Combined Project Information Documents / Integrated Safeguards Datasheet (PID/ISDS)

Appraisal Stage | Date Prepared/Updated: 29-Mar-2019 | Report No: PIDISDSA24735
## BASIC INFORMATION

### A. Basic Project Data

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Project ID</th>
<th>Project Name</th>
<th>Parent Project ID (if any)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mali</td>
<td>P164561</td>
<td>Mali Deployment of State Resources for Better Service Delivery</td>
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<th>Region</th>
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<th>Financing Instrument</th>
<th>Borrower(s)</th>
<th>Implementing Agency</th>
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<tr>
<td>Investment Project Financing</td>
<td>Republic of Mali</td>
<td>Ministry of Finance</td>
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### Proposed Development Objective(s)

The project will improve the availability and timeliness of resources from the central government to LGs, all the way to service centers (schools and health service centers), as well as the management and accountability of these resources by LGs and service centers.

### Components

- Results based financing for Strengthening Availability and Management of Resources for LGs
- TA to Support the Strengthening of Locan Government Management of Resources
- Project Management

## PROJECT FINANCING DATA (US$, Millions)

### SUMMARY

<p>| | |</p>
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<tr>
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<td>Total Financing</td>
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### DETAILS

**World Bank Group Financing**

| International Development Association (IDA) | 50.00 |
B. Introduction and Context

Country Context

1. Mali is a landlocked country with an approximate population of 18 million (2016), ranking among the poorest in the world – 182 out of 189 countries in 2018¹ (UNDP). Despite relatively high GDP growth rates of 5.3 and 5.8 percent in 2017 and 2016, respectively, over 40 percent of Malians live in poverty. Ninety percent of the poor live in rural areas in the south of the country, where most of the population is concentrated. Moreover, it is estimated that 100,000 persons are internally displaced facing food insecurity. Mali can be divided into two distinct parts, the South, where most economic activity takes part, and the North, where rebellions, armed groups and the military coup of 2012 have led to increased political tension and insecurity. The Northern Jihadist insurgency is ongoing and has expanded to the central region.

2. Human capital in Mali is among the lowest in the world, and low health outcomes are a key driver of the country’s underperformance in the Human Capital Index (HCI). Human capital consists of the knowledge, skills, and health that people accumulate over their lives, enabling them to realize their potential as productive members of society. Mali is currently the 4th lowest scoring (with a score of 32 out of 100) country in the world against the Human Capital Index recently released by the World Bank. Mali in underperforming in health, which is a key component of human capital as people are more productive when they are healthier. Mali is among the five countries in the world with the largest burden of disease², a high maternal and under-5 mortality (about

¹ 2018 Human Development Index, UNDP.
160,000 women and children under the age of 5 die every year) and an increasing percentage of stunted children (from 28 percent in 2009 to 30 percent in 2015). In addition to low health outcomes, only one in three Malians aged 15-24 years is literate. Today’s children who start school at age 4 are expected to complete, on average, just 5.6 years of school by their 18th birthday.

3. **The security situation has deep historical roots and has a major impact on Mali’s development trajectory.** The security challenges relate to the geographical context and the tumultuous history of the country. Territorial disputes and frustrations exacerbated by recurrent droughts and famines, particularly in the North, resulted in the eruption of recurrent conflicts throughout the latter half of the 20th century. However, with the arrival of religious extremists in the northern and central regions additional factors detrimental to durable peace have emerged. This explains the change in the dynamics of the armed rebellion, which in 2012 succeeded in pushing the Malian army out of the Northern region.

4. **The political and security crisis led to a renewed emphasis on the decentralization agenda to tackle insecurity and restore stability.** Mali’s decentralization agenda was born out of conflict. To a large extent its impetus dates to the insurgency in the North that began in the latter days of the military regime that was in power between 1968 and 1991. Demands from the North for more autonomy resulted in a general push toward decentralization in the 1992 Constitution. While it took several years for the legal framework to be adopted and partially implemented, these events set in motion a process of bringing governance closer to the people. The National Pact of 1992, the 2006 Accord for the Restoration of Peace and Security and the 2015 Agreement of Peace and Reconciliation and related laws, stipulate that any transfer of competences to a decentralized authority should be accompanied by the transfer of corresponding resources.

