAS directives, and the initiative to develop a common mining code, as well as the study by Revenue Watch on the concession negotiations process in Liberia. These are all important initiatives, many of which bring together CSOs from multiple countries to talk about common issues, which in itself is a positive development and one that should be encouraged by donors. CSOs that work together to push for changes in policies, rather than merely campaigning against mining activities, deserve to be considered as viable stakeholders with which governments and donors can work constructively and productively.

424. National level. The challenges of managing priorities at the national level have been discussed in previous sections of this report, including a lack of management and enforcement capacity that has led to many of these issues becoming a priority.

425. Local level. There is a dominant perception of governance failure to manage mining coupled with a very limited capacity to address this failure locally. Local government officials and community groups often have no resources or training to manage the issues that arise from a mining operation, whether it is large scale like the Simandou/Nimba cluster or an artisanal mining site. The traditional system of chieftains can be abused, and access to land without adequate compensation and effective safeguards for land reclamation has led to serious land degradation and social tensions, for example, in Sierra Leone (World Bank, 2007b). In spite of this acute institutional constraint, increasingly local civil society organizations are mobilizing residents to deal with environmental and social issues, but they lack training and may have no standing with or influence over national government authorities. Unless this critical gap between
governance needs and capacity gaps at the local level is addressed, mining growth may not only fail to deliver sustainable development but may foster social disruption and internal conflict.

4.9 Implications for AMGP

426. Given the significant institutional and other stakeholder capacity weaknesses that exist at regional, national, and local levels, the AMGP capacity-building component is critical to improving mineral sector governance and development planning. Building capacity early in the AMGP project can empower and enable stakeholders to better ‘own’ their environmental, social, and governance priorities and apply their own solutions to resolve them.
5. Findings, Recommendations, and Action Plans

5.1 Summary of key findings

427. Finding 1. Mining is a key development opportunity for the Mano River Union countries. The region has significant geological resources focused on a number of key commodities — iron ore, bauxite, gold, and diamonds in all of the countries, with heavy minerals and platinum group minerals concentrated in Sierra Leone. However, infrastructure in the MRU is poor overall and inadequate for mining development or for other economic uses.

428. Finding 2. Mining can become a driver of sustainable development if project-oriented development is replaced with a mining-infrastructure cluster approach for planning and investment. There are a number of key mineral clusters with sub-regional potential in the MRU, and some mining companies and governments are already looking at transborder cooperation to develop infrastructure.

429. Finding 3. Coordinated regional approaches to manage environmental and social effects are required because many of these mineral belts cross national borders. Sub-regional habitat and biodiversity loss, water pollution in transboundary watersheds, and migrants attracted by mining activity cannot be contained or managed within the borders of single country.

430. Finding 4. Priority issues include environmental, social, and overarching governance issues in the mining sector. They are critically important because they are perceived as having strong negative effects on the potential for mining-led sustainable development in the sub-region.

431. Finding 5. Despite the initial focus of WAMSSA on purely environmental and social issues, there were strong currents of social accountability and frustration with the quality of governance that arose from the consultations, coupled with a sense that these issues need to be tackled before the environmental and social concerns can be addressed. As evidence, four of the final priorities selected through the consultative process are governance issues.

432. Finding 6. There are critical institutional, policy, legal, and regulatory gaps to dealing with these priority issues. Significant improvements need to be made in these areas — resolving the confusion and clarity of roles and responsibilities among various ministries, improving transparency and consistency of decision making, addressing lack of institutional capacity, as well as inadequate implementation, monitoring, and enforcement of environmental and social policies and regulations.

433. Finding 7. Communities need to be empowered and given a leading role in development decision-making processes to manage expectations and minimize potential conflicts between mining-affected communities and mining companies and/or governments. Decentralization of government authority is needed to enable community-driven development, including giving communities a greater role in governance, resource use, and development decisions.

434. Finding 8. Sub-regional and regional organizations are becoming more involved in mining policy and governance issues because they realize the value of and
need for wider approaches to mineral governance and sustainable development. Regional institutions like ECOWAS, WAEMU, and the Mano River Union, as well as national governments and coalitions of national and international NGOs and CSOs, are increasingly looking at coordinated approaches for mineral governance, management of environmental and social issues, and sustainable development to deal with mining-sector-related impacts and issues.

435. **Finding 9. A permanent multi-stakeholder constituency is needed to keep the policy dialogue going on critical mineral governance and mining-infrastructure development decisions.** This approach empowers stakeholders to follow through on the execution of needed reforms, and to ‘own’ both the solutions and the process to achieve them.

5.1.1 DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS

436. The investigations undertaken for WAMSSA revealed a number of general trends and evolution in stakeholder perceptions and the growing roles that non-governmental stakeholders seek to play in the development of the mining sector. They appear to be driven in part by a sense of inadequacy, frustration, or powerlessness with the way the sector has developed in the past. While Findings 1 to 6 were discussed at length in previous sections of this report, a short discussion of the additional findings is included below.

437. Communities need to be empowered and given a leading role in the development decision-making processes to manage expectations and minimize potential conflicts among mining companies, communities affected by mining, and governments.

438. Decentralization of government authority is needed to enable community-driven development, including giving communities a greater role in governance, resource use, and development decisions. Long ignored or overlooked by industry and government decision makers, communities and civil society organizations that purport to represent grassroots constituencies are increasing their activism, visibility, and in some cases, militancy for being included in investment and development decisions that will affect their communities. As the number of large-scale mining activities increases in the sub-region, expectations are rising among communities as to how they can benefit from such projects. These expectations need to be met through dialogue and participatory consultation processes that do not serve merely to impose or transmit the results of government or mining company decisions in a one-way fashion. Some of the disputes between communities and mining companies or government have turned violent, and this trend could continue unless people sense that their voices and concerns are being heard. The long-term sustainability of investments in the community by industry or government requires active participation by the affected constituents from the earliest planning stages.

439. Efforts to decentralize spending and decision-making authority need to be extended not just to local representatives of national government or local government entities, but to the communities themselves. This requires leadership in local governing bodies that is elected by communities and not appointed by a central authority, and where participatory decision-making processes are used to ensure that all voices in the community, including those of women, youth, the elderly, and other vulnerable populations, are included in development decisions. This empowerment of local
communities and a community-driven development approach will enable local populations to withstand the inevitable shocks brought on by rapid development of mining and ancillary infrastructure in their communities. Communities will need significant guidance and capacity building to be able to take on this expanded role.

440. AMGP and EITI++ teams, working with other development partners, can enable this empowerment and participation by communities in political and economic decisions, hopefully leading to better consensus on actions that can minimize negative effects and enhance positive ones.

441. Sub-regional and regional organizations are becoming more involved in mining policy and governance issues as they realize the value of and need for wider approaches to mineral governance and sustainable development.

442. Regional institutions like the AU, ECOWAS, WAEMU, and the Mano River Union, as well as national governments and coalitions of national and international NGOs and CSOs, are increasingly looking at coordinated regional approaches. To date, most of these groups’ work has been in formulating a vision and framework to harmonize development of the sector. However, their organizational mandates and abilities to help implement and enforce new mineral governance initiatives appear limited. Mining is only one of a number of sectors these organizations are trying to develop; clearly more resources will be needed for them to play a more active role in this sector.

443. Also, civil society organizations and other NGOs are increasingly becoming involved in regional or sub-regional efforts to address issues of concern to their constituencies brought on by mining activities. Momentum is building in civil society to demand transparency and accountability in governance in general, and specifically in the mining sector. This new source of pressure and expertise could change the balance of mining development discussions that has largely taken place between governments and mining companies. CSOs active in the mining sector have traditionally been project-focused or engaging government on national mining policy issues. However, a growing number of CSOs, including several involved in the WAMSSA consultations, participated in helping to develop a mining code for ECOWAS, which is part of the ECOWAS initiative to harmonize mining policies across its member states. Other MRU and ECOWAS member-state CSOs worked together on an Open Society in West Africa-coordinated effort to analyze natural resource management capacity in West Africa, which looked at the capabilities of governments, development partners, civil society, industry, the media, and other stakeholders to manage mining and other mineral resources in the region. This trend of CSOs joining forces across regions to have a louder voice and demand a seat at the policy-making table is only expected to increase over time, and should be encouraged by AMGP.

444. Lastly, and most important, initiatives that can stall or be set aside with changing leadership or policy priorities need a permanent multi-stakeholder group (MSG) to keep the policy dialogue going.

445. A policy or program may have the backing of a development partner or a particular administration, and then a change of decision makers can cause those priorities to shift. An example is the Sierra Leone SESA, which provided useful recommendations at the time, but appears to have been set aside when a new government came in following
elections. There needs to be a broad and permanent constituency that will pursue the political dialogue begun through consultations on WAMSSA and other mining sector-related initiatives. The presence of an ongoing multi-stakeholder group can continue to maintain interest, visibility, and accountability for a particular initiative, even if individual champions in government or the development partner community change or move on, for whatever reason. This participatory process or mechanism should be designed to outlast particular policy decisions or projects. In addition, these groups can also serve as the liaison between high-level government, industry, and development partners, decision makers, and the grassroots communities they represent. As such they can serve as communications conduits and facilitators for a two-way exchange of challenges, options, and solutions that runs in both directions, hopefully providing improved outcomes for all stakeholders. Figure 10 is a proposed framework to make this happen.

Figure 10. Proposed multi-stakeholder framework for regional mining sector development

5.2 Recommendations

446. There is much that needs to be done to improve mineral sector governance in the MRU; this sector is subject to the same political, organizational, and capacity constraints as many others in the MRU countries. It was recognized early that not all issues identified in the WAMSSA process could be addressed in depth, hence the use of the consultation process to help establish priorities that are important and meaningful to stakeholders at all levels in these countries. Some issues, including questions of in-migration, border security, potential conflicts between large-scale and artisanal mining concerns, mining fiscal issues, HIV/AIDS and other health concerns, etc. are present in the mining sector and need to be addressed, many within a regional context, but they were not addressed by stakeholders in the consultative process.
The following recommendations are the distillation of all that has been learned in both the analytical and consultative components of the WAMSSA process. They are organized around strategic themes, including environmental, social, and overarching governance components. These recommendations are intended for use by all stakeholders, however, they are primarily intended as guidance for the AMGP, EITI++ teams and others undertaking national or regional efforts to improve mineral governance in the MRU.

**WAMSSA recommendations.** The four primary strategic recommendations are supplemented by supporting recommendations that address objectives derived from the critical priorities identified by stakeholders in the WAMSSA consultation process. A discussion of the recommendations follows, with more detailed cluster-level, national, and regional actions presented later in this chapter.

**Recommendation 1. Adopt a strategic, cluster-focused, permanent multi-stakeholder framework to address mineral sector policy and development decisions.**

- 1a. Assess priority regional and national mineral clusters to become the primary focus of mineral sector infrastructure and governance improvements.
- 1b. Create permanent regional, national, and local multi-stakeholder bodies to help develop and monitor appropriate policy frameworks.

**Recommendation 2. Strengthen environmental governance.**

- 2a. Address mining-induced deforestation, water pollution, and loss of biodiversity.
- 2b. Reduce mining-induced land degradation and increase reclamation of mining lands.

**Recommendation 3. Increase local-level benefits in mining areas.**

- 3a. Integrate mineral sector projects into local development plans to address poverty.
- 3b. Create training, employment, local supplier, and sustainable alternative livelihood opportunities.

**Recommendation 4. Improve social accountability and mineral sector governance.**

- 4a. Eliminate lack of transparency and consistency in policy formulation and decision making.
- 4b. Provide capacity building and institutional strengthening to all stakeholder groups (government, civil society, industry, etc.).
- 4c. Minimize disenfranchisement of communities from development decision-making processes.
- 4d. Minimize conditions that lead to rent-seeking behavior and distorted benefit-sharing.
5.2.1 DISCUSSION OF RECOMMENDATIONS


454. National governments, development partners, sub-regional, and regional inter-governmental organizations, mining companies, and civil society need to take a strategic, transborder, multi-stakeholder approach to planning for sustainable development of mining and related infrastructure. As noted above, the AU and other regional organizations and development partners increasingly see the benefits of regional development planning for the mineral sector and related infrastructure development. Growing industry adherence to environmental and social responsibility benchmarks such as the IFC Performance Standards, government and industry involvement in EITI and other revenue transparency schemes, growing regional cooperation among national CSOs on mining sector issues, and development partner activities with strong consultation components like WAMSSA are creating a dynamic for broader stakeholder participation in development decision-making processes.

455. **Recommendation 1a.** Assess priority regional and national mineral clusters to become the primary focus of mineral-infrastructure governance improvement efforts.

456. Within the MRU, there are several mineral clusters and the artisanal mining sector, which make logical units of analysis for this integrated approach to planning and development. The business case will need to be made for why a particular cluster should be considered for investment, but meanwhile there are compelling transborder environmental and social factors (potential for pollution of transborder watersheds, environmental degradation and loss of biodiversity in parks that straddle international borders, social issues caused by internal and cross-border population influxes seeking mining sector employment, other cumulative effects of neighboring mining deposits being developed simultaneously, etc.) for adopting regional harmonization and cluster-based and/or development corridor strategies.

457. Also, the selection of one or several mineral-infrastructure clusters as the focus of concerted integrated development efforts can create a catalyst for addressing many of the policy and governance issues that are larger than a single project, with a potential to improve outcomes for all projects at all levels within the sector.

458. The MRU is a particular sub-region with a particular history that will require its own carefully crafted solutions. There is, however, past regional development experience such as the Maputo Development Corridor, as well as a growing body of knowledge and data on spatial development initiatives, development corridors, and regional infrastructure planning, to draw upon for lessons learned and concepts to consider as mining development in the MRU moves forward.

459. **Recommendation 1b.** Create permanent regional or sub-regional, national, and local multi-stakeholder bodies to help develop and monitor appropriate policy frameworks.

460. A key objective of WAMSSA was to initiate a strategic policy dialogue among a broad cross-section of stakeholders about how to improve mineral sector governance in the MRU. At every stage of the consultation process, stakeholders insisted that this type
of forum for multi-stakeholder discussion needs to be maintained as a key aspect of regional and national mineral policy development. Not only did consultations drive a number of key results and recommendations produced by the WAMSSA process, they also served to energize stakeholders, who demanded at each meeting that the policy dialogue continue and not be stopped with the completion of the WAMSSA report. The team shares the view of its workshop participants that an ongoing forum for policy dialogue will ensure input from critical stakeholders, and is a mechanism that can and should outlast individual policy or project decisions, potential capture by powerful interests, or the changing priorities of successive government decision makers and/or administrations.

461. It is also critical that the planning effort for the development of mining-infrastructure clusters needs to go beyond bilateral discussions between government and mining companies (on projects), or government and development partners (on policy development), to include mining and infrastructure actors; international, national, and local civil society organizations; community-based organizations and grassroots communities affected by mining development (including vulnerable segments of those populations); and the media.

462. It is strongly recommended that AMGP take the lead to create or empower existing steering committees, commissions, expert panels, local councils, etc. to help develop the appropriate policy frameworks for mining sector governance and development. These groups would also help to determine how responsibility is to be shared for implementation and monitoring of policies, projects, and other initiatives in support of this new policy framework. A key part of this initiative is to ensure that governance structures and rules are developed that formalize civil society’s participation in economic integration and planning efforts. As an example, the inter-ministerial commission created by Guinea and Liberia to look at sub-regional and transborder mining and infrastructure planning for the Simandou/Nimba/Buchanan corridor should consider opening its deliberations to other stakeholders. The proposed multi-stakeholder group would also take the lead on ensuring an increased flow of information to all stakeholders about mining development activities, and would lead formalized efforts to hold governments and regional organizations accountable to civil society and grassroots organizations.

463. To continue and expand the policy dialogue begun by WAMSSA, a multi-stakeholder framework is proposed that would include a series of multi-stakeholder bodies formed at the regional, national, and local levels to ensure transparent stakeholder participation and social accountability for mining development decisions (Figure 10).

464. International organizations, line ministries at the national level, and local government bodies would be a form of secretariat to develop policy and planning efforts, but they would be informed by and accountable to multi-stakeholder groups that would provide valuable input and feedback on priorities and proposed initiatives. The multi-stakeholder groups could be formed from existing groups or bodies at each level, such as regional civil society consortia, national EITI committees, and local community-based organizations, or created as new entities where appropriate.
Recommendations 2 through 4 are designed to address the critical priorities identified through the WAMSSA consultation process. These would fall under the broad objectives of strengthening environmental governance and management of the mineral sector, reducing poverty in mining areas, and improving overall mineral governance, with an emphasis on addressing the additional critical overarching governance priorities identified by extensive WAMSSA consultations. It is envisioned that selected mining-infrastructure clusters would be the focus of actions to address lack of transparency and consistency of decision making; disenfranchisement of local communities; and rent-seeking behavior and conditions that lead to distorted benefit-sharing in the mining sector.

**Recommendation 2.** Strengthen environmental governance and management of the mineral sector.

**Recommendation 2a.** Address mining-induced deforestation, water pollution, and loss of biodiversity.

One way to improve environmental governance and address mining-induced deforestation and loss of biodiversity at a sub-regional level would be to develop a model treaty for the MRU countries. It would lay out a framework for harmonized and consistent environmental decision making and monitoring for all projects proposed in areas where mineral deposits and related ecosystems and potential infrastructure corridors cross national boundaries. One cluster (e.g., the eastern iron ore deposit cluster lying in southeastern Guinea and eastern Liberia) could be selected as the pilot to develop a model treaty agreement between the two countries (Liberia and Guinea). The treaty would clarify roles and responsibilities for environmental management, improve transborder environmental and natural resource management skills, and develop policies and guidelines that are adapted to the transborder, multi-project environment of a mining-infrastructure cluster, including planning for cumulative impacts. The treaty should allow for application of consistent standards and guidelines, clear processes for environmental assessment, and associated public participation exercises.

Addressing mining-induced deforestation and loss of biodiversity in an illustrative case of the eastern iron ore deposit cluster would limit the potential impact of mining on the Mount Nimba ecosystem priority area. To manage the potential deforestation it is recommended that (with AGMP support), a Mount Nimba Transboundary Conservation Park (MNTCP) be established. The model of the MNTCP could be based around the final resolution of the 2002 World Summit on Sustainable Development (WSSD) Project Implementation Plan, which refers to the development of ‘peace parks’ (essentially transboundary conservation areas) in Chapter viii, Clause 64: “support Africa’s efforts to attain sustainable tourism that contributes to social, economic and infrastructure development through . . . (b) establishing and supporting national and cross-border conservation areas.” The following pillars should be adopted in developing the MNTCP.

- **Seek political will and establish a technical advisory group.** To assist with technical advice in the transborder conservation process and provide a forum for discussion of significant cross-border issues, an advisory committee should be
established with representation from the wildlife authorities of Liberia and Guinea.

- **Secure space.** Ensure that the land is protected through dialogue with local communities and potential project developers.

- **Effective wildlife management.** Once the area is secured, it is essential to have the capacity to manage it in a sustainable manner by training competent and professional managers at appropriate institutions.

- **Efficient ecotourism management.** Park managers and/or suppliers in the local community are trained to manage guest houses and small lodges situated in and around the MNTCP.

- **Access.** Ensure direct flights to bring tourists directly to the areas they want to visit. This component also facilitates infrastructure development within and around the MNTCP. This would benefit from a direct link with project developers.

470. *Reducing the potential for water pollution associated with mining development* in the eastern iron ore deposit cluster will require an integrated approach to watershed management. It is recommended that a Mount Nimba Catchment Management Forum be established to ensure equitable integrated water resource management. The forum should include regulatory agencies from Liberia and Guinea (and possibly Côte d’Ivoire, which also has mineral deposits on its side of Mount Nimba), large-scale water users (including the mining and agricultural sectors), and community groups. The forum would develop a framework in which water extraction is managed within the socioecological requirements of downstream users and effluent releases meet downstream water user requirements:

- Develop a water action plan to establish an appropriate institutional and legal framework, standards, and guidelines for different users based on ecosystem structures and functions;

- Develop programs and projects for catchment areas aimed at soil erosion, water pollution control, and siltation to maintain productive soil and water environments; and

- Promote regional cooperation in the development and management of shared water resources.

471. Data collection and regulatory mechanisms to enforce common approaches to water management in mining projects will need to be considered. In addition, it is recommended that a comprehensive survey of groundwater resources be undertaken in the Mount Nimba area. Each of the proposed mines would complete a groundwater assessment that would form a useful basis for a complete understanding of the resources in the sub-region. A common suite of water quality standards, consistent with the requirements of the international community, would ensure that any mining project implemented in the sub-region performs against a consistent level.

472. **Recommendation 2b.** Reduce land degradation caused by mining or ancillary activities and reclaim mined land.

473. *Reducing land degradation and reclaiming mined land* requires a common, agreed-upon approach to rehabilitation and/or closure planning. A common policy
framework is needed that will work for regional clusters where different mines or infrastructure components may lie in multiple bordering countries.

474. Building capacity and providing resources is needed to allow ministry staff, local governments, and national and cluster-level MSGs to participate in development and monitoring of SEAs, ESIAs, ESMPs, and mine closure plans. Cluster-area communities need to be engaged in closure planning in the pre-construction phase to ensure long-term sustainability of facilities and activities after closure.

475. A number of themes need to be captured in closure planning. Mine villages and administrative/workshop areas could possibly be reused, and where applicable, integrated with urban areas, while associated mining areas could be rehabilitated to natural vegetation for subsistence farming. The level to which natural vegetation areas must be improved and surface erosion areas curbed could be major issues that require resolution in terms of closure planning. The cost of closure should be considered at the earliest stages and treated consistently by the various mining and environmental authorities.

476. Mine closure, and in particular mine closure planning, that takes place early in the mining life cycle (e.g., at exploration or development stage) is a topic that is attracting increasing interest by various stakeholders in the context of long-term sustainability of mining investments and development projects. Resources such as the International Council on Mining & Metals (ICMM) guide *Planning for Integrated Mine Closure: Toolkit* (2008), can provide pointers to the types of activities that will need to be undertaken for a robust closure planning process. However, it should be noted that both the policy framework, and any closure planning for projects located with mineral clusters, will need to be approached at the cluster level, taking into account multiple projects and disparate mining and infrastructure project components of varying life spans.

477. **Recommendation 3.** Increase local-level benefits in mining areas.

478. **Recommendation 3a.** Integrate mineral sector projects into local development plans to address poverty.

479. **Recommendation 3b.** Create training, employment, local supplier, and sustainable alternative livelihood opportunities.

480. Mining companies have traditionally tended to do their planning as an internal exercise, with little inclusion of other stakeholders, even for potential community development projects, until many of the key decisions have already been made. Likewise, provincial or local development planning often is done by local governments as an internal budgeting exercise that neglects to include private operators, especially if they are only in an exploration phase and are not yet seen as a major source of employment or income generation. The WAMSSA team recommends development of mechanisms to bring these two planning processes together, with grassroots community input.

481. The goal is to reduce poverty in the selected mining-infrastructure cluster areas, through creation of training, employment, and local supplier business links, as well as spin-off economic opportunities. These would be targeted to the cluster areas, where there is not only more opportunity for synergy in terms of training and employment opportunities, but a population influx flocking to multiple projects will necessitate proactive planning for both mining-related employment and alternative livelihoods.
482. The IFC CommDev initiative has identified and in some cases implemented community development schemes, while the IFC linkages program has been involved in mining sector projects such as the Mozlink SME program and the IFC/NGGL Ahafo linkages program. These models could provide useful lessons for design of MRU mining-infrastructure cluster business links and community development schemes.

483. In the case of specific clusters in the MRU, the first place to start would be to build on plans and programs of mining companies located in that cluster.

484. **Recommendation 4.** Improve social accountability and (overall) mineral sector governance.

485. **Recommendation 4a.** Eliminate lack of transparency and consistency in policy formulation and decision making.

486. This can be done by enabling multi-stakeholder-led groups to provide a wider flow of and access to information about the mining sector, policies, and investment decisions, as well ensuring more accountability by the government by linking to activities that support Recommendation 1. This could also include strengthening national revenue transparency mechanisms such as EITI and Publish What You Pay. It would also be helpful to clarify roles and responsibilities among ministries on environmental and social issues at the cluster level, and between governments that have joint responsibility for transborder watersheds or infrastructure planning that fall with a mining-infrastructure cluster area.

487. **Recommendation 4b.** Provide capacity-building and institutional strengthening support to all stakeholder groups (government, civil society, industry, etc.).

488. All stakeholder groups involved in development of the targeted mining-infrastructure clusters should benefit from this initiative. An initial phase of this capacity-building will be to ensure that all stakeholders participating in the proposed committees have the necessary skills, capabilities, and resources to adequately represent their constituencies in decision-making processes. This includes providing government, industry, civil society, and communities with stronger skill sets in classic environmental and social impacts assessment, but also in other critical areas such as participatory decision making, conflict resolution, negotiation, communications, people, project and resource management, and strategic development planning.

489. **Recommendation 4c.** Minimize disenfranchisement of local communities from development decision-making processes.

490. This is accomplished by including and empowering community representatives and community-based organizations in planning for development of mining-infrastructure clusters, and promoting improved negotiation and conflict resolution skills, as well as job training and alternative livelihood development.

491. **Recommendation 4d.** Minimize conditions that lead to rent-seeking behavior and distorted benefit-sharing in the mining sector.

492. This would include strengthening national revenue transparency mechanisms such as EITI and Publish What You Pay, using best practices as demonstrated by Liberia and other select EITI countries, as well as looking at implementing EITI++ initiatives to use
revenues generated in the mining-infrastructure clusters to enable sustainable development for communities found within and around those clusters. Other steps could include creating frameworks at the regional and national levels for transparent negotiations and awarding permits, licenses, access to land, etc. The multi-stakeholder group could ensure these frameworks develop with broad participation from other mining sector stakeholders in addition to governments and mining companies.

5.3 Operationalizing WAMSSA

5.3.1 INTRODUCTION

493. The WAMSSA findings and strategic recommendations are a reflection of realities on the ground, as determined by the WAMSSA team and enriched by multiple rounds of consultation with key stakeholders. Many of the findings and recommendations are applicable to and could be taken up by any number of actors involved in improving mineral sector governance in the MRU, and more broadly, in Africa.

494. WAMSSA was initially envisioned as one of several research and consultation inputs to develop AMGP. As such, many, if not all, of the strategic recommendations and the recommended actions described in the following sections can be applied to key thematic initiatives planned under AMGP. In addition, the EITI++ analytical framework is gaining momentum, and looks to address many of the same issues raised by WAMSSA. A number of the recommended actions could be taken up by EITI++ country teams, ideally working in coordination with AMGP. WAMSSA recommendations and suggested actions can also be applied to country-level mining technical assistance programs undertaken by the World Bank or other development partners.

495. As noted above, the most direct links are between WAMSSA and AMGP. However, there are also links that can be made with EITI++ initiatives, as well as with other country-level mining technical assistance programs in the pipeline. Table 14 maps out the links between WAMSSA, AMGP, and EITI++

5.3.2 WAMSSA IMPLICATIONS FOR AMGP

496. While the business case for specific MRU mineral-infrastructure clusters remains to be developed, there is growing support for integrated development and regional approaches to economic development and infrastructure planning such as those proposed by WAMSSA. Regional bodies and development partners are increasingly showing interest in using Development Corridor and Spatial Development Initiative planning concepts to gain maximum synergies from infrastructure investments to stimulate regional economic growth. Within the MRU countries, AMGP’s planned efforts to develop regional common principles and policy and regulatory frameworks, and to provide institutional strengthening, should support identification and development of viable mineral-infrastructure corridors as a cornerstone of support to those countries.

497. WAMSSA consultation stakeholders prioritization of governance issues ties in well with the AMGP components devoted to improving policy and regulatory frameworks and strengthening institutional and community-level capacity. The ability to better assess, monitor, and manage mining-induced environmental and social issues will flow from the development of stronger institutions and policy frameworks. Also, the
transborder nature of environmental and social impacts that arise from individual mining projects and mineral clusters that lie near country borders require regionally harmonized approaches if they are to be properly addressed.

498. Given the significant institutional and other stakeholder capacity weaknesses at the regional national and local levels, AMGP’s capacity-building component is critical to improving mineral sector governance and development planning. Building capacity early in the AMGP rollout can empower and enable stakeholders to better ‘own’ their environmental, social, and governance priorities and apply their own solutions.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Recommendation</th>
<th>AMGP component</th>
<th>EITI++ link</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Recommendation 1. Adopt strategic, cluster-focused, permanent multi-stakeholder framework for addressing mineral sector policy and development decisions</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1a. Assess priority regional and national mineral clusters to become the primary focus of mineral sector infrastructure and governance improvements.</td>
<td>1, 2, 3</td>
<td>1, 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1b. Create permanent regional, national and local multi-stakeholder bodies to help develop appropriate policy frameworks</td>
<td>1, 3</td>
<td>1, 2, 3, 4, 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Recommendation 2. Strengthen environmental governance and management of the mineral sector</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2a. Address mining-induced deforestation, water pollution, and loss of biodiversity.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2b. Reduce mining-induced, land degradation caused by mining or ancillary activities and reclamation of mining lands.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Recommendation 3. Reduce poverty and increase local-level benefits in mining areas</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3a. Integrate mineral sector projects into local development plans to address poverty</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4, 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3b. Create training, employment, local supplier and sustainable alternative livelihood opportunities</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Recommendation 4. Improve social accountability and mineral sector governance</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4a. Eliminate lack of transparency and consistency in policy formulation and decision-making</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1, 2, 3, 4, 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4b. Provide capacity building and institutional strengthening to all stakeholder groups (government, civil society, industry, etc.)</td>
<td>1, 2, 3, 4</td>
<td>1, 2, 3, 4, 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4c. Minimize disenfranchisement of community from development decision-making processes</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1, 2, 3, 4, 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4d. Minimize conditions that lead to rent-seeking behavior and distorted benefit-sharing</td>
<td>1, 2</td>
<td>1, 2, 3, 4, 5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5.3.3 WAMSSA IMPLICATIONS FOR THE EITI++ VALUE CHAIN APPROACH

499. Many of the WAMSSA findings and recommendations resonate with the objectives of the World Bank’s Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI++) Value Chain approach to addressing governance issues in the mining sector (Figure 11). The WAMSSA analysis and recommendations especially speak to Links 1 and 2, improving institutional, policy, and regulatory frameworks for mineral sector governance
and social accountability, and to Link 5, providing sustainable infrastructure and economic opportunities to impacted communities. However, the issues raised and the actions proposed in the following sections touch on all five links in one way or another.

