ELEPHANT CRIME INTELLIGENCE SYSTEM ASSESSMENT

Robert C. Fahlman, Consultant, Intelligence Systems, World Bank, Africa Region
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ASSESSMENT

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It is sometimes asked why the World Bank has taken a strong interest and active role in supporting the strengthening of environment and natural resource law enforcement. Certainly, the World Bank is not a law enforcement agency. However, among the things that we have learned in pursuit of the Bank’s main objectives of poverty reduction and promotion of shared prosperity is that development needs to be understood as more than only increasing the consumption of goods and services. Importantly, we are seeing that vulnerability is an essential part of the crushing reality of poverty. Whether it is violence against women and children, corruption in social services, fraud or abuse of public procurement processes, or the loss of natural resources from poaching, crime exacerbates the suffering of our primary target beneficiaries, and is therefore a pressing issue for the World Bank.

The Bank comes to focus attention on environment and natural resource crime in other ways as well. As discussed in this report, the international nature of wildlife crime, in this case the poaching of elephants and the smuggling of contraband ivory, is a truly global phenomenon. The illicit supply chain extends from the African range states through many and diverse trans-shipment points before reaching consumer markets in countries around the world, leaving criminality, corruption, and diverted resources all along the way. No single country suffers the full damage of this criminality, and none has the full incentive or resources needed to respond. In this way, natural resource law enforcement has some of the same Global Public Good properties as, for example, agricultural research, the fight against HIV/AIDS, the struggle to contain Ebola, and the challenge of Greenhouse Gas–induced climate change. While not always well matched to the World Bank’s traditional business model of country-based lending and investment, the Bank recognizes a special obligation as a global institution to advocate for global solutions to global problems.

In this report, Robert Fahlman, a leading expert and practitioner in the field of criminal intelligence systems and operations, takes on an important part of the puzzle of how the global community can come together to better protect the African elephant. We asked Mr. Fahlman to take on this work, not as a crime investigator, or as an advocate for conservation, but as an analyst of the institutional architecture through which information, data, suspicion, and sometimes unfounded rumor are or are not translated into effective law enforcement responses to the global problem of ivory smuggling and elephant poaching. His findings and recommendations merit serious consideration, debate, and follow-up by those concerned with the survival of African elephants and the people and ecosystems dependent on them.

As the reader will see, Fahlman finds that, as with other global public good problems, the international community is failing to adequately organize and finance the provision
of intelligence support to ivory-related law enforcement. As a result, poachers, smugglers, and corrupt officials conspire and thrive as transnational criminal networks. In addition to a global problem, Fahlman finds a law enforcement capacity-building challenge and an institutional coordination problem at the national and regional levels. His proposed response and recommendations build on the roles, mandates, and programs of existing agencies, but with recognition of the need for urgency and ambition in a rapid scaling up.

We initiated this work recognizing that the responsibility for wildlife crime intelligence analysis and follow-up at the global level was unlikely to reside with the World Bank. As the report makes clear, there are other international agencies and agencies at national and regional levels that are properly mandated to take on this work. Advocating for proper resourcing and better integration, however, is a responsibility to which we hope the World Bank, in making this report available, is responding and will continue to pursue.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The preparation of the Final Report: Elephant Crime Intelligence System Assessment greatly benefited from the generous collective spirit of cooperation and best practice sharing of the international law enforcement community and nongovernmental organizations dedicated to wildlife conservation. Recognition needs to be made of the following organizations and programs: partner organizations of the International Consortium on Combating Wildlife Crime (ICCWC) (Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora [CITES], United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime [UNODC], World Customs Organization [WCO], International Criminal Police Organization [INTERPOL], World Bank), Monitoring the Illegal Killing of Elephants (MIKE), Elephant Trade Information System (ETIS), Wildlife Trade Monitoring Network (TRAFFIC), and World Wildlife Fund (WWF). And, to the more than 125 people interviewed during the project in 12 countries, thank you for your knowledge sharing and insights. Finally, special mention needs to be made of the silent partners in this project—the elephants.

This report was prepared as part of the World Bank-executed Global Environment Fund Medium Size Project Fighting Against Wildlife Poaching And Illegal Trade In Africa—The Case Of African Elephants, implemented under overall guidance of Magda Lovei, Environment Practice Manager, Claudia Sobrevilla, Task Team Leader. William B. Magrath, Lead Natural Resource Economist and Sara Thompson, Wildlife Law
Enforcement Specialist provided oversight and support. Simon Robertson and Valerie Hickey made valuable contributions and advice.

The ever-evolving landscape of organized crime, including the poaching of elephants and traffic in ivory, has brought with it many new challenges to law enforcement, government, and civil society in general in all regions of the globe. In my three decades of working within law enforcement, whether on the domestic front or on assignment internationally, the lessons learned from two of the most influential forefathers of criminal intelligence, Justin J. Dintino and Frederick T. Martens, in their guidebook *Police Intelligence Systems in Crime Control* (1983), capture today perhaps more than ever the value of intelligence to effective crime control:

“The future of law enforcement in its role against organized crime is dependent upon intelligence. Intelligence will permit an organization to meet future challenges with an awareness that allows for the development and implementation of viable crime control policies. Without intelligence there is no strategy. The intelligence process is central to the development of an effective crime control programme.”
# Abbreviations and Acronyms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AED</td>
<td>African Elephant Database</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASEAN</td>
<td>Association of Southeast Asian Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BSC</td>
<td>Balanced Scorecards</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CISC</td>
<td>Criminal Intelligence Services Canada</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CITES</td>
<td>Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ETIS</td>
<td>Elephant Trade Information System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GEF</td>
<td>Global Environment Facility</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICCWC</td>
<td>International Consortium on Combating Wildlife Crime</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IIOC</td>
<td>Integrated Intelligence-Operations Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INTERPOL</td>
<td>International Criminal Police Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IUCN</td>
<td>International Union for Conservation of Nature</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LATF</td>
<td>Lusaka Agreement Task Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MIKE</td>
<td>Monitoring the Illegal Killing of Elephants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NCB</td>
<td>National Central Bureau</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Nongovernmental Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NIM</td>
<td>National Intelligence Model</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PIKE</td>
<td>Proportion of Illegally Killed Elephants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RCMP</td>
<td>Royal Canadian Mounted Police</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RILO</td>
<td>Regional Intelligence Liaison Offices</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOP</td>
<td>Standard Operating Procedure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T&amp;CG</td>
<td>Tasking &amp; Coordination Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TRAFFIC</td>
<td>The Wildlife Trade Monitoring Network</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNEP</td>
<td>United Nations Environment Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNODC</td>
<td>United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WCO</td>
<td>World Customs Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WWF</td>
<td>World Wildlife Fund</td>
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This assessment concludes that individual nations as well as regional and transnational organizations now have severely limited to nonexistent capacities to effectively respond to growing threat levels. It proposes a networked intelligence-led strategy at national, regional, and transnational levels to more effectively control, reduce, and, more importantly, prevent the wholesale slaughter into extinction of the African elephant population within the next decade. It concludes by outlining the requirements for designing and implementing a long-term sustainable elephant crime intelligence system, including the required governance arrangements, and proposes the roles and functions that key organizations could play at the national, regional, and transnational levels.

Escalation in illegal killing of elephants across Africa since 2010 poses a major threat to the survival of a number of elephant populations in the short term (3 to 5 years) and the African elephant population as a whole in the medium term (within a decade). Available data are evidence of the growing severity of the threat—in 2006, an estimated 5,000 elephants were illegally killed at CITES Monitoring the Illegal Killing of Elephants monitored sites. In 2011, this figure increased by more than 300 percent to some 17,000 illegally killed elephants, representing 7.4 percent of the total elephant population. The continentwide figure for illegally killed elephants is estimated to be more than 25,000. The annual elephant reproduction rate of approximately 5 percent is unable to compensate for this level of illegal killing. Further, data from the Elephant Trade Information System indicate that the illegal trade in ivory has more than doubled since 2007 and is more than three times greater than it was in 1998.

Key enablers that foster continued escalation in elephant poaching and ivory trafficking include:

» High levels of corruption across the political, judicial, and law enforcement sectors;
» Weak governance and poverty across elephant range states;
» Limited and poor quality wildlife, habitat, and natural resource management; and
» Growing involvement of organized crime groups and networks attracted by the relatively low risks and high profits driven by the demand for illegal ivory in consuming countries.
This assessment responds directly to both the growing threat levels posed by organized elephant poaching and illicit ivory trafficking crime and related criminal networks, and the severely limited to nonexistent criminal intelligence capacity of national governments, and regional and global institutions, to effectively counter these threats.

**WHY INTELLIGENCE IS CRITICAL**

The mission of intelligence, whether for a national, regional, or global policing agency or, more specifically, in the context of wildlife conservation and protection, is to enable the effective management of threats posed by organized crime through effective detection, suppression, and prevention strategies. Success in meeting this mission requires a professional criminal intelligence capacity and an understanding that the primary purpose of intelligence is to provide advanced warning on emerging threats and targeting of operations on specific key criminals, organizations, and networks.

All levels of involved government as well as the nongovernmental community are starting to realize the value of reliable, timely, and accessible criminal intelligence as a foundation for understanding the key drivers of elephant poaching and the ivory trade and its value as an effective crime control, reduction, and prevention tool.
Although the importance of good data is certainly not a new concept, the worldwide trend toward sustainable wildlife conservation and support for management practices is calling for improvements in monitoring, assessment, and reporting that are consistent, effective, and transparent and that inspire confidence and cooperation among law enforcement, wildlife conservation authorities, government, nongovernmental organizations, and the general public.

Intelligence is a specialized program of activity based on six steps in the intelligence process: planning and direction; collection; evaluation; collation; analysis; reporting/dissemination/application. A robust intelligence system to address elephant poaching and illegal ivory trade is either nonexistent or seriously limited across the elephant range states and the illegal supply chain, thus posing major roadblocks to effectively responding to elephant poaching and ivory trafficking.

Implementation of a networked intelligence-led approach at the national, regional, and transnational levels is recommended to:

» Expose opportunities and vulnerabilities—and take the necessary actions to reduce vulnerabilities and maximize opportunities;
» Better inform both internal and external decision making;
» Target crime “hot spots” as well as priority organized crime networks, groups, and individuals for enforcement action;
» Provide future, more proactive, views for prioritized enforcement, conservation, and protection action; and
» Maximize the ability to achieve mission success.