### Sectoral and Institutional Context

5. **The process of decentralization started in the 1990s, with the creation of a legal framework and devolution of certain functions to Local Governments (LGs), particularly in health and education.** Decentralization started (i) to expand the process of democratization and participation of the population in the management of public affairs, (ii) to promote local development by favoring initiatives of relevant civil society actors and the creation of a framework controlled by the local population, and (iii) to operationalize the subsidiarity principle of service delivery in priority sectors, such as health, education and land management. Mali begun a process of political and fiscal decentralization in the early 1990s. Over the 1990-2000 period, a series of decrees and laws aimed at setting up the legal framework necessary for the creation and operationalization of decentralized structures were adopted. Mali’s Government is composed of four levels: the national administration, regions and one district, counties (cercles), and communes. The latter three form the local government authorities. There are 10 regions\(^3\), the district of Bamako, 56 counties and 703 communes (see Annex 2: Administrative Map of Mali). The first decrees on transfer of service delivery responsibility in health and education were adopted in 2002, followed by successive policies and laws. With the adoption of the 2017 local government law, communes are now responsible for preschool, basic and non-formal education, vocational training and apprenticeships, as well as health, public hygiene and sanitation. In the spirit of subsidiarity, the legal framework specifies that service is to be managed by local management structures (Comités de Gestion des Écoles, CGES, responsible for operating schools, and Associations de Santé Communautaire, ASACO, responsible for operating Centres de santé communautaires, CSCOMs) (see Annex 4 for more detailed information on the decentralization context in Mali).

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\(^3\) A draft law is to be presented in the Ministers Council that would increase the regions to 20 plus de District of Bamako, with 94 cercles.
6. **Local Governments face significant challenges to deliver basic services due to geography, fragility, demography, and insufficient resources, exacerbated by inefficiencies created by the adopted decentralization processes.** There is a need to address the following critical constraints impeding effective deployment of state resources and decentralization to improve the capacity to provide services in health and education:

- Lack of clarity on roles and responsibilities for basic service delivery in health and education
- Lack of equitable, predictable and timely resources transferred to LGs and service providers;
- Limited LG support mechanisms and concentration of resources in the capital;
- Limited technical and managerial capacity in LGs;
- Lack of accountability and citizen’s participation in the management of resources; and
- Low women’s participation in public administration.

7. **Responsibility for basic service delivery in health and education has been partially transferred to local government structures, but actual implementation is hampered by a lack of clarity on roles, responsibilities and financing, which adversely impact the quality of basic services.** De-jure decentralized, the sectors remain organized as deconcentrated administrations with central government ministries and agencies retaining substantial authority, resulting in a complex management system. Each service point is to be governed by service delivery agreements signed between communes, which are to receive budget transfers, and relevant management structures. Meanwhile, the signing of management agreements and corresponding resource transfers remains partial. Transferred human resource (HR) and budget management responsibilities are not fully aligned with delivery responsibility. Planning remains centralized and lacks accuracy, as aggregation and arbitration do not rely on complete information regarding local needs and the actual allocations are not always communicated to CGES and ASACOs.