**Figure 11. EITI++ value chain of management of natural resources**

Note: EITI++ is a comprehensive initiative to improve governance in extractive industries that was launched by the World Bank in April 2008. It provides a framework to identify obstacles to effective governance along the entire chain of managing EI resources — from granting access to those resources, to monitoring operations, to collecting EI revenues, to improving economic management decisions, to spending resources effectively for sustainable growth and poverty reduction.

500. The findings of the WAMSSA study can serve as a reference for EITI++ teams as they conduct the Value Chain analysis in the MRU countries because EITI++ supported sustainable development activities may be able to benefit from access to mining sector-financed infrastructure. Also, teams developing national EITI++ strategies will need to liaise with AMGP and other regional development proponents to ensure that national EITI++ plans consider any proposed regional development initiatives, such as mineral-infrastructure cluster or corridor development. Conceivably this could add a transborder, sub-regional, or regional dimension to national plans addressing issues arising in any of the five links in the value chain. Also, the regional, national, and local multi-stakeholder groups proposed by WAMSSA for AMGP could also serve as fora for developing and ensuring buy-in for projects initiated under national EITI++ programs (or regional EITI++ initiatives, if these develop).

**5.3.4 WAMSSA IMPLICATIONS FOR NATIONAL MINING DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS**

501. Even as the AMGP and EITI++ initiatives get underway in some MRU countries, the World Bank and other donors have country-level programs to improve governance and benefits of the mining sector, which can also dovetail with some of the WAMSSA
proposed actions. Within the MRU, Sierra Leone is the farthest along, with a US$ 4 million World Bank IDA grant for a Mining Technical Assistance Project (MTAP) signed in December 2009. Various project components will address many of the national-level issues identified in the WAMSSA study — the need to improve policy, legal, and regulatory frameworks for the mining sector (including environmental management practices and relations with communities), and strengthen institutional capacity in ministries and agencies with mineral sector governance responsibilities. Similar World Bank technical assistance programs have been under development for Liberia and Guinea, although discussions with Guinea were suspended in the wake of the 2009 military coup, pending indications that the country would return to democratic civilian rule. Coordination among these national programs, EITI++ initiatives, and the regional AMGP will help ensure that many of the issues identified by WAMSSA are addressed.

5.3.5 WAMSSA IMPLICATIONS FOR OTHER COUNTRIES

502. Côte d’Ivoire did not become a full member of MRU until after the WAMSSA project was well underway, and as such it was not included in the analysis and consultation processes. Because Côte d’Ivoire is an EITI candidate country with significant mineral potential and a growing mining sector, it is recommended that additional research be undertaken to identify priority issues in Côte d’Ivoire and how best to apply WAMSSA’s recommendations in this fourth MRU member country. Because the consultation and policy dialogue process is critical to identifying key priorities and gaining stakeholder buy-in for solutions, it is recommended that the same consultation approach that was used in the other three countries also be used in Côte d’Ivoire.

503. Also, if AMGP project managers have identified other sub-regional or regional countries that are likely candidates to develop mining-infrastructure clusters and corridors, they may wish to conduct other regional SESAs similar to WAMSSA. It is recommended that the WAMSSA experience be examined to apply lessons learned (on approach, methodology, and results) to any subsequent regional or multi-country SESA. It is the team’s view that one of the most important results of WAMSSA was validation of the consultation process, both as it was used to obtain the WAMSSA results, and in the conclusion by participants that such a multi-stakeholder process is a useful model to use in an ongoing basis for other large-scale development initiatives.

5.4 National and cluster-level recommended actions

504. A number of key recommended near-term actions to help AMGP and EITI ++ teams operationalize WAMSSA recommendations at the national and cluster level are proposed (Table 15). Some activities suggested here could be undertaken by AMGP, EITI++ teams, or both, collaborating to ensure adequate attention is paid to regional, local, and local/cluster levels of the problems and proposed solutions. The WAMSSA team also developed a separate action matrix of initiatives to be planned at the regional level, but implemented at multiple levels over a longer timeframe (Table 16).

5.5 Political economy challenges

505. The political economy challenges to implementing the national recommendations and activities focused on clusters are considerable but not insurmountable. While the nuances of regional vs. national or cluster vs. individual project-driven approaches may
be difficult for many stakeholders to fully grasp, most appear to agree that the status quo has not delivered the benefits of mineral sector development. As such, they welcome new approaches, whether they are driven by top-down regional or bottom-up community and cluster-based initiatives. Political will and stability at the highest levels of government appear to be the biggest potential enablers — or blockers — of implementation of the WAMSSA recommendations. Other political economy challenges relating to the four key strategic recommendations are discussed below.
Table 15. National and cluster-level actions

Recommendation 1. Adopt strategic, cluster-focused, permanent multi-stakeholder framework to address mineral sector policy and development decisions.

1a. Assess priority regional and national mineral clusters to become the primary focus of mineral sector infrastructure and governance improvements.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>National</th>
<th>Cluster</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Consult with key national and local stakeholders to gain/solidify buy-in for regional cluster and/or development corridor approach</td>
<td>Conduct rapid appraisal/scoping study in potential cluster areas to gather basic cluster-level existing mining, infrastructure, environmental, demographic and socioeconomic data from local government, industry, civil society, and community sources</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Create small working group of government and/or regional organizations to identify initial list of clusters and development corridors</td>
<td>Once cluster(s) is/are selected conduct full multi-country SEA for selected cluster area(s), including cumulative impact assessment for combined effects of multiple large mining and infrastructure projects (transborder pollution, water usage, in-migration, etc.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Identify national policy and economic, environmental, and social issues affected by regional cluster development.</td>
<td>Engage and work with local stakeholders to delineate appropriate cluster boundaries to ensure understanding and buy-in of which communities are included and why (as part of Activity 1b below)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Align regional cluster development with national priorities and regulations</td>
<td>If eastern iron ore (Nimba cluster) selected, liaise with existing Guinea-Liberia Ministerial Commission to assess status of shared rail infrastructure discussions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assess current regulatory situation and consider policy adjustments to be made in one or more of the countries to harmonize regulatory framework to enable cluster development</td>
<td>If Sierra Leone-Liberia border cluster selected, liaise with Gola transborder peace park authorities</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1b. Create permanent regional, national and local multi-stakeholder bodies to help develop and monitor appropriate policy frameworks

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>National</th>
<th>Cluster</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Consult with key national and local stakeholders to gain or solidify buy-in for regional cluster and/or development corridor approach</td>
<td>Consult with key local stakeholders to gain or solidify buy-in for regional cluster and/or development corridor approach within selected cluster area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Establish national-level multi-stakeholder group (MSG), create work plan and begin regular interaction on cluster selection, policy reforms and cluster development process</td>
<td>Establish cluster-level MSG(s) and begin regular interaction on issue identification, policy reforms, and cluster development process</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provide capacity building to MSGs in skills needed to do their work (e.g. teamwork, facilitation, participatory decision making, conflict resolution, strategic planning, communications, etc.)</td>
<td>Help MSG set up communications and consultation mechanism and plan to allow regular, broader dissemination of information and exchanges with community on cluster development process</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Provide capacity building to local MSGs in needed skills (e.g., teamwork, facilitation, participatory decision making, conflict resolution, strategic planning, communications, etc.)</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
**Recommendation 2. Strengthen environmental governance and management of the mineral sector**

### 2a. Address mining-induced deforestation, water pollution, and loss of biodiversity

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>National</th>
<th>Cluster</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>To improve overall environmental governance at national and cluster levels:</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Support development of a treaty to be signed between MRU countries for harmonized and consistent environmental decision making and monitoring for all projects proposed in transborder mineral deposit areas.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Select one cluster (e.g., Nimba area east iron ore deposit cluster) to develop model treaty agreement between two countries (e.g., Guinea and Liberia). Treaty to be developed using information gained from cluster level SEA. Focusing on developing policy framework and treaty terms and conditions for transborder multiple mine cluster will ensure model treaty deals with transborder issues, cumulative impacts, etc. and can be reused at national level for other transborder or national cluster development</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Provide technical assistance to ensure treaty will clarify roles and responsibilities for environmental management, improve transborder environmental and natural resource management skills, and develop policies and guidelines that are adapted to the transborder, multi-project environment of a mining-infrastructure cluster, including planning for cumulative impacts, clear processes for environmental assessment, and associated public participation exercises, etc.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Liaise with other development partners working on artisanal mining environmental issues, including deforestation, land degradation, water pollution and reclamation to ensure coordination of policy initiatives and on-the-ground activities</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>To conduct SEA to determine area of environmental impact from mining-infrastructure cluster. Use data to delineate areas to be preserved or rehabilitated</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Provide training in environmental monitoring and reporting to local cluster/community populations. Create team or network of local pollution ‘spotters’</td>
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</table>

**To address mining-induced deforestation and loss of biodiversity:**

| • Help establish or strengthen existing transboundary conservation zones, e.g., create a Mount Nimba Transboundary Conservation Park (MNTCP), possibly building on existing park systems. Assist park authority to carry out following activities  |
| • Set up technical advisory group with wildlife authorities of both countries. Add other (donor, NGO) advisors as needed  |
| • Secure space: Ensure land is protected through dialogue with local communities and potential project developers  |
| • Effective wildlife management: recruit, train, and provide resources (vehicles, weapons, etc.) to management and staff  |
| • Establish local (eco) tourism through training and financing to set up guest houses and small lodges situated in and around MNTCP, managed by park or by local communities  |
| • Improve access: Establish or improve air links to cluster zone to facilitate tourism and movement of goods and services in and out of park and nearby communities  |

**To address water resource management and pollution issues:**

| • Complete comprehensive groundwater resources survey for cluster region, building on existing company data where possible  |
| • Establish cluster area integrated watershed management body to manage transborder water resource use and pollution, e.g., a Mount Nimba Catchment Management Forum. Include regulatory agencies from Guinea, Liberia (and possibly Côte d’Ivoire) large-scale water users (mining and agricultural sectors), and community groups.  |
| • Assist forum to develop framework for water resource abstraction to ensure socio-ecological requirements of downstream users and effluent releases meet downstream water user requirements. Framework to include:  |
| • Develop Water Action Plan to establish appropriate institutional and legal framework, standards and guidelines for different users  |
| • Develop programs and projects for catchment areas aimed at soil erosion, water pollution control and siltation  |
| • Promote regional cooperation in development, management of equitable utilization of shared water resources  |

### 2b. Reduce mining-induced, land degradation caused by mining or ancillary activities and improve reclamation of mining lands

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>National</th>
<th>Cluster</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Strengthen and harmonize national environmental impact mitigation and management policies and regulations across MRU, including ESIAs, ESMPs, and Mine Closure plans</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Establish and enforce policy of progressive rehabilitation of mined-over areas during operational phase, to reduce rehabilitation or reclamation activities remaining at end of project life</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Strengthen and harmonize national closure requirements for mining operators, including development and approval of closure plans prior to licensing, and including financing commitments for closure activities</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Conduct SEA for cluster areas with robust environmental and social management plan as follow-on</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Train and build capacity for local MSG and other community representatives to participate in development and monitoring of SEAs, ESIAs, ESMPs, and mine closure plans</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Engage cluster-area communities in closure planning in pre-construction phase to ensure long-term sustainability of facilities and activities post-closure</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
### Recommendation 3. Reduce poverty and increase local-level benefits in mining areas

#### 3a. Integrate mineral sector projects into local development plans to address poverty

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Share Poverty Reduction Strategy, Millennium Development Goal plans and other national development planning tools and information with mining companies so as to align government and company objectives at national and cluster levels</td>
<td>• Review existing local development plans, consider sponsoring additional participatory planning processes with local communities to update plans in light of cluster development opportunities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Use EITI+ Value Chain analysis to identify Link 5 opportunities (sustainable development benefits) that can be implemented at community/cluster level</td>
<td>• Incorporate results of EITI+ Value Chain analysis into cluster development plans, defining cluster-specific opportunities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Include results of existing or new local development plans or strategies to inform EITI+ analysis and action plans</td>
<td>• Liaise with other World Bank and other development partners to identify links to other development plans within cluster areas</td>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Work with government to improve national and sub-regional training facilities to develop skills needed by mining industry, government, and NGO management and staff</td>
<td>• Work with mining and construction firms to develop cluster-wide employee recruitment and training programs for local (cluster-area) residents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Work with government to build local employment and procurement requirements into standard mining concession and development agreements</td>
<td>• Work with mining and construction firms to develop cluster-wide pre-construction local supplier development and training programs targeting local (cluster-area) residents (similar to IFC Mozlink SME program or IFC CommDev Ahafo Linkages program)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Work with relevant government ministries to develop business support services (small business development, microcredit, etc.) that can support creation of cluster-level businesses</td>
<td>• Conduct market assessment for cluster-level sustainable economic and alternative livelihood opportunities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Liaise with other World Bank and other development partners to identify links to other development plans within cluster areas</td>
<td>• Initiate cluster-level program to develop market opportunities, could include microcredit, business skills training, business plan development, other support to launch new ventures</td>
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</table>

#### 3b. Create training, employment, local supplier and sustainable alternative livelihood opportunities

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<tr>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Recommendation 4. Improve social accountability and mineral sector governance

#### 4a. Eliminate lack of transparency and consistency in policy formulation and decision-making

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th>Cluster</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Provide assistance with developing transparent standardized processes to award permits, concessions, land use, environmental and social regulations and obligations, etc., for use in mining/infrastructure cluster projects (tie in with regional regulatory harmonization initiatives)</td>
<td>• Provide cluster-level information center where communities can learn about laws, policies and their legal rights concerning mining-induced land access, environmental and social issues</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Ensure local MSGs to serve as catalysts and advocates for good local governance and decision-making processes (through provision of information, technical assistance, and capacity building)</td>
<td>• Enable local MSGs to serve as catalysts and advocates for good local governance and decision-making processes (through provision of information, technical assistance, and capacity building)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
- Support development of policy framework to clearly delineate mining sector environmental and social management responsibilities
- Other related activities as already envisioned in AMGP work plan

### 4b. Provide capacity building and institutional strengthening to all stakeholder groups (government, civil society, industry, etc.)

#### National
- Conduct institutional capacity and skill needs assessments for key ministries (e.g., mining, finance, environment, lands) involved in mining sector
- Provide capacity building and training to government officials responsible for environmental evaluation and monitoring processes (ESIAs, ESMPs, etc.)
- Provide capacity building and training to members of national-level MSG. Possible topics: participatory decision making, conflict resolution, teambuilding, development planning, environmental and social impact monitoring
- Provide capacity building to other civil society organizations working in mining areas
- Capacity building for national and sub-regional training facilities to develop skills needed by mining industry, government, and NGOs

#### Cluster
- Provide capacity building and training to members of local cluster-area MSGs, and to local government officials, CSOs, and other community representatives. Possible topics: participatory decision making, conflict resolution, facilitation, teambuilding, development planning, environmental and social impact monitoring
- Support development of local facilitators who can convene and run stakeholder meetings
- Support recruiting field-level ministry environmental and social monitoring officers
- Support development of trainers who can provide health, safety, and environment training for artisanal miners (in or outside cluster areas)
- Capacity building for cluster-level training facilities to develop skills needed by mining industry, government, and NGOs

### 4c. Minimize disenfranchisement of community from development decision-making processes

#### National
- Include representatives from local MSGs in national level planning or development decision meetings
- Use EITI++ Value Chain analysis to identify national Link 5 initiatives (sustainable development benefits) that can be implemented at community/cluster level
- Create and build capacity for inter-ministerial planning team that is capable of engaging communities on development planning and decision making processes
- Ensure team makes regular visits to communities during planning process

#### Cluster
- Initiate regular meetings of local MSGs to share information and solicit community input on cluster-related mining and infrastructure development
- Establish local dispute mechanisms for mining-induced land, environmental, social, etc. issues that can be accessed by local populations
- Support development of cluster or community-level participatory budgeting process, where community stakeholders are involved in local government budgeting decisions
- Where there is potential for competing land claims or conflict, facilitate meetings between large-scale and artisanal miners working in cluster areas to agree on working alongside each other

### 4d. Minimize conditions that lead to rent-seeking behavior and distorted benefit-sharing

#### National
- Provide technical assistance and other support to strengthen national revenue transparency organizations (e.g., EITI and Publish What You Pay)
- Help develop transparent standardized processes to award permits, concessions, land use, etc., for use in cluster projects (tie in with regional regulatory harmonization initiatives)
- Support creation of protection mechanisms within civil service

#### Cluster
- Support cluster-level MSGs involvement in EITI process, including awareness raising of EITI objectives and dissemination of reports at cluster level
- Support development of cluster or community-level participatory budgeting process, where community stakeholders are involved in local government budgeting decisions
- Provide information on government and industry transactions (mining or infrastructure contracts, tax payments) available to local communities through local information service centers
The single biggest challenge to creating a successful regional cluster-driven approach — and a multi-level, multi-stakeholder consultation framework — is the need for buy-in and active support from the highest levels of political and government leadership (such as that shown by Liberia’s President for her government’s improved financial management initiatives). Key ministers and their top technical and policy making advisors will need to be brought on board as well. Regional harmonization and cluster development activities, which largely involve exchanges between technical experts, may be easier to launch than the MSGs. However, a careful balance of technical expertise and political acumen will be needed to develop mineral-infrastructure cluster plans that can accommodate expectations of what such cluster development can deliver.

The MSGs will by their nature require buy-in and productive collaboration from a broad array of constituents at all levels. Collaboration across government, industry, and civil society stakeholders worked well in the WAMSSA consultation process, perhaps because of shared interests in maximizing national and community benefits from mining activities. But more permanent MSGs will need to grapple with thorny decisions and unanticipated problems that will arise in the development process. Establishing transparent processes for selection of MSG members, and facilitating early trust-building exercises, teambuilding, and conflict resolution skills among all the players will be critical to MSG success. Also important is the need to select capable and respected MSG leaders and meeting facilitators. The Liberian EITI MSG provides a useful model for how to address many of these issues.

Powerful stakeholders who may oppose or try to bend the regional cluster-based development process in their favor could include politicians or private interests that perceive a loss of influence or access to resources if the new approach succeeds. Efforts will need to be made through the consultative processes to constructively engage their support for the new initiatives. In some extreme cases they may need to be isolated or removed from the process by more senior decision makers if it is clear they have no intention to cooperate.

While environmental governance has been weak to date in the MRU countries, the WAMSSA consultation process indicated a willingness by all stakeholder groups to improve performance. The biggest hurdle appears to be lack of adequate government capacity to enforce and/or strengthen existing environmental protections. Large-scale mining companies are generally more favorable to and better able to support environmentally responsible practices than smaller, under-resourced companies and artisanal miners, but there still needs to be a government or independent watchdog capability to ensure compliance. There is also a need to overcome institutional — and in some cases powerful individual — competing interests as to which government ministry or agency is ultimately responsible for environmental, social, and land access issues in the mining sector. Local community use of natural resources, especially as mining-induced in-migration occurs, can have its own negative effects. Efforts are necessary to educate communities on why adopting responsible and sustainable natural resource management practices are in their own best interest.

Few stakeholders appear opposed to increasing the benefits to local communities affected by mining and infrastructure projects. Rather, the challenge is to identify comprehensive and consistent frameworks for community development, employment,
and local link programs that include community and CSO input, as well as that of industry and government, in their design. Most important, these schemes need to be collectively defined and launched early enough in the process (e.g., pre-construction) to overcome corporate pressure on local operations to rapidly import goods and labor to meet aggressive construction timelines. The IFC CommDev unit, working with ICMM and a number of major mining companies in the MRU and elsewhere in Africa, has developed some useful models to be considered by AMGP for addressing this issue.

511. Improving the transparency and consistency of government policies and decision-making processes requires engaging, changing, or isolating institutional or individual blockers of such initiatives. The WAMSSA consultation process indicated a willingness among many government technical staff to act responsibly — if the political and institutional environments allow it. Pressure from external stakeholders, including more senior government authorities, civil society, and development partners may be needed to counteract blocking forces.

512. There is also broad stakeholder support for capacity-building efforts because it enables managers and staff to better carry out their responsibilities. Proper training and adequate resources are powerful incentives and enablers of good governance practices. However, capacity-building efforts need to be based on needs of the institutions and aimed at strengthening institutional capabilities, not just meeting individual training requests. This holds true for national and cluster-level government, civil society, and community capacity-building efforts.

513. Figure 12 represents the potential effects of the proposed regional and cluster-focused approach on various stakeholder groups, as well as their relative ability to influence the implementation process.

**Figure 12. Stakeholder interest and influence over implementation**
5.6 WAMSSA action matrix

514. In addition to the short-term national and cluster actions, the WAMSSA team also identified a number of issues that need to be planned at the regional level, but implemented at regional, national, and local levels over a longer timeframe. The Table 16 Action Matrix shows recommended short-, medium- and long-term actions that may be taken to support the four strategic recommendations and address the critical priorities identified by WAMSSA. This matrix reflects input from the Regional Validation Workshop, the final Steering Committee meeting, as well as feedback from other reviewers.

5.7 Critical success factors

515. Finally, there are several factors that are critical to the success of the issues and priorities identified by WAMSSA.

516. Stakeholders, especially communities affected by mining, need to be empowered and included in the policy dialogue. Including their views in the decision-making process can improve the chance for more sustainable outcomes, lessen the risk of social tension and civil conflict, and provide an outside force to maintain pressure for social accountability. The creation of the MSGs is one way to accomplish this, although there must also be other strategies for broader inclusion of community members in information gathering, discussions, and decision making, perhaps with MSGs as a conduit between policy and decision makers and grassroots communities.

517. Institutional strengthening and capacity building must be a first and primary priority. As noted earlier, many environmental and social policies in the MRU countries are adequate, but they remain un- or under-enforced due to lack of adequate skills, capacity, and resources to enforce them. Capacity building is a slow process, and should be started as early as possible in any AMGP or EITI++ project. Participants can then play a stronger role in the development, execution, and longer-term sustainability of the project itself.

518. Planning for future mineral governance initiatives needs to be well coordinated with ongoing efforts by other development partners, not only in the mining sector (such as the ECOWAS mining directive, and USAID’s CEPESL artisanal mining policy project in Sierra Leone), but also with initiatives in infrastructure development, environmental management and biodiversity conservation, health and socioeconomic development, and overall human resource development. This means closer collaboration not only among donors, but also among donors and the growing number of consortia of CSOs and NGOs working on governance and sustainable development issues that are relevant to the mining sector and/or its affected communities.

519. Past initiatives to improve mineral sector governance and development have identified critical issues and proposed useful solutions, but there is often insufficient follow-up. Examples include the Sierra Leone SESA, the D4D artisanal mining initiative for the MRU countries, and the IFC Community Development Framework initiative in Guinea. For a variety of reasons, many of the recommendations and programs put forward by these initiatives have not been yet implemented. AMGP and EITI++ should consider reviewing and incorporating the best ideas from these studies into their
programs. Similarly, there is a developing body of experience about regional development initiatives, including mineral sector-driven SDI and development corridors such as the Maputo Development Corridor and Mozlink SME project, which can inform environmental, social, and other policy aspects of AMGP or EITI++ improved mineral governance objectives. WAMSSA consultation stakeholders were adamant that WAMSSA recommendations not suffer a fate similar to other previous studies. They want the MSG consultation mechanism and policy dialogue begun with WAMSSA to continue so as to provide ongoing social accountability that will ensure improved mineral sector governance and more equitable sharing of mineral sector development benefits in their countries.
Table 16. West Africa Mineral Sector Strategic Assessment (WAMSSA) Action Matrix

Recommendation 1. Adopt strategic, cluster-focused, permanent multi-stakeholder framework to address mineral sector policy and development decisions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Priority reform area</th>
<th>Short-term actions (1-2 years)</th>
<th>Short-term monitorable outcomes</th>
<th>Medium-term actions (3-5 years)</th>
<th>Medium-term monitorable outcomes</th>
<th>Long-term actions (more than 5 years)</th>
<th>Final outcomes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Assess priority regional and national mineral clusters to become the primary focus of mineral sector infrastructure and governance improvements | • Select target mining-infrastructure clusters to serve as focal point of environmental and social governance improvements  
• Carry out studies and discussions required to plan mining and other infrastructure development | • Mining-infrastructure clusters defined and selected | • Expand effort to additional clusters within MRU as appropriate, including Côte d’Ivoire  
• Strengthen regional institutions (ECOWAS, MRU, etc.) to establish a secretariat for mining-infrastructure cluster coordination | • Additional clusters included in governance and planning mechanisms  
• Establish a secretariat on mining and infrastructure in a regional  
• A multi-stakeholder steering committee for the secretariat is established | • Where appropriate link to clusters outside MRU (e.g., Guinea Bissau, Mali) | • Mining-infrastructure clusters develop, taking advantage of regional economies of scale and addressing transboundary economic, environmental, and social issues |

• Create permanent regional, national, and local multi-stakeholder bodies to help develop appropriate policy frameworks

• Create regional, national and local multi-stakeholder bodies  
• Select participants  
• Provide necessary training to these bodies  
• Work to ensure full regional organization and national government support for such bodies

• Multi-stakeholder groups created and active at all three levels (regional, national, and local)

• Formal structures and rules conducive to promote civil society participation in economic integration organizations are adopted

• ECOWAS, MRU, WAEMU are more open to concerns of civil society.