The forthcoming UNODC *Global Report on Wildlife Crime* will provide a strategic threat level intelligence framework with baseline knowledge on elephant poaching and ivory trafficking as well as other forms of wildlife crime. Advancing to the tactical or nominal level, a networked criminal intelligence system capacity and governance arrangement led by INTERPOL would provide an effective response to the growing threats posed by elephant poaching and ivory trafficking across African range states as well as along the global supply chain countries. The proposed intelligence-led enforcement model employs a *network of networks* architecture to form effective partnerships and capacity building based on shared principles.

The effective implementation of a networked criminal intelligence system at the national, regional, and transnational levels requires committed and visionary leadership at all levels.

Although the lead agencies at national levels would reside within national police services, the consultant’s assessment that it will take from 3 to 5 years to develop national-level intelligence system capacities to be in a position to effectively respond to the current, let alone future, crises necessitates that a more proactive response be implemented in the short term. The report thus recommends a two-phase strategy, with INTERPOL General Secretariat, based in Lyon, France, taking the lead role in Phase 1 to initiate immediate action, while concurrently working with prioritized affected African range states and partner organizations in Phase 2 to build intelligence system capacities over a 3- to 5-year time frame. While INTERPOL is in the best position to lead the global response to this crisis, its current intelligence staffing complement will need augmentation as outlined in this report.

The key aims of the intelligence-led approach are:

**Phase 1: Immediate Action—Recommendations 1 through 4**

» Establish and develop requisite skills and procedures for evidence-based information and intelligence collection and exploitation on elephant poaching, ivory trafficking, and interrelated crime in and from Africa;
» Generate and gather actionable intelligence on international criminal networks and individuals involved in ivory poaching and trafficking in and from Africa;
» Identify, disrupt, and dismantle the transnational organized criminal networks involved in elephant poaching, ivory trafficking, and interrelated crime and trafficking in and from Africa;
- Enhance global situational awareness of these crime types; and
- Support INTERPOL member country-led operations/investigations that result in the arrests and prosecutions of priority targeted offenders.

Phase 2: National Level Intelligence System Capacity Building (over 3 to 5 years)—Recommendations 1 through 16

The 20 recommendations outlined in this report offer a road map and action plan for the implementation of a global criminal intelligence system to effectively respond to the current crisis facing the African elephant, as well as be better prepared for the future.
CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION

The United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP)/Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora/International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN)/The Wildlife Trade Monitoring Network joint Rapid Response Assessment entitled *Elephants in the Dust: The African Elephant Crisis* (UNEP, CITES, IUCN, TRAFFIC 2013) clearly underlines the serious and growing threats posed by elephant poaching and ivory trafficking in many range states across Africa. Data from the CITES database Monitoring the Illegal Killing of Elephants indicate an alarming increase in the number of African elephants illegally killed since 2006, with 2011 marking the highest poaching levels since the inception of MIKE in 1997. In 2006, an estimated 5,000 elephants were illegally killed at MIKE-monitored sites alone; in 2011, this figure increased by more than 300 percent to some 17,000 illegally killed elephants, representing some 7.4 percent of the total elephant population. The continentwide figure for illegally killed elephants is estimated to be more than 25,000. The annual elephant growth rate of approximately 5 percent is not able to compensate for this level of illegal killing. Further, data from the Elephant Trade Information System, which is managed by TRAFFIC on behalf of the CITES parties, indicate that the illegal trade in ivory has more than doubled since 2007 and is more than three times greater than it was in 1998.

The sustainability of elephant populations in many African range states is now in jeopardy and is further exacerbated by weak governance, corruption, and the growing involvement of transnational criminal networks involved in the illegal ivory trade chain—from localized poaching through the shipment of multihundred kilograms of illicit ivory to the underground ivory factories and final consumers. Although increased general capacity building across law enforcement and wildlife conservation agencies is necessary to respond to the growing problem, the implementation of a networked community-based intelligence system is particularly essential in moving from present reactive responses to proactive long-term, sustainable prevention strategies. Such a networked intelligence system needs to be accompanied by a governance model that would ensure the system is built on a foundation encompassing key stakeholder agencies, while responding to elephant crime at the local, national, regional, and transnational levels.
The Final Report: Elephant Crime Intelligence System Assessment, although a key component within the broader World Bank–Global Environment Facility (GEF) project entitled Fighting Against Wildlife Poaching and Illegal Trade in Africa: The Case of African Elephants, underscores the pressing requirement to maximize the knowledge-building capacities that intelligence systems develop and accompanying good governance can provide to more effectively respond to elephant crime. The World Bank–GEF project encompasses a wide range of strategies in the domains of policy- and lawmaking, demand reduction, economics, money flows, forensics, and the focus of this report—criminal intelligence—to effectively respond to the illegal poaching and the trade of elephant ivory, while providing a uniquely collaborative approach to control, reduce, and prevent elephant-related crime specifically, and wildlife-related crime generally. This element of the project is worth underlining as elephant-related crime is intricately linked with other forms of organized crime, and therefore needs to be studied in this broader context. Further, elephant-related crime will be assessed within its full dimensions: as a crime against wildlife as well as a crime that undermines strong economies, healthy and resilient communities, and, in a broader context, the good governance of those countries affected by high levels of such crime. Therefore, the principal components of the assessment include the designing of a framework and accompanying governance model for criminal intelligence collaboration at the national, regional, as well as transnational levels, including agencies participating in the gathering and analysis of information and intelligence related to elephant poaching and ivory trafficking along the full spectrum of the transnational crime chain. Within this broader context, this work has sought to provide a thorough and credible assessment of the key requirements to design as well as implement an effective criminal intelligence system and accompanying governance model to effectively respond to the escalating threats, risks, and harms associated with elephant poaching and ivory trafficking at all levels of the poaching and ivory trade chains. Currently, a robust intelligence system addressing elephant poaching and illegal trade of ivory at all phases within the intelligence process is either nonexistent or seriously limited in capacity (the key phases in the intelligence process are planning and direction; collection; evaluation; collation; analysis; reporting/dissemination/action). Therefore, the project examines the need for designing and implementing a long-term sustainable elephant crime intelligence system and governance model as well as assessing the roles and functions that key organizations could play at the national, regional, and international levels within such an intelligence system and accompanying governance model.
CHAPTER TWO
PROJECT TERMS OF REFERENCE, SCOPE, AND METHODOLOGY

This report centers on seven key areas:

1. Assessment of current national, regional, international law enforcement and intelligence capacity levels to respond to the growing threats, risks, and harms posed by elephant poaching and ivory trafficking;
2. Elaboration of a model networked intelligence system to effectively respond to elephant-related crime;
3. Specification of the minimum requirements to implement a networked intelligence system in all phases of the intelligence process and governance model: (a) Planning, Direction and Priority Setting; (b) Information and Intelligence Collection; (c) Collation—Information Management and Technologies; (d) Intelligence Analysis; (e) Intelligence Reporting and Dissemination; (f) Intelligence-Operations Alignment; and (g) Intelligence Evaluation and Quality Assurance;
4. Description of the key Intelligence Asset Requirements to implement an elephant crime intelligence system: (a) People Assets; (b) Source Assets; (c) System Assets; and (d) Knowledge Assets;
5. Outlining the training and development needed for Intelligence Personnel;
6. Proposal of the strategic partnerships across local, national, regional, and international law enforcement, intelligence, governmental, nongovernmental, and other support communities (for example, academic and forensic science institutes); and
7. Proposal of a governance model at the national, regional, and transnational levels for an effective, sustainable intelligence system.

The assessment included a broad-based literature review of reports and documentation on the scope and dimension of elephant poaching and ivory trafficking and intelligence system capacities currently in place to respond to this issue—documentation originating from the World Bank, International Criminal Police Organization, United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, World Customs Organization, CITES, United Nations Environment Programme, government organizations, intelligence services,
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), forensic science and academic institutes, and open source information. Additionally, an intensive 1-week set of planning meetings was held at the World Bank, Washington, D.C., in January 2014 to meet with key World Bank sectors, NGOs and U.S. government agencies to explore the multidimensions of the elephant poaching and ivory trafficking intelligence system and governance model project and review the initial project Terms of Reference (TORs). Included in the weeklong visit was the delivery of a half-day workshop, “The Mission, Roles and Functions of Criminal Intelligence,” by the project consultant to World Bank and partner organization staff.

A series of missions to African range states (including Kenya, Zimbabwe, Uganda, South Africa) to conduct stakeholder interviews and visit field sites was made in March 2014. Stakeholder interviews in April 2014 were also conducted with all members of the International Consortium on Combating Wildlife Crime: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora Secretariat, International Criminal Police Organization, World Customs Organization, and the World Bank. Interviews were also conducted with members of the Elephant Trade Information System, Monitoring the Illegal Killing of Elephants, and the African Elephant Database. Additionally, members of nongovernmental organizations and wildlife advocacy organizations including the World Wildlife Fund and TRAFFIC: The Wildlife Trade Monitoring Network, academic, and forensic science institutes were consulted. In total, more than 125 persons were interviewed in 12 countries over the project research and analysis phases.
CHAPTER THREE

ELEPHANT CRIME AND LAW ENFORCEMENT CONTEXT

TRENDS IN ELEPHANT POACHING AND IVORY TRAFFICKING: GROWING ORGANIZED CRIME CONNECTIONS

The illegal killing of elephants for their ivory has persisted over the centuries—in the 1800s, the African elephant population was estimated at 26 million; today population estimates from data contained in the African Elephant Database (AED), managed by the IUCN/SSC African Elephant Specialist Group (AeSG), range from 400,000 to 600,000, as illustrated in figure 3.1 (CITES, IUCN, TRAFFIC 2013). The wide population range figure is partially attributable to the absence of population data in a number of countries experiencing political conflict and weak governance and placing low priority on conducting regular population survey counts. This situation is further compounded by the migratory nature and patterns of the overall elephant population. Whereas habitat loss, human-elephant conflict, and natural deaths account for a significant percentage of the overall population decline, the recent rise in illegal poaching involving sophisticated transnational organized crime groups across many of the African range states has advanced the situation to a crisis point; and if the current trend line continues during the next decade, a number of range states could face extinction of the species.

The joint CITES, IUCN, TRAFFIC report “Status of African Elephant Populations and Levels of Illegal Killing and the Illegal Trade in Ivory: A Report to the African Elephant Summit,” Gaborone, Botswana, December 2013, notes that elephant poaching and ivory trafficking started to increase again in the mid-2000s, following an easing in the 1990s, with the rate of increase jumping dramatically from 2009. The report goes on to state that the overall trend appeared to level off in 2012 compared with 2011, but at an unsustainably high level. As shown in figure 3.2 and table 3.1, the trend in proportion and the percentage of illegally killed elephants in Africa (PIKE) data from CITES Monitoring the Illegal Killing of Elephants database suggests that 15,000 elephants were illegally killed at the 42 monitored MIKE sites in 2012 (CITES, IUCN, TRAFFIC 2013).
FIGURE 3.1. AFRICAN ELEPHANT POPULATION

African elephant population estimates, thousands

DEFINITE COUNT  PROBABLE COUNT  POSSIBLE COUNT  SPECULATIVE COUNT

Note: Estimates are based on various surveys methods with different levels of reliability and data quality. Values are approximated to the thousand.