8. **Financial resources transferred to LGs from the central government are insufficient to enable them to fulfil the mandates transferred to them.** To support the transfer of competencies to LGs, the Government committed to transferring 30 percent of fiscal revenues to local authorities by the end of 2018 (a mix of conditional and unconditional transfers), but it is still far from achieving this target (see [Error! Reference source not found. below]). Tax revenues collected by LGs are insufficient to meet increasing expenditures associated to transfer of competencies and must be supplemented by fiscal transfers. LGs rely heavily on transfers from the central government to finance their expenditures (they account for more than 80 percent of total revenues of LGs). Thus, the inability of the Government to meet its transfer commitment severely impacts the performance of LGs and, in turn, service providers.

| Table 1: Transfer of budgetary resources to local authorities |
|-------------------|-------------------------------|-------------------------------|-------------------------------|-------------------------------|-------------------------------|-------------------------------|-------------------------------|-------------------------------|
| **Year**          | **2011**                      | **2012**                      | **2013**                      | **2014**                      | **2015**                      | **2016**                      | **2017**                      | **2018**                      |
| Total resources transferred (bn CAF) | 64,900                        | 126,500                       | 126,900                       | 147,900                       | 170,900                       | 213,300                       | 261,822                       | 326,238                       |
| Total budgetary revenues (bn CAF)    | 775.1                         | 813.3                         | 842.7                         | 935.3                         | 1,120.1                       | 1,277.8                       | 1,429.0                       | 1,650.05                      |
| Transferred resources/ budgetary revenues | 8.40%                         | 15.60%                        | 15.10%                        | 15.80%                        | 15.30%                        | 16.70%                        | 18.30%                        | 19.77%                        |

Source: Government data

9. **The fiscal equalization role of intergovernmental transfers could be improved, as well as the timeliness and predictability of these transfers.** The repartition formula utilized by the National Local Government Investment Agency (ANICT in French) to allocate resources to LGs is intended to ensure equity by considering the degree of development of local and regional authorities, but disadvantaged communities with low population
density do not benefit as expected. Transfers are not favoring poor regions. For example, between 2006 and 2016, ANICT transferred 16 times as much to Kidal as to Sikasso, the poorest region in Mali. Meanwhile, transfers to LGs fluctuate a lot, reducing their predictability, and are announced late to LGs (6 to 9 months after the beginning of the fiscal year), which reduces their ability to forecast budgets, schedule investments, and impacts their credibility vis-à-vis service providers and local populations.

10. **In the health and education sector, there is a need to improve information flows, resource planning and management, and transferred amounts to ASACOs.** According to the latest health sector Public Expenditure Review (2017 PER), ASACOs must go through 10 steps involving eight actors to access operating funds for CSCOMs. The release of the capital budget takes 39 steps. Budget management is weakened by lack of capacity and insufficient knowledge of regulations and processing deadlines. Funds that should be accessed through the LGs’ budget are often unavailable, adversely impacting the efficiency and quality of the health system. Other factors affecting service delivery in the sector include: (i) a lack of information, because local authorities are still often unaware of the details of the responsibilities transferred by law; (ii) a low capacity of communes and ASACOs for resource planning and management, including asset management; and (iii) an insufficient transfer of funds to LGs.

11. **In the education sector, the mechanism for funding school activities, including school supplies and canteens through CGSs, remains ineffective and salary payments are not based on actual teacher presence.** Educational facilities are broadly inadequate, and learning outcomes are unsatisfactory. An assessment of learning environment by civic organizations across Mali by the Beekunko Program (OMAES, 2014), showed that in about 12 percent of the classes, children were sitting on the floor, and in 18 percent of the classrooms, desks were holding more children than they are designed for. Desks were broken or in disrepair in 11 percent of the classrooms, and in one out of five classrooms, there was no schedule or timetable displayed for the children or the teacher. Similarly, only a limited number of public schools have a school canteen, and few of them operate all year round. This is mainly due to the lack of availability and sub-optimal use of resources for educational facilities and the inefficiencies created by the decentralization processes.