• Mechanisms at the regional and national levels are developed to promote free access of information and to hold government and regional organizations accountable to civil society and grassroots organizations
## Recommendation 2. Strengthen environmental governance and management of the mineral sector

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Priority reform area</th>
<th>Short-term actions (1-2 years)</th>
<th>Short-term monitorable outcomes</th>
<th>Medium-term actions (3-5 years)</th>
<th>Medium-term monitorable outcomes</th>
<th>Long-term actions (more than 5 years)</th>
<th>Final outcomes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Address mining-induced deforestation, loss of biodiversity, and water pollution</td>
<td>• Legal and regulatory analysis to involve local communities in environmental and social monitoring of mining operations</td>
<td>• Framework for community participation on environmental and social monitoring in mining operations completed.</td>
<td>• Framework for community participation on environmental and social monitoring in mining operations is tested and refined.</td>
<td>• Framework for community participation on environmental and social monitoring in mining operations is adopted.</td>
<td>• Strengthen the capacity of the judiciary for dealing with lawsuits originated in environmental (and social) damages.</td>
<td>• Triateral negotiations and relationships (government, community, and industry) are prevalent in mining-infrastructure clusters.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• Review standards pertaining to the environment</td>
<td>• Develop environmental and social guidelines to be implemented for projects in selected clusters</td>
<td>• Undertake an SEA for each of the key mining-infrastructure clusters to identify more detailed environmental opportunities and constraints to developing the mining-infrastructure clusters</td>
<td>• SEAs undertaken for clusters which include strategic plan for transboundary conservation developed</td>
<td>• Implement transboundary conservation plans for selected clusters</td>
<td>Communities are actively involved in environmental and social monitoring.</td>
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<td>• Identify and delineate key areas for transboundary conservation management in the selected clusters</td>
<td>• Training programs for key staff in environmental and social planning and management.</td>
<td>• Undertake capacity building activities with representatives from the three MRU countries on transboundary conservation management</td>
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<td>Tribunals have considered cases on environmental (and social) damage.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• Harmonize environmental and mining policies and legislation to limit conflicting roles between various parties</td>
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<td>Transboundary conservation areas established and implemented seeking opportunities for associated alternative income sources.</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Reduce mining-induced land degradation and increase reclamation of mining lands</td>
<td>• Prepare proposals to enhance transparency and accountability in access to land by mining operations</td>
<td>• Legal proposals on access to information and transparency are complete</td>
<td>• Regional discussion on laws and regulations for access to information, transparency, and accountability on management of mineral resources</td>
<td>• Laws and regulations on access to information, transparency, and accountability on management of mineral resources are adopted</td>
<td>• Implementation of laws and regulations on access to information, transparency, and accountability on management of mineral resources</td>
<td>Land degradation and social marginalization and conflicts associated to land degradation significantly decrease across the MRU.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Conduct more detailed analysis/mapping of waste areas and degraded land in and around selected clusters</td>
<td>• Legal proposals to increase accountability of chiefs, district officers, government authorities, and regional representatives are complete</td>
<td>• Access to land for mining activities reviewed to adopt common sub-regional standards, including easements and expropriations</td>
<td>• Legal proposals to increase accountability of Chiefs, district officers, government authorities and regional representatives are adopted</td>
<td></td>
<td>There is an effective land management policy in place for land restoration of newly disturbed areas and existing degraded landscapes.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• Vocational training in terms of environmental awareness with artisanal miners</td>
<td>• Regional map prepared of degraded lands and volume and quality of disposed waste materials in mining-infrastructure cluster areas</td>
<td>• Regional discussion on laws and regulations for access to information, transparency, and accountability on management of mineral resources</td>
<td>• Regional discussion on laws and regulations for access to information, transparency, and accountability on management of mineral resources are adopted</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• Develop remediation guidelines for new mining ventures</td>
<td>• Artisanal miners are equipped with basic environmental management skills</td>
<td>• artisanal miners are equipped with basic environmental management skills</td>
<td>• Artisanal miners are equipped with basic environmental management skills</td>
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<td>• Regional discussion on laws and regulations for access to information, transparency, and accountability on management of mineral resources</td>
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### Recommendation 3. Reduce poverty and increase local-level benefits in mining areas

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Priority reform area</th>
<th>Short-term actions (1-2 years)</th>
<th>Short-term monitorable outcomes</th>
<th>Medium-term actions (3-5 years)</th>
<th>Medium-term monitorable outcomes</th>
<th>Long-term actions (more than 5 years)</th>
<th>Final outcomes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| • Integrate mineral sector projects into local development plans in order to address poverty | • Use EITI++ Value Chain analysis and approach to ensure sustainable development benefits accrue to local communities  
• Strengthen the capacity of local governments and local communities for development planning | EITI++ Value Chain approach beginning to be implemented in multiple countries in sub-region  
• There is a cadre of local and district officers trained in key development planning skills | • Economic development plans in areas of mining-infrastructure clusters are developed involving all key stakeholders including regional and sub regional organizations, government industry, CSOs, donors and communities  
• Promote implementation and enforcement of decentralization laws | • Economic development plans in areas of mining-infrastructure clusters are adopted  
• Decentralization policies are harmonized across the region | • Bottom-up and participatory planning is applied in areas covered/affected by mining-infrastructure clusters  
• Decentralization policies and laws are implemented across the region | • Capacities at local level to effectively manage development induced by mining growth are prevalent in provinces and districts affected by mining-infrastructure clusters |
| • Create opportunities for training, employment, local suppliers, and sustainable alternative livelihoods | • Develop model for training programs to create labor pool of local residents for unskilled and semi-skilled construction and mining jobs, roll out in one cluster as pilot  
• Develop model for training programs to train local suppliers for mining industry (food production, carpentry, etc.), roll out in one cluster  
• Identify and support training resources to develop supplier skills  
• Require mining company to maximize local sourcing of goods and services  
• Assess other economic opportunities in mining zones that can be supported by mining companies, donors, other backers  
• Set up vocational training facilities for potential construction and mining company employees | Local training programs for labor pool and local suppliers operational in one cluster  
100% of unskilled workers sourced locally, 50% of semi-skilled sourced locally | • Require aggressive recruitment of local workers by mining firms and their contractors as part of concession agreements  
• Set up management development training program to develop technical and management staff for government and industry | • Labor pool and supplier training programs operational in all MRU clusters  
• Local training programs developed and implemented  
• Active local employment recruitment and local supplier sourcing programs operational  
• Technical and management candidates in training pipeline or employed by government or mining companies  
• Multiple use infrastructure in place | • Evolve training of mining labor and local suppliers to skill sets that are marketable outside mining industry and after mine closure (expand reach beyond cluster areas)  
• Local populations have marketable skills base that no longer entirely depends on mining company for jobs  
• Local suppliers have goods and service businesses outside mining industry |
## Recommendation 4. Improve social accountability and mineral sector governance

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Priority reform area</th>
<th>Short-term actions (1-2 years)</th>
<th>Short-term monitorable outcomes</th>
<th>Medium-term actions (3-5 years)</th>
<th>Medium-term monitorable outcomes</th>
<th>Long-term actions (more than 5 years)</th>
<th>Final outcomes</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Eliminate lack of transparency and consistency in policy formulation and decision making</td>
<td>• Create framework for transparent standardized process for awarding exploration permits, concessions, land use, management of environmental and social issues, etc. to be used in the selected clusters</td>
<td>• Transparent procedures framework agreed to by all government and in early stages of roll-out.</td>
<td>• The sub-regionally harmonized framework on transparency and accountability of decision makers and chiefs is adopted.</td>
<td>• Communities and civil society are empowered and use their rights against arbitrary decisions and to redress grievances.</td>
<td>• Processes for licensing, etc. more transparent in all countries</td>
<td>• Checks and balances that create incentives to key public and private decision makers to adopt development decisions on access and use of mining resources and revenues that are consistent with environmental and social sustainability of communities in mining-infrastructure clusters.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Provide capacity building and institutional strengthening to all stakeholder groups (government, civil society, industry, etc.) | • Strengthen capacities for negotiation on key development, environmental and social issues emerging from the cluster approach for mining induced development | • MRU has started a high-level dialogue on mining-infrastructure cluster development in the Mano River Union. | • Support negotiations on development and environmental and social management on mining-infrastructure clusters. | • Specific multi-country agreements on shared infrastructure and environmental and social management are adopted by the MRU countries. | • Continuous support to enhance negotiation capacities and engagement of civil society and the private sector on sub-regional discussions on mining-infrastructure clusters. | • Improved management of mining-related environmental and social issues across mining sector in entire sub-region. |

| • Strengthen capacity and increase funding for EIA and SIA oversight, environmental and social monitoring and evaluation (M&E), and other environmental and social management in MDAs responsible for mining | • Prepare sub-regional standards and national plans for training local officials, CSOs, other local community-based groups in development planning skills and environmental and social management | • Sub-regional standards for training have been agreed and national training plans adopted. | • Staffing of national and field-level environmental and social experts increased in environment and mining MDAs. | • Regional training facility provides regular training courses to government and industry participants. | • Growth of sub-regional public and private sector management workforce with common knowledge base and standards. | • Local government officials, CSOs, and community groups able to play active role in development planning and management of environmental and social mining-related issues. |

| • Strengthen overall MDA staffing at national and field level in environmental and social management | • Improved MDA ability to assess ESIAs and ESMPs, and monitor and enforce ESMPs and environmental and social standards | • Improved MDA ability to assess ESIAs and ESMPs, and monitor and enforce ESMPs and environmental and social standards. | • Specific multi-country agreements on shared infrastructure and environmental and social management are adopted by the MRU countries. | • Regional training facility provides regular training courses to government and industry participants. | • Growth of sub-regional public and private sector management workforce with common knowledge base and standards. | • Local government officials, CSOs, and community groups able to play active role in development planning and management of environmental and social mining-related issues. |

| • Develop mechanisms and rules to enhance accountability of decision makers and chiefs | • Support negotiations on development and environmental and social management on mining-infrastructure clusters. | • Develop sub-regional training facility for improved management of technical, legal, financial, environmental, and social aspects of mining sector geared to serve both government and industry | • Strengthen sub-regional and local development planning capacity in national governments and communities and local governments. | • Strengthen capacity of training institutions to provide training and technical assistance. | • Develop training programs for local officials, CSOs, other local community-based groups. | • Continuous support to enhance negotiation capacities and engagement of civil society and the private sector on sub-regional discussions on mining-infrastructure clusters. | • Growth of sub-regional public and private sector management workforce with common knowledge base and standards. | • Local government officials, CSOs, and community groups able to play active role in development planning and management of environmental and social mining-related issues. |

| | • Harmonized sub-regional framework on transparency and accountability is refined and implementation is continuous and broadening its coverage | | | | | | | | | |
### Recommendation 4. Improve social accountability and mineral sector governance (continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Priority reform area</th>
<th>Short-term actions (1-2 years)</th>
<th>Short-term monitorable outcomes</th>
<th>Medium-term actions (3-5 years)</th>
<th>Medium-term monitorable outcomes</th>
<th>Long-term actions (more than 5 years)</th>
<th>Final outcomes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Minimize disenfranchisement of community from development decision-making processes</strong></td>
<td>Use EITI++ Value Chain analysis and approach to ensure sustainable development benefits accrue to local communities</td>
<td>EITI++ Value Chain approach beginning to be implemented in multiple countries in sub-region</td>
<td>Multi-stakeholder economic development committees established and making consensus decisions on development issues</td>
<td>Establish permanent cluster-level multi-stakeholder fora with active community participation for discussion of long-range planning, cumulative effects of multiple mining projects, and closure and post-closure development planning</td>
<td>Communities in cluster areas empowered to work together with each other and with national and local governments and industry on planning</td>
<td><strong>Minimize conditions that lead to rent-seeking behavior and distorted benefit-sharing</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Minimize conditions that lead to rent-seeking behavior and distorted benefit-sharing</strong></td>
<td>Strengthen national revenue transparency mechanisms such as EITI and Publish What You Pay</td>
<td>Improved functioning of national EITI bodies and reporting on revenues for mining-infrastructure cluster projects</td>
<td>Increase focus on transparency and planning for use of mining revenues (EITI++) through study missions and development of sub-regional EITI++ strategies</td>
<td>Increased transparency of mining revenue uses</td>
<td>Harmonized sub-regional framework on transparency and accountability (see above insufficient transparency/consistency of decision making) is refined and implementation is continuous and broadening its coverage</td>
<td><strong>Checks and balances that create incentives to key public and private decision makers to adopt development decisions on access and use of mining resources and revenues that are consistent with environmental and social sustainability of communities in mining-infrastructure clusters</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Also see actions proposed under Recommendations 2 and 3, which are applicable to address disenfranchisement of local communities, such as actions to reduce deforestation and loss of biodiversity, land degradation and need for reclamation, lack of local participation in mineral sector planning and job creation, insufficient transparency/consistency of decision making and lack of capacity.
5.8 Version française des recommandations et actions

5.8.1 ACTIONS RECOMMANDÉES DANS LES PAYS ET LES GRAPPES MINIÈRES

Plusieurs actions clés à court terme ont été formulées afin d’aider les équipes du PAGM et de l’EITI++ à opérationnaliser les recommandations faites par l’étude WAMSSA dans les pays et les grappes minières.

520. Le tableau 15 identifie les actions à court terme qui devraient être menées dans les pays et les grappes minières afin d’opérationnaliser les recommandations faites par l’étude WAMSSA. Plusieurs des activités suggérées ici pourraient être mises en œuvre soit par les équipes du PAGM, soit par celles de l’EITI++ ou encore par les deux, qui travailleraient alors en collaboration afin de s’assurer qu’une attention adéquate est portée dans l’analyse des problèmes et solutions, aux aspects régionaux, locaux et relatifs aux grappes. L’équipe WAMSSA a également élaboré une matrice d’activités consacrée aux initiatives qui seront planifiées au niveau régional, mais qui seront ensuite mises en œuvre aux niveaux régional, national et local selon un échéancier à plus long terme et tel qu’illustré au tableau 16.
Tableau 15. Actions à mener aux niveaux national et des grappes minières

**Recommandation 1 :** Adopter un cadre stratégique multipartite, permanent et axé sur les grappes chargé de traiter des questions relatives aux décisions en matière de politiques et de développement du secteur minier.

**1A : Évaluer les grappes minières régionales et nationales prioritaires susceptibles de constituer le point central des améliorations en matière de gouvernance et d’infrastructures sectorielles**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Niveau national</th>
<th>Niveau des grappes minières</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Consulter les parties prenantes nationales et locales clés pour assurer/solidifier leur engagement envers les grappes régionales et/ou l’approche par corridor de développement</td>
<td>• Procéder, dans les zones potentielles d’implantation de grappes, à une étude d’évaluation/exploration rapide qui permettrait de collecter, auprès des gouvernements locaux, de l’industrie, de la société civile et des communautés, des données de base démographiques, environnementales, socioéconomiques, minières et sur les infrastructures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Créer de petits groupes de travail composés de membres du gouvernement et/ou d’organismes régionaux qui seraient chargés de dresser une liste préliminaire des grappes et des corridors de développement</td>
<td>• Une fois la (les) grappe (s) retenue (s), procéder à une évaluation environnementale et sociale multi-pays complète de la (les) zone (s) retenue (s), y compris une évaluation des impacts cumulatifs générés par les effets combinés de plusieurs projets miniers et d’infrastructures de grande ampleur (pollution transfrontalière, utilisation de l’eau, migration intra-nationale, etc.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Identifier les questions économiques, environnementales et sociales et de politique nationale soulevées par le développement de grappes régionales</td>
<td>• Participer et travailler avec les parties prenantes locales à l’identification de limites adéquates aux grappes minières, ceci afin de s’assurer de la compréhension et de l’appui des communautés</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Ajuster le développement des grappes régionales aux politiques et réglementations nationales</td>
<td>• Si le minerai de fer de la région Est (grappe de Nimba) est retenu, entrer en relations avec la Commission ministérielle Guinée-Libéria pour évaluer l’avancement des discussions sur les infrastructures ferroviaires communes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Évaluer la situation actuelle en matière de réglementation et identifier les ajustements de politiques à effectuer dans un ou plusieurs des pays concernés afin que le cadre réglementaire puisse être harmonisé et permettre le développement des grappes</td>
<td>• Si la grappe située à la frontière du Libéria et de la Sierra Leone est retenue, entrer en contact avec les autorités de la paix du parc transfrontalier de Gola</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Créer et renforcer les capacités d’une Unité de gestion par grappe minière. L’Unité sera responsable de la promotion des investissements, de la gestion des constructions et des installations, des relations avec les clients, etc. Elle constituerait une entité distincte des GMP actifs au niveau des grappes et décrits plus loin. L’Unité pourrait également être responsable du recrutement des travailleurs sur l’ensemble de la grappe minière et des programmes de mises en relations locaux</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### 1B : Mettre en place des instances régionales, nationales et locales permanentes et multipartites chargées d’appuyer l’élaboration et le suivi de cadres de politiques appropriés

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Niveau national</th>
<th>Niveau des grappes minières</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Consulter les parties prenantes nationales et locales clés pour assurer/solidifier leur engagement envers les grappes régionales et/ou l’approche par corridor de développement</td>
<td>• Consulter les parties prenantes locales clés pour assurer/solidifier leur engagement envers les grappes régionales et/ou l’approche par corridor de développement dans les zones où se trouvent les grappes retenues</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Créer des groupes multipartenaires au niveau national (GMP), élaborer des plans de travail et amorcer la tenue d’interactions régulières sur les questions de sélection des grappes, réformes de politiques et processus de développement des grappes</td>
<td>• Créer des groupes multipartenaires au niveau des grappes (GMP) et initier des interactions régulières sur les questions d’identification, de réforme de politiques et de processus de développement des grappes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Renforcer les capacités des GMP dans les secteurs pertinents à leurs fonctions (ex. : travail en équipe, facilitation, processus de décision, résolution de conflits, planification stratégique, communications, etc.)</td>
<td>• Aider les GMP à mettre en place des mécanismes de communication et de consultation et des plans qui permettront d’une part une dissémination régulière et à large échelle des informations et d’autre part des échanges avec les communautés sur le processus de développement des grappes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Recommandation 2 : Renforcer la gouvernance environnementale et la gestion du secteur minier

#### 2A : Solutionner les problèmes de déforestation, de perte de biodiversité et de pollution de l’eau induits par l’exploitation minière

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Niveau national</th>
<th>Niveau des grappes minières</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Afin d’améliorer la gouvernance environnementale en général, dans les pays et au niveau des grappes minières.</strong></td>
<td>• Procéder à des EES afin d’identifier les zones d’impacts environnementaux suite à l’opérationnalisation des grappes d’exploitation minière-développement d’infrastructures. Utiliser les données dans la délimitation des zones à préserver ou réhabiliter</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Appuyer l’élaboration d’un traité qui serait signé par les pays de l’URM et permettrait une prise de décision harmonisée et cohérente ainsi que le suivi de tous les projets proposés dans les zones de dépôts miniers transfrontaliers</td>
<td>• Former les populations locales situées à proximité des grappes en suivi environnemental et préparation de rapports. Mettre sur pied des équipes ou réseaux de «pisteurs» de pollution locale</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| • Choisir une grappe (par exemple la grappe de dépôts de minerai de fer de la région de Nimba) pour l’élaboration d’un modèle de traité d’accord entre deux pays (par ex. Guinée et Libéria). Le traité devrait être élaboré sur la base des informations tirées des EES effectuées au niveau des grappes. L’accent mis sur l’élaboration d’un cadre de politiques et les termes et conditions relatifs aux | • Aider à la création ou au renforcement des zones de conservation transfrontalières. Par ex., créer un Parc de Conservation Transfrontalier du Mont Nimba (PCTMN), si possible sur la base de systèmes implantés dans les parcs existants. Aider les autorités du parc à mener à bien les activités suivantes :
  - Former un groupe technique conseil avec les autorités chargées de la faune et de la flore dans les deux pays. Inclure d’autres conseillers (bailleurs de fonds, ONG) lorsque nécessaire
  - Sécuriser la zone : S’assurer que les terres sont protégées en dialoguant avec les communautés locales et les initiateurs de projets potentiels |
|  | o Former un groupe technique conseil avec les autorités chargées de la faune et de la flore dans les deux pays. Inclure d’autres conseillers (bailleurs de fonds, ONG) lorsque nécessaire |
|  | o Sécuriser la zone : S’assurer que les terres sont protégées en dialoguant avec les communautés locales et les initiateurs de projets potentiels |
grappes minières transfrontalières permettra de s’assurer que le modèle de traité tient compte des questions transfrontalières, des impacts cumulatifs, etc. et peut être réutilisé au niveau national pour d’autres accords liés au développement de grappes nationales ou transfrontalières

- Fournir l’assistance technique qui permettra (i) de s’assurer que le traité clarifie bien les rôles et responsabilités en matière de gestion environnementale, (ii) d’améliorer les compétences en gestion des ressources naturelles et environnementales transfrontalières, et (iii) d’élaborer des politiques et directives adaptées au contexte multi-projets et transfrontalier des grappes d’exploitation minière-développement d’infrastructures, incluant la planification des impacts cumulatifs potentiels, de processus clairs d’évaluation environnementale et d’exercices de participation publique y afférent, etc.

- Prendre contact avec les autres partenaires au développement travaillant sur les questions environnementales liées à l’exploitation minière artisanale, notamment la déforestation, la dégradation des terres, la pollution de l’eau et entreprendre un plaidoyer pour une coordination des initiatives politiques et des activités sur le terrain

### Pour résoudre les problèmes de gestion des ressources en eau et de pollution

- Effectuer des enquêtes exhaustives des ressources en eaux souterraines dans les zones de grappes minières, si possible sur la base des données consignées par les compagnies

- Mettre en place une instance de gestion intégrée des lignes de partage des eaux des zones de grappes minières qui serait chargée de gérer l’utilisation et la pollution des ressources en eau transfrontalières, par ex. le forum de gestion des captages du Mont Nimba. Inclure les agences de réglementation de la Guinée, du Libéria (et potentiellement de Côte d'Ivoire), les grands utilisateurs d’eau (secteurs minier et agricole) et les groupes communautaires

- Aider le forum à élaborer un cadre d’extraction des ressources en eau afin de s’assurer que les normes socio-écologiques relatives aux utilisateurs en amont et aux rejets d’effluents correspondent aux normes des utilisateurs d’eau en aval. Le cadre devra comprendre :
  - L’élaboration d’un Plan d’Action des Eaux qui définira un cadre institutionnel et légal approprié, ainsi que les normes et les directives s’adressant aux différents utilisateurs
  - Le développement de programmes et projets situés dans les zones de captage et destinés à contrôler l’érosion des sols, la pollution de l’eau et l’ensablement
  - La promotion de la coopération régionale dans le développement et la gestion d’une utilisation équitable des ressources en eau communes
**2B : Réduire la dégradation des sols causée par l’exploitation minière ou les activités auxiliaires et augmenter les réclamations relatives aux terrains miniers**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Niveau national</th>
<th>Niveau des grappes minières</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Renforcer et harmoniser la réduction des impacts environnementaux, les politiques de gestion et les réglementations nationales dans tous les pays de l’URM, incluant les EIES, les PGES et les Plans de Fermeture de Mines</td>
<td>• Procéder à des EES des zones de grappes minières débouchant sur des plans solides de gestion environnementale et sociale</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Définir et mettre en vigueur une politique de réhabilitation progressive des zones exploitées au cours de la phase opérationnelle, ceci afin de diminuer l’importance de la réhabilitation ou les réclamations encore en suspend à la fin du projet</td>
<td>• Former et renforcer les capacités des GMP locaux et des autres représentants communautaires afin qu’ils puissent participer à l’élaboration et au suivi des EES, EIES, PGES et Plans de fermeture de mine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Renforcer et harmoniser les exigences nationales envers les opérateurs en matière de fermeture de mine, incluant l’élaboration et l’approbation de plans de fermeture définissant, avant l’octroi de la licence, les engagements financiers et les mécanismes de fermeture</td>
<td>• Impliquer, au cours de la phase pré-construction, les communautés des zones de grappes minières dans la planification des fermetures afin de s’assurer de la pérennité à long terme des installations et activités post-fermeture</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Recommandation 3 : Réduire la pauvreté et accroître les bénéfices locaux dans les zones minières**

**3A : Intégrer les projets du secteur minier dans les plans de développement locaux afin qu’ils contribuent à la lutte contre la pauvreté**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Niveau national</th>
<th>Niveau des grappes minières</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Partager les documents de Stratégie de Réduction de la Pauvreté, les plans relatifs aux Objectifs de Développement du Millénaire et les autres outils de planification du développement et d’information nationaux avec les compagnies minières afin que les objectifs nationaux et au niveau des grappes du gouvernement et des compagnies soient concordants</td>
<td>• Revoir les plans de développement existants, considérer la possibilité de subventionner des processus de planification participative additionnels avec les communautés afin de mettre à jour les plans à la lumière des opportunités offertes par le développement des grappes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Utiliser l’analyse de la chaîne de valeur de l’EITI++ pour l’identification des opportunités offertes dans le cadre du Lien 5 (bénéfices de développement durable) qui pourraient être concrétisées aux niveaux communautaire/grappe minière</td>
<td>• Inclure les résultats de l’analyse de la chaîne de valeur de l’EITI++ dans les plans de développement des grappes, y compris l’identification des opportunités spécifiques aux grappes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Prendre en considération les données relatives aux plans de développement locaux existants ou nouveaux dans la conduite des analyses et préparation de plans d’action de l’EITI++</td>
<td>• Établir des contacts avec les autres partenaires de la Banque mondiale et au développement afin d’identifier les liens potentiels avec d’autres plans de développement dans les zones de grappes minières</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Travailler avec les gouvernements, les compagnies minières et les ONG orientées vers le développement à la traduction, dans des formats accessibles aux communautés, des informations sur l’exploitation minière, les infrastructures et les options de développement spécifiques aux grappes</td>
<td>• Évaluer et compléter tout programme déjà initié par les compagnies travaillant dans les grappes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### 3B : Créer des opportunités de formation, d’emploi, d’émergence de fournisseurs locaux et de moyens d’existence alternatifs et durables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Niveau national</th>
<th>Niveau des grappes minières</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Travailler avec les gouvernements à l’amélioration des centres de formation nationaux et sous-régionaux en vue du développement des compétences requises par les gestionnaires et employés du gouvernement, des ONG et de l’industrie minière</td>
<td>• Travailler avec les compagnies minières et les entreprises de construction à l’élaboration de programmes de recrutement et de formation couvrant l’ensemble d’une grappe et destinés aux habitants locaux (grappe)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Travailler avec le gouvernement à l’introduction d’exigences en matière d’emploi local et de passation des marchés dans les concessions minières types et les accords de développement</td>
<td>• Travailler avec les compagnies minières et les entreprises de construction à l’élaboration de programmes pré-construction de développement de fournisseurs locaux et de formation ciblant les habitants locaux (grappe) (similaires au programme PME Mozlink du Mozambique ou le programme ComDev Ahafo de mises en relation financés par l’IFC)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Collaborer avec les ministères concernés au développement de services d’appui à la création d’entreprises (petites entreprises, microcrédit, etc.) au niveau des grappes minières</td>
<td>• Procéder à des études de marché sur les opportunités d’amélioration de moyens d’existence alternatifs durables au niveau des grappes minières</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Recommandation 4: Améliorer l’imputabilité sociale et la gouvernance du secteur minier

### 4A : Éliminer le manque de transparence et de cohérence dans la formulation de politiques et la prise de décisions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Niveau national</th>
<th>Niveau des grappes minières</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Appuyer l’élaboration de processus standardisés et transparents d’octroi de permis, de concessions, d’utilisation de terres, de réglementations et obligations environnementales et sociales etc. qui seront employés dans les projets d’exploitations minière-développement d’infrastructures (s’associer aux initiatives régionales d’harmonisation des réglementations)</td>
<td>• Mettre en place au niveau des grappes des centres d’information dans lesquels les communautés pourraient trouver de l’information sur les politiques, les lois et les droits légaux relatifs aux questions environnementales, sociales et d’accès aux terres liées à l’exploitation minière</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Appuyer l’élaboration de cadres de politiques qui définissent clairement les responsabilités de gestion environnementale et sociale du secteur minier</td>
<td>• Permettre aux GMP locaux d’agir comme catalyseurs et défenseurs d’une bonne gouvernance locale, notamment en matière de processus décisionnels (par la diffusion d’informations, la fourniture d’assistance technique et le renforcements des capacités)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Autres activités déjà envisagées dans le plan de travail du PAGM</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### 4B : Renforcer les capacités et consolider les organes institutionnels de tous les types de parties prenantes (gouvernement, société civile, industries, etc.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Niveau national</th>
<th>Niveau des grappes minières</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Évaluer les capacités institutionnelles et les besoins en matière de</td>
<td>• Renforcer les capacités et assurer la formation des membres des GMP logés au niveau des</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>compétences des ministères clés (mines, finances, environnement, terres)</td>
<td>grappes, des membres du gouvernement local, des OSC et autres représentants communautaires.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>impliqués dans le secteur minier</td>
<td>Sujets potentiels : prise de décision participative, résolution de conflits, formation d’équipe, planification du développement, suivi des impacts environnementaux et sociaux</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Renforcer les capacités et assurer la formation des membres du</td>
<td>• Appuyer la mise en place de facilitateurs locaux qui peuvent convoquer et diriger des réunions de parties prenantes locales</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>gouvernement responsables des processus d’évaluation gouvernementale et du</td>
<td>• Appuyer le recrutement et la mise en place de chargés terrain du suivi environnemental et social au nom du ministère</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>suivi (EIES, PGES, etc.)</td>
<td>• Appuyer la création de formateurs aptes à dispenser des formations environnementales, sanitaires et en matière de sécurité aux mineurs artisanaux (dans ou hors des zones de grappes)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Renforcer les capacités et assurer la formation des membres des GMP</td>
<td>• Renforcer les capacités des centres de formation logés au niveau des grappes afin qu’ils développent les compétences requises par l’industrie minière, les gouvernements et les ONG</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>nationaux. Sujets potentiels : prise de décision participative, résolution de</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>conflits, formation d’équipe, planification du développement, suivi des</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>impacts environnementaux et sociaux</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Renforcer les capacités des autres organisations de la société civile</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>travaillant dans les zones minières</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Renforcer les capacités des centres de formation nationaux et sous-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>régionaux afin qu’ils développent les compétences requises par l’industrie</td>
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<tr>
<td>minière, les gouvernements et les ONG</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Renforcer les capacités des centres de formation nationaux et sous-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>régionaux afin qu’ils développent les compétences requises par l’industrie</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>minière, les gouvernements et les ONG</td>
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</table>

### 4C : Réduire l’importance de la privation des droits des populations au cours des processus décisionnels liés au développement

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Niveau national</th>
<th>Niveau des grappes minières</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Inclure les représentants des GMP locaux dans les réunions nationales</td>
<td>• Initier la tenue de rencontres régulières des GMP locaux afin de partager l’information et de solliciter les avis des communautés sur l’exploitation minière par grappe et le développement des infrastructures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>planification ou de prise de décision en matière de développement</td>
<td>• Mettre en place des mécanismes de discussion locaux accessibles aux populations et qui puissent traiter des problèmes environnementaux, sociaux et d’accès à la terre induits par les grappes minières</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Utiliser l’analyse de la chaîne de valeur de l’EITI++ pour l’identification</td>
<td>• Appuyer l’élaboration de processus de budgétisation participatifs au niveau des grappes ou des communautés, et dans lesquels les parties prenantes communautaires pourraient être participer aux décisions budgétaires du gouvernement local</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>des opportunités offertes dans le cadre du Lien 5 (bénéfices de développement</td>
<td>• Dans les endroits potentiellement porteurs de conflits de populations concurrentes des terres, faciliter les rencontres entre les mineurs artisanaux et à large échelle travaillant dans les zones de grappes afin d’en arriver à une entente sur les moyens qui permettront de travailler côte à côte</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>durable) qui pourraient être concrétisées aux niveaux communautaire/grappe</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>minière</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Créer et renforcer les capacités d’une équipe de planification interministérielle</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>capable d’impliquer les communautés dans le processus de planification et de prise</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>de décision en matière de développement</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• S’assurer que l’équipe visite régulièrement les communautés au cours du</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>processus de planification</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### 4D : Limiter les conditions qui encouragent un comportement de recherche de rente et de partage déloyal des bénéfices

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Niveau national</th>
<th>Niveau des grappes minières</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Fournir de l’assistance technique et d’autres appuis au renforcement des organismes veillant à la transparence des recettes nationales (par ex., EITI et Publish what you pay)</td>
<td>• Appuyer l’implication des GMP logés au niveau des grappes dans les processus EITI, incluant la sensibilisation sur les objectifs de l’EITI et la diffusion de rapports au niveau des grappes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Appuyer l’élaboration de processus standardisés d’octroi de permis, de concessions, d’utilisation des terres destinés aux projets de grappes minières (s’associer aux initiatives régionales d’harmonisation des réglementations)</td>
<td>• Appuyer l’élaboration de processus de budgétisation participatifs au niveau des communautés, dans lesquels les parties prenantes communautaires pourraient participer aux décisions budgétaires du gouvernement local</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Appuyer la mise en place de sonnettes d’alarme et de mécanismes de protection des sonnettes d’alarme dans les services publics</td>
<td>• Fournir de l’information sur les transactions entre le gouvernement et les compagnies minières (contrats miniers ou d’infrastructures, versement de textes, etc.) aux communautés locales par le biais des centres locaux d’information</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
5.8.2 MATRICE D'ughters DE L'ÉTUDE WAMSSA

521. En plus des actions à court terme à mener aux niveaux des pays et des grappes présentées plus haut, l’équipe de l’étude WAMSSA a également identifié plusieurs questions qui devront faire l’objet d’une planification régionale, mais qui seront traduites en actions aux niveaux régional, national et local selon un échéancier à plus long terme. La Matrice d’Actions suivante présente des actions à court, moyen et long terme qui pourraient être menées en appui aux quatre recommandations stratégiques et répondre aux priorités cruciales identifiées par l’étude WAMSSA. Cette matrice tient compte des apports de l’Atelier de validation régional, de la dernière réunion du Comité de Pilotage et des commentaires des autres réviseurs