FIGURE 3.2. TREND IN PROPORTION OF ILLEGALLY KILLED ELEPHANTS IN AFRICA, 2002–12

Estimated PIKE

PIKE is an index that measures the proportion of illegally killed elephants to the total of carcasses found. It ranges from 0.0 (no illegal killings) to 1.0 (all carcasses found are illegally killed elephants).

Note: PIKE values for 2012 are only for the first 6 months of the year.

The estimated poaching rate of 7.4 percent in 2012 remains at an unsustainably high level, as it exceeds natural population growth rates (usually no more than 5 percent). Although the MIKE database is viewed as holding the most accurate data on the annual number of illegally killed elephants, significantly higher estimates of 35,000 to as many as 50,000 elephants illegally killed annually are claimed by a host of organizations involved in wildlife conservation.

The December 2013 CITES, IUCN, TRAFFIC report as well as the interview responses from specialists responsible for the MIKE, ETIS, and AED indicate that monitoring of elephant populations, apart from a few well-monitored sites, is sporadic and inconsistent. The low precision of most estimates makes it difficult to detect any immediate repercussion on elephant numbers in the short term, but this does not mean that there are no changes. The report goes on to state that although it remains to be seen whether the elephant poaching and ivory trafficking situation is stabilizing,

TABLE 3.1. NUMBER AND WEIGHT OF LARGE-SCALE (>500 KG) IVORY SEIZURES BY YEAR AND MODE OF TRANSPORT, 2009–13 (ETIS, NOVEMBER 15, 2013)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Air</th>
<th></th>
<th>Sea</th>
<th></th>
<th>Land</th>
<th></th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Number</td>
<td>Weight</td>
<td>Number</td>
<td>Weight</td>
<td>Number</td>
<td>Weight</td>
<td>Number</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2,364</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>15,915</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3,898</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6,390</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>8,035</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>616</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3,808</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>27,939</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3,084</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>601</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>17,683</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>656</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>797</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>31,069</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>9,808</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>13,960</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>100,641</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>23,971</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>0.16</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>0.64</td>
<td>0.73</td>
<td>0.20</td>
<td>0.17</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>
it is clear that international cooperation on law enforcement and public awareness is vital. Improved monitoring is also essential to allow informed, evidence-based decision making. There is a need for continued and improved reporting to the MIKE and ETIS programs, as well as improved and more frequent monitoring of elephant populations, including carcass counts wherever possible (see figure 3.3). The new annual reporting requirement for CITES parties to provide information on national ivory stockpiles is expected to provide much-needed information (CITES, IUCN, TRAFFIC 2013).

Data from the Elephant Trade Information System, managed by TRAFFIC on behalf of the CITES Conference of Parties, indicates that the illegal trade in ivory has more than doubled since 2007, and is more than three times greater than it was in 1998 (ETIS 2013). The joint 2013 CITES, IUCN, TRAFFIC report cited above notes that the frequency of large-scale ivory seizures—500 kilograms or more of raw or worked ivory—has increased significantly since 2000.

Prior to 2009, an average of five and never more than seven such seizures of this magnitude occurred each year but, from 2009 onward, an average of 15 and as many as 21 large-scale ivory seizures have taken place each year according to ETIS data. As illustrated in table 3.1, summarizing the 76 large-scale ivory seizures between 2009 and 2013 (not all data for 2013 were available at the time this report was prepared), the 41.67 metric tons of ivory seized in 2013 from a total of 18 seizures yielded a greater quantity of ivory than any previous year going back to 1989 when CITES secured an agreement among its member states to ban the international trade in ivory. Such sizable seizures of ivory are clear indicators of a growing presence of transnational organized crime groups and networks in the financially lucrative trade in ivory.

Law enforcement, wildlife, and conservation officials interviewed by the consultant stated that although the poaching of elephants across range states was African-based, the mid- to high-level transportation and manufacturing of the raw ivory and entry into global retail markets are dominated by Asian-based organized crime groups and networks. The project study noted that the vast majority of cases that come before the courts are at the poaching level, with only a small number of cases targeting the higher-level criminal organizations and networks—the critical missing link being the absence of target-rich criminal intelligence to guide enforcement action.
Although the assessment noted an absence of target-rich nominal criminal information and intelligence on specific criminal networks, groups, or individuals, there is a significant body of information available from diverse sources that, if collected, evaluated, collated, and analyzed as part of the intelligence process, would assist in gaining a clearer understanding of the scope and dimension of the illicit elephant poaching and ivory trade. As examples, reports from across the nongovernmental organization community (TRAFFIC, World Wildlife Fund, International Union for Conservation of Nature, and others) and related databases including Monitoring the Illegal Killing of Elephants, Elephant Trade Information System and the African Elephant Database, the scientific community (specifically the forensic analysis of ivory DNA and isotopes for both “hot-spot” identification and evidentiary purposes), Wildlife Enforcement Networks (WENs), international governmental and law enforcement community reports (including United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime [UNODC], CITES, the World Customs Organization, and INTERPOL), as well as media and other open sources of information, provide a solid base of information on elephant poaching and ivory trafficking trends (see for example figure 3.4). What is currently lacking, however, is an organizational structure and systematic process to make sense of the disparate datasets and align the data with law enforcement crime databases to develop actionable crime control and prevention strategies.

**ALLEGED LINKS TO INTERNATIONAL TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS**

Media reports in recent years have made alleged links between the global illicit wildlife trade, in particular the African ivory trade, and terrorist organizations. One study, *Africa’s White Gold of Jihad: al-Shabaab and Conflict Ivory*, by Nir Kalron, CEO Maisha Consulting, and Andrea Crosta, Executive Director and Co-founder, Elephant Action League, two independent organizations with missions to fight wildlife crime, stated that al-Shabaab involvement in trafficking in ivory through Kenya in the period 2011–12 could account for up to 40 percent of the terrorist group’s operating funds (Kalron and Crosta 2012). Since the release of this report, the popular media as well as independent consulting companies and political figures have quoted the alleged “40% of terrorist operations reportedly obtained through illicit wildlife trade.” The 40 percent figure could not be substantiated by any of the law enforcement agency, academic research, or NGO wildlife specialists interviewed in this project—the majority of interviewees stated that if there was a link between terrorist funding and wildlife crime, it would be marginal at best as there are no hard data to support such allegations. This possible dimension of the illicit wildlife trade requires a focused, in-depth criminal intelligence analysis assessment to arrive at a supportable evidence-based conclusion.

**KEY ENABLERS FOSTERING WILDLIFE CRIME**

The key enablers that foster the continued escalation in elephant poaching and ivory trafficking include:

» High levels of corruption, particularly across the political, judicial, and law enforcement sectors (during the interviews, the term “khaki-collar crime” surfaced to describe the complicity of police, customs, military, wildlife officials, and so on);

» Weak governance and high poverty levels across a number of elephant range states;
» Limited and poor-quality wildlife, habitat, and natural resource management;
» Growing involvement of organized crime groups and networks attracted by the relatively low risks and high profits driven by the demand for illegal ivory in consuming countries.

CAPACITY TO RESPOND

The current capacity of governmental agencies and organizations to respond to the growing threat levels posed by organized elephant poaching and illicit ivory trafficking crime and related criminal networks, whether at the national, regional, or transnational level, is severely limited at best. A result of the inadequacy of governmental agencies to effectively respond to the growing crisis situation (whether from legitimate capacity shortfalls, intelligence gaps, corruption, and so on) has been the proliferation of private entities that advertise themselves as “intelligence and investigative” agencies for hire to gather intelligence, run confidential human sources, conduct undercover operations, and follow-through with operations targeting poachers and organized crime members along the illicit elephant poaching and ivory trafficking supply chain. What is of concern about this trend is that these agencies operate outside official government rules of law, thus further necessitating the development of effective intelligence systems, governance models, and operational response capacities within recognized governmental structures at all levels. Additionally, there are numerous nongovernmental organizations working in the area of wildlife conservation (for example, TRAFFIC and WWF) that possess valuable information and intelligence that could partner with governmental agencies to more effectively respond to the growing threat levels.

As individual nations as well as regional and transnational organizations currently possess limited to nonexistent capacities to respond to the growing threat levels, the author proposes that a networked intelligence-led strategy at all levels (national, regional, and transnational) would provide a model that could effectively control, reduce, and, more important, prevent the wholesale slaughter into extinction of the African elephant population within the next decade.
FIGURE 3.4. ILLEGAL IVORY TRAFFICKING ROUTES
It takes a network to defeat a network.

The conclusion reached following the assessment of range state, regional, and transnational law enforcement abilities and capacities to effectively respond to the growing threats posed by elephant poaching and ivory trafficking, and by extension all forms of serious and organized crime, is that no one agency at any level is able to effectively accomplish this mission. One step above the supply-level poaching of elephants is a complex spider’s-web matrix of criminal networks controlling the warehousing of multihundred kilogram ivory stockpiles through to the supply chain transportation and final routing to the global consumer markets. It is thus crucial that the multiplicity of agencies working at controlling, reducing, and ultimately preventing the escalating slaughter of the African elephant increasingly network to start to level the playing field. The current strategy promoted by the UNODC in “networking the networks” to more effectively respond to interregional drug control has a direct application to building intelligence systems in response to the growing threats posed by elephant poaching and ivory trafficking (UNODC 2013a, 2013b).

INTERGOVERNMENTAL/TRANSNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND NETWORKS

As the intelligence capacity building at both the national and regional levels will require a minimum 3- to 5-year investment and the threat levels for elephant poaching and ivory trafficking are trending upward toward potential species extinction within a decade in some range states, more immediate action is required to respond to the growing threat levels. There is a consensus viewpoint held by all the partner agencies within the International Consortium on Combating Wildlife Crime, and supported by the key law enforcement agencies at both the national and regional levels, that the ICCWC agencies, working with other transnational partner organizations and
national and regional networks, could form an operational alliance to effectively target the mid- to top-level criminal organizations and networks that control the criminal markets surrounding elephant poaching and ivory trafficking.

As illustrated in figure 4.1, the ICCWC partner agencies would act as the governing body of the operational alliance, with the INTERPOL General Secretariat, as the organization that unites the global law enforcement community, acting as the lead agency strengthened by the intelligence and operational support from the WCO and CITES, and knowledge sharing and capacity building from the UNODC and World Bank as well as the WCO and CITES.