12. **Current LG support mechanisms are inefficient, and resources are concentrated in the capital.** Central ministries have established multiple, overlapping technical support structures to support LGs, often with limited resources, in the capital and at local level. At the central level, units coordinated by the Ministry of Territorial Administration and Decentralization are responsible for the design, implementation and coordination of decentralization. At the local level, deconcentrated central government units located in regions, counties and communes provide advisory and technical support to LGs. Liaison and coordination officials have been assigned to monitor and assess the support and coordinate the development actions at regional, local and communal level. More recently, Regional Development Agencies (ADR) have been created to provide technical assistance to LGs. In addition, the Government is also establishing Village Land Committees (Commissions Foncières Villageoises or CoFoC) and Communal Land Committees (Commissions Foncières Communales or CoFoC) tasked to prevent and mediate land conflicts and support land tenure management. Thus, to improve efficiency and effectiveness of LG support mechanisms, it is necessary to clarify these entities’ roles and competencies and provide them with enough resources to fulfill their missions.

13. **Limited and concentrated technical and managerial capacity hamper the ability of LGs to manage local development and service delivery, creating disincentives for the central government to transfer financial resources, but progress is possible.** Technical and administrative institutional capability is low due to a lack of trained staff, high staff turnover and low pay. There are also vast disparities across LGs, with some having better institutional capability than others. This limits the quality of planning, budgeting and public investment
management processes. The absence of effective career management systems, together with poorly targeted and limited on-the-job training makes it difficult for LGs to attract and retain qualified staff. This creates a vicious circle whereby the central government is reluctant to transfer additional resources and the lack of resources further compounds the ability of LGs to develop more capacity. Organizational structures and staffing strategies need to be refined to ensure key positions are held by qualified technical staff. The Urban Local Government Support Project (PACUM\textsuperscript{4}) demonstrated that with strengthened technical and managerial capacity, certain larger urban LGs have the capacity to implement investments in health, education and urban infrastructure. In addition, resources are concentrated in the capital. For example, staff in health facilities is unevenly distributed, with most qualified health staff concentrated in Bamako and the regional capitals.

14. **The limited accountability framework for LGs creates a further disincentive for the central government to transfer financial resources.** Mali has a body of laws and regulations that establishes the accountability of local officials, as well as sanctions. Obligations of Elected Officials are defined in Law No 06-043 of August 18, 2006 on the Status of Elected Officials of LG. LG budget and accounting regulation as well as internal and external control mechanisms are established in various regulations\textsuperscript{5} and call for the involvement of various entities such as the financial controller, ministerial inspections, comptroller general of public services, ANICT, the Office of the Auditor General, the Accounts Section of the Supreme Court, etc.). The regulations are not always used effectively, reducing the real impact of the accountability framework. Limited accountability of local elected officials and managers in cases of irregularities, errors or dishonesty reinforces a sense of impunity and constitutes a major risk to increasing and improving LG public spending.

15. **Citizen engagement (CE) can usefully supplement institutional accountability mechanisms.** The principal mechanism for accountability at the local level is through the election of communal councils. While citizens have a right to information on budgets at every level of government, they are rarely aware of their rights or of what mechanisms are in place to promote participation and accountability. Civil society organizations can play an important role in helping communities access information and use CE mechanisms such as community monitoring, to monitor development plans and hold LGs accountable. Some citizen oversight initiatives have been initiated but they need to be streamlined.

16. **Women’s participation in public administration has not yet reached the minimum of 30 percent recommended in the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW)\textsuperscript{6}.** Malian public service staff is mostly comprised of men. The proportion of women increased from 19.4 percent in 2006, to 28 percent in 2009. At the subnational level, the participation rate of women in the public sector is similar, though at higher rate in the capital than other regions. Most women have administrative careers (Administrative Officer and Secretary of Administration) though, since 2011, women also have managerial positions. Change is slow, but there is an increased political will to promote women’s participation in public administration.

C. Proposed Development Objective(s)

Development Objective(s) (From PAD)

17. **The Project Development Objective is: to improve the availability and timeliness of resources from the**

\textsuperscript{4} PACUM is the Urban Local Development Support Project (P116602)

\textsuperscript{5} Loi n° 96-060 relative à la loi de finances ; loi n° 96-061 portant principes fondamentaux de la comptabilité publique

\textsuperscript{6} CEDAW is an international treaty adopted in 1979 by the United Nations General Assembly.
central government to LGs, all the way to service centers (schools and health service centers), as well as the management and accountability of these resources by LGs and service centers.