**Recommandation 1 : Adopter un cadre stratégique multipartite, permanent et axé sur les grappes chargé de traiter des questions relatives aux décisions en matière de politiques et de développement du secteur minier**

<table>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>• Évaluer les grappes minières et nationales prioritaires susceptibles de constituer le point central des améliorations en matière de gouvernance et d'infrastructures sectorielles</td>
<td>• Sélectionner des grappes minières-infrastructures cibles qui serviront de point focal à l'amélioration de la gouvernance environnementale et sociale</td>
<td>• Grappes minières et d'infrastructures définies et sélectionnées</td>
<td>• Étendre si approprié, les appuis à des grappes additionnelles dans les pays de l'URM incluant la Côte d'Ivoire</td>
<td>• Grappes additionnelles indues dans les mécanismes de planification et de gouvernance</td>
<td>• Si approprié, créer des liens avec les grappes situées hors de l'URM (par ex., Guinée, Bissau, Mali)</td>
<td>• Le développement des grappes minières-infrastructures tire avantage des économies d'échelle régionales et résout les questions économiques, environnementales et sociales</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Mener les études et discussions nécessaires à la planification minière et au développement des autres infrastructures</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Renforcer les organismes régionaux (ECOMAS, URM, etc.) afin qu'ils mettent en place un Secrétariat de coordination des grappes minières-infrastructures</td>
<td>• Un Secrétariat chargé des mines et infrastructures a été mis en place dans une entité régionale</td>
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### Recommandation 2: Renforcer la gouvernance environnementale et la gestion du secteur minier

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<tr>
<td>• Solutionner les problèmes de déforestation, de perte de biodiversité et de pollution de l'eau induits par l'exploitation minière</td>
<td>• Conduire une analyse légale et réglementaire de la participation des communautés locales au suivi environnemental et social des activités minières</td>
<td>• Résolutions légales et réglementaires relatives à la participation des communautés locales au suivi environnemental et social des activités minières testées et affinées</td>
<td>• Directives environnementales et sociales à appliquer aux projets dans les grappes minières réunies</td>
<td>• Cadre de participation communautaire au suivi environnemental et social des opérations minières établi et affiné</td>
<td>• Procéder à une EES de chaque des grappes minières-infrastructure transfrontalières</td>
<td>• Les négociations trilatérales et les relations (gouvernement, communautés et industrie) sont régulières dans les grappes minières-infrastructure transfrontalières</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Conduire une analyse régionale et internationale de la participation des communautés locales au suivi environnemental et social des activités minières</td>
<td>• Examen des normes et directives relatives à l'environnement</td>
<td>• Identification et définition des zones clés de protection transfrontalières au sein des grappes minières et environnementales</td>
<td>• Directives environnementales et sociales à appliquer aux projets dans les grappes minières et environnementales</td>
<td>• Cadre de participation communautaire au suivi environnemental et social des opérations minières testés et affinés</td>
<td>• Procéder à une EES de chaque des grappes minières-infrastructure transfrontalières</td>
<td>• Les communautés participent activement au suivi environnemental et social</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Examen des normes et directives relatives à l'environnement</td>
<td>• Identification et définition des zones clés de protection transfrontalières au sein des grappes minières et environnementales</td>
<td>• Programmes de formation du personnel clé en planification et gestion sociale et environnementale disponibles</td>
<td>• Directives environnementales et sociales à appliquer aux projets dans les grappes minières et environnementales</td>
<td>• Cadre de participation communautaire au suivi environnemental et social des opérations minières et environnementales</td>
<td>• Procéder à une EES de chaque des grappes minières-infrastructure transfrontalières</td>
<td>• Les tribunaux ont accepté d'entendre des cas de dommages environnementaux et sociaux</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Harmoniser les politiques et lois minières et environnementales afin de limiter les rôles conflictuels entre les différentes parties</td>
<td>• Conduction d'analyses régionales et internationales de la participation des communautés locales au suivi environnemental et social des activités minières</td>
<td>• Programmes de formation du personnel clé en planification et gestion sociale et environnementale disponibles</td>
<td>• Directives environnementales et sociales à appliquer aux projets dans les grappes minières et environnementales</td>
<td>• Cadre de participation communautaire au suivi environnemental et social des opérations minières et environnementales</td>
<td>• Procéder à une EES de chaque des grappes minières-infrastructure transfrontalières</td>
<td>• Les zones transfrontalières protégées sont créées et il y a recherche d'opportunités de sources de revenus alternatives y afférent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Renforcer la capacité du système judiciaire à traiter des poursuites résultant de dommages environnementaux et sociaux</td>
<td>• Mettre en œuvre des plans de protection transfrontalières dans les grappes retenues</td>
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</table>
### Recommandation 2: Renforcer la gouvernance environnementale et la gestion du secteur minier

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>● Réduire la dégradation des sols causée par l'exploitation minière ou les activités auxiliaires et augmenter les réclamations relatives aux terrains miniers</td>
<td>● Préparer des propositions d'amélioration de la transparence et de l'imputabilité dans l'accès à la terre par les opérateurs minières</td>
<td>● Les propositions légales relatives à l'accès à l'information, à la transparence et à l'imputabilité sont élaborées</td>
<td>● Les lois et réglementations sur l'accès à l'information, la transparence et l'imputabilité sont adoptées</td>
<td>● Mettre en œuvre des lois et réglementations sur l'accès à l'information, la transparence et l'imputabilité dans la gestion des ressources naturelles</td>
<td>● La dégradation des terres, la marginalisation sociale et les conflits associés à la dégradation des terres sont sensiblement moindres dans les pays de l'URM</td>
<td>● Une politique de gestion des terres est effective et permet la restauration des sols des zones nouvellement perturbées et des paysages déjà dégradés</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>● Procéder à des analyses/ délimitation des zones de déchets et de terres dégradées dans et autour des grappes retenues</td>
<td>● Les propositions légales relatives à l'accroissement de l'imputabilité des chefs, des dirigeants de district, des autorités gouvernementales et régionales sont élaborées</td>
<td>● Les lois et réglementations sur l'accroissement de l'imputabilité des chefs, des dirigeants de district, des autorités gouvernementales et régionales sont adoptées</td>
<td>● Les priorités dans les secteurs des réclamations et du ré-minage sont définies et les contrats établis</td>
<td>● Les promesses légales relatives à l'accroissement de l'imputabilité des chefs, des dirigeants de district, des autorités gouvernementales et régionales sont adoptées</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>● Formation technique des mineurs artisanaux sur la sensibilisation environnementale</td>
<td>● Carte régionale des terres dégradées, du volume et de la qualité des déchets dans les zones de grappes minières-infrastructures</td>
<td>● Coûts/bénéfices d'une nouvelle exploitation des vieux déchets</td>
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<tr>
<td>● Élaborer des directives de réparation pour les nouveaux projets minières</td>
<td>● Les mineurs artisanaux maîtrisent les connaissances de base en matière de gestion environnementale</td>
<td>● Évaluer la mise en place de méga instruments de suivi pour les grappes minières-infrastructures</td>
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### Recommandation 3: Réduire la pauvreté et accroître les bénéfices locaux dans les zones minières

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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Intégrer les projets du secteur minier dans les plans de développement locaux afin qu'ils contribuent à la lutte contre la pauvreté</td>
<td>• Utiliser l'approche et l'analyse de la chaîne de valeur de l'EITI++ pour s'assurer de bénéfices en termes de développement durable dans les communautés</td>
<td>• L'approche par chaîne de valeur de l'EITI++ commence à être utilisée dans plusieurs pays de la sous-région</td>
<td>• Élaborer des plans de développement économique des zones de grappes minières-infrastructures avec toutes les parties prenantes des, incluant les organismes régionaux et sous-régionaux, les ONG, les donateurs et les communautés</td>
<td>• Des plans de développement économique des zones de grappes minières-infrastructures sont adoptés</td>
<td>• La planification participative et à partir de la base est utilisée dans les zones couvertes/affectées par les grappes minières-infrastructures</td>
<td>• Les capacités au niveau local à réellement gérer le développement induit par la croissance minière sont en place dans les provinces et districts affectés par les grappes minières-infrastructures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Créer des opportunités de formation, d'emploi, d'émergence de fournisseurs locaux et de moyens d'existence alternatifs et durables</td>
<td>• Développer des modèles de formation pouvant créer un pool d'emplois non et semi-spécialisés dans les secteurs miniers / infrastructures et disponibles aux habitants locaux. Mettre en œuvre de façon pilote dans une grappe</td>
<td>• Programmes de formation locaux pour un pool d'emplois et les fournisseurs locaux opérationnels dans une grappe</td>
<td>• Demander fermement dans les accords de concession le recrutement de travailleurs locaux par les compagnies minières et leurs entrepreneurs</td>
<td>• Programmes de formation locaux pour un pool d'emplois et les fournisseurs locaux opérationnels dans toutes les grappes de l'URM</td>
<td>• Faire évoluer la formation des emplois miniers et des fournisseurs locaux vers des compétences qui sont pertinents hors de l'industrie minière et après la fermeture des mines (élargir horizons des zones minières)</td>
<td>• Les populations locales ont une base de compétences pertinentes et ne sont plus entièrement dépendant des compagnies minières en termes...</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- Intégrer les projets du secteur minier dans les plans de développement locaux afin qu'ils contribuent à la lutte contre la pauvreté.
- Utiliser l'approche et l'analyse de la chaîne de valeur de l'EITI++ pour s'assurer de bénéfices en termes de développement durable dans les communautés.
- Renforcer la capacité des gouvernements locaux et des communautés locales en planification du développement.
- L'approche par chaîne de valeur de l'EITI++ commence à être utilisée dans plusieurs pays de la sous-région.
- Un cadre des dirigeants locaux et de district est formé sur les éléments clés de la planification du développement.
- Promouvoir la mise en vigueur et application des lois relatives à la décentralisation.
- Des plans de développement économique des zones de grappes minières-infrastructures sont adoptés.
- Les politiques de décentralisation sont harmonisées dans toute la région.
- La planification participative et à partir de la base est utilisée dans les zones couvertes/affectées par les grappes minières-infrastructures.

- Créer des opportunités de formation, d'emploi, d'émergence de fournisseurs locaux et de moyens d'existence alternatifs et durables.
- Développer des modèles de formation pouvant créer un pool d'emplois non et semi-spécialisés dans les secteurs miniers / infrastructures et disponibles aux habitants locaux. Mettre en œuvre de façon pilote dans une grappe.
- Élaborer des modèles de programmes de formation destinés aux fournisseurs locaux faisant affaire avec l'industrie minière.
- Programmes de formation locaux pour un pool d'emplois et les fournisseurs locaux opérationnels dans une grappe.
- 100% des travailleurs non spécialisés sont recrutés localement, 50% des travailleurs semi-spécialisés sont recrutés localement.
- Demander fermement dans les accords de concession le recrutement de travailleurs locaux par les compagnies minières et leurs entrepreneurs.
- Mettre en place un programme de formation en gestion pour développer les capacités du personnel gestionnaire et technique du gouvernement et de l'industrie.
- Programmes de formation locaux pour un pool d'emplois et les fournisseurs locaux opérationnels dans toutes les grappes de l'URM.
- Les programmes de formation locaux sont élaborés et mis en œuvre.
- Les programmes de recrutement.
Recommandation 3: Réduire la pauvreté et accroître les bénéfices locaux dans les zones minières

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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(production alimentaire, menuiserie, etc.). Mettre en œuvre de façon pilote dans une grappe • Identifier et appuyer les ressources en formation afin qu’elles augmentent les compétences des fournisseurs • Demander la maximisation des approvisionnements locaux en biens et services par les compagnies minières • Évaluer les autres opportunités économiques dans les zones minières qui pourraient être appuyées par les compagnies minières, les donateurs et les autres comitaires • Mettre en place des services de formation technique destinés aux employés potentiels des compagnies minières et de construction</td>
<td></td>
<td>local et l'attribution de contrats aux fournisseurs locaux sont opérationnels • Les candidats techniques et gestionnaires sont en attente de formation ou employés par le gouvernement ou les compagnies minières • Des infrastructures multi-usage sont en place</td>
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Recommandation 4: Améliorer l’imputabilité sociale et la gouvernance du secteur minier

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<tr>
<td>• Éliminer le manque de transparence et de cohérence dans la formulation de politiques et la prise de décisions</td>
<td>• Créer un cadre pour un processus transparent et standardisé d’octroi de permis d’exploration, de concessions, d’utilisation des terres, de gestion des questions environnementales et sociales, etc. qui pourra être utilisé dans les grappes retenues</td>
<td>• Cadre de procédures transparentes accepté par tous les gouvernements et aux premiers stades d’application</td>
<td>• Le cadre sous-régional harmonisé sur les questions de transparence et d’imputabilité des décideurs et autorités adopté</td>
<td>• Les communautés et la société civile sont plus fortes et utilisent leurs droits dans les décisions arbitraires et dans le redressement des torts subis</td>
<td>• Le cadre sous-régional harmonisé sur les questions de transparence et d’imputabilité des décideurs et autorités est affiné, son application est continue et de plus en plus étendue</td>
<td>• Le système de freins et contre-poids créé des incitatifs poussant les décideurs publics et privés clés à adopter des décisions de développement relatives à l’accès et à l’utilisation des ressources et recettes minières qui sont cohérentes avec la pérennité environnementale et sociale des communautés logées dans zones de grappes minières</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Clarifier les rôles et responsabilités conflictuels des ministères en matière de questions environnementales et sociales</td>
<td>• Développer des mécanismes et règles de meilleure imputabilité des décideurs et des autorités</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Renforcer les capacités et consolider les organes institutionnels de</td>
<td>• Renforcer les capacités de négociation sur les questions clés de développement environnemental et social</td>
<td>• L’URM a amorcé un dialogue aux plus hauts niveaux sur le développement des grappes minières</td>
<td>• Appuyer les négociations sur le développement et la gestion environnementale et sociale dans les grappes</td>
<td>• Accord multi-pays spécifique sur les infrastructures et la gestion environnementale et</td>
<td>• Accueillir continûment à l’amélioration des capacités de négociation et à l’implication de la</td>
<td>• Gestion améliorée des questions environnementale et sociales liées</td>
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Recommandation 4: Améliorer l’imputabilité sociale et la gouvernance du secteur minier
**Recommandation 4: Améliorer l’imputabilité sociale et la gouvernance du secteur minier**

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| tous les types de parties prenantes (gouvernement, société civile, industries, etc.) | qui émergent suite à une approche par grappe du développement induit par l’exploitation minière | - infrastructures dans l’Union de la Rivière Mano  
- Les normes sous-régionales de formation ont été approuvées et les plans nationaux de formation adoptés  
- Dans les organismes chargés du développement minier, le déploiement de personnel expert des questions environnementales et sociales au niveau national et terrain a augmenté  
- Capacité améliorée des organismes chargés du développement minier à évaluer les EIES et les PGES et à suivre et appliquer les normes environnementales et sociales des PGES | - Développer des services de formation sous-régionales pour une gestion améliorée par les gouvernements et l’industrie des aspects techniques, légaux, financiers, environnementaux et sociaux liés au secteur minier  
- Renforcer les capacités de planification du développement sous-régional et local des gouvernements nationaux, des communautés et des gouvernements locaux  
- Renforcer la capacité des organismes de formation à donner des formations et à fournir de l’assistance technique  
- Élaborer des programmes de formation à l’intention des fonctionnaires, des OSC et des autres groupes communautaires | socialement commune adopté par les pays de l’URM  
- Des centres de formation régionaux dispensent des formations régulières aux gouvernements et à l’industrie  
- Croissance sous-régionale capacité publique et privée de gestion du secteur avec des connaissances et normes communes  
- Les fonctionnaires des gouvernements locaux, les OSC et les groupes communautaires sont aptes à jouer un rôle actif dans la planification du développement et la gestion des questions environnementales et sociales liées au secteur minier | société civile et du secteur privé dans les discussions portant sur les grappes minières-infrastructures  
- Amélioration continue du nombre et de la variété des formations offertes | à l’exploitation minière dans toute la sous-région |

- Réduire l’importance de la privation des droits des  
- Utiliser l’approche et l’analyse de la chaîne de valeur de l’EITI++ pour assurer aux  
- L’approche par chaîne de valeur de l’EITI++ commence à être appliquée dans plusieurs  
- Créer des Comités de Développement Économique multipartenaires qui  
- Le cadre sous-régional harmonisé sur les questions de transparence et  
- Mettre en place un forum permanent multipartenaire  
- Les communautés situées dans les zones de grappes
Recommandation 4: Améliorer l'imputabilité sociale et la gouvernance du secteur minier

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<td>populations au cours des processus décisionnels liés au développement</td>
<td>communautés locales des bénéfices accusés en matière de développement durable - Créer des mécanismes qui permettent aux communautés affectées par les gisements miniers d'interagir avec les planificateurs du gouvernement et de l'industrie - Instaurer des mécanismes de résolution des controverses sur les questions environnementales et sociales (incluant les questions de terres) qui soient accessibles aux populations locales - Considérer les communautés dans l'octroi d'emplois et de sous-traitance de biens et services</td>
<td>pays de la sous-région - Il y a tenue de consultations régulières entre les communautés et les gouvernements et compagnies - Les controverses sont résolues plus rapidement qu'avant - Il y a moins de conflits sur l'utilisation des terres</td>
<td>incluent des représentants des communautés, notamment les femmes, les jeunes et autres groupes vulnérables - Créer des liens entre les communautés dans les zones de gisements miniers pour discuter des opportunités et menaces communes</td>
<td>d'imputabilité des décideurs et autorités est créée et prend des décisions consensuelles sur les questions de développement</td>
<td>au niveau des gisements qui comprend la participation active des communautés et discute des questions de planification à long terme, des effets cumulatifs créés par plusieurs projets miniers, et de la planification de la fermeture et post-fermeture</td>
<td>mineures sont capables de travailler ensemble, avec les gouvernements locaux et nationaux et avec l'industrie sur les questions de planification - Les femmes, les jeunes et les personnes vulnérables participent pleinement au processus de planification du développement - Les priorités et activités liées au développement reflètent les besoins et les souhaits des communautés</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- Voir également les actions proposées sous les recommandations 2 et 3, qui sont applicables à la résolution des questions d'exclusion des communautés locales, par exemple les actions destinées à réduire la déforestation et la perte de biodiversité, la dégradation des terres et les besoins de conversion, l'absence de participation dans la planification du secteur minier et de la création d'emplois, l'insuffisance de la transparence et de la cohérence des prises de décisions, ainsi que le manque de capacités.
### Recommandation 4: Améliorer l’imputabilité sociale et la gouvernance du secteur minier

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Domaine de réforme prioritaire</th>
<th>Action à court terme (1-2 ans)</th>
<th>Résultats suivis à court terme</th>
<th>Actions à moyen terme (3-5 ans)</th>
<th>Résultats suivis à moyen terme</th>
<th>Actions à long terme (plus de 5 ans)</th>
<th>Résultats finaux</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| conditions qui encouragent un comportement de recherche de rente et de partage déloyal des bénéfices | transparence des recettes nationales telles que l’EITI et *Publish what you pay*  
- Mener des missions de recherche et étude pour l’identification des meilleures pratiques relatives aux modèles EITI (ex. :LEITI)  
- Créer un cadre de processus standardisés et transparents d’octroi de permis, de concessions, d’utilisation de terres afin de réduire le recours à des pouvoirs discre tionnaires et à des comportements de recherche de rente relatifs aux transactions liées au développement des grappes minières-infrastructures | amélioré des instances nationales de l’EITI et rapports sur les recettes tirées des projets de grappes minières-infrastructures  
- Processus de décision transparents et cohérents en place | porté à la transparence et à la planification de l’utilisation des recettes minières (EITI++) par le biais de missions d’étude et l’élaboration de stratégies EITI sous-régionales  
- Renforcer les mécanismes de lutte contre les comportements de recherche de rente (lois, ressources, appuis politiques)  
- Créer des sonnettes d’alarme et des mécanismes de protection des sonnettes d’alarme dans la fonction publique | l’utilisation des recettes minières est accrue  
- Des programmes sous-régionaux de l’EITI++ sont élaborés et mis en œuvre  
- Un pourcentage accru de cas avérés de comportements de recherche de rente est rapporté et sanctionné | régional harmonisé de transparence et d’imputabilité (voir le manque de transparence et d’imputabilité dans les processus décisionnels) est affiné et mis en œuvre de façon continue et avec une couverture croissante | freins et contre-poids créés des incitatifs poussant les décideurs publics et privés d’adopter des décisions de développement relatives à l’accès et à l’utilisation des ressources et recettes minières qui sont cohérentes avec la pérennité environnementale et sociale des communautés logées dans zones de grappes minières |
5.8.3 Facteurs de succès déterminants

522. Finalement, le succès de la démarche de résolution des questions et priorités soulevées par l’étude WAMSSA dépend de plusieurs facteurs cruciaux.

523. Les parties prenantes, en particulier les communautés affectées par l’exploitation minière doivent être dotées des moyens d’action nécessaires et participer au dialogue politique. La prise en considération de leurs points de vue dans le processus décisionnel pourrait améliorer la probabilité de résultats plus durables, diminuer les risques de tensions sociales ou de guerre civile et permettre la constitution d’une force externe susceptible d’exercer des pressions sur le gouvernement en matière d’imputabilité sociale. La création des GMP représente un moyen d’atteindre cet objectif, bien qu’il existe certainement d’autres formules qui permettraient d’inclure davantage les communautés dans la collecte d’informations, les discussions et les processus décisionnels, peut-être par le biais d’un mécanisme dans lequel les GMP agiraient comme intermédiaires entre les instances politiques et décisionnelles et les communautés de base.

524. Le renforcement institutionnel et le renforcement des capacités doivent être considérés primordiaux et hautement prioritaires. Comme souligné précédemment, outre le fait que plusieurs des politiques environnementales et sociales des pays de l’UM sont inappropriées, elles restent souvent lettre morte ou sont inadéquatement mises en vigueur en raison d’un manque de compétences, de capacités et de ressources. Le renforcement des capacités demande du temps et devrait donc être initié dès l’opérationnalisation d’un projet du PAGM ou de l’EITI++. Par conséquent, les acteurs dont la capacité aura été renforcée et qui seront impliqués pourront jouer un rôle plus important dans l’élaboration, l’exécution et la pérennité à long terme du projet lui-même.

525. La planification des initiatives à venir en matière de gouvernance minière devrait être coordonnée avec les efforts en cours des autres partenaires au développement. Ceci devrait s’appliquer non seulement au secteur minier (par exemple les directives minières de l’ECOWA et le projet CEPESL de politiques relatives à l’exploitation minière artisanale de l’USAID en Sierra Leone), mais aussi aux politiques et programmes de développement des infrastructures, de gestion environnementale et de protection de la biodiversité, de développement sanitaire et socio-économique ainsi que de développement général des ressources humaines dans les secteurs publics et privés. Cette coordination demandera une collaboration plus étroite non seulement entre les donateurs, mais aussi entre ces derniers et le nombre croissant de consortiums d’OSC et d’ONG actifs dans les secteurs de la gouvernance et du développement durable pertinents au secteur minier et /ou aux communautés qu’il affecte.

régional, notamment en matière d’IDS basées sur le secteur minier et de corridors de développement, par exemple le Corridor de développement de Maputo et le projet PME Mozlink du Mozambique, constitue un bassin d’informations qui pourraient éclairer les aspects environnementaux sociaux et politiques des objectifs de gouvernance minière améliorée du PAGM et de l’EITI++. Par ailleurs, les parties prenantes consultées par l’étude WAMSSA ont été catégoriques sur le fait que ses recommandations ne devaient pas subir le même sort que celles des études antérieures. Elles souhaitent que le mécanisme de consultation par GMP et le dialogue politique amorcés avec l’étude WAMSSA se poursuivent et permettent une imputabilité sociale continue, une meilleure gouvernance du secteur minier et un partage plus équitable des bénéfices du développement du secteur minier dans les pays concernés.
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# Annex 1. Commodity Prospects in the Mano River Union

## Table A1-1. Prospects for four commodities in the Manu River Union countries

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Commodity</th>
<th>Anchor deposits in the MRU</th>
<th>Commodity outlook</th>
<th>Conclusion</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Iron ore      |  - Southeast Guinea and northern Liberia, as follows including deposits under investigation at Simandou, Mount Nimba, and Yekeba.  
- Central iron ore deposits in Liberia and Sierra Leone, comprising the Kongo, Western Bomi Hills, and Bea Mountains, and the planned rehabilitation of iron ore reserves at the Bong Mines. Iron ore deposits located ENE of Monrovia are included in this zone and include the Marampa and Tonkolili iron ore prospects.  
- Lowland deposits in Guinea associated with laterites at Pic de Fon and the Kaloum Peninsula. |  - The spot price of iron remained relatively constant for the last three years but rose sharply in the first half of 2007. It remained high until September 2008 and then dropped back to 2006 levels. This price rise, mainly driven by China, led to record contract prices, up to US$ 145 per unit of fines. In April 2009 China’s iron ore production was reported to have risen to a new high of 53.4 million metric tonnes from a year earlier. This was the third consecutive rise in three months amid the global financial crisis (Mining Weekly, May 2009).  
- The outlook for future iron ore trade is positive as China continues to grow and position itself to remain a major consumer and steel exporter. In 2007, the industry predicted that iron ore trade will grow by an additional 200 to 250 million metric tonnes by 2011. This obviously did not account of how the current global financial crisis will affect demand and supply.  
- Consolidation of the Chinese industry is seen as a good sign that will facilitate movement to a higher quality and value flat product export to the USA, Europe, the Middle East, and the rest of Asia, as well as supplying domestic consumption in durable goods. (Brown, 2009) |  - With world class iron ore deposits in the MRU, it is clear that iron ore is a critical commodity from which sub-regional development can be driven.  
- The iron ore deposits are of such a nature that they could, if infrastructure allowed, lead to specific opportunities for downstream processing. |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th>Commodity outlook</th>
<th>Conclusion</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Bauxite   | - The Republic of Guinea possesses bauxite resources estimated by some researchers to exceed 40,000 million metric tonnes (Mamedov, unpub. lecture notes 2005), which represents approximately 40% of the world’s known bauxite resources. Joint-venture bauxite mining and alumina operations in northwest Guinea historically provided 80% of the country’s foreign exchange.  
- Significant deposits are located at Sangaredi (operated by Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinée). Other deposits and downstream refining options in this area are under investigation by: Guinea Alumina Corporation (GAC), United Company Rusal’s at Dian-Dian, Alcoa-Rio Tinto-Alcan (Kamsar refinery project), and BHP Billiton’s Boffa/Santou project.  
- The south central bauxite deposits include significant resources in Sierra Leone; the Friguia and Porto Loko deposits located within the same vicinity. | - World refined aluminium output rose by 12% to 38 million metric tonnes in 2007 compared with 2006. China (31.6%) is the world’s largest producer of aluminum followed by Russia (11.1%) and Canada (8.2%), which collectively account for one-half of the world’s production (SAM, 2007/2008). Bauxite-like iron ore is traded on long-term contracts and typically prices are not published.  
- During 2008 prices for most commodities increased including non-metallurgical bauxite. Aluminum prices on the London Metal Exchange (LME) showed similar trends to those shown by alumina. Official LME daily cash price of aluminum showed a sharp increase in the early part of 2008, reaching a high of just over US$ 3,100 per metric tonne by the end of March before dropping back slightly. It remained at similar levels until June, peaked at US$ 3,200 per metric tonne in early July but has since fallen dramatically to less than US$ 1,500 per metric tonne by end of the year as a result of the global financial crisis that’s caused a decline in demand for most commodities. (Brown, 2009).  
- Market conditions toward end of the year caused to a large extent by the global financial crisis have had a number of significant impacts including closure of an aluminum smelter in Texas, and reduction of alumina production at plants in Shandong in China and Point Comfort in the USA. Norsk shelved plans for a new aluminum production line in Karmoy and decided to close its 120,000 metric tonne per year Soderberg aluminum potlines earlier than expected (Brown. 2009). | - Short-term returns due to bauxite mining are likely to be low, but long-term trends suggest that aluminum demand will increase, resulting in medium- to long-term aluminum investments being sound.  
- This is further supported through opportunities to establish bauxite refineries in the region and the longer-term potential to develop aluminum smelters – although establishment of smelters is heavily dependent on the availability of low cost, reliable energy resources. |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Commodity</th>
<th>Anchor deposits in the MRU</th>
<th>Commodity outlook</th>
<th>Conclusion</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Gold      | - Gold occurs as veins and alluvial deposits and was mined at artisanal, small, and industrial scales.  
- Significant clusters occur in the north of Guinea associated with the Siguiri Basin. Gold is also found in the Fitaba, the N'Zerekore, and the Sierra-FORE areas and was produced by Société Ashanti de Guinée (SAG), Société d’Exploitation Minière d’Afrique de l’Ouest-Guinée (SEMAFO-Guinée), Société Minière de Dinguiraye (SMD), and artisanal and small-scale miners. (Lugo, 2008).  
- Gold is found to the east of Sierra Leone and the west of Liberia (the Weaju gold deposit) associated with greenstone belts and Archaean shear zone and occurs in the Kangari Hills, the Sula Mountains, and in the Bo, Koinadougu, and Tonkolili Districts. | - Demand for gold fell by 1.6% to 3,895 metric tonnes in 2007. Global gold supply was expected to register a slight increase in 2008 because the scrap supply was forecast to rise compared with 2007. Mine production was expected to remain largely flat in 2008 and official sector sales were expected to be market neutral as volumes deviate little from 2007 (SAMI, 2007/2008).  
- In 2008 the gold price was extremely strong as the U.S. dollar weakened against the Euro and oil prices exceeded US$ 100 per barrel. A troy ounce of gold sold at US$ 859 on 3 January 2008, the highest ever price to the previous record of US$ 850 in 1980. Prices continued to increase throughout January 2009 ending at US$ 923 per troy ounce.  
- By middle of March, with some volatility in between, an ounce of gold was trading at US$ 1,011. The sharp price rise was said to be from investors turning to gold as a safe haven during the current financial crisis. The volatility of gold prices continues as markets remain uncertain about the state of global financial markets. (Brown, 2009.) | - In the face of the current financial crisis, gold is a strong investment with the result that investments in gold mining remain profitable.  
- In the MRU, gold does not typically spur significant investment. Therefore, while the MRU (and Guinea in particular) mine world class deposits, these are unlikely to return investments of a sub-regional nature. |
| Diamonds  | - Macenta area in southeastern Guinea and western Liberia kimberlite deposits.  
- Other mining occurs in alluvial deposits across the MRU region associated with alluvial mining, along the drainages of the Boboule, the Diani, the Milo, the Mano, the Moa, the Sewa, and the Woa Rivers. | - Rough diamond statistics released by the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme reveal that the world production from mines declined by 4.4% to 168 million carats (Mct) in 2007.  
- The decrease in global output was attributed to a decline in production from Botswana, Australia, and China. The value of diamonds mined decreased by 0.6% to US$ 12.1 billion in 2007 compared to 2006.  
- Diamonds are currently a weak commodity but are likely to return to profitability as global markets ease.  
- Sub-regional opportunities linked to diamonds are relatively limited due to the high-value, low-bulk nature of the material (i.e., not requiring significant associated infrastructure development). | - Diamonds are currently a weak commodity but are likely to return to profitability as global markets ease.  
- Sub-regional opportunities linked to diamonds are relatively limited due to the high-value, low-bulk nature of the material (i.e., not requiring significant associated infrastructure development). |
Annex 2. National Level Infrastructure Issues and Prospects

527. This annex reviews the key infrastructure requirements for Sierra Leone, Liberia, and Guinea (at the national level). The current Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers identify strategies aimed at developing each sector. These strategies are an important part of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Millennium Development Goals, and key to addressing poverty in the MRU region by enhancing economic development.