The INTERPOL-led intelligence system and operational response, by focusing on the major criminal organizations and networks that control elephant poaching and ivory trafficking, would be aimed at disrupting or dismantling the major organized crime groups, effectively reducing poaching and ivory trafficking. To put this intelligence-led enforcement strategy in place, a number of capacity-building initiatives are required as outlined in Phase 1, Recommendations 1 through 4 below.

***REGIONAL SYSTEMS AND NETWORKS***

The regional-level governance was described by the spectrum of national, regional, and transnational organizations as an essential building block and linkage mechanism between both national agencies and the transnational community. However, the consensus view is that the regional level is at present the “weakest link in the chain.” Although a number of regional-level agencies and networks have higher-capacity levels (organizations such as Europol, based in The Hague, Netherlands; the Lusaka Agreement Task Force [LATF], based in Nairobi, Kenya; the Association of Southeast Asian Nations [ASEAN] Wildlife Enforcement Network, based in Bangkok, Thailand; and WCO Regional Intelligence Liaison Offices [RILOs]...
were cited), the majority of regional-level entities were seen as lacking capacity to contribute to either intelligence- or enforcement-related initiatives.

As illustrated in figure 4.1, the network partners at the regional level would include the community of Wildlife Enforcement Networks, WCO’s Regional Intelligence Liaison Offices, INTERPOL Regional Bureaus, Europol, other government agencies, forensic and academic institutes, nongovernmental organizations, and other community groups as required. At the regional level, organizations are, in the aggregate, seen as the “weak link in the chain,” while at the same time being critical to a strong networked, community-based response to elephant poaching, ivory trafficking, and the wider spectrum of crime. This is an area that requires a level of investment in strengthening the capacities of the key regional-level organizations. As with the national-level agency capacity building, strengthening regional-level intelligence capacities should be seen as a multiyear investment.

NATIONAL SYSTEMS AND NETWORKS

Although park and wildlife service authorities across range states have a central mandate to respond to the threats posed by elephant poaching and ivory trafficking, they are by and large ill-equipped to respond as individual agencies to the threats. This was reinforced by the range state park and wildlife authorities that had intelligence systems in place, albeit rudimentary, in their consensus view that national police agencies would be best equipped to lead in a collective response to this escalating criminal enterprise. As the elephant poaching and ivory trade was described by the spectrum of law enforcement agencies and the wider partner agency community as enmeshed within the broad spectrum of criminal enterprise—including the drug trade, weapons trafficking, human smuggling, and money laundering—the capacities of national police agencies that have broader mandates to respond to a wider range of serious and organized crime is essential to achieving any degree of success in future in controlling, reducing, and preventing these crimes.

The governance model architecture at the national level that was seen as being best-equipped to effectively respond to elephant poaching and ivory trafficking, in conjunction with the interrelated organized crime activities, and received broad support across national, regional, and transnational law enforcement agencies and partner communities, is illustrated in figure 4.1. The national level governance model, which has the National Police Service as the central and lead agency within a network of agencies, would include a network of agencies including the National Customs Authority, Parks and Wildlife Service, Revenue Agency–Asset Forfeiture, dedicated National Prosecutors/Magistrates, INTERPOL National Central Bureaus (NCBs), and other agencies/departments as required (for example, National Defense, National Security). The one caveat in this model was the need to strengthen the intelligence capacity across key agencies operating at the national level where capacity levels were either weak or nonexistent. It is estimated that it would take a minimum of 3 to 5 years to strengthen the intelligence capacity levels of key national-level law enforcement agencies following the intelligence system and intelligence asset recommendations contained within this assessment report.

RECOMMENDATION NO. 1

The ICCWC should form an operational alliance to act as the governance body to set up an INTERPOL-led intelligence system and operational response to control, reduce, and prevent elephant poaching and ivory trafficking in African range states as well as across the global supply chain—from poaching to transit to retail ivory markets. Based on the assessment of current ICCWC partner agency capacity levels, the following capacity enhancements would build a more effective response capacity:

INTERPOL General Secretariat acts as the lead organization within the ICCWC governance model in the development of a comprehensive law enforcement strategy aimed at identifying and dismantling the criminal networks controlling the global illicit elephant poaching and ivory trade. The strategy, based on the body of recommendations contained in this report, will allow for evidence-based information and intelligence collection from the kill and seizure sites and subsequent exploitation and analysis of it. This will assist law enforcement at the transnational, regional, and national levels, in the course
of INTERPOL-supported operations and investigations, better understand how the organized crime networks and key players within networks operate. Importantly, INTERPOL is uniquely mandated to help law enforcement agencies in Africa and other relevant regions fill this critical gap. Through its General Secretariat in Lyon (IPSG); its regional bureaus (RBs) in Southern Africa (Harare), East Africa (Nairobi), Central Africa (Yaoundé), and West Africa (Abidjan); its South East Asia liaison office in Bangkok (LOBANG); the INTERPOL Global Complex for Innovation (IGCI) due to open in Singapore later in 2014; as well as its network of National Central Bureaus—in 190 member countries—INTERPOL is strategically placed to coordinate and support such a transnational law enforcement network of networks. The aims would be to:

» Establish and develop requisite skills and procedures for evidence-based information and intelligence collection and exploitation on elephant poaching, ivory trafficking, and interrelated crime in and from Africa;

» Generate and gather actionable intelligence on international criminal networks and individuals involved in ivory poaching and trafficking in and from Africa;

» Identify, disrupt, and dismantle the transnational organized criminal networks involved in elephant poaching, ivory trafficking and interrelated crime and trafficking in and from Africa;

» Enhance global situational awareness of these crime types; and

» Support member country-led operations/investigations that result in the arrests and prosecutions of priority targeted offenders.

To achieve the aims of the strategy, the following intelligence resources and funding support are required:

» INTERPOL General Secretariat’s Environmental Security Sub-Directorate’s limited intelligence staff (that is, one dedicated intelligence analyst focused on both elephant- and rhino-related issues) be augmented by five intelligence analysts, five intelligence officers, two information management-information technologies and quality assurance positions, one project manager, and two project support positions—for a total of 15 new dedicated intelligence positions that would provide a core capacity for a dedicated intelligence system to more effectively respond to the growing threats posed by criminal networks involved in elephant poaching and ivory trafficking at the transnational, regional, and national levels;

» As the ICCWC does not have core funding for its five representatives to participate in ICCWC meetings and activities, a core funding budget for ICCWC representatives is necessary—this will become increasingly required should the ICCWC become the governing body of a newly created ICCWC intelligence system and operational response to more effectively respond to the growing threats posed by elephant poaching and ivory trafficking.

RECOMMENDATION NO. 2

With the support and commitment to fund Recommendation No. 1, the INTERPOL General Secretariat, with assistance from the ICCWC partner organizations, should develop a multiphase Action Track and Implementation Plan based on the four core intelligence system assets (people, sources, systems, and knowledge) to strengthen existing and implement new intelligence systems and networks to more effectively respond to the growing threats posed by elephant poaching and ivory trafficking at the national, regional, and transnational levels as outlined in the body of recommendations contained in this assessment report.

RECOMMENDATION NO. 3

Following the development of the multiphase Action Track and Implementation Plan outlined in Recommendation No. 2, a select number of national-level “pilot test” sites should be launched to advance the development of intelligence-led elephant poaching and ivory trafficking.

1 The position of Project Manager is critical to the successful implementation of the overall ICCWC INTERPOL-led intelligence systems and operations capacity enhancement and requires extensive experience and knowledge of criminal intelligence systems development and implementation within law enforcement organizations at the national, regional, and transnational levels.
control strategies. Based on the preconditions that there is high-level government support for such an initiative and an ability to develop an accord among the core agencies required to build a strong “network of networks” across national, regional as well as transnational boundaries, following is a list of countries that are recommended as potential pilot test sites to launch networked intelligence systems:

» Kenya
» Uganda
» South Africa
» Gabon
» Botswana

RECOMMENDATION NO. 4
Implementation Teams will need to be established at the transnational level (INTERPOL General Secretariat), regional levels (INTERPOL Regional Bureaus), and at national levels (in each of the selected pilot test countries) to implement the multiphase Action Track and Implementation Plan outlined in Recommendation No. 2. The Recommendations contained in this report provide a logical starting point as well as a road map to achieve this objective. As the full implementation of the proposed organizational structures, governance model, and intelligence systems processes forms a multiyear undertaking (minimum of 3 to 5 years), strong and sustainable leadership at all levels is essential. Additionally, to ensure ongoing progress is being made on all key project areas within the Action Track and Implementation Plan, an independent evaluation of the status of Action Track and Implementation Plan advancements should be built into the Interpol-led governance model at regular intervals (for example, annual evaluations would ensure any obstacles to successful implementation are addressed in a timely manner and adjustments are made as required to ensure successful implementation at all levels).
CHAPTER FIVE
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The implementation of a networked criminal intelligence system within the mission of the International Consortium on Combating Wildlife Crime led by INTERPOL, as outlined in this report, would provide an effective response to the growing threats posed by elephant poaching and ivory trafficking across African range states as well as along the global supply chain countries. The proposed intelligence-led enforcement model employs a “network of networks” architecture to form effective partnerships and capacity building based on shared principles.

The effective implementation of a networked criminal intelligence system at the national, regional, and transnational levels requires committed and visionary leadership at all levels. The recommendations outlined in this report offer a road map and action plan for the implementation of a global criminal intelligence system and governance model to effectively respond to the current crisis facing the African elephant as well as better preparation for the future.

I would like to conclude this report with the words of Dr. Dame Daphne Sheldrick, DBE, of the David Sheldrick Wildlife Trust:

“Saving wildlife and wilderness is the responsibility of all thinking people. Greed and personal gain must not be permitted to decimate, despoil and destroy the earth’s irreplaceable treasure; for its existence is essential to the human spirit and well-being of the earth as a whole. All life has just one home—the earth—and we as the dominant species must take care of it.”