Key Results

- The percentage of central government budget transferred to local governments (LGs) periodically. This indicator measures the availability of resources to LGs.
- Time it takes to for the payment of LA expenditures. This indicator measures the timeliness of availability of allocated resources to LGs.
- The percentage of schools operational before the start of the school year in selected LGs. This indicator measures the availability, timeliness and use of resources in the schools.
- The percentage of health infrastructure (CSCom) with average score for quality of facility (based on a checklist) of 70% in selected LGs. The indicator measures the availability, timeliness and use of resources in CSCom.
- The number of communes with functional CDQs/Vs providing regular community feedback to LGs and/or DGCT. This indicator measures accountability at the local level.

D. Project Description

18. The proposed operation seeks to address key challenges related to the level of financing transferred to LGs, and to institutional capacity and accountability mechanisms that affect the capacity to deliver services in health and education at the local level. This operation supports institutional reforms that seek to establish a more robust foundation for the evolution of the decentralization agenda in Mali and has the following features:

- **Transformational scalability.** The operation can be transformational and scalable, given the potential to reach a significant proportion of the population in the first phase (100 communes and 43 percent of the population).
- **Platform for joint donor intervention.** The operation will provide a coordination platform for donor support to decentralization led by the World Bank (WB) and a strong dialogue with the Government. As of now, Switzerland, the Netherlands, and France committed to contribute to the operation.
- **E-government and reliance on technology.** The operation puts an emphasis on leveraging technology to reduce bureaucracy, enhance the quality, accessibility and transparency of information and ultimately service delivery.
- **Citizen Engagement.** The operation builds on prior experience and accentuates CE as a crucial means to promote and supplement accountability mechanisms.
- **Addressing critical bottlenecks.** The operation addresses bottlenecks in the delivery of health and education services, such as lack of funding, of capacity and accountability at the local level, and tackles institutional reforms.

19. The project consists of three complementary components for a total of US$94.8 million equivalent which will use both results-based and traditional disbursement methods:

- **Component 1. Results-based Financing** (US$70 million) to provide incentives for achieving results along the Government’s decentralization strategy, budget decentralization process, performance-based budgeting, and service delivery. Disbursements will be made to the Finance Ministry, conditional on pre-

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7 Measured by school level scorecard which will include indicators related to operationalization of the school feeding program, the acquisition and distribution of school material, the presence of teachers and a start of the school year as planned.
specified results, as verified by achievement of disbursement linked Indicators (DLIs).

- **Component 2. Technical Assistance** (US$21.8 million) would finance key essential advisory, technical, and capacity-building support for the decentralization strategy and performance-based budgeting.
- **Component 3. Project Management** (US$3 million). Components 2 and 3 will follow a traditional reimbursement mode based on statements of expenditures after the completion of activities.

20. **The project will simultaneously tackle issues at the national and local levels.** Thus, over the course of the five years, the project will cover horizontally national level structural reforms which will impact all LGs across the country. At the same time, the project will focus vertically on piloting certain activities that support mechanisms to boost the performance of selected LGs and enhance demand for accountability through increased participation and voice.

21. **Selection of communes.** In this first project of the SOP, the Government has selected 100 LGs across all regions based on both socio-economic criteria and expression of interest. Criteria applied included LG population, presence of administration in LG, existence of civil registration service, telephone network coverage, presence of micro finance/banking establishment, connection to electricity, existence of a primary or secondary school and existence of a community health center. To ensure national representation in each region, a minimum quota of LGs per region was established. Subsequently, each selected LG was requested to confirm their interest in participating in the project. Among the 100 LGs selected, 14 benefited from support by the PACUM project. To account for insecurity and in case some communes would drop out or could not be accessed during project implementation, a waiting list of 10 communes was established. The list of selected LGs can be found in Annex 6, as well as additional information about the selection process.