Sierra Leone

528. A number of environmental and social issues identified in the previous sections can be attributed to the civil war and poor environmental management and planning in Sierra Leone. The Poverty Reduction Strategy Program (PRSP) 2005-2007 for Sierra Leone proposed future development needs to focus on eradicating the high poverty rate within the country, boosting communities, and promoting downstream industrial development.

529. In 2007, a steel company (Arcelor Mittal) started to restore the iron ore mine in the town of Yakepa in Liberia after negotiating a deal with the Government to invest in the iron ore mining. The company was prepared to invest more than a US$ 1 billion to restart mining operations and restore the country’s infrastructure (Control Risk, 2008). The revamp will include railway networks and ports. Moreover, South African companies like Delta Mining, BHP Bilton, and Trans Hex have made bids to mine minerals and gold in the country, and these contracts come with an obligation of infrastructure renewal. The necessary infrastructure requirements for Sierra Leone are described briefly below.

Water supply and quality

530. The MDGs have identified that by 2015 the proportion of people without sustainable access to safe drinking water and basic sanitation needs to be halved. In Sierra Leone land degradation and poor waste management have affected both water quality and supply. The impacts of mining on water quality and supply are also extensive, not only from large-scale mining operations, but also from artisanal mining. The majority (81 percent) of the Sierra Leone population relies on river or well water, thus it is evident that infrastructure development is required to ensure that safe drinking water is available for the entire population, as well as for industrial uses.

531. Ensuring a safe supply of drinking water will not only require development of water infrastructure for urban and rural communities, but will also require effective water resource management and protection. Mining operations specifically need to be addressed, for example, a study of Sierra Rutile Ltd. (SRL) in the southern province of the country revealed that the total tailings facility contained a high sulphur base in the waste materials as a result of the rutile extraction process. This facility is located close to a small village and affected water quality for downstream community members.
532. The incidence of boom towns surrounding mining developments also places increased pressure on water infrastructure and the quality of water available to communities. A potable water supply will need to be upgraded in these areas, and large- and small-scale mining companies should assess ways to boost communities surrounding mines as part of, for example, their community development action plans.

**Transportation**

533. Road network construction and rehabilitation was identified as a development requirement in the early 1990s. Two projects were initiated in the early 1990s, the Roads Rehabilitation and Maintenance Project and the Freetown Infrastructure Rehabilitation Project. Both projects focused on the road network and basic infrastructure in Freetown and surrounding areas. However, both projects were significantly affected by civil war and the shortcomings of each project can be attributed to the war.

534. In August 2002, the Government of Sierra Leone drafted a National Transport Strategy 2003-2007. This strategy’s key objective is to develop the transport sector to help reduce poverty and improve economic development. The program also strives to establish a transport management system that aims to ensure a reliable, affordable, and continuously improved transport service in Sierra Leone (CSP, 2003-2007). Table A2-1 provides a breakdown of the road network as detailed in the 2003-2007 strategy — 25 percent of roads are classified as good, 31 percent as fair, and 44 percent as poor.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table A2-1. Sierra Leone road network and condition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Road network/class</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Class A (Primary)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bituminous</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unpaved</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sub-total Class A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Class B (Secondary)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bituminous</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unpaved</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sub-total Class B</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Class F (Tertiary)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sub-total Class F</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source:** CSP, 2003-2007

**Energy and electricity**

535. Energy is a key sector in the Sierra Leone economy as a major source of income for the Government (e.g., fuel taxes, license fees, and royalties), but simultaneously comprises a substantial portion (26 percent) of imports. “Sierra Leone experiences Energy poverty [evident from the] low levels of consumption of modern energy forms (electricity and petroleum products) [and the] inadequacy and poor quality of electricity services” (Energy Policy, 2004).
With less than 10 percent of the population having access to electricity, it is clear that this sector requires much attention (Energy Policy, 2004). The majority of generated power is used by the Western portion of the country, with the industrial/commercial sectors using the majority (70 percent) of the supply while residential usage is 30 percent. The energy policy has four key development objectives:

- Expand access to improved energy services and improve energy supply reliability;
- Improve energy sector governance and regulation;
- Reduce the health and environmental costs associated with energy supply and use; and
- Enhance women’s participation in energy policy planning, formulation, implementation, and monitoring.

The plans and programs identified in the energy sector strategy during 2006 involved immediate, medium, and long-term strategies (Table A2-2).

### Table A2-2. Proposed energy production facilities in the 2006 Sierra Leone Energy Sector Plan

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Project timeframe</th>
<th>Outcome</th>
<th>Proponent</th>
<th>Challenges</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Immediate</td>
<td>Greater Freetown is expected to have a steady supply of 30 MW on a daily basis</td>
<td>Variety of independent power producers selling power to the National Power Authority</td>
<td>Continued theft of cables</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nov 2006 – Feb 2007</td>
<td>Installation of three 7.56 MW diesel generating units at Blackhall Road (22.68 MW)</td>
<td>Arab Bank for Economic Development in Africa</td>
<td>The Sierra Leone Government reliance on loans places pressure on project delivery.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium 2007-2009</td>
<td>Implement a thermal project at Kingtom Generating Station (10 MW)</td>
<td>Japan International Cooperation Agency</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium 2007-2009</td>
<td>By 2009 generation expected in greater Freetown will be 100 MW</td>
<td>Bumbuna Hydroelectric Project</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Long 2010-2015</td>
<td>When completed, will generate 134 MW during dry season and 275 MW during rainy season</td>
<td>Bumbuna Hydroelectric Project</td>
<td>Funding is the greatest constraint to developing hydroelectric projects</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Long 2010-2015</td>
<td>Power generation in Kono district (200 MW)</td>
<td>Bekonger Hydroelectric Project</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Long 2010-2015</td>
<td>By 2015 expected generating capacity country wide will be 519.68 MW</td>
<td>Bo- Kenema Power services</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Long 2010-2015</td>
<td>Goma Hydroelectric facility</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Liberia

Liberia is crippled by a lack of infrastructure, which is regarded as an obstacle to development and investment. Currently, development of infrastructure in Liberia has been approached as an investment opportunity in that mining contracts have been linked to infrastructure investments (Control Risks, 2008), so that an organization looking to enter mining must be prepared to invest in its network infrastructure. The infrastructure
development is further linked to the socio-environment issues — the infrastructure should be planned, and the plan should include people living in the surrounding area and as well as the long-term impact on the environment. The network infrastructure, for example roads, should be accessible and usable by people in the area and long-term effects on the environment should be considered (Brandolini et al., 2006). The PRSP strategy for Liberia identified a three-pronged approach to development, where the first strategy focuses on rebuilding basic infrastructure. This section looks at infrastructure requirements in Liberia.

**Water supply and quality**

539. The civil war affected water services to a point that no piped water was distributed for 15 years until the new Liberian government turned on some water in Monrovia in July 2006 (PRSP, 2008). Water and sanitation are critical for a country with a high poverty level because the population is very susceptible to disease and health issues without access to clean drinking water. A lack of water infrastructure also affects the economic development of other sectors in the country.

540. The Government of Liberia has identified water an integral part of future economic development and has strategic objectives to promote development of the water sector.

- **Strategic objective 1.** To increase access to safe drinking water from 25 percent to 50 percent by 2012, including 45 percent of the rural population
- **Strategic objective 2.** To increase access to human waste collection and disposal facilities from 15 percent to 40 percent, including 35 percent of the rural population
- **Strategic objective 3.** To ensure sustainability of 90 percent of water and sanitation facilities in the country (PRSP, 2008, p. 118)

**Transportation**

541. The road network in Liberia is 9,915 kilometers, with 734 kilometers paved, yet most of the paving is significantly deteriorated. An additional 2,414 kilometers of feeder roads also exist, but most of these were privately constructed by logging and mining companies and are currently heavily degraded.

542. Many roads are still impassable in Liberia, which constrains economic development. Since 2006 the Government has initiated rehabilitation of much of the road network (including major highways, secondary roads, bridges, culverts, etc.) throughout the country (PRSP Liberia, 2008).

543. The Government identified five key strategies as part of its Poverty Reduction Strategy (2008) aimed at improving the existing road network:

- Ensure all primary roads are passable all year-round,
- Work in partnership with private companies (such as mining, logging, and agricultural companies) to rehabilitate certain feeder roads,
- Rehabilitate roads in communities in Monrovia and the headquarters of the 15 counties,
• Rebuild the capacity for sustained construction and maintenance of roads and bridges, and
• Rebuild the financing, planning, and management systems necessary to ensure a capacity to fund road construction and maintenance over time.

544. Other transportation infrastructure requiring improvement and rehabilitation includes the railway network that has not been use in approximately 20 years. The Port of Monrovia is also heavily degraded, and the pollution and mismanagement of the environment is having detrimental impacts on the ecosystem and biodiversity of the port area (UNDP, 2006).

Energy and electricity

545. As with water services in Liberia, there was no electricity in Liberia for 15 years until 2006 when the Government provided electric power to Monrovia (PRSP, 2008). The PRSP (2008) describes electricity as a significant issue because demand in Monrovia alone is between 30 and 50 megawatts, while the supply is only 2.65 megawatts. The electricity sector requires rehabilitating existing infrastructure and boosting electricity generation. Hydroelectric power and other renewable resources must be investigated as potential sources of energy for Liberia.

546. The PSRP (2008) says that for the Government of Liberia to achieve its goal to “provide reliable, sustainable and affordable energy services to all Liberians in an environmentally sound manner” (PSRP, 2008, p. 116) requires undertaking five key strategies (Table A2-3).

| Table A2-3. Strategic objectives and interventions for the energy sector in Liberia |
|-------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------|
| **Strategic objective**                        | **Interventions**                              |
| Extend electric grid throughout Monrovia       | • Rehabilitate electricity infrastructure      |
|                                                | • Increase electricity generation              |
| Develop hydro capacity and other renewable energy sources | • Rehabilitate the Mt. Coffee hydroelectric facility |
|                                                | • Assess other hydropower potential and construct several mini-hydro power facilities across the country |
|                                                | • Assess solar, wind, and biomass potential to harness these resources |
| Expand electric grid to other urban areas and some rural areas | • Extend electric grid to county headquarters |
|                                                | • Connect 18 communities along the border with Côte d’Ivoire through the West Africa Power Pool |
| Improve legal, institutional, and regulatory frameworks in the energy sector | • Complete and publish the National Energy Policy |
|                                                | • Prepare a strategic plan for the energy sector |
|                                                | • Draft relevant energy bills to attract private capital |
| Develop the upstream and downstream petroleum sectors | • Attract major oil companies to conduct petroleum exploration |
|                                                | • Merge LPRC and NOCAL                         |
|                                                | • Expand and improve petroleum delivery services to all parts of Liberia |
Guinea

547. The Guinean mining industry was under scrutiny at the SMG 2008 conference. Discussions were based around developing the country’s economy through mining endeavors. The mining agreements currently being reviewed and/or implemented have an underlying infrastructure development component for the country. The Government also promoted the use of local companies and workforce in mining projects to create employment and a skilled Guinean workforce (SMG, 2008). The key infrastructure requiring development is the water, transportation, and electricity sectors.

Water services

548. The Government has committed to improving private sector participation in the development and management of the water sector. This would allow mining companies to invest in water production, transportation, and use for their mining operations in Guinea. The PRSP (2008) has a strategy for rural and urban development of water resources (Table A2-4).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sector</th>
<th>Strategy components</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rural</td>
<td>• Increase supplies of safe drinking water to rural areas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Achieve sustainable access to safe drinking water in rural areas by making sure that</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>pumps continue to operate at no less than 90 percent of capacity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Promote water hygiene</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban</td>
<td>• Increase water supply for Conakry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Increase water supply to towns outside the capital</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Improve the performance of the urban water supply sector</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: PRSP, 2008

Transportation

549. At present 28.7 percent of the road system is asphalted and accessible, and unasphalted roads pose accessibility problems. The forest region is particularly bad because of high rainfall and spongy, porous soils. Guinea has developed a number of local and national road upgrade programs aimed at making the access to regional economic centers easier. This is being done by upgrading existing infrastructure and constructing new infrastructure.

Energy and electricity

550. The three key strategies for the energy sector include:

• Increasing the supply of electricity to Conakry,
• Increasing the supply of electricity to towns in the interior of the country, and
• Improving electricity sector performance.

551. The production of electricity must be a combination of Government initiatives and local-level energy responses aimed at using sustainable energy resources.
Annex 3. Stakeholder Analysis

552. This analysis is based on representative stakeholder interviews conducted in Guinea, Sierra Leone, and Liberia early in the WAMSSA process. It was further enhanced and validated through interaction with stakeholders in the focus groups, community surveys, and national workshops. Original research and consultations undertaken for WAMSSA were also supplemented with stakeholder research and analysis carried out in Sierra Leone for the Sierra Leone Environmental and Social Assessment (SESA), and additional information on stakeholders from additional resources in Guinea and Liberia.

553. Although there are some differences in the stakeholder mix in Liberia, Guinea, and Sierra Leone, the categories of groups are largely the same and many of the issues, interests, and influences are common across the three countries (Figure 12 in the main report).

554. Stakeholder groups considered important to the mining sector in the sub-region include the mines ministries and other government ministries and agencies; multi-lateral and bilateral donor agencies; regional and sub-regional organizations such as the Mano River Union and ECOWAS; private sector players including large-scale, small-scale, and artisanal miners, and construction firms; civil society, including international, sub-regional, and national civil society organizations (CSOs), non-governmental organizations (NGOs); mining communities; ex-combatants; and potentially vulnerable populations including women and youth.

555. The stakeholders were assessed against a series of categories:

- **Influence.** The power a stakeholder has to facilitate or impede the African Mineral Governance Project (AMGP) and the design and implementation of sub-regional and cluster-based mining policies and approaches.

- **Interest.** The perceived level of interest that each stakeholder has in AMGP and cluster-based mineral development, along a continuum from commitment to status quo to openness to change.

- **Impact.** The degree to which AMGP and cluster-based mineral development will affect each stakeholder.

- **Power.** The level of coercive power that the stakeholder has to command compliance in the policy process.

- **Resources.** The level of resources that stakeholders possess and are able to bring to bear on the policy process.

- **Legitimacy.** The degree of legitimacy of each stakeholder’s interest, i.e., the extent to which the stakeholder’s claims are seen as appropriate by other stakeholders.

National government

556. National government stakeholders in the mineral sector include the heads of state and ministries responsible for mining, land use, and the environment, the finance ministry, and to a lesser extent, other ministries. Other ministries, including those
responsible for infrastructure development, labor, health, decentralization, rural development, etc. may also become involved in mining sector activities, although they typically play a minor role. Given the current military Government in Guinea, the overall political environment is less certain and future policy orientations are less predictable than with the democratically elected Governments in neighboring Liberia and Sierra Leone.

**Heads of state**

557. In all three countries the heads of state have taken an active interest in the mining sector, as have the prime ministers in Guinea and Sierra Leone. These top leaders can serve as the catalysts for change in mining policies and personnel in the ministries, including naming or replacing ministers and other key officials with purview over policies affecting the mining sector. The current presidents of Liberia and Sierra Leone have shown strong interest in developing the mining sector, and are understood to support improving mineral sector governance and reducing rent-seeking behavior. There has been uncertainty in the mining sector in Guinea since a military junta took power in a December 2008 coup. It is unclear how mining sector governance will evolve in Guinea if and/or when the country eventually returns to civilian rule, although mining development is likely to remain a priority for whoever becomes head of state.

- **Influence.** By virtue of their positions, heads of state have the ability to influence sub-regional and national mining and other related policies.

- **Interest.** While the leaders of the three countries are understood to support mining growth in their respective countries, it is unclear the extent to which they specifically support a regional cluster-based approach. However, the leaders of Sierra Leone and Liberia are known to be active supporters of regional and sub-regional organizations and initiatives, including the revival of the Mano River Union.

- **Impact.** The heads of state will not be significantly affected by mining development and adoption of a regional cluster-based approach, except to the extent they are seen to be responsible for the success or failure of such activities.

- **Power.** These leaders do have strong coercive power to bring about policy changes, especially in the case of the military head of state in Guinea. But they are likely to use it sparingly, leaving most policy making to their ministries, saving their power to adjudicate policy disagreements between ministries with overlapping or conflicting agendas.

- **Resources.** The heads of state have significant discretionary power to direct financial and human resources to policy processes, including convening special commissions or task forces, such as the strategy and policy unit under the president’s office in Sierra Leone.

- **Legitimacy.** While they may disagree with it, it is hard for other stakeholders to publicly question or oppose the legitimacy of any issue in which the head of state takes an interest.
Mines ministries

558. The mines ministries in the three countries are the lead and dominant players (if not always the change agents) for governance of the mining sector. Because mining is considered a strategic economic activity in all three countries, there is a lot of pressure on these ministries, especially the top appointees, concerning awarding of concessions, permitting, access to lands, etc. This can lead to personal interests taking precedence over good policy decisions, and in some cases to rent-seeking behavior. This in turn can lead to morale problems, as well as personnel changes. And the potential for self-interested behavior, up to and including favoritism and rent-seeking behavior is ever present, longstanding, and difficult to root out in all three countries.

559. The challenges facing mines ministries are very similar in all three countries. As noted in the situation analysis, and as was discussed in the focus groups and pinpointed in the community surveys, virtually all the ministries involved in one way or another in the mining sector face challenges: (i) insufficient consistency and transparency for decision-making processes, which is compounded by a lack of jurisdictional clarity and conflicting views of roles and responsibilities on such key matters as land allocation, environmental requirements, and handling of mining revenues; (ii) manpower shortages, often starting barely a level or two below the minister or deputy minister and extending deep into the technical and field staff are common to the three countries; and (iii) lack of adequate capacity, whether it’s a sufficient number of personnel or gaps in technical expertise that can hamper a ministry’s ability to carry out its work even if the policies and procedures are clear and in place. This is as true in the field offices as it is in the central office.

560. The ministries for mines in the three countries have primary responsibility for mining development, and are usually the initiators of mining-related infrastructure development projects, although they need to coordinate these with other relevant ministries.

- **Influence.** These ministries are central to any decisions made about the mining sector and related infrastructure development because such projects usually pass through the ministry before being reviewed by other ministries. Key political and technical people in these ministries can either bring about change or stop it in its tracks, depending on where their interests lie.

- **Interest.** These ministries are highly interested in whatever policy shifts may occur, although reactions may vary from wanting to keep the status quo to bringing about change. There is enough turnover in these ministries, and a sufficient mix of political appointees and technical experts, that it is hard to generalize about the ministries as a whole. However, mines ministry technical staff in all three countries indicated an interest in policies that would clarify roles and responsibilities, improve worker conditions of service and build capacities. Several joint Guinea-Liberia inter-ministerial meetings to discuss transborder cooperation on mining infrastructure were held in 2009, although no conclusive agreements were announced.

- **Impact.** These ministries will be affected by any mining policy shifts, especially if they require changing procedures such as increased enforcement activities. An increase in mining activities would also increase the ministries’ workload.
- **Power.** These ministries have a high degree of coercive power for mining-related policy issues as the responsible ministry for the sector.

- **Resources.** With financial and human resources to bring to bear on the policy process, there is broad agreement that these ministries do not have adequate capacity and technical expertise to carry out their responsibilities.

- **Legitimacy.** The mines ministries are legitimate stakeholders and central to any policy process, although there may be differences of opinion with other stakeholders, including other ministries, industry, donors, and civil society, about the best course of action to take.

**Environment ministries and agencies**

561. The ministries and agencies responsible for environmental oversight and protection in each of the three countries also are key stakeholders in the mining sector — they all have responsibility for environmental oversight of proposed mining projects. However, in Guinea and Sierra Leone the environmental function has moved from ministry to ministry when governments have changed, making it difficult for these ministries to establish a clear mandate. Liberia has a standalone environmental authority, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), and there is a move to establish a similar body in Sierra Leone, although a previous effort to establish such an agency foundered when the Government changed hands.

562. As with the mines ministries, a key issue in all three countries is lack of sufficient capacity (both in sheer numbers and competence) within the relevant ministries to adequately manage their countries’ environmental challenges. This includes a lack of capacity for adequate and timely reviews of mining project environmental and social impact assessments (ESIAs), and especially for conducting any monitoring and enforcement of policies, laws, and regulations once a mining project is in the construction or operations phase. These ministries also face challenges with lack of clarity in defining roles and responsibilities, and territoriality shown between ministries when it comes to regulating access to land and natural resources, including minerals.

- **Influence.** Environmental agencies have a strong potential to influence policy, especially if they are included in the policy-making process, although there may be some conflicts with other ministries over who has lead responsibility over environmental issues in the mining sector.

- **Interest.** The level of interest held by these ministries in policy development is strong, especially because it pertains to sub-regional environmental issues. More so than mines officials, the environmental authorities think in terms of major watersheds and ecosystems, many of which cross national borders in the MRU countries and their neighbors. They would also be favorable to policy changes that strengthen their environmental mandate.

- **Impact.** These agencies will no doubt be affected by a growth in mining activities, and will be implicated in any regional cluster-based environmental planning, management, or monitoring activities.
• **Power.** This group has power over environment-related policy, although often economic issues, including mining concession fees and potential mineral revenues, trump the arguments of environmental managers.

• **Resources.** Environmental agency resources to contribute to policy discussions are limited to the experts they have on staff, many of whom may be spread thin across multiple projects and responsibilities.

• **Legitimacy.** As the environmental stewards of their country, these ministries have a strong claim to legitimacy in being involved in mining sector policy and development, however, environmental considerations can be discounted by other stakeholders when they conflict with strong economic interests.

**Finance ministries**

563. The finance ministry in each country plays a key role in the mining sector in the realm of collecting and allocating mining sector revenues, and in approvals for large-scale mine concessions. The World Bank has been working closely with the three countries to spearhead an effort to harmonize fiscal regimes for mining, with the finance ministry in each country playing a lead role, alongside their mines ministry counterparts.

• **Influence.** The finance ministries in all three countries have a great deal of influence on revenue-related policies for the mineral sector.

• **Interest.** Their participation in the fiscal harmonization process demonstrates the finance ministries’ interest in changing and improving mineral sector policies and adopting a sub-regional approach.

• **Impact.** Possible effects for finance ministries would be a need to increase their involvement in the mining sector to handle increased sub-regional coordination on fiscal policy, as well as participating in efforts to increase revenue transparency and eliminate rent-seeking behavior.

• **Power.** These ministries have significant power in terms of negotiating new policies if they involve revenues and expenditures. They also have the power of the purse, including deciding which other ministry activities get funding.

• **Resources.** These ministries may have more discretion than others to bring resources to bear on policy matters.

• **Legitimacy.** As the steward of a nation’s financial resources, the finance ministry has a great deal of legitimacy in discussing revenue-related policies, even if other ministries disagree with their approach to policies and their enforcement.

**Local government and traditional authorities**

564. The role of local government and traditional authorities in the mining sector varies in each of the three countries, however, their primary responsibility is to ensure the well-being of their communities in the face of nearby mining sector development. In Sierra Leone, paramount, section, and town chiefs have significant power over allocation of mining leases to artisanal and mechanized small-scale mining operations (Sierra Leone SESA, World Bank, 2007). In recent years the Guinean central authorities have created several layers of local government, including the Conseils Préfectorals de Développement and Communautés Rurales de Développment (Rural Development
Communities). Mining companies can work directly with these local entities, which are nominally responsible for local development planning.

- **Influence.** Local government authorities have little influence over national or sub-regional policy making, however, they can play a critical role in implementation of policies in the field.

- **Interest.** Local government officials would be very interested in policy reforms that give them more resources to spend at the local level, or more tools to obtain and enforce mining company environmental and social commitments.

- **Impact.** Local authorities in jurisdictions near new mine sites or related infrastructure corridors will have to manage the significant impacts mining growth will have in the life and livelihoods of their communities.

- **Power.** This group has power to affect implementation of policies at the lower levels, if they have sufficient capacity and loyalty to carry out central government-authored mandates.

- **Resources.** Traditionally these local governments have had few resources to implement policy, and often the ones they receive appear to have been poorly managed. Local governments in Guinea and Sierra Leone receive a portion of mining taxes and revenues, intended to fund development of the affected communities. Local authorities often lack the capacity or expertise to enforce existing environmental and social policies.

- **Legitimacy.** As the governing authority in local communities, these stakeholders should have legitimacy with other players with respect to policies and policy reform. However, local government officials can lose legitimacy if they are seen as corrupt and known to favor certain parties or projects over others.

**Multilateral and bilateral donor agencies**

565. Donor agencies have played and will continue to play an active role in the mining sector in the three countries, although roles and responsibilities and participation levels have evolved over time. The World Bank is the most active player in this sector with the impending AMGP, although the EU, ARD, USAID, DFID, and UNDP are also involved to varying degrees in one or more of the countries. Because they serve as a key driver of policy thinking and strategy and have expertise and financial resources to contribute, these stakeholders are key players in development of sub-regional policies.

- **Influence.** The World Bank is the key driver behind the regional policy approach and the focus on mining-infrastructure clusters or resource corridors, although there is support for these initiatives among other donors. As such, the potential for influence is high because donors are central to the entire regional cluster-based initiative.

- **Interest.** Donors are clearly interested in changing the status quo to improve mineral sector governance and transparency.

- **Impact.** Donors will not be affected by policy reforms, except to the extent that they become heavily involved in the development and implementation of those reforms.
- **Power.** Donors have the power to offer or withhold financial resources, but must largely rely on their ability to convince governments that a particular course of action is the right one to obtain participation and compliance.

- **Resources.** Donors have financial resources and technical expertise that can be applied to the regional cluster-based approach, as well as local country offices that are familiar with local environments.

- **Legitimacy.** Donor legitimacy is based on effectiveness of their programs and the ability to persuade governments and other stakeholders that their approaches are in the best interest of the other stakeholders.

**Sub-regional and regional inter-governmental institutions**

566. The two primary organizations relevant to the mining sector in the three WAMSSA target countries are the Mano River Union and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). While the Mano River Union has been in existence since 1973, the organization was virtually non-functioning during the civil wars in Sierra Leone and Liberia. The MRU and its secretariat in Freetown have recently been revived as a working organization, helped in part by the inclusion of Côte d’Ivoire in the MRU in June 2008. The group has taken an interest in sub-regional infrastructure development, in addition to its ongoing work in peace building and post–conflict reconstruction. ECOWAS is a 16-member state organization founded in 1975 and based in Abuja, Nigeria. It has a number of regional policy initiatives that apply to the MRU countries, including the ECOWAS Regional Policy on Environment. It is also spearheading efforts to expand regional transportation and power infrastructure.

- **Influence.** These bodies have some influence over policy making because they serve as the fora for laying out sub-regional or regional policy frameworks. If these policy frameworks such as the ECOWAS Policy on Environment are adopted and given enforcement teeth, then these groups could have more influence.

- **Interest.** These groups are interested in seeing sub-regional standards and policies adopted; it is one of their reasons for their existence. MRU and ECOWAS have taken a strong interest in promoting mining and infrastructure development in recent years, so they will be interested in playing an active role where possible, especially where mining-infrastructure clusters cross national boundaries in the region.

- **Impact.** Mining development and related sub-regional policies and cluster-based approaches would affect these bodies if they are engaged to help formulate new sub-regional or regional policies or programs, or if they are given a role in implementing or enforcing such new policies and programs.

- **Power.** These groups have advisory power, but are understood to have limited ability to mandate changes because of national sovereignty principles. Suspension of non-compliant member states as a tool of coercion is usually only available for extreme cases such as coups d’état.

- **Resources.** These groups have some resources devoted to regional policy development, and can possibly support research or policy analysis efforts.
Enforcement ability of any regional cluster-based schemes would require additional financial and logistical resources.

- **Legitimacy.** Because these groups are sub-regional and regional in scope, they presumably have some legitimacy in being involved in the policy dialogue. ECOWAS has been more active over the past decade than the MRU, and thus there is a fair amount of interaction between the regional body, donors, and national governments. The MRU could gain more legitimacy with national governments and donors as it reactivates.