RECOMMENDATIONS:
PHASE 1—IMMEDIATE ACTION

RECOMMENDATION NO. 1
The ICCWC forms an operational alliance to act as the governance body to set up an INTERPOL-led intelligence system and operational response to control, reduce, and prevent elephant poaching and ivory trafficking in African range states as well as across the global supply chain—from poaching to transit to retail ivory markets. Based on the assessment of current ICCWC partner agency capacity levels, the following capacity enhancements would build a more effective response capacity:
INTERPOL General Secretariat should act as the lead organization within the ICCWC governance model in the development of a comprehensive law enforcement strategy aimed at identifying and dismantling the criminal networks controlling the global illicit elephant poaching and ivory trade. The strategy, based on the body of recommendations contained in this report, will allow for evidence-based information and intelligence collection from the kill and seizure sites and subsequent exploitation and analysis of it. This will assist law enforcement at the transnational, regional, and national levels, in the course of INTERPOL-supported operations and investigations, better understand how the organized crime networks and key players within networks operate. Importantly, INTERPOL is uniquely mandated to help law enforcement agencies in Africa and other relevant regions fill this critical gap. Through its General Secretariat in Lyon (IPS); its regional bureaus (RBs) in Southern Africa (Harare), East Africa (Nairobi), Central Africa (Yaoundé), and West Africa (Abidjan); its South East Asia liaison office in Bangkok (LOBANG); the INTERPOL Global Complex for Innovation (IGCI) due to open in Singapore later in 2014; as well as its network of National Central Bureaus—in 190 member countries—INTERPOL is strategically placed to coordinate and support such a transnational law enforcement network of networks. The aims would be:

» Establish and develop requisite skills and procedures for evidence-based information and intelligence collection and exploitation on elephant poaching, ivory trafficking, and interrelated crime in and from Africa;

» Generate and gather actionable intelligence on international criminal networks and individuals involved in ivory poaching and trafficking in and from Africa;

» Identify, disrupt, and dismantle the transnational organized criminal networks involved in elephant poaching, ivory trafficking, and interrelated crime and trafficking in and from Africa;

» Enhance global situational awareness of these crime types; and

» Support member country–led operations/investigations that result in the arrests and prosecutions of priority targeted offenders.

To achieve the aims of the strategy, the following intelligence resources and funding support is required:

» INTERPOL General Secretariat’s Environmental Security Sub-Directorate’s limited intelligence staff (that is, one dedicated intelligence analyst focused on both elephant- and rhino-related issues) be augmented by five intelligence analysts, five intelligence officers, two information management-information technologies and quality assurance positions, one project manager; and two project support positions—for a total of 15 new dedicated intelligence positions which would provide a core capacity for a dedicated intelligence system to more effectively respond to the growing threats posed by criminal networks involved in elephant poaching and ivory trafficking at the transnational, regional, and national levels;

» As the ICCWC does not have core funding for its five representatives to participate in ICCWC meetings and activities, a core funding budget for ICCWC representatives is necessary—this will become increasingly required should the ICCWC become the governing body of a newly created ICCWC intelligence system and operational response to more effectively respond to the growing threats posed by elephant poaching and ivory trafficking.

RECOMMENDATION NO. 2

With the support and commitment to fund Recommendation No. 1, INTERPOL General Secretariat, with assistance from the ICCWC partner organizations, should develop a multiphase Action Track and Implementation Plan based on the four core intelligence system assets (people, sources, systems, and knowledge) to strengthen existing and implement new intelligence systems and networks to more effectively respond to the growing threats posed by elephant poaching and ivory trafficking at the national, regional, and transnational levels as outlined in the body of recommendations contained in this assessment report.

2 The position of Project Manager is critical to the successful implementation of the overall INTERPOL-led intelligence systems and operations capacity enhancement and requires extensive experience and knowledge of criminal intelligence systems development and implementation within law enforcement organizations at the national, regional, and transnational levels.
RECOMMENDATION NO. 3

Following the development of the multiphase Action Track and Implementation Plan outlined in Recommendation No. 2, a select number of national-level “pilot test” sites should be launched to advance the development of intelligence-led elephant poaching and ivory trafficking control strategies. Based on the preconditions that there is high-level government support for such an initiative and an ability to develop an accord among the core agencies required to build a strong “network of networks” across national, regional, and transnational boundaries, following is a list of countries that are recommended as potential pilot test sites to launch networked intelligence systems:

» Kenya
» Uganda
» South Africa
» Gabon
» Botswana

RECOMMENDATION NO. 4

Implementation Teams will need to be established at the transnational level (INTERPOL General Secretariat), regional levels (INTERPOL Regional Bureaus), and at national levels (in each of the selected pilot test countries) to implement the multiphase Action Track and Implementation Plan outlined in Recommendation No. 2. The Recommendations contained in this report provide a logical starting point as well as road map to achieve this objective. As the full implementation of the proposed organizational structures, governance model, and intelligence systems processes forms a multiyear undertaking (minimum 3 to 5 years), strong and sustainable leadership at all levels is essential. Additionally, to ensure ongoing progress is being made on all key project areas within the Action Track and Implementation Plan, an independent evaluation of the status of Action Track and Implementation Plan advancements should be built into the governance model at regular intervals (for example, annual evaluations would ensure any obstacles to successful implementation are addressed in a timely manner and adjustments are made as required to ensure successful implementation at all levels).

RECOMMENDATIONS: PHASE 2—DURING A PERIOD OF 3 TO 5 YEARS

RECOMMENDATION NO. 1

An Integrated Intelligence–Operations Council (IIOC) should be established at national levels to ensure that intelligence and enforcement are integrated into a single coordinated intelligence-led response, thus ensuring a more strategic, proactive approach in responding to the threats, risks, and harms posed by elephant poaching and ivory trafficking (as well as the wider spectrum of serious and organized crime). A Guidance Advice document should be prepared to aid the effective implementation of the IIOCs.

RECOMMENDATION NO. 2

Intelligence Services across range states should be established (where not already in place), having a dedicated cadre of Intelligence Officers.

RECOMMENDATION NO. 3

A national standard Intelligence Collection Plan and Information/Intelligence Evaluation Report Form should be developed and implemented for use by all range state Intelligence Officer staff. Existing reporting models currently exist within the wider intelligence community (that is, 5X5X5 system developed for the UK National Intelligence Model) that could be easily modified for range state requirements.

RECOMMENDATION NO. 4

Develop a comprehensive Information Management Strategy and accompanying Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) to ensure national, regional, and transnational consistency in the overall collection, collation, and management of information and intelligence across the multiplicity of agencies responding to the threats posed by elephant poaching and ivory trafficking (as well as the full spectrum of threats posed by serious and organized crime).

See appendix B, Assessment of National Level Intelligence Systems and Intelligence Needs in Select Range States, for background on the Phase 2 recommendations.
RECOMMENDATION NO. 5
Develop standards for Information Technologies and Analytical Tools for use by Intelligence Services at the national, regional, and transnational levels.

RECOMMENDATION NO. 6
Establish Intelligence Services across range states (where not already in place) having a dedicated cadre of Intelligence Analysts.

RECOMMENDATION NO. 7
National standards for intelligence assessment formats should be established for the range of intelligence products produced by range state, regional and transnational intelligence services—strategic, tactical, early warning product lines.

RECOMMENDATION NO. 8
Develop a national distribution system aligned to key partner community organizations at the national, regional, and transnational levels.

RECOMMENDATION NO. 9
Establish an Intelligence Review Board process at the national, regional, and transnational levels to ensure all finished intelligence assessments adhere to national, regional, and transnational policies, standards, and security requirements.

RECOMMENDATION NO. 10
Establish a national Intelligence Requirements Management System—a database set up to track all finished intelligence assessments with the client base that received the assessments to measure client satisfaction levels and quality assurance in reference to the value-added and utility of the intelligence products and services.

RECOMMENDATION NO. 11
Develop a national Human Resource Strategy for all three categories of intelligence service specialists (intelligence officers, intelligence analysts, and information management/information technology/quality assurance specialists) to ensure recruitment of qualified candidates that meet the core competencies of each category of employee. The HR Strategy should also focus on employee retention as well as career training and development. Thus, the HR Strategy should include Work Descriptions for each of the three core categories of intelligence staff; Competency Profiles for each of the three core categories of intelligence staff; a Training and Development Strategy for Intelligence Staff together with Training Templates for each of the three core categories of intelligence staff.

RECOMMENDATION NO. 12
Develop Human Source Development Policy and Standard Operating Procedures together with a Training Program for Intelligence Officer staff to ensure maximum exploitation of confidential human source information as a key Source Asset within range state intelligence services.

RECOMMENDATION NO. 13
Develop an Intelligence Service Orientation Guide to ensure all staff have the requisite knowledge to effectively carry out their duties in an effective and efficient manner from the initial date they sign on. The orientation guide will also ensure that all staff have a consistent and comprehensive understanding of all required organizational policy, directives, SOPs, and infrastructure that affect their position as well as their colleagues within the Intelligence Service and wider partner community organizations.

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4 The global criminal intelligence community (including INTERPOL, Europol, and a number of range states visited in the project), although not having formal standards (that is, ISO standards) in place for Information Technology and Analytical Tools, is employing the IBM i2 suite of products, including Analyst’s Notebook, iBase, and IntelliShare for criminal network analysis, event charting, pattern recognition, database needs, and intelligence sharing. The critical element is not the requirement for all intelligence services and partner agencies to employ the same information technology tools, but that the individual databases are able to share information assets across platforms, thus enabling aggregate datasets and an ability to perform more holistic analyses. A more detailed discussion related to intelligence analyst requirements is contained in appendix A under People, Source, System, and Knowledge Assets.

5 This recommendation aligns with Recommendation No. 4 regarding the development of a comprehensive Information Management Strategy and accompanying Standard Operating Procedures to ensure national, regional, and transnational consistency in the overall collection, evaluation, collation, and management of information and intelligence across the multiplicity of agencies responding to the threats posed by elephant poaching and ivory trafficking (as well as the full spectrum of threats posed by serious and organized crime).
RECOMMENDATION NO. 14
Develop an *Intelligence Service Code of Practice* to outline to all intelligence staff the basic principles and minimum common standards for an effective Intelligence Service; promote compatibility of procedures and terminology for the Intelligence Service; clarify the responsibilities of all core intelligence staff; ensure that observance of these principles and the standards for implementation results in a systematic program of continuous development of intelligence policy, practice, and capability; and identify and promulgate good practice across the wider intelligence and partner community.

RECOMMENDATION NO. 15
Develop a comprehensive training and career development program for Intelligence Service staff. As a first step, existing training and career development programs across the wider intelligence community should be explored and evaluated for applicability within wildlife crime, as well as a broader serious and organized crime, context. This could include programs offered by established best-practice criminal intelligence programs that are currently operating in Europe, Australia–New Zealand, Asia, and North America.

Additionally, staff membership in professional intelligence associations to enhance knowledge levels, career development, and professional certification should be an integral component of any comprehensive training and career development program. Professional associations in this domain include the International Association of Law Enforcement Intelligence Analysts (IALEIA); the Association of Law Enforcement Intelligence Units (LEIU); the International Association of Crime Analysts (IACA); and the International Association for Intelligence Education (IAFIE).