**E. Implementation**

**Institutional and Implementation Arrangements**

15. **The Ministry of Economy and Finance will have the overall technical responsibility for the project via a project coordination unit that will be created before project effectiveness.** In addition, a small coordination unit will be created within the DGCT for the purposes of implementing this IDA-financed operation. Furthermore, all project beneficiary institutions will formally nominate focal points who will be supporting the implementation of project activities and to ensure technical coordination and effective oversight of said activities.

16. **The project coordination unit will include a Project Coordinator who is responsible for the overall project implementation will be working full-time on this Bank project and will be located within the MEF.** Additional staff will include: (i) a procurement specialist; (ii) a financial and administration specialist; (iii) an accountant; (vi) a monitoring and evaluation specialist; (v) an administrative assistant, and (iv) three experts responsible for component implementation. On the DGCT side, a small unit composed of dedicated experts, including but not limited to an M&E specialist to support the evaluation of communes performance, a communications Specialist, a planning Specialist and a Fiscal Affairs Specialist, will be added.

17. **The project will be implemented under the overall leadership of the MEF and the MATD.** A project Technical Steering Committee will be established by an Inter-Ministerial Decision of the MEF and the MATD. The Technical Steering Committee will oversee the project, approve Annual Work plans and Budget (AWPB), as well as its progress reports, and ensure that the broader project objectives are being met. The Steering Committee will be chaired by the MEF. It will be composed of representatives of targeted ministries, including implementing agencies in charge of executing the project’s activities and CTs representative through “Association faïtière”. This committee will review and
approve the annual work program and budget of the project as well as ensuring coordination across sectors during implementation of the project.

F. Project location and salient physical characteristics relevant to the safeguard analysis (if known)

G. Environmental and Social Safeguards Specialists on the Team

Emeran Serge M. Menang Evouna, Environmental Specialist
Mahamadou Ahmadou Maiga, Social Specialist

SAFEGUARD POLICIES THAT MIGHT APPLY

<table>
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<th>Safeguard Policies</th>
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KEY SAFEGUARD POLICY ISSUES AND THEIR MANAGEMENT

A. Summary of Key Safeguard Issues

1. Describe any safeguard issues and impacts associated with the proposed project. Identify and describe any potential large scale, significant and/or irreversible impacts:
2. Describe any potential indirect and/or long term impacts due to anticipated future activities in the project area:

3. Describe any project alternatives (if relevant) considered to help avoid or minimize adverse impacts.

4. Describe measures taken by the borrower to address safeguard policy issues. Provide an assessment of borrower capacity to plan and implement the measures described.
   No specific measures as the safeguards risk was assessed as low.

5. Identify the key stakeholders and describe the mechanisms for consultation and disclosure on safeguard policies, with an emphasis on potentially affected people.

B. Disclosure Requirements

C. Compliance Monitoring Indicators at the Corporate Level (to be filled in when the ISDS is finalized by the project decision meeting)

The World Bank Policy on Disclosure of Information

Have relevant safeguard policies documents been sent to the World Bank for disclosure? NA

Have relevant documents been disclosed in-country in a public place in a form and language that are understandable and accessible to project-affected groups and local NGOs? NA
All Safeguard Policies

Have satisfactory calendar, budget and clear institutional responsibilities been prepared for the implementation of measures related to safeguard policies?
NA

Have costs related to safeguard policy measures been included in the project cost?
NA

Does the Monitoring and Evaluation system of the project include the monitoring of safeguard impacts and measures related to safeguard policies?
NA

Have satisfactory implementation arrangements been agreed with the borrower and the same been adequately reflected in the project legal documents?
NA

CONTACT POINT

World Bank

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Christian Vang Eghoff
Senior Urban Development Specialist

Tahirou Kalam
Financial Management Specialist

Borrower/Client/Recipient

Republic of Mali

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APPROVAL

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Approved By

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| Practice Manager/Manager: | Alexandre Arrobbio | 02-Apr-2019 |
| Country Director: | Michael Hamaide | 09-Apr-2019 |