**Private sector**

567. Private sector stakeholders include large-scale, small-scale, and artisanal miners, as well as construction firms likely to be involved in mining and infrastructure construction.

**Large-scale miners**

568. A number of the world’s largest mining companies are active in the three countries, including BHP-Billiton, Rio Tinto, Alcoa, and Arcelor Mittal, as well as a number of other second tier large-scale players such as RusAl, Titanium Resources Group, and Mano River Resources. These groups typically have staff and resources devoted to management of environmental and social issues, which can often exceed the capabilities of the governments that are attempting to regulate them. They are also sensitive to media, NGO critics, and managing community expectations.

- **Influence.** These companies can have a major influence over policy development in that mining policy is largely built around the opportunities and issues related to their activities. Also, they typically deal with the highest levels of government in discussing conditions for investment and other commitments made by the company or by government as part of concessions and licensing agreements. Many of them have world class standards and expertise to bring to bear when governments are developing or strengthening environmental and social standards and practices.

- **Interest.** Large-scale mining companies would support policies that promote transparency and regional consistency of regulations in the sub-region. BHP is actively exploring in all three countries, while Rio Tinto has made major investments in the Simandou area, which is not far from the railhead in Liberia that leads to Buchanan. Investor confidence can fall quickly if concession agreements are in flux, such as with recent government moves to alter existing agreements with Rio Tinto in Guinea and London Mining in Sierra Leone.

- **Impact.** Large-scale mining companies stand to benefit from the development of common policies and enforcement mechanisms tailored to large mining projects. Any regional coordination of standards and policies will also have an effect in terms of making the environment more predictable and transparent.

- **Power.** Large-scale mining companies have a high degree of power when negotiating long-term agreements because they potentially can walk away from a project or a country if the conditions are not seen as favorable enough to their
business model. Traditionally this has meant companies seek special one-off agreements that may run counter to policies intended for the entire industry.

- **Resources.** Mining companies potentially have considerable resources to muster for policy processes, including government relations or public affairs staff, environmental experts, and others who can help inform the policy-making process.

- **Legitimacy.** Mining companies have high legitimacy in any discussion of mining development because their projects are at the heart of the industry for which the policies are being developed.

**Chinese companies**

569. Chinese mining and construction firms have become a major force in the Mano River Union. Chinese companies have been bidding for and winning concessions or contracts for mining, road construction, and other infrastructure projects. While many are ostensibly private firms, they are understood to have the political (and in some cases financial) backing of the Chinese government. These companies typically seek to negotiate one-off agreements at the highest level of government for combined investment packages that may involve mineral concessions linked to construction and/or operation of rail or other infrastructure. As such they represent a new force and a change from the traditional government/private industry relationships established by Western mining companies in these countries.

- **Influence.** While these companies’ influence over policy is theoretically similar to that of other large mining firms, they have the additional leverage of the Chinese government backing their activities.

- **Interest.** It is unclear if these firms would promote transparency and regional consistency in government regulations because many of them are focused on a particular project and not larger regional considerations.

- **Impact.** Implementation of harmonized regional approaches would have an effect on the individual deals that Chinese companies seek to make in a given country, especially if all MRU countries agree to apply a common regional framework for concessions.

- **Power.** Because of tacit or behind the scenes Chinese government support, and an apparent willingness to invest in costly infrastructure projects, these companies have tremendous negotiating power, in some cases supplanting longstanding relationships between government and Western mining companies.

- **Resources.** It remains to be seen if many of the entrepreneurial Chinese firms committing to large projects have the financial backing or technical expertise needed to implement them, with progress on concessions awarded in the past few years slow to occur.

- **Legitimacy.** These companies tend to be insular and keep a low profile. Unlike some large Western mining companies they typically do not interact publicly with other stakeholders or the media on policy issues. Therefore, it is hard to gauge how legitimate their interests are seen to be by other stakeholders. Public perceptions of the Chinese throughout the region are that they are there to conduct business, and not to promote local employment or development.
Small-scale miners

570. In recent years, the number of small-scale miners in the sub-region was on the rise, especially in Liberia and Sierra Leone, although the worldwide credit crunch may cause a near-term slowdown. Small-scale miners would generally be opposed to any sub-regional or national policies that would require them to spend heavily on environmental protection or community development because they have a smaller resource base to work with than the larger mining companies. They would support improvements to mining and land policies that could allow them greater access to potentially resource-rich areas, and provide better protection against encroachment by both artisanal and large-scale miners. They also might support efforts to crack down on illegal mining and cross-border smuggling of minerals.

- **Influence.** This group would have limited influence over the development of policies because they are small companies that are not organized to present a common voice to government on policy debates.
- **Interest.** This group would be interested in policy changes that would increase access to land and that would codify distinctions between land available for small-scale miners as opposed to larger companies’ artisanal miners.
- **Impact.** These groups could be affected by policy changes, especially if they are located in areas near the borders between countries.
- **Power.** This group’s coercive power is limited because they do not work together as a group. The resources they have for policy processes are also minimal; their primary focus is to equip and pay their crews for exploration or production.
- **Legitimacy.** These groups are viewed jealously by artisanal miners, and may also be seen as interlopers by the large-scale miners.

Artisanal miners

571. Artisanal miners make up the bulk of workers in the mining sector, especially in Sierra Leone and Liberia. With the exception of those settled communities whose members mine part-time between planting seasons, most artisanal miners move from site to site, making it hard for them to organize to advocate positions on any government policies, and so they have weak influence on both the creation and implementation of policies. They tend to support policies that would increase the areas open for artisanal mining and resolve land conflicts with large- and small-scale mining operations, which is one of the most contentious issues in the sector. They might be opposed to more restrictive and widespread policing of national borders, and the shrinking of mineral price differentials between countries. However, they might be likely to favor strengthened government oversight in mining areas that could spread market price data more widely so diggers and miners could get a better price for minerals. Also, artisanal miners would favor reforms that promote better access to tools, affordable loans, and training in mining techniques, and health and safety precautions.

- **Influence.** Artisanal miners, because of their unorganized and mobile nature, do not have a lot of influence over policy processes.
- **Interest.** Awareness of current policies may be low among this group because many are uneducated and unlikely to encounter government officials who actively
enforce policy. However, if regional policy coordination led to tighter border controls, artisanal miners might be opposed to such changes, while increased availability of land for artisanal mining would gain support among artisanal miners.

- **Impact.** Tightening border controls or making more land available for mining could have a significant effect on the lives of many artisanal miners.
- **Power.** Artisanal miners' only power is in their numbers. If they can succeed in organizing around an issue, they could advocate for their demands at the local level.
- **Resources.** Similarly, artisanal miners' only resource is their human capital and its numerical strength. They have virtually no financial resources that could be applied to supporting or opposing policies.
- **Legitimacy.** This group is a legitimate stakeholder group because artisanal mining plays such a significant role in all three countries and is a significant employer in all three. However, artisanal miners' views may be discounted by legally operating mining companies and other stakeholders who see them as illegal or unwanted in their communities.

**Dealers, brokers, and other middlemen**

Dealers, brokers, and other middlemen play an important role in the artisanal diamond and gold trades, however, they often operate partly or wholly outside the law. They would tend to be opposed to any sub-regional efforts to better regulate and monitor the artisanal mineral value chain, including coordinated efforts to better police cross-border movement of minerals because it could add to their costs and disrupt a marketing system that now works well for them. Some of the larger players might try to actively influence policy makers to defer implementing such reforms, while many of the smaller players will continue to find ways to keep their product out of view of government. Like artisanal miners themselves, dealers and brokers are likely to support any reforms that increase the number of areas where artisanal mining can be done, or efforts to improve mining and processing efficiency.

- **Influence.** This group’s influence over policy is minor, unless there are one or two powerful players in a position to influence individual policy makers.
- **Interest.** Their interest in policy reforms, especially to increase areas open for mining, would be high, but they might be opposed to more regional coordination, especially for enforcement of regulations, border controls, anti-smuggling, and anti-corruption activities.
- **Impact.** To the extent that increased mining activity will bring these players more business, they will be affected by mining sector development. However, if efforts are mounted to rebalance the benefit sharing up and down the value chain in the diamond and gold sectors, they could end up with a smaller share of the revenue pie.
- **Power.** Their power to bring compliance is based entirely on their willingness to comply with new, more transparent, and/or equitable benefit-sharing schemes within the industry. Unscrupulous or self-interested members opposed to policy
changes could use financial or other resources to convince key policy makers to water down new policies, or discourage local government agents from active enforcement of new policies.

- **Legitimacy.** This group’s legitimacy could be at issue because the perception among other stakeholder groups is that the group profits to the disadvantage of government revenue collectors and workers in the mining sector value chain. Thus their positions on issues may not be popular or given much credence.

**Construction industry**

Any major construction project or cluster of projects initiated as a result of mining development would likely involve foreign contractors, but would also require support from local subcontractors and laborers hired in country.

- **Influence.** Normally this group would play a very minor role in policy making, although they may try to influence the decision-making process for awarding contracts once projects are in the pipeline.
- **Interest.** Both international and local firms would be interested in seeing mining and related infrastructure develop, but it is unclear how they would benefit if a regional policy approach were taken, unless it gave them a broader platform to bid for more or large projects.
- **Impact.** Any new projects would have a positive effect on these companies.
- **Power.** Normally this group’s power and influence would be fairly low, unless the principals within the firms have close ties to key government officials. If the three countries decide to approach infrastructure planning from a regional cluster-based perspective and opt for an approach that brings together public and private sector players (including mining companies, construction firms, and infrastructure service providers) in the planning process, then construction firms could have larger role to play. In some cases, Chinese companies are already leveraging mining and construction investments to gain access to these markets, although on a project-by-project basis at the country (not regional) level.
- **Resources.** These companies could bring design expertise to the policy process if they are included in decision making on policies and rules for integrated development, either across country lines and/or in planning multi-use infrastructure.
- **Legitimacy.** While these players are seen as key to the implementation of mining sectors and other infrastructure development, they may be viewed by other players as mere for-hire contractors, and thus not seen as having a legitimate claim to participating in the policy-making process.

**Civil society**

**Mining communities**

Mining communities are often the ones most affected by mining development because many of the changes to the landscape and local economy, as well as access to natural resources, occur on or near their land.
Mining communities in Guinea have become more active, and at times violent, in their pursuit of grievances against mining companies. Riots have occurred in several communities in the past few years, with company buildings and vehicles damaged and production halted. A protest by the miners union against Koidu Holdings in Sierra Leone also ended in violence, with two protestors shot by police. In Liberia, communities located near new large-scale mining activities seem more fearful of publicly expressing dissatisfaction with mining company activities for fear of losing jobs or access to housing. Company employees refused to be interviewed in the community survey conducted for this report, and media reports from around Yekepa suggest the there is little individual or community activism at this early stage of mine development, although that may change over time.

Communities located near mining areas have high expectations for jobs and community development investments to be made by mining companies, and often feel they are left out of development decisions made for their community by mining companies, or national or local governments. They would support laws that give a portion of tax revenues from operating mines directly to communities, and for capacity building or strengthening of governance mechanisms to police mining operations’ environmental performance and follow-through on social commitments. They would also welcome reforms to reduce illegal mining and encroachment on farmland and other community lands by artisanal miners.

- **Influence.** Mining community ability to influence policy making is quite low, although depending on the level of activism in a community, it could have an effect on implementation of new mining activities or related policies.
- **Interest.** Mining communities or those located along an infrastructure corridor would have a strong interest in such projects for potential jobs and other economic benefits, although they may also have concerns for environmental matters or significant changes to the landscape and local community.
- **Impact.** Often changes for communities near mining development will be substantial, with physical changes to the landscape, traffic patterns, population, as well as changing access to water, power, and other resources. Communities near border crossings may also feel the impact if better border controls change the patterns of movement of good and people. Reduced traffic may have a stabilizing influence on local communities, but certain communities that have come to rely on legal or illegal border trade may find themselves negatively affected.
- **Power.** The community has little power to influence national policy, although local stakeholders can disrupt a specific construction or mining project if they mobilize in large numbers over grievances.
- **Resources.** Local communities have few resources to contribute to the policy process, although it is desirable to include their concerns and suggestions in the policy-making process because they are the ones most likely to be affected by mining growth.
- **Legitimacy.** These groups have legitimate claims about the effects of mining development and policy changes on their lives, but companies and government often fail to adequately consult with communities, downplay community
concerns, or unilaterally make decisions intended to resolve these issues but without adequate consultation.

Vulnerables (women, children, and youth)

Women and children

577. Women and children make up two key vulnerable groups in mining areas. In artisanal mining areas they are often involved in the work, providing food, or even working as diggers. Women would support policies that give them more opportunities to work in the sector, including holding licenses. Policy attempts to limit child labor may meet with resistance from those who rely on their labor to support their family. Unless they are organized as a group, women may have a hard time expressing their concerns as separate from those of men in the sector.

- **Influence.** Women as a group do not yet have a strong influence on mining policy in these three countries, although women’s organizations are growing in both number and strength and increasingly focusing on the mining sector.

- **Interest.** Women would be interested in any policy shifts affecting the economic health of their communities and would clearly be interested in any policy changes that improve quality of life, economic opportunities, health and safety, education for their children, etc.

- **Impact.** Women bear the double impact of working and trying to care for children, both of which may be difficult in artisanal mining environments, or in communities near large-scale mining sites with heavy in-migration

- **Power.** Women tend not to have power in this sector unless they are organized in groups, either at the local or national levels.

- **Resources.** Women have few resources to bring to bear on issues, except when they can use their numbers in a form of protest to call attention to their issues

- **Legitimacy.** Women’s issues and concerns are considered important by donors and government, although perhaps less so by local authorities or men in general.

Youth

578. The category of youth in this sub-region is broad, encompassing people between the ages of 15 and 35. As many as one-half of the population in all three countries falls in this category, and they are the group that is most likely to seek employment in the mining sector. Because of the conflicts in Sierra Leone and Liberia, many people in this age group missed opportunities to get an education or learn a skill, and so the governments and donors put a number of programs in place to provide various kinds of training. This group does not have much power to influence policy decisions made relative to growth of the mining sector, although they could be a disruptive force if they feel the mining companies are not hiring or otherwise providing benefits to nearby communities. They would favor any policies that increase access to land for mining and opportunities for mining employment, by large or small companies and artisanal miners.
• **Influence.** Typically this group has little influence over policy formulation, and may not have much influence over implementation, unless they are organized and mobilize to advocate their interests.

• **Interest.** This group would support the AMGP and policy development if the policy changes could affect their lives by providing increased access to jobs and training.

• **Impact.** They are the most likely to seek and gain employment, especially low-skilled labor, so they are also the most likely to be affected by any mining sector or infrastructure development that includes jobs.

• **Power.** Power is in numbers, if they mobilize as a group to press for demands, they may have the power to bring about policy changes.

• **Resources.** The primary resource of this group is human and their numbers, as noted above. The large number of youth and unemployed is always a worry to governments because they can be a potential source of civil discontent.

• **Legitimacy.** This group can rightly claim a legitimate interest in mining sector development and related policy shifts because they are the workforce of the present and future for the sector and the overall economy. However, unless they are well organized and have coherent, representative spokespersons, their voices may not be included in the debate, even if their concerns are considered legitimate and something other stakeholders seek to deal with.

**Ex-combatants**

579. Ex-combatants could be considered a subset of youth, although because the wars in Sierra Leone and Liberia lasted well over a decade, there are older ex-combatants as well. They include men, but also some women. While many of the fighters received some kind of assistance including vocational training as part of the DDRD process, many remain un- or underemployed and live in poverty and in some cases have had a difficult time reintegrating into their families and communities. Mining is one of the few opportunities for work for those with little education. Surveys conducted among ex-combatants in Liberia (Hill et al., USIP 2008) suggest that while the great majority do not want to see a return to war, as many as one-third could consider returning to fighting again if they saw no other way to improve their economic conditions. Thus they are a potentially volatile stakeholder group that must be addressed.

580. As with the youth, ex-combatants would favor any policies that increase employment opportunities in the mining sector, including any efforts to improve financial, training, safety, and other benefits that could be provided to artisanal miners. They might also be amenable to alternative livelihood programs that allowed them to farm or take up other economic activities. They may be unfavorable to policies that limit the movement of goods or people across borders, especially those that may be smuggling minerals across the border.

• **Influence.** As with other youth and mining community stakeholders, ex-combatant’s influence over policy design would be minimal, however, they could have an effect on implementation as a potential force to be mobilized for or against new policies and programs in mining regions.
- **Interest.** Their primary interest would be training and/or jobs that lead to economic activity. In addition, this group would also favor regional or national mining policy changes or mining sector development that allows the ex-combatants to reintegrate socially and economically into family, friends, and community.

- **Impact.** Mining development of any scale (large, small, and artisanal) could have a significant effect on this group because they may be well placed to take advantage of job opportunities. Potential negative effects could be the exacerbation of old ethnic or other wartime tensions as a result of movements of people within the country and sub-region as a result of mining activity.

- **Power.** This group’s power is primarily disruptive because these stakeholders could cause problems for mining companies or government authorities if they thought their needs weren’t being met by mining development. In addition, because of the fear of a return to violence, ex-combatants as a group command the attention of government, donors, and communities that suffered during the war, even if they are not organized.

- **Resources.** Ex-combatants have no resources to contribute to the policy process, although they can be a labor resource for the sector.

- **Legitimacy.** This group’s claim to benefits from mining are as strong as any other rural and mining community residents, although there may be some sense that this group has already benefited from government and donor reintegration and retraining programs, thus they should not be given any specific advantages when it comes to mining employment.

**International NGOs**

581. International NGOs are active in the three countries. Many became active during the civil war years in Sierra Leone and Liberia and have focused on consensus and peace building and post-conflict development. Others focus primarily on environmental protection for local ecosystems. Several, including International Alert and Diamonds for Development, became active in the mining industry when they championed the end of ‘blood diamonds’ and pushed for bans on diamond experts from Liberia and Sierra Leone. In Guinea the focus of many NGOs is on strengthening civil society to increase government transparency and accountability, a vector by which they have been drawn into the extractive sector. Publish What You Pay is another international NGO focused on revenue transparency and good governance that is actively tracking the MRU countries’ participation in the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI).

- **Influence.** International NGOs can have a strong influence on the policy dialogue in that they can bring international media attention to the shortcomings of both government and industry in mineral sector governance. And because much of their work involves engaging the vulnerable and other affected stakeholders, they can influence processes by increasing the participation of these other groups in policy discussions.

- **Interest.** International NGOs that actively track mining, environmental, governance, and revenue transparency issues have a high degree of interest in
policy changes, and would presumably support national or regional policy initiatives that increase environment and social responsibility, benefit sharing, poverty reduction, and better governance.

- **Impact.** The potential impact of regional and national policy initiatives on these groups would be minor or neutral, unless they are invited to participate in the policy-making process, or if policy shifts cause them to significantly increase or decrease their involvement in the sector.

- **Resources.** International NGOs can bring significant resources to bear on policy issues. They can fund local NGOs and conduct research or consultation exercises which in turn give other stakeholders a voice in the process. The other resource they can bring is experience with similar issues in other countries based on their work or the work of other international NGOs from whom they can import best practices and research results.

- **Legitimacy.** Different international NGOs come with varying degrees of legitimacy. Generally speaking, those that focus entirely on advocacy and/or which take a vehement anti-mining stand tend to have little legitimacy with mining companies or governments and even with local communities. The international NGOs that mix advocacy with service delivery and/or which actively partner with mining companies and governments tend to have more legitimacy in policy discussions.

**Local NGOs**

582. There are a significant number of NGOs or CSOs in Guinea and Sierra Leone, and their numbers are increasing in Liberia. Among the most active and well known involved in the mining sector include CECIDE and CECI in Guinea; Green Advocates in Liberia; and Network Movement for Justice and Development, National Coalition on Extractives, and Campaign for Just Mining in Sierra Leone. In Liberia and Sierra Leone, many of the groups have a strong adversarial and anti-mining bent because many of them were formed in response to environmental and social problems associated with mining. In Guinea, more CSOs are focused on civil society strengthening, community capacity building, and provision of health and other services. However, these groups have begun to focus on mining communities and their problems, mobilizing community members to demand jobs and respect from large mining companies that may be operating near them.

583. While these groups are often focused on local or national issues related to mining, there has been movement in recent years to link up with other NGOs in the sub-region to pool resources, share strategies and tactics, and create critical mass to deal with government and mining company issues. Indications from focus group sessions suggest that these groups would strongly endorse regional or sub-regional mechanisms or institutions that could increase transparency in the mining sectors, as well as better enforcement of international environmental and social standards. These groups would also support (and would likely want to be involved in implementing) programs that might be developed or implemented in the field to provide conflict resolution, capacity building, skills training, livelihood creation, etc. at the community level.
- **Influence.** Given the increasing activism and visibility of these groups in the three countries, they could have an outsized impact on policies. NGOs were successfully able to influence the community rights provisions of a recent forest policy in Liberia, and they were instrumental in discussions surrounding the violence that erupted at Koidu Holdings in Sierra Leone. In Guinea, several NGOs and CSOs actively engage the Government and are often sought out by donors and mining companies to help resolve issues or participate in policy development processes.

- **Interest.** Their interest in policy reform is also strong, particularly NGOs that are active in the mining sector, or those that are focused on revenue transparency or other aspects of good governance and civic activism.

- **Impact.** The effect of policy on these groups is somewhat neutral, except where they may become actively involved in policy implementation or monitoring on the ground.

- **Power.** These groups can hold significant power, especially if they are able to mobilize public opinion in communities or in the cities, and if they are able to use national and international media to get their messages out.

- **Resources.** The resources local groups have can vary. They typically get their funding from outside the country, and the ability to have continued access to this funding depends on their ability to portray the issues they are fighting for as critical to communities. Local or national NGOs typically do not have deep financial resources, but do have human resources on the ground, often located in affected communities, and know the local political environment, and can help get the messages of the vulnerable back to decision makers.

- **Legitimacy.** The legitimacy of these groups can vary depending on their effectiveness. Groups that are well run with a clear set of objectives and principles, and are perceived as effective advocates and/or mediators for community issues, will be seen as legitimate players by community and institutional players alike.

**CSOs/NGOs with a regional focus**

While there are only small number of sub-regional NGOs that operate on a multi-country basis (including the Mano River Union Women’s Peace Network (MARWOPNET), West Africa Network for Peace-Building (WANEP), and ECOWAS Civil Society), a growing trend in the MRU countries and West Africa in general is the formation of coalitions of national NGOs that then work with each other to address regional or sub-regional issues. CECIDE in Guinea has already collaborated with key NGOs in Ghana, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, and Liberia on initiatives related to civil society development and monitoring of the extractive sector in West Africa. If these groups succeed in working together, they could bring more pressure to bear at the sub-regional level on both companies and governments in the areas of governance and transparency in the mining sector, environmental and social responsibility, and broader benefit sharing with communities and other traditionally disenfranchised stakeholders. These groups also could be potential allies in encouraging regional approaches to dealing with environmental and social challenges in the sector.
• **Influence.** To the extent that these groups have the ear of national authorities, they can influence policy, and in particular focus on regional/sub-regional commonalities.

• **Interest.** These groups are all interested in improving mineral sector governance, and thus will seek to participate in the policy process and are looking at issues through a regional lens.

• **Impact.** These groups are unlikely to be directly affected by policy changes unless they are called on to play key roles in the implementation phase, in which case they may find themselves growing in size or adding new capabilities and programs.

• **Power.** Depending on how vocal and successful these groups are in getting their message out, they may have significant power to influence the policy debate and to push for compliance during implementation.

• **Resources.** These NGOs typically do not have a lot of financial resources, but like the national NGOs, they may have human resources on the ground, often located in affected communities.

• **Legitimacy.** As with nationally-focused NGOs, their legitimacy depends on their perceived effectiveness to act as advocates or mediators for community stakeholders and vulnerable populations

**Key findings**

585. Individual stakeholder interviews, community survey results, and discussions that took place during the focus group meetings and national and regional workshops demonstrate that stakeholders at all levels in the MRU understand the potential for mining to improve the economic well being of their countries and sub-region. There is, however, a general and rising sense of frustration with the lack of progress on mining-induced economic growth.

586. Guineans have had large-scale mining in their country for years, but the benefits have been seen by few, and communities and civil society are growing increasingly militant about seeing more transparency and improved benefit sharing in the sector, especially given its potential for significant expansion in all areas of the country. In Sierra Leone, the initial optimism for the mining sector to serve as a major catalyst to help Sierra Leone rebuild from the effects of civil war has been tempered by the recent experiences at Koidu and Sierra Rutile, where significant gaps between community expectations and mining company performance on environmental, social, and economic commitments have exacerbated tensions. In Liberia, it is still early in the country’s reconstruction, but excitement over the new iron ore projects is already raising expectations, even as the Government is in a hurry to put in place an equitable and transparent mineral governance scheme that can attract investors while ensuring adequate benefit sharing and social and environmental protection for its people.

587. Internal government power struggles and rent-seeking behavior are serious challenges to overcome in improving mineral governance, but there does seem to be support from all quarters to move away from the status quo to improved government action on environmental, social, and economic issues in the sector.
The majority of stakeholders engaged by WAMSSA appeared to support regional harmonization to address mineral governance, although such an approach needs to be clearly defined for them to understand how it will work, and for them to play an active role in its design and/or implementation. Stakeholders had a similar reaction when hearing about the cluster approach to mining, with some individuals supporting the concept but expressing doubts that the political will exists to adopt such a strategic vision that may run counter to nationalistic sentiments for such issues as transborder railway corridors. Likewise, the majority of stakeholders encountered in the WAMSSA process also see the value of empowering local communities to play an active role. They also see the establishment of ongoing multi-level, multi-stakeholder groups as way to keep pressure on policy makers to improve the returns to society from mining.
Annex 4. WAMSSA Approaches to Public Participation and Consultation

Introduction

589. The West African Mineral Sector Strategic Assessment (WAMSSA) involved a series of public participation and consultation activities, which are described in this annex. WAMSSA combined analytical work with a participatory consultation process that involved several rounds of consultations at the national and regional levels. These consultations were designed to initiate a policy dialogue on environmental, social, and governance issues in the mining sector across a broad range of stakeholders, including governments, industry, civil society organizations, and communities. Figure 1 in the main report diagrams the overall process.

- Stakeholder consultations were held in the three target countries (Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone), including one-on-one interviews, focus group meetings of institutional stakeholders (government, industry, and civil society organizations), and surveys of grassroots communities affected by mining.
- The output of those meetings, which identified critical issues, was then fed into national workshops where the critical issues were prioritized.
- These consultations were complemented by research and analysis, including situation analysis of mining-infrastructure clusters, stakeholder analysis, scenario analysis, and institutional analysis.
- The results of the national workshops and additional analyses were presented and discussed at a regional validation workshop, where recommendations and an action matrix were discussed and validated.

590. The combination and iteration of analytical and consultative work was a lengthy and complex process, but it yielded useful results. Through multiple interactions with the WAMSSA team, stakeholders were given an opportunity to provide both original insights and react to findings of the team as it conducted its analysis.

591. This participatory approach was deemed important enough by workshop participants and steering committee members that it recommended a similar multi-stakeholder participation mechanism be continued with the follow-on Africa Mineral Governance program (Figure 10 in the main report).

592. The rest of this annex describes the methodology and outcomes of the various consultation activities, including:

- Steering Committee meetings,
- Focus group discussions,
- Community surveys,
- National workshops, and
- Regional validation workshop.
WAMSSA Steering Committee

593. A WAMSSA Steering Committee was established with one delegate each from ECOWAS, WAEMU, Mano River Union (MRU), and representatives from the mines ministries of the Governments of Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone. Each of the three countries had one representative. The committee provided guidance to WAMSSA, and informed the approach to the policy dialogue, discussions, and consultations with stakeholders.

594. WAMSSA Steering Committee members were responsible for:

- Serving as the key national point of contact with the national governments during the conduct of the WAMSSA process.
- Helping with access to government documents to assist the WAMSSA team with access to relevant national information for the analytical work.
- Helping to identify experts from other relevant ministries who could meet with the WAMSSA team. It was initially envisioned that a cross-sectoral inter-ministerial team would be established in each country, although this did not occur in any of the three countries for various logistical reasons. However, the ministerial experts and industry representatives identified by the WAMSSA Steering Committee members all participated actively in the focus groups, and national and regional workshops.
- Participating in the focus groups and national workshops in their own countries and in the final regional workshop convened by the WAMSSA team, as well as other international meetings where WAMSSA was presented or discussed, serving as both resource persons and champions for the study.
- Participating in Steering Committee meetings with the World Bank to discuss progress and provide guidance on direction of the study.
- Reviewing and commenting on the interim and draft final reports prepared by the WAMSSA team.

595. The Steering Committee held three meetings. It first met in June 2008 in Conakry, Guinea at the time of project launch to discuss and agree on terms of reference for WAMSSA and provide some initial guidance to the WAMSSA team.

596. A second Steering Committee meeting was held in May 2009 in Accra, Ghana, where the Committee reviewed the preliminary interim findings of WAMSSA to date. There the committee members provided feedback on the results. They strongly endorsed the approach of looking at mining-infrastructure clusters as the focal point of the WAMSSA analysis. In addition, they supported the approach of considering both regional harmonization and increased local community participation in development decisions. The Steering Committee members also participated in a panel discussion on WAMSSA at the International Association for Impact Assessment (IAIA) Annual Meeting held during the same week in Accra.

597. A third Steering Committee meeting was held in November 2009 in Freetown, Sierra Leone immediately following the WAMSSA regional validation workshop. The Steering Committee members present at the meeting in Freetown, including the three country representatives and the MRU representative, were solicited for their views on the
findings and recommendations in this report, and on how to continue the policy dialogue and ensure that the WAMSSA recommendations are successfully disseminated and implemented. The committee expressed satisfaction with the overall WAMSSA process, including the focus on mining and infrastructure clusters as an appropriate framework for integrating a regional development strategy. The committee again endorsed the consultation process by which environmental, social accountability, and governance priorities were selected and addressed.