RECOMMENDATION NO. 16
Develop a Global Partnership Strategy across national, regional, and transnational law enforcement agencies, networks, and partner communities to break down existing barriers to open communications and enhance wildlife intelligence, enforcement, and prevention.

As the full implementation of the proposed organizational structures, governance model, and intelligence systems processes forms a multiyear undertaking (minimum of 3 to 5 years), strong and sustainable leadership at all levels is essential. Additionally, to ensure ongoing progress is being made in all key project areas within the Action Track and Implementation Plan, an independent evaluation of the status of Action Track and Implementation Plan advancements should be built into the governance model at regular intervals (for example, annual evaluations would ensure any obstacles to successful implementation are addressed in a timely manner and adjustments are made as required to ensure successful implementation at all levels).


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The following section highlights the role of intelligence in natural resource law enforcement and the principal requirements necessary to build and implement a criminal intelligence system and governance model to effectively respond to the growing threats posed by elephant poaching and ivory trafficking at all levels of the supply chain.

INTELLIGENCE AS A BUILDING BLOCK FOR GREATER EFFECTIVENESS

The advent of intelligence-led policing in the 1990s, and the more systematic employment of strategic and tactical intelligence, has provided the tools with which law enforcement can level the playing field and more effectively control and prevent organized crime from gaining a stronger foothold in society. The focus of this section centers on the application of both strategic and tactical intelligence as effective tools with which to control, reduce, and prevent organized crime—and more specifically, wildlife-related organized crime.

The effective management of crime is dependent on a professional criminal intelligence capacity and understanding that the primary purpose of intelligence is to ensure effective operations against organized crime with the aim of controlling, reducing, and ultimately preventing the threats and harms posed by crime on society.

INTELLIGENCE PRINCIPLES, CATEGORIES, & BENCHMARKING

INTELLIGENCE PRINCIPLES

An effective criminal intelligence program should be governed by nine basic principles:

1. **Planning & Direction**—Intelligence support needs to be focused toward achieving clearly defined operational and strategic outcomes. This is accomplished through systematic planning and direction to achieve targeted operational and intelligence priorities, which are established at the transnational, regional, and national levels.

2. **Centralized Management and Coordination**—The intelligence process must be centrally managed and coordinated at the transnational, regional, and national levels to avoid unnecessary duplication of effort, foster mutual support, and ensure the most effective and efficient utilization of human, financial, and materiel resources.

3. **Responsiveness/Satisfaction**—Intelligence service delivery must at all times be responsive to the operational and strategic needs of the user. Support to users must be anticipatory and precise and intelligence staff must be capable of responding both rapidly and flexibly to changing operational needs and redirecting intelligence collection and analysis efforts accordingly.

4. **Responsibility to Share**—All available information and intelligence are both “owned” and “used” by the intelligence community and not individual units or individuals and therefore must be placed on corporate records management and intelligence databases. Accordingly, all information and intelligence must be readily available to intelligence staff as well as to users. Information and intelligence are of no value if not disseminated or accessible in a timely manner to those who need it.

5. **Source Protection/Security of Information**—In the collection of information or the dissemination of intelligence, both sources and methods must be properly protected to avoid compromise and subsequent loss of future collection capability. The security of information for both storage and dissemination must be in alignment with respective organizational security protocols.

6. **Objectivity**—Any temptation to distort intelligence to fit preconceived ideas must be resisted; the integrity and credibility of the intelligence program depend on it.
7. **Lawful**—Information and intelligence are collected, stored, used, and shared lawfully.

8. **Ethical**—Intelligence staff adhere to the highest ethical principles in carrying out their day-to-day duties.

9. **Continual Improvement & Innovation**—Intelligence staff must continually review practices, procedures and processes and embrace innovation to ensure that changes in the operating environment and user requirements are accommodated.

**Strategic and Tactical Intelligence: Techniques and Applications**

Crime in the 21st century, more than in any previous era, can be characterized by two fundamental elements: it has become global and is constantly evolving. Thus, the capacity of law enforcement or government—whether at the national, regional, or transnational level—will, to a large extent, be dependent on its ability to adapt on a continuing basis to a constantly changing environment. To deal more effectively with the threats, risks, and harms posed by organized crime on society, law enforcement will need to employ more sophisticated intelligence systems and approaches to prioritize its resources aimed at dismantling criminal networks and neutralizing criminal markets. Strategic and tactical intelligence provides the necessary support for both law enforcement leaders and government policy makers to recognize emerging crime threats as well as opportunities to respond in a timely, proactive, and effective manner.

There are two broad, often overlapping, and complementary, forms of intelligence: strategic and tactical (see definitions in box A.1). Although having different primary purposes, they should not be viewed as being totally distinct from each other. Tactical intelligence often serves as the primary base of information for strategic intelligence, and strategic intelligence in turn serves to position and often guide tactical intelligence. This interdependent and complementary relationship serves to strengthen the six-phase intelligence process (as illustrated in figure A.1) and thus better serve the operational (tactical) and managerial (strategic) requirements of law enforcement. However, whether strategic or tactical, criminal intelligence has its focus on five distinct areas in relation to organized crime or criminal market control and prevention:

- Capabilities;
- Intentions;
- Limitations;
- Vulnerabilities; and
- Opportunities.

Intelligence therefore clearly has both a strategic and tactical utility that is more often than not complementary; hence, there is the need within the intelligence governance model to emphasize balance, coherence, and integration. The key is to understand user needs and then deliver the required intelligence in a timely and complete manner.

**BOX A.1. STRATEGIC AND TACTICAL INTELLIGENCE FORMS**

**Strategic Intelligence**

Largely a management tool, strategic intelligence attempts to provide an overview of the scope and dimension of criminal activity to assist in policy development aimed at providing effective crime control and prevention strategies to deal with the overall costs and effects of crime on society. Strategic intelligence permits the initiation of plans of action on a long-term basis against emerging crime rather than reacting—after the fact—to individual criminal acts. Strategic intelligence is able to go well beyond what tactical intelligence can provide; it takes a longer, broader view of what is, what has been, and, by so doing, forecasts what might be. Strategic intelligence does not compete with tactical intelligence; rather, these two forms of intelligence complement each other, but at different levels within the law enforcement organization.

**Tactical Intelligence**

Principally an investigative tool, tactical intelligence is the support given by analysts and intelligence officers to operational sections or investigators during the course of an active investigation. Normally directed at short-term objectives, its direct application has a focus on more immediate impacts, such as arrest, seizure, and forfeiture. Its direct application to an active operation leads to better prioritization of cases for maximum enforcement effectiveness against criminal organizations, networks, and activities as well as the efficient utilization of investigative resources.
comprises six interrelated steps: (a) Planning and Direction; (b) Collection; (c) Evaluation; (d) Collation; (e) Analysis; and (f) Dissemination/Application.

The key elements within each of the six steps in the Intelligence Process as illustrated in figure A.1 are discussed in the following section.

Criminal intelligence is the end product of information that has been subjected to the intelligence process/cycle. This process consists of six steps as illustrated below.

**Step 1: Planning and Direction** provide focus for the remaining steps, and ensure that an organized and systematic approach is taken. Threat, risk, and harm analysis is conducted to determine on which specific threats, risks, and harms to focus. Key elements within the planning and direction step include establishment of a conceptual framework, definition of the problem/issue under study, generation of working hypothesis/hypotheses, and list of indicators. Intelligence staff then develop an Intelligence Collection Plan, applying available sources (human intelligence, electronic intelligence, publicly available or open source intelligence, and so on) and methods, and seeking information and intelligence from other agencies.

**Step 2: Collection** is the gathering of raw information in accordance with the Collection Plan. Activities such as interviews, technical and physical surveillances, human source operations, database searches, and liaison relationships result in the collection of information and intelligence. The Collection Plan includes the information to be collected and its prioritization, its location, mechanisms or processes for its gathering, and time line for obtaining the information.

**Step 3: Evaluation** applies a first-level filter to both the information collected and the source of the information to evaluate the validity of the information and the reliability of the source of the information. Some of the information collected may be discarded at this point.

**Step 4: Collation** involves organizing, cross-referencing, and filing the information that has been collected so that it can be compared with existent data to detect contradictions, incongruences, and patterns. Entering information into electronic databases is strongly preferred over filing of paper documents owing to the ease of sharing and exploitation of this information during the Analysis step in the process.

**Step 5: Analysis** produces finished intelligence products by logically integrating the collated information; putting it in context; establishing its significance, implications, and relevance to requirements; integrating it by combining disparate pieces of information to identify collateral information and patterns; and finally interpreting the significance of any newly developed knowledge. The product of this process is a forecast of the continued activity of the subject(s) and issue(s) being analyzed.

**Step 6: Reporting/Dissemination and Application** convey finished intelligence products in a timely fashion, in appropriate form, and by secure means depending on the needs of decision makers and reporting requirements. The key finished intelligence products should include:

- Transnational, Regional, and National Threat/Risk/Harm Assessments;
- Intelligence Alerts (new trends, Methods of Operation [MOs], and so on);
- Early Warning Assessments;
- Annual Reports on Elephant Poaching and Ivory Trafficking with links to other Serious and Organized Crime (Public Reports);
Elephant Crime Intelligence System Assessment

Intelligence Assessments (issue/topic focus reports);

Crime “Hot Spots” and named criminal organizations, networks, and principal targets.

INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS TECHNIQUES AND APPLICATIONS

There is a growing number of techniques employed in the tradecraft of criminal intelligence, many of which have both tactical and strategic applications (see table A.1 for a sampling of a number of frequently employed techniques). Marilyn B. Peterson, in her seminal text, Applications in Criminal Analysis, highlights some 65 techniques in criminal analysis (Peterson 1998). Another valuable reference is Successful Law Enforcement Using Analytical Methods, published by IALEIA—the International Association of Law Enforcement Intelligence Analysts (Peterson et al. 1996).

A comprehensive understanding of organized crime and concomitant criminal markets can be gained through the development of an organized crime threat/risk assessment (OCTRA). The principal purpose of a threat and risk assessment is to provide decision makers with a clear picture of key undesirable events (current and potential), the probability of those events occurring, their possible repercussions, and recommendations to minimize or address specific risks and threats (Tusikov and Fahlman 2008).

The Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) analytical threat measurement technique known as Sleipnir was developed in the late 1990s and updated in 2010. Sleipnir V.2.0, uses a numerical rank-ordered set of 12 criminogenic attributes (for example, corruption, violence, money laundering, scope, diversification) to assess the relative threats posed by organized criminal groups (see figure A.2). Values, color-coded to visualize the threat, are assigned to each attribute: high (red), medium (orange), low (yellow), nil (green), or unknown (blue). The sum total of all the attribute scores provides the Sleipnir score for each crime group. The groups can then be rank-ordered in a matrix by threat level to provide a group-by-group comparison.