598. Steering Committee members and World Bank participants at the meeting recommended that the committee should be retained and expanded to include representatives from other countries such as Burkina Faso as a way to ensure that WAMSSA recommendations on improving environmental governance, social accountability, and local community-level development are included in the African Mineral Governance Program. It was agreed that industry and civil society representatives should also be included in a new AMGP Consultative Group. This evolving and ongoing role of the Steering Committee fits well with the concept of a multi-stakeholder consultative framework proposed in WAMSSA Recommendation 1 (Figure 10 in the main report).

Initial focus group consultations

599. Building on the work of the situation and stakeholder analyses, a series of stakeholder consultations was held in the three countries to validate a preliminary list of issues identified by the WAMSSA consultants and to help select key priorities for further study by the WAMSSA team. The consultations included a series of focus groups with institutional stakeholders in the three capital cities, yielding a preliminary shortlist of key national and sub-regional priorities. This list was then submitted to another round of stakeholder consultations — a series of national workshops bringing together all the key stakeholder groups in each country to deepen the policy dialogue on environmental and social priorities initiated in the focus groups, and to reach consensus across multiple stakeholder groups for the final list of priorities for each country.

Focus group process

600. The WAMSSA team held focus group meetings for industry, government, and civil society in all three countries in December 2008 and January 2009. The team worked with the WAMSSA focal point in the mines ministry in each country, local consultants, and key informants to identify key contacts within each stakeholder group. Typically 20 to 25 people were invited (mostly through their organizations) to participate in each stakeholder focus group, of whom 10 to 15 attended in most cases. The focus groups were planned to include only stakeholders from within a particular sector (e.g., industry, or civil society) so as to have a frank discussion of issues within a relatively homogeneous group, prior to bringing different stakeholder groups together in the national workshops. Care was taken to not put powerful and vulnerable stakeholders in the same group discussions. The team made a special effort to include CSOs that are viewed in their country as advocates for the vulnerable (e.g., women’s groups) and rural communities.

601. The meetings were held in easily accessible central locations, typically a hotel conference room, and lunch was provided for participants during the half-day session.
Background information on the African Mineral Governance Project (AMGP), WAMSSA, and the focus group objectives was provided to participants in advance through letters, e-mails, and phone calls.

602. During each focus group meeting, WAMSSA team members provided an overview of AMGP and WAMSSA and the main findings of the situation analysis to focus the discussion around material concerns affecting the sub-region, countries, the mining sector, and shareholders. The focus group process began in Guinea and was refined as the team moved from country to country, primarily in terms of sharpening the focus of participants on a smaller set of issues to discuss, and on highlighting the regional dimensions of issues that participants initially saw as national or local in scope. A similar process was followed in all focus groups, where they were presented with an initial list of environmental and social issues, which were identified by the study team, and derived from research and key informant interviews conducted as part of the situation analysis and stakeholder analysis processes. The issues were divided into several categories, including environmental and social governance, environmental issues, social and socioeconomic issues, regional and transborder issues, and infrastructure-related issues, although many of the concerns crossed multiple categories (Table A4-1).

603. The focus groups discussed the issues and then participants narrowed the list to their top priorities through a consensus-driven process. Within each focus group, a group discussion led to listing important issues on a flip chart. Once an initial list was established, participants were then given five votes, which they used to select their priorities. Votes could be spread across five issues or less, or all used to vote for one issue. After everyone in a focus group voted, issues receiving the most votes were declared priorities of that group.

604. The process varied slightly by country — the Guinea groups only made one round of prioritization, ending up with about 10 to 15 priority items in each group. In Sierra Leone and Liberia, the groups identified an initial list of 10 to 12 priorities, including some that were modifications or additions to the original list, and then did a second round of prioritization to yield the top five or six issues. The Sierra Leonean groups also ranked their final list of priorities through a similar voting process.

605. Table A4-1 summarizes the top results of the focus group prioritization process. Column 1 indicates the issue selected as a priority, while column 2 shows how many of the nine focus groups (government, industry, and civil society in each of the three countries) selected those issues as priorities through the voting process. Table A4-2 shows the complete tally for all issues selected by participants.

**Focus group meeting results**

**COMMONALITIES AMONG INSTITUTIONAL STAKEHOLDER GROUPS ACROSS THE THREE COUNTRIES**

A number of common themes and priority concerns emerged from the focus group discussions in all three countries, primarily focusing on environmental and social governance issues. Although the first three issues are largely national in scope, overall there was a lot of interest and support to deal with mining sector growth and related infrastructure development through sub-regional frameworks or mechanisms.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Environmental and social governance issues and environmental issues</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Clarity on roles and responsibilities of various government ministries for defining and enforcing environmental and social policies</td>
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<tr>
<td>2. Transparency and consistency of government processes for awarding concessions, mining development agreements, revenue splits and community investments</td>
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<tr>
<td>3. National and local government capacity to manage environmental and social issues</td>
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<tr>
<td>4. Corruption and conditions that lead to weak governance</td>
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<td>5. Water pollution and sanitation</td>
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<td>6. Deforestation and soil degradation</td>
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<tr>
<td>7. Land reclamation/rehabilitation for large-scale mines and artisanal sites</td>
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<td>8. Cumulative environmental effects of multiple mining or infrastructure projects</td>
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<tr>
<th>Social and socioeconomic issues</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Ad hoc approach of companies to local hiring, procurement, community development, vs. common standards or framework</td>
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<tr>
<td>2. Land tenure systems and balancing competing land uses</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Resettlement, land and crop compensation</td>
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<td>4. Employment and local procurement opportunities</td>
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<tr>
<td>5. Access to capital, tools, training, better benefit sharing, etc. for small-scale and artisanal miners</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Economic and community development, including opportunities for women and youth, and sustainability (post-closure) of investments, and community participation in development issues</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Distribution of benefits (surface rents, taxes, etc.) and contribution of mining to national economic development (not just to local community development)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Impact of in-migration on communities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Increase in social problems: Crime, HIV/AIDS, conflicts within families or communities</td>
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<tr>
<td>10. Cumulative social or socioeconomic effects of multiple mining projects</td>
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<td>11. Communications and dispute resolution mechanisms between stakeholders</td>
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<th>Regional/transborder issues</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Regional environmental planning and management of natural resources, habitat, biodiversity</td>
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<tr>
<td>2. Regional mechanism to establish goals on common fiscal, environmental, and social regulatory standards, and capacity-building needs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Regional infrastructure planning and coordination</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Management of interregional migration issues (crime, health, etc.)</td>
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<td>5. Regional communications and dispute resolution mechanisms</td>
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<tr>
<th>Infrastructure and downstream link issues</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Transparency/consistency of government processes for awarding infrastructure construction and operations concessions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Coordinated public/private/donor planning and investment for infrastructure development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Development of national private and public capacities for infrastructure provision</td>
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<tr>
<td>4. Multi-user shared access to mining sector-derived infrastructure (rail, power, etc.)</td>
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<tr>
<td>5. Participation of communities in infrastructure development decision-making processes</td>
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<tr>
<td>6. Long-term (post-mine closure) sustainability of infrastructure investments</td>
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<tr>
<td>7. Cumulative effects of multiple mining or infrastructure projects</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Eight of the nine focus groups across the three countries cited insufficient transparency and consistency of government decision-making processes for awarding concessions and infrastructure contracts, land use, community development investments, etc. Curiously, although corruption and conditions that lead to weak governance were explicitly presented as a separate issue on the list, only three focus groups specifically picked it as a priority. However, it was clear from the discussions that many stakeholders, including some government officials, believe that some important mining-related decisions are made in arbitrary, opaque, and potentially self-serving ways, often in contravention of existing policies. This may have been some participants’ euphemistic
way of referring to corruption in a group setting, especially in the government focus groups.

Table A4-2. Focus group priority issues

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Top priority issues</th>
<th>No. of focus groups selecting an issue</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Transparency and consistency of government processes for awarding concessions, mining development agreements, revenue splits, and community investments</td>
<td>8</td>
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<tr>
<td>Clarity on roles and responsibilities of various government ministries for defining and enforcing environmental and social policies</td>
<td>7</td>
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<tr>
<td>National and local government capacity to manage environmental and social issues</td>
<td>7</td>
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<tr>
<td>Regional environmental planning and management of natural resources, habitat, biodiversity</td>
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<tr>
<td>Regional mechanism to establish goals on common fiscal, environmental, and social regulatory standards and capacity-building needs</td>
<td>6</td>
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<tr>
<td>Management of interregional migration issues (crime, health, etc.)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Coordinated public/private/donor planning and investment for infrastructure development</td>
<td>5</td>
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<tr>
<td>Water pollution and sanitation</td>
<td>4</td>
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<tr>
<td>Deforestation and soil degradation</td>
<td>4</td>
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<tr>
<td>Land tenure systems and balancing competing land uses</td>
<td>4</td>
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<tr>
<td>Regional communications and dispute resolution mechanisms</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participation of communities in mining and infrastructure development decision-making processes</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a. Selected as a priority by four or more focus groups out of nine (government, industry, and civil society focus groups in each of the three countries)

607. Insufficient clear roles and responsibilities among various government agencies responsible for mining, environmental and social protections, land use, etc. was one of the three top priorities selected by seven of the nine focus groups. They noted conflicts of jurisdiction, including covert and overt power struggles among government entities responsible for mines, forests, land use, and the environment.

608. In the area of institutional strengthening and capacity building there was a similar recognition among all stakeholder groups for the need to provide institutional strengthening and capacity at multiple levels of government (national, provincial, local), with seven of them selecting it as a key priority. A number of group discussions also mentioned the need for capacity building and training within the mining industry because any significant expansion of mining activities in the three countries would require skills and capabilities that are in short supply, especially in Liberia and Sierra Leone. Others also cited the need for capacity building for civil society organizations as a way for them to better monitor environmental and social issues in communities affected by mining.

609. The groups also generally supported creation or strengthening of regional mechanisms or bodies to assist with:
• Improving and addressing cross-border issues such as joint management and protection of shared natural resources and sensitive biodiversity zones, immigration, and illicit movement of goods. The Gola forest, which lies on both sides of the Liberian and Sierra Leonean border, and where mining companies have been exploring for iron ore, was cited as an example of where this cross-border coordination and environmental management is needed.

• Harmonizing mining and infrastructure policies and planning.

• Strengthening institutional capacities for mineral sector governance.

• Improving regional communications and dispute resolution mechanisms.

• Dealing with issues arising from mining-related cross border movements and immigration, including border security, smuggling, crime, health issues, etc.

610. Other regional and cross-border issues or opportunities not on the study team’s proposed list but raised by various focus groups included a suggestion for regional monitoring of compliance with environmental and social laws and agreements, including the concept of a regional clearinghouse for information on company and government compliance. Also raised by some groups was the need for MRU-wide management of artisanal mining, and for creating a sub-regional platform to engage civil society in the sector.

611. More than one-half of the groups also highlighted the importance of coordinated public sector/private sector/donor planning and investments for infrastructure development, especially in light of the proposed development poll and development corridor concepts.

612. Another issue that came up frequently in the discussions, but which did not crystallize as its own discrete topic except in one group, is inadequate implementation, monitoring, and enforcement of environmental and social policies and regulations. This issue was linked to — and may have been embedded in — the issues of conflicting roles and responsibilities and lack of capacity. People repeatedly made reference to the fact that adequate environmental and social policies and procedures are in place, but that consistent implementation and follow-up are lacking due to resource and capacity constraints, unclear mandates, etc.

FOCUS GROUP DIFFERENCES ACROSS COUNTRIES

613. Given the fairly high degree of agreement on priorities among the focus groups in the three countries, there were not many instances of significant divergence among the three MRU members.

614. While prioritizing many of the governance issues noted above, the Guinean focus groups also identified issues of how mining revenues must contribute to the national economy and the well-being of mining-impacted communities and other rural areas of the country. Guineans are understood to be frustrated at how little economic value the country has to show for decades of large-scale bauxite mining. The Guineans were also the only focus groups to note the importance of having multi-user shared access to mining sector-derived infrastructure, no doubt because of the enclave mining facilities and single company dedicated rail lines that have been the norm in Guinea for many years. All three Guinea focus groups also identified environmental issues such as water
and sanitation, various types of pollution and environmental degradation, and compensation for their occurrence, perhaps because their country has a longer sustained history of large-scale mining, and thus exposure to and public awareness of these issues may be higher.

615. The Sierra Leonean focus groups did not join their Guinean and Liberian counterparts in identifying any infrastructure-related issues as high priority, such as the need for coordinated public-private planning, or multi-user access to infrastructure. These topics may be more prominent in the other two countries because of the ongoing rehabilitation of the Nimba-Buchanan rail line in Liberia and discussions surrounding several new mining-derived rail lines in Guinea. While a plan by London Mining to revive the Pepel-Port Loko rail line for multiple users in Sierra Leone was under consideration, it was sidelined when another mining company was granted exclusive access to the rail line.

616. One issue that was identified as a priority by some industry and civil society focus groups (but no government groups) was the importance of including participation by communities in mining and related infrastructure development decisions. Whether it involves siting of mining-related facilities, or company- or government-financed community development projects, mining communities are often the recipients of outcomes decided by others in the MRU and other countries. However, this model is changing as industry realizes they need community buy-in for their projects to avoid civil unrest, while civil society groups are increasingly helping communities become vocal about their needs and preferences early in the mining development process. The fact that only four groups identified this as a priority, and no government groups, suggests that more effort is needed to raise awareness of its importance to ensure long-term sustainability of community development initiatives.

617. None of the groups identified as an issue the cumulative environmental or social effects of multiple mining or infrastructure projects. This may be because the only country where this is beginning to be seen as a potential problem is Guinea, with the proposed addition of new mines and infrastructure near existing mining activities in the western part of the country. However, if the development pole and cluster concept becomes more widespread in the MRU countries, planners and other stakeholders will need to include cumulative effects of additional development in their impact assessments, mitigation strategies, and consultations.

618. Table A4-3 identifies which issues were selected as priorities by each of the nine focus groups in the three countries. Numbered items are those appearing in the initial list provided for discussion by the study team. Issues shown in italics are topics that were identified by one or several focus groups and added to their priority lists. An “X” indicates the issue was identified in a first round priority selection process (Guinean focus groups only did one round of issue selection). An “XX” indicates the issue was chosen as a top priority in a second round of priority selections, which occurred in Sierra Leone and Liberia. The Sierra Leonean groups also ranked their priorities (1, 2, 3, etc.). Item totals that are shaded indicate those issues selected as priorities by four or more focus groups.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Issue</th>
<th>Gui. gov’t</th>
<th>Gui. ind</th>
<th>Gui. CSOs</th>
<th>SL gov’t</th>
<th>SL ind</th>
<th>SL CSOs</th>
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<th>Lib. gov’t</th>
<th>Lib. CSOs</th>
<th>Totals</th>
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<td>5. Access to capital, tools, training, better benefit sharing,</td>
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<td>etc. for small-scale and artisanal miners</td>
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<td>6. [Strengthening and building capacity for] economic and community development, including opportunities for women and youth, and sustainability (post-closure) of investments, and community participation in development issues</td>
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<td>7. Distribution of benefits (surface rents, taxes, etc.) and contribution of mining to national economic development (not just to local community development)</td>
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<td>8. Impact of in-migration on communities</td>
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<td>9. Increase in social problems — security, crime, HIV/AIDS, conflicts within families or communities</td>
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<td>10. Cumulative social or socioeconomic effects of multiple mining projects</td>
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<td>Lack of harmonization of economic, social, and environmental issues and policies</td>
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<td>Management of mining revenues for community development in mining zones and other rural communities in the country</td>
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<td>Weak contribution of mining to national economy and to community of jobs, revenue-generating activities, local purchasing, small business, etc.</td>
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<td>Access to financing for small business and entrepreneurs, farmers for income-generating activities</td>
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<tr>
<td>2. Regional mechanism to establish goals on common fiscal, environmental, and social regulatory standards, and capacity-building needs (SL, Govt) — including compensation and benefit sharing where country may have disadvantage from regional approach</td>
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<td>4. Management of inter-regional migration issues (crimes, health, movement of licit and illicit goods and people, etc.)</td>
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<td>Regional consistency on national environmental and social responsibility standards and practices</td>
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<td>Enforcing compliance at the national level and monitoring at regional level for laws and agreements (e.g., mine closure plans)</td>
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<td>Issue</td>
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<td>Gui. CSOs</td>
<td>SL gov’t</td>
<td>SL ind</td>
<td>SL CSOs</td>
<td>Lib. gov’t</td>
<td>Lib. ind</td>
<td>Lib. CSOs</td>
<td>Totals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>------------</td>
<td>---------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
<td>----------</td>
<td>-------</td>
<td>---------</td>
<td>------------</td>
<td>---------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
<td>--------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional clearinghouse for info on company and gov’t compliance with agreements and commitments</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gov’t — regional security coordination (including movement of goods and people); CSOs — Inter-regional migration (human rights, security, crime, and health)</td>
<td>XX</td>
<td>#2</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Artisanal mining in Mano River basin as regional issue</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increase and share capacity expertise and best practice across region</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sub-regional platform for civil society engagement</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lack of mutual interest in managing goods and services in countries affected by transborder projects</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Infrastructure and downstream link issues**

1. Transparency/consistency of government processes for awarding infrastructure construction and operations concessions | X          |         |           |          |       |         |            |         |           | 1      |
2. Coordinated public/private/donor planning and investment for infrastructure development | X          | X       | X         |          |       |         |            |         |           | 5      |
3. Development of national public and private capacities for infrastructure provision (Guinean gov’t — weak national and sub-regional capacity to provide infrastructure) | X          |         |           |          |       |         |            |         |           | 2      |
4. Multi-user shared access to mining sector-derived infrastructure (rail, power, etc.) | X          | X       |           |          |       |         |            |         |           | 2      |
5. Participation of communities in [mining and] infrastructure development decision-making processes | X          | X       |           |          |       |         |            |         |           | 4      |
6. Long-term (post-mine closure) sustainability of infrastructure investments | X          |         |           |          |       |         |            |         |           | 2      |
7. Cumulative effects of multiple mining or infrastructure projects

**Notes**

1. Numbered items are those appearing in the initial list provided for discussion by the study team.
2. *Issues shown in italics* are topics that were identified by one or several focus groups and added to their priority lists.
3. An “X” indicates that the issue was identified in a first round priority selection process (Guinean focus groups only did one round of issue selection).
4. An “XX” indicates the issue was chosen as a top priority in a second round of priority selections, which occurred in Sierra Leone and Liberia.
5. The Sierra Leonean groups also ranked their priorities (1, 2, 3, etc.). Item totals that are shaded indicate those issues selected as priorities by four or more focus groups.
Community stakeholder surveys

Introduction

619. A second WAMSSA consultation effort sought input from community stakeholders. In order to ensure adequate representation of grassroots and mining project-affected communities, as well as the voices of the vulnerable (e.g., women, children, and youth) in the selection of WAMSSA priorities, a mining community survey was carried out. It targeted 10 communities in the three Mano River Union countries, selected to represent the breadth, depth, and diversity of communities affected by mines and/or infrastructure development.

620. A survey was administered to 22 to 25 respondents in each community, selected to represent the broad range of stakeholder groups in each one. The respondents were asked to prioritize social and environmental issues related to mining and infrastructure development from a list prepared by the WAMSSA study team (Table A4-4), by selecting the three most important priorities from among the 15 proposed by the study team. The respondents also had the opportunity to identify other priority social and environmental issues of their own not appearing in the list, although for the most part these issues were the same as those identified by the study team.

Table A4-4. Community survey issues

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Categories and issues</th>
<th>Issues</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>National/local governance issues</td>
<td>1. Insufficient transparency/consistency of decision-making processes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. Insufficient clarity of roles and responsibilities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3. Insufficient government capacity to manage environmental and social issues</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4. Corruption and conditions leading to corruption/weak governance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional/national/local environmental issues</td>
<td>5. Competing land and water uses</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6. Environmental degradation (soil, water, air)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>7. Reclamation/rehabilitation of closed/abandoned mine sites</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>8. Access to information on environmental risks, impacts of mining, and grievance mechanisms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional/national/local social issues</td>
<td>9. Community stakeholder participation in development decisions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>10. Shared multi-user access to infrastructure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>11. In-migration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>12. Communications and dispute resolution mechanisms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other regional/transborder issues</td>
<td>13. Multi-country management of natural resources and habitat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>14. Multi-country infrastructure planning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>15. Cross-border benefit sharing</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**Community selection**

621. The WAMSSA team mapped major mining communities in the three countries with the help of local partners to identify a representative set of communities to be surveyed. The objective was to identify a series of mining-area communities that capture the range of elements and issues that are representative of mining communities across the entire MRU region (Table 8 in the main report). Thus the team considered communities near an operating mine with a history of mine-community relations, mine sites abandoned during the civil wars but now being rebuilt, communities where artisanal mining or small-scale mining is present, and communities that have experienced significant within-country or transborder in-migration.

622. The team also included one site, Buchanan in Liberia, as an example of a community that will be affected by mining-derived infrastructure development (e.g., rehabilitation of a cross-country rail line and port facilities) but not mining itself. Other mining communities selected are also located on or near rail and port facilities. Profiles of the selected communities are presented in Table A4-5, including some of the mining-induced environmental and social impacts.

**Conducting the survey**

623. The WAMSSA team worked with local partners to identify and field local survey teams in each country, and tabulate the results. Each two-person team, a man and woman fluent in the local languages, were responsible for carrying out the surveys and tabulating the results. The WAMSSA study team provided the local survey team with survey interview guides and data collection sheets to conduct the surveys (Annex 5).

624. The local survey teams contacted the communities in advance of the visits. Where local protocol dictated, they held informational meetings with community leaders and other community representatives to properly inform community members of the goals and approach of the survey, as well as to help select appropriate interview candidates.

625. Great care was taken by the WAMSSA interviewers to respect traditional hierarchy, and solicit the support of village/community authorities where necessary. The interviewers used local languages and respected local practices, including length of the discussions, time of day, and an appropriate venue in the community for meetings.

626. The survey team interviewed 22 to 25 stakeholders in each community. These stakeholders were drawn from all the categories below that were represented and available in each community:

1. Local appointed representative of national government (e.g., county or provincial authorities),
2. Local agents of mines, lands and/or environment ministries (if any),
3. Local elected representatives of community (local councils, etc.),
4. Local traditional leaders and/or elders,
5. Local business owners (shopkeepers),
6. Mining company manager (for communities near large- or small-scale mining activities),
Table A4-5. Profiles of surveyed communities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Community description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fria, Guinea</td>
<td>Located near Fria Alumina plant, began in 1950s, the only existing alumina facility in Guinea, which was owned by Reynolds Aluminum, then bought out by RusAl. Site of sand and other quarry materials used by Fria plant. Rail line from Fria to port of Conakry. Lots of built social infrastructure in town, spotty community relations, water/electricity problems, overcrowding and sanitation issues due to population growth from in-migration over years.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bintimodia, Guinea</td>
<td>A small town off the paved road from Conakry to Kamsar (45-50 kms from Kamsar). Many residents are unskilled workers from CBG. Town is site of projects funded by CBG, including a bridge to link Kamsar with Bini village. Town is located down wind from bauxite drying facility, is a rice growing area that was supposed to be selling to the CBG mine workforce.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sangarédi, Guinea</td>
<td>Small town that grew up around current CBG bauxite mine site with mine infrastructure. Exploration began in 1960 with production starting in 1973. Company built production facilities, employee housing, rail line to Kamsar. Sangarédi and nearby communities expected to expand even more when GAC mining and alumina processing begins. Twenty impacted communities in area around Sangarédi were identified and studied by GAC for ESIA for new facilities separate from those of CBG, a few villages are scheduled for resettlement. Social issues remain from original CBG resettlement effort: local communities whose land was taken for mining not getting compensated. Mine take area will increase, as will traffic and population.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kanfarandé, Guinea</td>
<td>Located near Kamsar, the port for the CBG operations. While CBG has provided some community investments, the community says air and dust pollution from the Kamsar plant has affected local health conditions and crop production. Dredging for the port has caused mud inundations and disturbed traditional fishing activities. The region is also expected to be affected by the DianDian project located further inland because there are plans to connect that project to a port at Boubali via a 112-km rail line that will pass through the Kanfarandé region.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Koidu Town, Kono District, Sierra Leone</td>
<td>First area where diamonds discovered in Sierra Leone in 1930s. Currently site of country’s only large-scale industrial kimberlite diamond miner, Koidu Holdings Ltd., plus dozen or so other small scale mining companies, as well as artisanal miners digging in alluvial deposits. Few visible benefits of many years of diamond mining. Local infrastructure has always been deficient, became further run down during civil war. Many buildings still burned out, road system unpaved and degraded, poverty widespread. Environmental issues include many abandoned mine pits and piles of mine waste. Population has shrunk due to mining out of nearby alluvial deposits and suspension of Koidu Holdings operations in 2008 following clashes between mineworkers and security forces.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moriba Town, Sierra Leone</td>
<td>One of several communities located near Sierra Rutile Mining concessions area, some overcrowding. Very little artisanal mining in this area, most mining activity was done by Sierra Rutile workforce (800 workers at recent peak). Agriculture is prime activity of those not employed by mine. Dredge accident in July 2008 led to massive slowdown of operations, high unemployment in area now.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tongo Town, Kenema District, Sierra Leone</td>
<td>Artisanal mining area. Was site of European (later nationalized) alluvial diamond mining operations from 1950s to 1980s. Koidu Holdings opened office there recently but most mining activity occurring in region is artisanal. Region heavily damaged from artisanal activity, large water-filled pits, high mosquito population. Town is mostly mud huts with thatched roofs, and a few modern buildings, including Koidu facility.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Port of Buchanan, Grand Bassa County, Liberia</td>
<td>Large town of over 30,000. Port was built in 1960s by LAMCO to export iron ore from Mt. Nimba, has also been outlet for logs, rubber and some commercial goods. City grew quickly over two decades, but then port and rail facilities largely destroyed by civil war, when it became a ghost town. Arcelor-Mittal now rebuilding port and rail link to large iron ore Yekepa mine in Nimba County.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lofa Bridge, Grand Cape Mount County, Liberia</td>
<td>Lofa Bridge is a transitory crossroads town created by mining activities. Named for bridge constructed across Lofa River to reach former National Iron Ore Company iron ore deposit on border with Sierra Leone. It was a vibrant mining community before the war, with artisans and small-scale mining, some are now coming back. Community of approximately 5,000 people, mostly living in temporary structures as population fluctuates. Confluence of two rivers.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sanequellie, Yekepa, Nimba County, Liberia</td>
<td>LAMCO had a large-scale open pit iron ore mine from 1960s until the civil war. Yekepa was large vibrant well-developed mining community, now quite run down. Close to Guinea and Côte d’Ivoire borders, many residents fled into Guinea during civil war. Environmental issues include lots of old mine works, land reclamation issues, water pollution in St John’s River. Arcelor-Mittal developing new mine and production facility and rehabilitating rail line to port of Buchanan.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
7. Diamond or gold brokers or dealers (if present),
8. Local civil society organizations (e.g., associations, cooperatives, etc.),
9. Women,
10. Youth,
11. Farmers,
12. Current or former mine or mill employees (for communities near large- or small-scale mining activities),
13. Artisanal miners (for communities where it exists),
14. Vulnerables (handicapped persons, widows, persons living with HIV/AIDS, etc.),
15. Ex-combatants, and
16. Foreign immigrants.

The survey teams attempted to interview at least two people from each category, except where there may have been only one person in a category (e.g., village chief) in a particular community. In many cases, respondents represented multiple categories (woman farmer who is on local council, ex-combatant who is artisanal miner, immigrant who is mine employee, etc.). While assistance from local contacts was sought to identify interview candidates fitting the above criteria, great care was taken by the survey team to ensure that those selected were broadly representative of the community, and not just hand-picked friends or allies of local powerful players. Community members were told that the survey team was looking for diverse views that were representative of the entire community.

Following any general community discussions that took place, the survey team then conducted in-depth, semi-structured, one-on-one interviews with individual stakeholders. The surveyors explained the objectives of the survey, provided an overview of WAMSSA, asked for some basic biographical information, and then asked the respondents to identify two or three social or environmental issues related to mining (or infrastructure development if they were near a current or future infrastructure site) that are most important to them, and why. Then the surveyors read and explained the WAMSSA study team list of 15 issues, and asked the respondents to select his/her top three priorities from among this list and why. Respondents were also asked if any of the issues they identified should be considered as important as or more important than the one on the WAMSSA list, and why. Surveyors also asked respondents to assess the political will of government authorities to resolve the priorities they identified (Annex 5).

Survey responses

A total of 234 people responded to the surveys in the 10 communities (three each in Liberia and Sierra Leone and four in Guinea) (Table A4-6). Of these, around one-third (77) were women. Thirteen were foreigners in the country where the survey was taking place, including four Malians, three Guineans, three Lebanese, one Liberian, and one Gambian.

As noted earlier, each respondent was asked to select up to three priorities from among the 15 environmental and social issues presented in the survey. Table A4-7 ranks the issues by the percentage of respondents who selected them as priorities.
Table A4-6. Survey respondents by community

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country and community</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Men</th>
<th>Women</th>
<th>Foreign</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Liberia</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Buchanan</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yekepa</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lofa Bridge</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sierra Leone</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kono</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tongo</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moriba</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guinea</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bintimodia</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fria</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kafarande</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sangaredi</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>234</td>
<td>157</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table A4-7. Ranking of community survey priority issues

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Issue</th>
<th>% of total n=234</th>
<th>% of women n = 77</th>
<th>% of men n=157</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Insufficient transparency/consistency of decision-making processes</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Environmental degradation</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community stakeholder participation in development decisions</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corruption and conditions leading to corruption/weak governance</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reclamation/rehabilitation of closed/abandoned mine sites</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Insufficient government capacity</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In-migration</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Competing land and water uses</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Access to information on environmental risks and impacts of mining and to grievance mechanisms</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communications and dispute resolution mechanisms</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Insufficient clarity of roles and responsibilities</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shared multi-user access to infrastructure</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multi-country management of natural resources and habitat</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cross-border benefit sharing</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multi-country infrastructure planning</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Four issues were identified as priorities by nearly one-half of the respondents (Table A4-7):

The issue garnering the most responses (49 percent) as a priority was insufficient transparency or consistency of government or village decision-making processes for awarding mining concessions, land use, and community development spending. This is consistent with the institutional focus groups.