Sleipnir is a national analytical technique employed within the Canadian law enforcement intelligence community to assess the relative threat of criminal groups. The Sleipnir technique provides intelligence analysts working on organized crime groups with a comprehensive and transparent method to assist in developing and presenting recommendations and supporting intelligence in a concise manner. This framework is not intended to produce a matrix that stands in isolation, but to be fleshed out in the context of a strategic analytical assessment that explains the details and significance of the comparisons. The attribute set serves as a skeleton of the Collection Plan for the assessment and the matrix as a clear illustration of the rankings and of the reasons behind the judgments.

The technique has also been employed by numerous law enforcement and public safety agencies around the globe within the context of developing serious and organized crime threat assessments (SOCTAs). In this regard, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime has developed a guidance document and training program on the use and preparation of serious and organized crime threat assessments—The SOCTA Handbook: Guidance on the Preparation and Use of Serious and Organized Crime Threat Assessments (UNODC 2010b).

An additional benefit of an analytical threat measurement technique such as Sleipnir is in the development of Intelligence Collection Plans. Through the determination of critical knowledge gaps (the category labeled “unknown” in the Sleipnir matrix)—whether in the domain of individual criminals, organized crime groups and networks, or criminal markets—a prioritized Criminal Intelligence Collection Plan can be developed. This type of knowledge-mapping exercise permits more directed and

| TABLE A.1. INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS TECHNIQUES |
|-------------------|-------------------|
| Association Analysis | Net Worth Analysis |
| Bank Record Analysis | Commodity Flow Analysis |
| Activity Flow Analysis | Organizational Analysis |
| Statistical Analysis | Geo-spatial Analysis |
| Business Record Analysis | Vulnerability Analysis |
| Telephone Record Analysis | Crime Pattern Analysis |
| Case Analysis | Comparative Case Analysis |
| Time Series Analysis | Trend Analysis |
| Threat Analysis | Risk Analysis |
| Criminal Market Analysis | Early Warning Analysis |
Elephant Crime Intelligence System Assessment

**Effective collection** by intelligence officers and analysts based on the critical threats, risks, and harms posed by organized crime groups, networks, and markets in any given geographical jurisdiction, whether local, regional, national, or transnational.

**BENCHMARKS OF EFFECTIVE INTELLIGENCE**

Effective intelligence is essentially intelligence that meets the needs of the user. To achieve this, intelligence program products and services must have all of the following characteristics:

1. **Actionable**—Intelligence must be relevant to a user’s needs and have value in supporting a decision being made.
2. **Timely and Available**—Intelligence must be available in time to enable informed decisions to be made and executed.
3. **Objective**—Intelligence must be free from bias and must not be directed or manipulated in any way to conform to a predetermined result or politicized position.
4. **Accurate**—Intelligence must be factually correct and indicate the degree of confidence in intelligence assessments and analytical judgments.
5. **Usable**—Intelligence products and services must be clear and easily understood and have practical application for the user.
6. **Lawful and Ethical**—Intelligence staff must, above all, respect the laws that govern it and uphold the highest ethical standards throughout all the steps in the Intelligence Process.

**KEY INTELLIGENCE SYSTEM ASSETS**

The four key components of an intelligence system are centered on people, source, system, and knowledge assets (ACPO 2005) as outlined below:

**PEOPLE ASSETS**

The introduction of a fully functioning and effective intelligence service relies on a solid foundation of dedicated staff knowing their particular roles and responsibilities in relation to the mandate of the intelligence service. Key intelligence staff fall within three core areas of responsibility: intelligence collection, the domain of intelligence officers; analysis, the domain of intelligence analysts; and information management and exchange, the domain of information management/information technology/quality assurance specialists.
SOURCE ASSETS
For an intelligence service to work effectively, information is its "lifeblood." Source assets, therefore, refer to a broad spectrum of information sources that can be classified as both overt and covert. Primary examples include direct observations of intelligence staff, witnesses, forensic information, open source information, partner agencies, and human intelligence sources.

SYSTEM ASSETS
Intelligence staff must be aware of all relevant policy, directives, and standard operating procedures associated with the secure access, recording, storage, and utilization of information and intelligence as well as the internal infrastructure required to carry out their specific intelligence roles and responsibilities.

KNOWLEDGE ASSETS
Knowledge assets refer to the professional knowledge required by staff to enable them to work effectively and efficiently. The timely dissemination and accessibility of knowledge assets make this possible. Examples of knowledge assets (relevant to wildlife-related crime) include CITES regulations, national-level legislation that affects wildlife crime, and organizational policies and directives. These types of assets are usually obtained through training and development, shared knowledge over organizational intranets, and access to internal and external reference libraries and other available information sources.

GOVERNANCE DEFINED
Governance is not an end in itself, but rather a process and set of practices that enable organizations to realize their goals. The purpose of having a governance framework is to ensure that there is a set of principles in place as a guide to roles and responsibilities, clear expectations, authorities, decision making, performance monitoring, and mechanisms of accountability. These are the essential elements that make up good governance.

PRINCIPLES OF GOOD GOVERNANCE
The following general definition of good governance that can be applied to any organization is based on the key principles that define good governance as developed by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP 1977):

1. Maximum participation of program personnel, partners, and stakeholders;
2. Transparent decision making and accessibility of program-related information;
3. Responsiveness to concerns and issues raised;
4. Consensus-oriented in terms of making and implementing decisions that are in the best interests of the broad group of stakeholders;
5. Producing timely results that meet the needs of stakeholders, while making the best use of human, financial, and materiel resources;
6. Strong accountability mechanisms;
7. Ongoing and timely communication; and
8. Adherence to ethical practices.

INTENT OF CRIMINAL INTELLIGENCE GOVERNANCE
A coherent governance framework is both a starting point and one of the essential keys to organizational success. The criminal intelligence system governance framework, in recognizing the ever-adapting nature of organized crime, coupled with the dynamic nature of the operating environment, renders overly prescriptive, independent, and rigid structures less effective. An effective governance framework needs to recognize the benefit of a network-based model, with the majority of decision making and program execution made at the partner community level; further underscoring the principle that information is a community asset and not owned by any one organization or unit. Although this principle remains a cultural
challenge, adherence to the principle of information being a community asset is central to overall mission success.

Further, the proposed governance model takes into consideration that we have a changing and dynamic workforce in a new generation of intelligence professionals who bring different skills and cultural attitudes and who need to be adequately trained to meet current and future challenges. Just as important, new and developing technologies for information management, sharing, and knowledge development must be recognized in how we govern ourselves. The proposed governance model is therefore centered on a distributed, network-based architecture that embraces maximum participation and ongoing innovation as core principles and practices.

The governance framework also needs to embody that the program has a wide and diverse customer, partner, and stakeholder base, with different, but not competing, requirements. This is reflected in the provision of the strategic and tactical intelligence products and services provided by intelligence program staff. However, central to the governance framework is ensuring the intelligence program remains focused on its critical support role to operations in fulfilling the mandate of the ICCWC as a united front, employing a collaborative partnership approach to respond effectively to the multifaceted challenges posed by transnational criminal organizations and networks involved in wildlife crime.  

INTELLIGENCE SYSTEM GOVERNANCE PROCESS

Intelligence has limited value unless it is operationalized.

The intelligence system governance process effectively operationalizes intelligence at whatever level through the employment of a robust tasking and coordination process. It focuses intelligence products and services for the use of the Strategic Tasking and Coordination Group (ST&CG), and Tactical Tasking and Coordination Group (TT&CG) for tactical resolution and operational review, as outlined in figure A.3. The Intelligence System Process outlines how information undergoes development to become actionable intelligence.

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7 See chapter 4, Intelligence to Enforcement Action: A Networked Elephant Crime Intelligence System, for the specific details regarding the core elements of the proposed ICCWC INTERPOL-led intelligence system governance model.
The principles that underlie the tasking and coordination function must be consistently applied at all levels of operations (transnational, regional, national) to ensure a high standard of intelligence throughout the overall intelligence network.

Practice Advice on standard operating procedures is required to provide clear guidance to all intelligence and operational personnel involved in the tasking and coordination processes, including intelligence managers/supervisors, intelligence officers, intelligence analysts, file managers, and other specialists.

It is crucial that staff understand one another’s roles and responsibilities within both intelligence and operational domains. In particular, T&CG Chairs must understand the minimum content requirements for the intelligence products. Their leadership will guide the effective tasking of intelligence officers and intelligence analysts to use the most appropriate techniques and, in turn, provide for tactical review, operational decision making, and the development of effective intelligence-based outcomes.

**REQUIREMENT FOR EFFECTIVE TASKING AND COORDINATION**

Effective tasking and coordination processes are essential to successfully meeting organizational mandates, as they:

- Ensure that decisions about priorities and resources are made on an evidence-based assessment of threats/risks/harms;
- Enable managers to weigh competing demands using timely information and intelligence;
- Establish a pragmatic, interactive approach for priority setting; and
- Engage decision makers at all levels—increasingly, these decisions involve a multiplicity of partners across government as well as nongovernmental organizations.

**PLANNING AND PRIORITIZATION OF CRIMINAL INTELLIGENCE**

Intelligence is not produced for its own sake or to provide intellectual satisfaction for the intelligence analyst or intelligence officer. Intelligence is prepared as advice to its primary user communities, whether operational law enforcement officers, senior law enforcement managers, or other governmental clients, whether at the transnational, regional, or national level. Accountability mechanisms for planning, direction, and prioritization of intelligence will ensure intelligence program staff fully understand the requirements of principal users and clarity around issues concerning assessment content, recommendations, and time constraints.

In the initial planning and direction stages of the Intelligence Process, intelligence managers should give consideration to the following key questions when determining Transnational, Regional, or National Intelligence Priorities:

1. What benefits are to be derived, or what practical significance to the client community does this priority have in terms of human, financial, and material resource commitments?
2. What is the assessed level of threat, risk, and harm to the community that this priority (threat issue) poses?
3. What are the critical gaps in our knowledge of the level of threat/risk/harm posed by the criminal activity, criminal organization or individual and what is the risk level of the knowledge gap?
4. What are the political and/or legal implications?
5. What is the cost versus benefit?
6. Will the focus of the intelligence resource commitment have an impact beyond low-level criminal operations?
7. Are the financial, material, intelligence, information access, and operational resources available?
8. Will the potential results of resource commitments have long-range strategic benefit in terms of crime prevention/reduction and/or policy and strategy development?