Environmental degradation (air, soil, water pollution, etc.) was also cited as a priority, which is not surprising because these communities directly bear the brunt of any problems that arise in these areas.

The need for broader community stakeholder participation in community development-related decisions also scored highly among respondents. This is also not surprising given that communities must live with the consequences of such decisions, but are often not consulted until after the fact, or are merely informed of what is to transpire without an opportunity to provide their input. This issue relates to decisions for where to site mining facilities and related infrastructure, and also applies to any community development activities that may be undertaken by the mining companies or government. The relatively high score for this issue across the survey suggests that communities have high expectations that they should be included in such discussions.

Nearly four in 10 respondents also cited corruption and conditions that lead to corruption or weak governance as a priority issue. As with the institutional stakeholders, the perception of corruption as an issue may be even higher if one assumes it is only the most extreme case of what is identified as the top issue, i.e., insufficient transparency or consistency in decision making. This also indicates that corruption and self-interest are present at the community and national government levels, which will make it hard to combat through policy reforms because it is so pervasive.

Two other issues were also selected as priorities by more than one-quarter of the respondents:

Reclamation or rehabilitation of closed or abandoned mines sites, as with other environmental issues, is felt most acutely at the local level, and may escape the attention of institutional stakeholders sitting in the capital city.

Insufficient national, provincial, and local government capacity to manage mining- or infrastructure-related environmental and social issues and adequately protect the rights of weak, vulnerable, and adversely affected stakeholders also scored high. The importance of this issue for communities mirrors the similar perception indicated by institutional stakeholders. It also demonstrates yet another issue that is prevalent from top to bottom within the system and thus will need a significant effort to be remedied.

In contrast to the results in the focus groups held among institutional stakeholders in the capital cities, there was virtually no interest shown by community respondents in the three issues on the list specifically focused on regional and transborder issues:

- Cross-border management of shared natural resources and habitat,
Multi-country infrastructure planning involving local authorities and stakeholders, and
Cross border sharing of benefits from mining or infrastructure projects.

While none of the sites sits directly on a border, they all had immigrants from neighboring countries, some of whom responded to the survey, and were thus aware that people moved across borders and into their communities. There was some concern, especially among women, about the effects of in-migration, but otherwise results in all three countries appear to track what was found by the Sierra Leone field survey team. They noted that community residents were mostly focused on resolving local issues, and seemed unable or unwilling to think about problems or solutions at a sub-regional or even national level. The five people who did identify one or more of the above three issues as a priority were all in Sierra Leone. They included a traditional leader, a local government employee, two immigrant Guinean artisanal miners (one of whom was an ex-combatant), and a shopkeeper in Kono.

Community survey differences among the MRU countries

Results varied more widely by country, although many of the same issues stayed at or near the top of all three lists (Table A4-8). Decision-making transparency, insufficient capacity, and environmental degradation were all among the top five issues for the three countries, with corruption, reclamation/rehabilitation of mine sites, and community participation in development decisions appearing in the top five for two of the three countries. Interestingly, no one in Liberia identified reclamation or rehabilitation as a priority issue, although environmental degradation was an issue for one-third of them (34 percent). This may be due to a lack of familiarity with large-scale mining activities. One site, Buchanan, is a port, old mines near Yekepa have been closed for many years but are now being resuscitated, and Lofa Bridge is largely an artisanal mining area. By contrast, the communities surveyed in Sierra Leone, located near the Koidu and Sierra Rutile operations, have had recent experience with mine sites closing or going into care and maintenance with little or no rehabilitation.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Guinea (n = 88)</th>
<th>Liberia (n = 67)</th>
<th>Sierra Leone (n = 79)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Environmental degradation (63%)</td>
<td>1. Community participation in development decisions (90%)</td>
<td>1. Rehabilitation of mine sites (56%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Lack of gov’t capacity (34%)</td>
<td>2. Transparency/consistency of decision making (73%)</td>
<td>2. Transparency/consistency of decision-making (52%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Corruption (34%)</td>
<td>3. Corruption (63%)</td>
<td>3. Community participation in development decisions (37%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Transparency (27%)</td>
<td>4. Environmental degradation (34%)</td>
<td>4. Environmental degradation (34%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Rehabilitation of mine sites (23%)</td>
<td>5. Lack of gov’t capacity (16%)</td>
<td>5. Lack of gov’t capacity (24%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Liberian respondents showed more unanimity in their priorities, with 90 percent identifying community stakeholder participation in development decisions as a top priority. Decision-making transparency (73 percent) and corruption (63 percent) also
attracted a strong majority of votes. Following the end of the war, there has been tremendous enthusiasm and expectations built up in Liberia for life to improve, however, there are fears the current Government will become as corrupt as the transitional one that preceded it. Also, a vast countrywide initiative carried out in the past two years — using participatory rural appraisal techniques to build bottom-up county development plans as part of the PRSP effort — may have led people to expect more of a say in how the mining sector and related port and rail infrastructure will be developed and their benefits shared.

643. In Sierra Leone reclamation and decision-making transparency were selected by more than one-half the respondents, with stakeholder participation in development decisions and environmental degradation attracting more than one-third of respondents.

644. Guinea communities, which have seen the environmental effects of longstanding mines in the Western region of the country, identified environmental degradation (63 percent) as a top priority, with one-third of them also identifying Government capacity and corruption as key issues.

645. At the community level, a few communities stand out for their choice of priorities. For example, after many years of neglect, Buchanan is on the verge of major upgrades to the port and incoming rail system to handle iron ore traffic from Arcelor-Mittal. It is perhaps no surprise that 90 percent of the Buchanan respondents said there needs to be more community stakeholder participation in development decisions. More than two-thirds (67 percent) are concerned about corruption, perhaps because of all the new economic activity, and 62 percent want to see more transparency and consistency in Government decisions affecting infrastructure and mining development.

Survey results by gender

646. There was a fair amount of consistency between men and women — the top four priorities were the same, although the order shifted slightly. Men tended to vote slightly more heavily for a smaller number of issues, while women spread their votes across a wider range of priorities. Transparency and consistency was selected as the top priority by more than one-half of the male respondents (55 percent) with the next three priorities all garnering more than 40 percent. The top priority for women, environmental degradation, just achieved 40 percent, while the others ranged from the low to mid-30s. Reclamation/rehabilitation and lack of capacity also figured in the top six or seven issues for both men and women.

National workshop

Introduction

647. The WAMSSA team organized three national workshops in Conakry, Freetown, and Monrovia to validate WAMSSA’s main findings, select WAMSSA’s priorities, and identify key policy and institutional adjustments to be incorporated in mining reforms of the Mano River countries and the African Regional Mineral Governance Program. A key goal of the national workshop was to select the WAMSSA priorities from among critical issues that were identified during the consultations and analysis held to date.
The majority of workshop invitees were participants in the focus group meetings, and the national workshop brought together representatives from industry, government, and civil society in one meeting. The WAMSSA focal point in the mines ministry in each country, local consultants, and key informants helped to identify key contacts within each stakeholder group.

- Nearly 80 stakeholders participated in the three national workshops altogether, with each workshop combining representatives of government, industry, and civil society from a single country.
- The groups reviewed the WAMSSA work to date and then selected top priority issues from the focus group and community survey work.
- The group also identified potential winners and losers, as well as enabling and blocking factors to improve mineral governance under two scenarios — increased local participation in development planning and increased regional harmonization of policies and planning.

**Selection of national priorities**

Participants in each national workshop were presented with the 12 critical issues that were culled from the research component of the project, focus group meetings, and community surveys. They were the issues that came up the most often or attracted the most interest in all of these activities.

After a discussion of the issues to ensure everyone understood how they were defined, participants in each national workshop were each given five votes to vote for their top priorities. The participants were asked to use one vote for their top environmental issue, one for their top social issue, and one for their top governance issue. They were allowed to allocate their two remaining votes as they wished. Table 9 in the main report shows how the stakeholders at the three national workshops and the community surveys voted to select their key priorities. Table A4-9 compares how issues were ranked in the national workshop in each country, as well as in the community survey across the entire region.

Results of the three national workshops were combined to determine which were the top five priority issues across the stakeholder groups from the three countries. Logistical challenges precluded bringing a significantly representative number of community and grassroots stakeholders to the national workshops, however, grassroots community priorities were retained in the prioritization process by including the top five priorities selected by the community stakeholders from the surveys. The final list of seven priorities (Table A4-10) includes any issue identified as a priority by the community stakeholders, or by community stakeholders and at least one of the national workshops, or by two or more national workshops.
Table A4-9. Issue ranking of top priorities by country

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Community surveys</th>
<th>Sierra Leone</th>
<th>Liberia&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
<th>Guinea&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Transparency/ consistency of decision-making processes (49%)</td>
<td>1. Transparency/ consistency of decision-making processes (17%)</td>
<td>1. Transparency/ consistency of decision-making processes (20%)</td>
<td>1. Poverty in mining areas (19%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Environmental degradation (45%)</td>
<td>2. Poverty in mining areas (17%)</td>
<td>2. Disenfranchisement of communities (17%)</td>
<td>2. Lack of capacity (14%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Community participation in development decisions (44%)</td>
<td>3. Deforestation/ biodiversity loss (15%)</td>
<td>3. Deforestation/ biodiversity loss (16%)</td>
<td>3. Deforestation/ biodiversity loss (13%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Rent-seeking behavior (38%)</td>
<td>4. Land degradation and need for reclamation (15%)</td>
<td>4. Poverty (13%)</td>
<td>4. Frustration with Government performance (12%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Reclamation/ rehabilitation of mining areas (27%)</td>
<td>5. Lack of capacity (8%)</td>
<td>5. Transparency/consistency of decision-making processes (10%)</td>
<td>5. Transparency/consistency of decision-making processes (10%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Lack of capacity (26%)</td>
<td>6. Rent-seeking behavior (8%)</td>
<td>6. Disenfranchisement of local communities (10%)</td>
<td>6. Disenfranchisement of local communities (10%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<sup>a</sup> Italics = chosen as a priority by a national workshop but was not one of final WAMSSA regional priorities (institutional and/or community)

Table A4-10. Seven selected priorities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Topic</th>
<th>Priorities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Environmental</td>
<td>• Deforestation and loss of biodiversity (institutional stakeholder priority)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Land degradation and need for reclamation (community stakeholder priority)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social</td>
<td>• Poverty in mining areas (institutional stakeholder priority)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Governance</td>
<td>• Insufficient transparency/consistency of decision-making (institutional and community)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Lack of capacity (institutional and community)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Disenfranchisement of local communities (institutional and community)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Rent-seeking behavior (community)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Scenario analysis

Research and consultations with stakeholders indicated that there were benefits to adopting regional harmonization, as well as advantages to increasing local government and community participation. A scenario analysis exercise was conducted in the national workshop to separate advantages or benefits and disadvantages or costs of each scenario (regional harmonization and local government/community participation) relative to the status quo for the mining sector in the Mano River Union countries.

- **Regional harmonization scenario.** Regional harmonization assumes that policy and project development (of both mining and associated downstream ventures) and infrastructure takes advantage of the cluster approach outlined above. The scenario assumes a great deal of planning integration among countries.

- **Local government/community participation scenario.** The underlying conceptual framework of this scenario is that mining and infrastructure development initiatives in the MRU countries include a much greater level of
participation in decision making by local government and affected communities. This increased engagement and participation by local stakeholders has been cited time and again in countries with active mining sectors as a way to manage community expectations, reduce civil conflict and poor mine-community relations, and ensure that industry and government investments in the communities are well-spent and oriented toward poverty alleviation.

**Scenario analysis discussion**

653. Workshop participants broke into small groups, each of which was assigned one of the two scenarios above. Breakout groups were also given additional descriptive information on the types of activities one might see under the scenario, and were asked to discuss two issues:

- Identify who are the *winners* and *losers* in a given scenario, and
- Identify what enables or blocks a scenario.

654. Care was taken to ensure that each breakout group was a mix of government, industry, and CSO representatives, and the WAMSSA team circulated throughout the exercise to ensure that all participants were given a chance to speak. The discussions were lively, with a variety of opinions expressed in each group, although each one converged to a single set of key points which they presented to the large group in a final plenary session (Table A4-11). One representative from each group made the presentation, although other participants were allowed to add additional comments to the rapporteur’s presentation.

**WAMSSA regional validation workshop**

**Introduction**

655. The final public consultation activity of the WAMSSA study was the regional validation workshop. This one-day workshop was held in Freetown, Sierra Leone on November 3, and organized in cooperation with the Mano River Union Secretariat, based in Freetown, in keeping with the sub-regional nature of the WAMSSA study.

**Workshop objectives**

656. The purpose of the regional workshop was to assemble government, industry, civil society, and community representatives from Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone to review, discuss, and validate the WAMSSA draft final report and recommendations of the study team to include useful feedback and input from stakeholders on the report. The workshop also provided an opportunity for the World Bank Mining Department to provide an update and solicit comments on the African Regional Mineral Governance project. The workshop enabled the team to solicit stakeholder input and validation of the findings as the final consultation component of the WAMSSA policy dialogue.

**Methodology**

657. The one-day workshop in Freetown included three eight-person delegations from Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone. For each country, invitations were sent to:
- A mines ministry representative who is also the WAMSSA national focal point for that country,
- one environment ministry (or other designated government) representative,
- two civil society representatives,
- two mining community representatives, and
- two mining industry representatives (who were expected to pay their own travel costs).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Guinea</th>
<th>Liberia</th>
<th>Sierra Leone</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Winners</strong></td>
<td>Mining companies — reduce costs of installation and operation; also investment guarantees, lower corruption</td>
<td>National governments of Liberia and Guinea — increase revenues and employment</td>
<td>MMR, other ministries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>National governments — improve revenues through negotiation of win-win contracts; also facilitate contracts, more secure investments, management transparency, poverty reduction, infrastructure development, consideration for environmental issues</td>
<td></td>
<td>Central government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Local governance — job creation, eliminate frustration</td>
<td></td>
<td>Local government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Donors — develop projects, guarantee funds</td>
<td></td>
<td>Traditional Leaders</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Losers</strong></td>
<td>Local communities — because of destruction of flora and fauna</td>
<td>Local communities — influx of foreigners, redistribution or destruction of towns and villages, pollution, land degradation, deforestation</td>
<td>Illicit players (“bad” mining companies, corrupt govt officials)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Artisanal miners — competition, precarious sector, lack of organization</td>
<td></td>
<td>Companies — face stronger, unified negotiators when negotiating contracts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Enablers</strong></td>
<td>Solidifying MRU process through common political will of governments to make it a true tool for sub-regional development</td>
<td>Transparency of transactions and decision-making</td>
<td>Review of national mining policies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Set up a consultation mechanism</td>
<td></td>
<td>Integration and harmonization (ECOWAS, AU, MRU, WB, D4D)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Political stability</td>
<td></td>
<td>Political will of members states within MRU framework</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Appropriate/suitable infrastructure</td>
<td></td>
<td>Social, economic, cultural ties and security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Strengthen capacity</td>
<td></td>
<td>Emergence of vibrant civil societies countries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Blockers</strong></td>
<td>Lack of political will driven by exacerbated nationalism</td>
<td>Corruption and patronage at all levels</td>
<td>Mining companies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>International or sub-regional crisis</td>
<td></td>
<td>Communities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Lack of transparency</td>
<td></td>
<td>Capacity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Language barrier/interpretation of laws</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table A4-11. Results from the scenario analysis national workshops

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Guinea</th>
<th>Liberia</th>
<th>Sierra Leone</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Losers, including illicit miners</td>
<td>• Losers, including illicit miners</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Enforcement/implementation</td>
<td>• Enforcement/implementation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Diverging or conflicting donor agendas</td>
<td>• Diverging or conflicting donor agendas</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

658. Stakeholders invited to the workshop included participants from focus groups and national workshops held in each of the three countries as part of earlier WAMSSA consultation activities. In addition, invitations were sent to WAMSSA Steering Committee (SC) members, who were also in Freetown to attend the Steering Committee meeting:

- Two WAMSSA SC members from ECOWAS,
- One WAMSSA SC member from WAEMU, and
- One WAMSSA SC member from the Mano River Union Secretariat.

659. Other invitees included representatives from the World Bank, other donor agencies, and international NGOs. Government, civil society, and community participants’ travel and per diem were paid by WAMSSA to ensure their ability to participate.

660. The workshop was organized and executed by a core member of the Golder/AGChange team with assistance from four Sierra Leone-based support staff (facilitator, rapporteur, and two interpreters).

661. Workshop participants were provided with materials in advance for review, including a summary of the findings and recommendations of the WAMSSA draft final report. These materials were translated into French for francophone participants. The workshop was conducted largely in English, and simultaneous and consecutive interpretation services were provided to facilitate interaction between anglophone and francophone workshop attendees.

662. The workshop was opened with introductions by the deputy secretary general of the Mano River Union, the acting director for mines in the Sierra Leone Ministry of Mining and Mineral Resources, and brief remarks by the World Bank task team leader.

663. Presentations were made in plenary sessions to provide an update on the status of the African Regional Mineral Governance Project, and to present the findings and recommendations of the WAMSSA draft report. Questions and answers were addressed throughout the sessions, and participant feedback was actively solicited. Facilitators took care to make sure the voices of women, community members, francophone, and less outspoken participants were included in the discussions.

664. Following the initial plenary session, four heterogeneous small groups were formed (each including a cross-section of government, industry, civil society, community, and donor representatives) to discuss the WAMSSA report’s action matrix. The action matrix, intended to operationalize the WAMSSA recommendations, includes short-, medium-, and long-term proposed activities and outcomes. Each breakout group
was asked to focus on the activities and outcome of one or several of the WAMSSA recommendations, including a discussion of how the outcomes support the recommendations, and who should be responsible for making the actions happen.

665. After the breakout sessions, participants reconvened in a plenary session and a rapporteur from each group briefed the entire audience on the output of their group. Ample opportunity was given for others in the workgroup and the general audience to comment on the findings and conclusions from each group.

666. The WAMSSA study team then opened the floor to final discussions and comments on the process and study, before making closing remarks and adjourning the workshop.

**Workshop results**

667. Forty people attended the workshop, including representatives from the governments, civil societies, and mining communities of the three countries, and industry representatives from Guinea and Liberia, as well as donor agencies and the media (Annex 6).

668. Workshop participants reviewed, discussed, provided input and feedback, and ultimately validated the WAMSSA approach. This approach included regional integration of mining infrastructure (using a mineral cluster-based approach), social accountability, local development, and environmental governance.

669. Participants also endorsed the WAMSSA consultation process, which included bottom-up consultations, focus group discussions, national workshops, and the final regional workshop, all supported by concurrent analytical tracks. There was also agreement that WAMSSA results should be used to inform the design of the African Mineral Governance Project.

670. The participants endorsed the recommendations contained in the WAMSSA report, as well as the supporting action matrix of activities. They especially stressed the need for a permanent, ongoing multi-stakeholder mechanism to continue the policy dialogue begun under WAMSSA, as a way to ensure a transparent and inclusive approach to sustainable mineral sector and infrastructure development in the region.

**Follow-up**

671. The comments from workshop participants, including suggested adjustments to the recommendations and action matrix, were conveyed to the final WAMSSA Steering Committee meeting and incorporated into the final version of the WAMSSA report.

**Suggested path forward and framework for future regional consultations and policy dialogue**

672. To continue and expand the policy dialogue begun by WAMSSA, a multi-stakeholder framework is proposed that would include a series of multi-stakeholder bodies formed at the regional, national, and local levels to ensure transparent stakeholder participation and social accountability for mining development decisions (Figure 10 in the main report).
673. International organizations, line ministries at the national level, and local government bodies would be a form of secretariat to develop policy and planning efforts, but they would be informed by and accountable to multi-stakeholder groups that would provide valuable input and feedback on priorities and proposed initiatives. The multi-stakeholder groups could be formed from existing groups or bodies at each level, such as regional civil society consortia, national EITI committees, and local community-based organizations, or created as new entities where appropriate (Figure 10 in the main report).
Annex 5. Community Survey Interview Guide

West Africa Minerals Sector Strategic Assessment
Community Survey Interview Guide
26 January 2009

Notes to survey interviewer/enumerator: Introduce yourself to the respondent, explain that you are part of a Study Team conducting a survey for the World Bank to gather information to help the government improve its policies for the mining sector and to ensure that the economic benefits of mining are shared more broadly with local communities and the rest of the country.

Say that you will provide an overview of the WAMSSA study, and then ask a series of questions of the respondent and then ask the respondent to identify his/her most important social or environmental issues or problems that the study needs to consider in its next phase.

Use the following talking points to provide an overview of the WAMSSA study and related African Mineral Governance Project, highlighting the importance of hearing the concerns of respondents:

1. Introduction to WAMSSA Study and Africa Mineral Governance Project

- WAMMSA stands for West Africa Minerals Sector Strategic Assessment
- WAMSSA is a study to identify the environmental and social impacts of mining and related infrastructure development in three countries of the Mano River Union (Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone)
- The study seeks to identify ways the World Bank can assist governments to better manage these impacts at the regional and national level in the three countries as the mining sector develops and grows over the next 5-10 years.
- The study also seeks to identify ways that mining sector revenues can contribute to broader economic and social development at the regional, national and local level
- The study team seeks key stakeholder input (from communities, government, mining companies, etc.) to select key environmental and social priorities that need to be addressed by the study.
- This survey is an important part of those stakeholder consultations, it is being carried out in your community and other communities across the three countries
- The study is regional in focus, it seeks to identify the regional, cross-border or other common issues in the three countries that come from mining and infrastructure development
- The study also seeks to identify the potential regional solutions, including harmonized or coordinated approaches by government and donors to address these issues
- The results of the study and the team’s recommendations will help the World Bank design an Africa Mineral Governance Project to invest in
- Strengthening government’s ability to govern and manage the mining sector, including policy reforms and capacity building
- Ways to improve the mining sector’s contribution to regional, national and local economic growth and community development
The initial beneficiaries of the large investment project are the three pilot countries, but it will also be extended to other African countries over time.

Once this introduction has been made, remind the respondents that the purpose of your discussion with them is to get their views on key environmental and social issues that the study team should be aware of in identifying ways governance in the mining sector can be improved with World Bank assistance.

Ask if there are any questions about the WAMSSA study or the larger regional mineral governance project. If they raise a concern with confidentiality tell them the study team will not identify any individuals by name in our report, but may use their responses with a general indicator of which stakeholder group they represent (woman farmer, local government official, artisanal miner, etc.)

2. Completing the Community Survey Response Sheet

A. Respondent Profile

Ask questions to complete Section 1: Respondent Profile of the Community Survey Response Sheet.

B. Respondent’s Social and Environmental Issues

Ask the respondent to identify what two or three social or environmental issues related to mining (or infrastructure development if they are near a current or future infrastructure site) are most important to them, and why. Write down a brief description of each issue and why the respondent feels it is important on the Community Survey Response Sheet under Section 2: Respondent’s Issues. Ask the respondent if their issues have a regional or cross-border dimension to them (i.e. involving the people or governments of neighboring countries), and if they believe the issues could or should be solved at the regional level (i.e. by local or national governments from neighboring countries). Note their answers on the response sheet.

C. Prioritize Issues identified from WAMSSA Team analysis

Tell the respondents that the study team has done its own research and talked to many people in the three countries, to identify its own list of social and environmental issues. Add that we would now like to ask them to help us select the most important issues on our list for further study.

Using Section 3: WAMSSA Study Team Issues List of the Survey Response Sheet, read and explain briefly each item on the list to make sure the respondent understands the issue. Then, ask the respondent to select his/her top three priorities that should be addressed in the next phase of WAMSSA. Mark which ones are selected and briefly note any explanation for how or why the respondent sees it as an issue. Also ask if he/she believes issue could/should be addressed at a regional/multi-country level. Note the answer.

D. Additional questions

Gather additional information on the respondent’s own priorities, and his/her assessment of the government’s political will to resolve them, following the instructions on the survey worksheet.

E. Closing Remarks

Thank the respondent for his/her time. Say that the results of the community interviews will be used to help determine which critical issues will be addressed by the WAMSSA team in the next phase of the WAMSSA study, in order to provide solutions to the World Bank and MRU governments.
Section 1: Respondent Profile

Full/maiden name: ___________________________ Gender: M F

Age/Date of Birth: _____________ Place of birth: _____________________________

Nationality: __________________ Number of years living in the community: _____________

Occupation now: ____________________________________________________________

Occupation ten years ago: ____________________________________________________

Section 2: Respondent’s Issues

What two or three social or environmental issues related to mining (or infrastructure development if he/she is near a current or future infrastructure site) are most important to him/her, and why?

Do these issues have a regional or cross-border dimension to them (i.e. involving the people or governments of neighboring countries), or can they be solved at the regional level?

Issue 1:________________________________________________________________________

Issue 2:________________________________________________________________________

Issue 3:________________________________________________________________________

Other comments or notes
Section 3: WAMSSA Study Team Issues List

After reading and explaining the list of issues below, ask the respondent to pick three priority issues from the list, to be addressed further by the WAMSSA study team. Circle the numbers of the top three issues identified as a priority by the respondents. Add brief notes on page 3 to indicate why respondent feels the issue is important. Ask if he/she believes issue could or should be addressed at regional/multi-country level, and note the answer.

National and Local Governance Issues

1. Insufficient transparency or consistency of government and/or village decision-making processes for awarding mining concessions, land use, and spending on community development
2. Insufficient clarity of roles and responsibilities of government agencies and different government levels (national, provincial and local) for defining and enforcing environmental and social policies
3. Insufficient national, provincial and local government capacity to manage mining or infrastructure-related environmental and social issues and adequately protect the rights of weak, vulnerable and adversely affected stakeholders
4. Corruption and national and local conditions that lead to corruption or weak governance

Regional, National and Local Environmental Issues

5. Competing land and water use issues, including resettlement, land, crop and livelihoods compensation
6. Environmental degradation (pollution, degradation of soil, water quality, etc.)
7. Reclamation/rehabilitation of closed or abandoned mining sites
8. Access to information on environmental risks and impacts of mining activities and to mechanisms for redressing environmental grievances

Regional, National and Local Social and Socioeconomic Issues

9. Broad participation of community stakeholders in community-related development decisions (e.g. those made by governments, local chiefs, mining companies)
10. Shared multiuser access to mining sector-created infrastructure (rail, power, water, etc)
11. In-migration of people into community from other countries, or other parts of your country, and issues it may cause (crime, health, economic, etc.)
12. Communications and dispute resolution mechanisms between miners and locally affected stakeholders

Other Regional/Transborder issues

13. Multi-country or cross-border management of shared natural resources and habitat
14. Multi-country infrastructure planning and coordination involving provincial and local stakeholders
15. Cross-border sharing of benefits from mining or infrastructure projects
Additional Questions & Clarifications

Identify below which priorities were identified and briefly note 1) why the respondent thinks they are important and 2) if he/she sees a regional (MRU) dimension to the problem or solution. If respondent identifies more than 3 issues, write down this same information on the extra issues on the back of the survey sheet. Tick here ( ) if additional issues are described on back of this sheet.

Priority no:____ Why is it important?

Priority no:____ Why is it important?

Priority no: ____  Why is it important?

Ask the respondents to think back to their own issues they identified, and ask how would they rank them compared to the top issues they picked from the WAMSSA study team list? Are there any that are just as important or more important than the ones on the WAMSSA list? If so, indicate briefly below which of his/her issues (if any), the respondent identifies as a top priority.

16.  
17.  
18.  

Political Will: Ask the respondents to rate the government’s political will to resolve the various priorities they selected, ranking them high, medium or low, with a score of 3, 2 or 1, respectively.

Issue no:  
Issue no:  
Issue no:  
Other comments or notes:
Annex 6. WAMMSA Consultation Participants

Key:
FG = Focus Group Participant
NW = National Workshop Participant
RW = Regional Workshop Participant

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Guinea stakeholders</th>
<th>Stakeholder name</th>
<th>M/F</th>
<th>Sector</th>
<th>Designation</th>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>FG</th>
<th>NW</th>
<th>RW</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ibrahima Sory Camara</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>Government</td>
<td>Conseiller MMG (WAMSSA Focal Point)</td>
<td>Ministère des Mines et de la Géologie</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mohamed Faro</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>Government</td>
<td>Charge d'études</td>
<td>Ministère de la Démontalisation et du Développement Local</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bakary Kaba</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>Government</td>
<td>DNA</td>
<td>Ministère de l'Urbanisme et de l'Habitat/BEPS</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malikc Sombre</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>Government</td>
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<td>James F. Sandy</td>
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<td>Principal Economist</td>
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<td>F. Thorlu Bangura</td>
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<td>Project Coordinator</td>
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<td>Simeon Moriba</td>
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<td>A. A. F. Conteh</td>
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<td>Deputy Director of Forestry</td>
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<td>Abubakar Karim Barrie</td>
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<td>Ibrahim Sorie Kamara</td>
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<td>Manoj Dosi</td>
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<td>Foday T. Bayoh</td>
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<td>Clive Dawson</td>
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<td>Cecilia C. Mattia</td>
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## Sierra Leone stakeholders

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<th>Stakeholder name</th>
<th>M/F</th>
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<td>Leslie Mboka</td>
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<td>Aminata Kelly-Lamin</td>
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<td>Nana Pratt</td>
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<td>Fudia Swaray</td>
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