**DIRECTION OF CRIMINAL INTELLIGENCE: TRANSNATIONAL TO NATIONAL CONTINUUM**

Intelligence and Operational Priorities set by an Integrated Intelligence and Operations Council, whether at a national, regional, or transnational level, are guided by the

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*A structural model for implementing the intelligence system governance process through a formalized Integrated Intelligence and Operations Council model is presented in chapter 4, Intelligence to Enforcement Action: A Networked Elephant Crime Intelligence System.*
Intelligence System Governance Process as illustrated in figure A.3 and aided by the employment of an organized crime threat/risk/harm prioritization methodology (such as the RCMP Sleipnir methodology noted in figure A.2).

It should be underlined that although the setting of transnational-level intelligence and operational priorities will be guided by those at the regional and national levels, early warning signals affecting serious and organized crime trends (whether political, economic, social, technological, economic, or legal) also play a role. However, the key factor in the decision-making process at all levels will center on the relationships and dialogue between the members of the Integrated Intelligence and Operations Council.

ACCOUNTABILITY AND PERFORMANCE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM REQUIREMENTS

Accountability mechanisms, including the evaluation/re-evaluation of the overall operations of the criminal intelligence system, including the operationalization of intelligence products, are essential. There is no other way in which members of the Integrated Intelligence-Operations Council can be assured that the overall operation of the intelligence system is both directed toward and achieving the specific objectives assigned to it.

There are no simple quantitative measurement systems that can be employed to measure the success of the intelligence system; however, evaluation systems are necessary. In this regard, one performance measurement system that is well designed for law enforcement agencies is the Balanced Scorecard (BSC), a strategy performance management tool developed by Robert S. Kaplan and David P. Norton at Harvard Business School as detailed in The Balanced Scorecard and Strategy-Focused Organization (Kaplan and Norton 1996, 2000).

The Balanced Scorecard and Strategy Map example provided in figure A.4 illustrates how one intelligence service, Criminal Intelligence Service Canada (CISC), employs the BSC performance management system to guide its organization.

The BSC consists of a Strategy Map together with a structured report, supported by design methods and automation tools, that can be used by managers to keep track of the execution of activities by the staff within their control and to monitor the consequences arising from these actions. The employment of the suite of BSC tools acts as an accountability mechanism to keep both the overall intelligence system and its staff focused on meeting their mission in as an effective and efficient manner as possible by ensuring the validity of the intelligence products and services, utility of the intelligence produced to the consumer(s) of the products and services, compliance with policy and standard operating procedures, intelligence security requirements, as well as effective and timely coordination with other partner organizations at the transnational, regional and national levels.

The employment of the suite of BSC tools acts as an accountability mechanism to keep both the overall intelligence system and its staff focused on meeting their mission in as an effective and efficient manner as possible by ensuring:

» Overall effectiveness of the reporting/dissemination and application of intelligence products and services;
» Results of the intelligence assessments meet the objectives assigned by the Integrated Intelligence and Operations Council;
» Sufficient resource deployment is achieved to meet assigned objectives; and
» A systematic qualitative measurement system is in place to evaluate the performance of the intelligence system and report back to Integrated Intelligence and Operations Council meetings on an ongoing basis.

The intelligence process is both labor intensive and costly. Therefore, effective planning, direction, and prioritization are essential elements to overall intelligence system performance management and accountability.
FIGURE A.4. THE BALANCED SCORECARD AND STRATEGY MAP PERFORMANCE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM

CISC MISSION

Championing integrated intelligence-led law enforcement, CISC provides knowledge and understanding of the threat and harm of organized and serious crime necessary for the guidance and influence of policy and decision making through application of the intelligence process.

The balanced scorecard sits behind the strategy map.

Strategy map

Balanced scorecard

- Perspectives & objectives
  - Purpose & vision
    - Financial
    - Customers
    - Process
    - Learning & growth
    - Values

- Objective
- Measure
- Target
- Level of performance required
- How will success be measured
- Investments & projects
- Responsibility
- What the strategy must achieve
- Initiative
- Who
This section provides an assessment of the intelligence systems, governance structures, and intelligence needs within the agencies visited during the interview phase of the project in the following range states: Uganda, Kenya, Zimbabwe, and South Africa. Although the range states visited are not inclusive of all range states affected by elephant poaching and ivory trafficking, they are believed to represent the existent intelligence system capacity pan-Africa in responding to the increasing threats posed by elephant poaching and ivory trafficking. The assessment is focused on the three key, and critical, elements that serve as the foundation for an effective intelligence system as noted below:

» Strength of existing mechanisms across the key steps in the Intelligence Process: Planning and Direction, Collection, Evaluation, Collation, Analysis, Reporting, and Dissemination/Application;

» Capacity of key agencies to respond effectively to elephant crime at the local, national, regional, and international levels in all key intelligence asset building blocks: People Assets, System Assets, Source Assets, Knowledge Assets; and

» Challenges to good governance models to effectively respond to elephant crime while ensuring long-term sustainability for prevention, detection, and suppression initiatives.

CURRENT ENVIRONMENT AND KEY FINDINGS: THE INTELLIGENCE PROCESS

The project methodology used the framework of the six interdependent steps in the standard Intelligence Process to evaluate the current intelligence service capacity within the range states visited as well as to make recommendations for service-level delivery enhancements. Following are the key observations in each step in the Intelligence Process based on the on-site visits in Uganda, Kenya, Zimbabwe, and South Africa, including meetings with intelligence and enforcement staff across a spectrum of agencies—parks and wildlife authorities, national police services, customs authorities, national defense agencies; field visits to national and private wildlife parks and game reserves; and survey questionnaire responses.

PLANNING, DIRECTION, AND PRIORITY SETTING

Although management structures (Management & Planning Committees) at the National level across the spectrum of range state agencies visited are in place, an intelligence component within these mechanisms to ensure an intelligence-led approach to programwide planning, direction, or priority-setting was absent, with the exception of South Africa, which had in place management structures to bring intelligence and operations across a spectrum of agencies together at the same planning tables. Interviews and discussions across all management levels cited what is best described as an ad hoc and largely reactive approach in determining priority threats, risks, and crime control responses across the operating environment.

Recommendation No. 1

An Integrated Intelligence–Operations Council (IIOC) should be established at national levels to ensure that intelligence and enforcement are integrated into a single coordinated intelligence-led response, thus ensuring a more strategic, proactive approach in responding to the threats, risks, and harms posed by elephant poaching and ivory trafficking (as well as the wider spectrum of serious and organized crime). A Guidance Advice document should be prepared to aid the effective implementation of the IIOCs.

INFORMATION AND INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION AND EVALUATION

The findings from the range state site visits and interviews with the specialists responsible for the three core datasets
of information centered on elephant poaching, ivory trafficking and population (Monitoring the Illegal Killing of Elephants, Elephant Trade Information System, African Elephant Database) indicate there is potentially a data-rich environment at the strategic information level if these datasets are made available for in-depth analysis. Although strategic-level data are potentially available, a critical shortcoming was observed in the availability of “target-rich” nominal data on the criminals involved at all levels across the supply chain—from the poachers, to the middlemen directing operations in range states, to the heads of the crime organizations and criminal networks—whether the operational bases are in Africa or overseas in proximity to the primary consumer markets. Further complicating the dearth of tactical information available is the limited availability of the data in electronic format—several site visits saw the storage of data in handwritten ledgers, often stored at regional offices and not aggregated at a national headquarters level, which, although not ideal, would facilitate both data evaluation and analysis within the intelligence process.

Additionally, the current operating environment is absent of a standard national collection planning process, standard information validity, or source reliability templates and dedicated Intelligence Officer positions to ensure prioritized and targeted national collection planning. The range state agency staff interviewed largely characterized the present information and intelligence collection efforts as “at the side of the desk,” with wildlife, police, and customs officers balancing existing compliance-enforcement responsibilities with part-time intelligence collection. There is unanimous agreement that the current approach is not a viable one. The roles and responsibilities of a dedicated Intelligence Officer, although highly relevant to enforcement and operations, fall outside of these two domains. The Intelligence Officer plans, collects, evaluates, and collates information and intelligence from a wide variety of sources, both overt and covert, not only to assist enforcement and operations but also to assist in the prevention of regulatory and other criminal offenses, as well as crime prevention strategy and policy development. A key responsibility of the Intelligence Officer is to collect to fill known gaps in knowledge; this is usually accomplished via a prioritized Intelligence Collection Plan, which is developed in cooperation with staff Intelligence Analysts who have identified critical knowledge gaps through the intelligence assessment process.

Recommendation No. 2
Establish Intelligence Services across range states (where not already in place) having a dedicated cadre of Intelligence Officers.9

Recommendation No. 3
A national standard Intelligence Collection Plan and Information/Intelligence Evaluation Report Form should be developed and implemented for use by all range state Intelligence Officer staff. Existing reporting models currently exist within the wider intelligence community (that is, 5X5X5 system developed for the UK National Intelligence Model) that could be easily modified for range state requirements.

COLLATION—INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND TECHNOLOGIES
Although the situation at the strategic information level can be characterized as being data rich, field staff underlined that “we don’t know what we know.” A key element currently missing across range states is an ability to link up or collate all existing datasets, making it impossible to fully see or understand the total operating environment. With key information stored in handwritten ledgers or independent electronic systems across agencies at the national, regional, and transnational levels, a holistic understanding of critical threats and risks—whether at a national, regional, or transnational level—is not possible.

Recommendation No. 4
Develop a comprehensive Information Management Strategy and accompanying Standard Operating Procedures to ensure national, regional, and transnational consistency in the overall collection, collation, and management of information and intelligence across the multiplicity of agencies responding to the threats posed by elephant poaching and ivory trafficking (as well as the full spectrum of threats posed by serious and organized crime).

9A more detailed discussion related to intelligence officer requirements is contained in appendix A under People, Source, System, and Knowledge Assets.
Recommendation No. 5
Develop standards for Information Technologies and Analytical Tools for use by Intelligence Services at the national, regional, and transnational levels.10

INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS
It is at the analysis phase that information is turned into useable intelligence products, and thus a critical requirement for any effective intelligence service. This was found to be the key critical gap in the current intelligence capacity across the range states. Although a limited number of staff are performing rudimentary intelligence analysis functions at a select number of range state law enforcement agencies (for example, Kenya Wildlife Service, SanParks, South Africa Police Service), the majority of law enforcement agencies do not have in place intelligence services or dedicated intelligence analysis capacities.

The number of dedicated intelligence analysts across range state law enforcement agencies is therefore inadequate to meet the broad range of strategic and tactical intelligence products required at national, regional, or transnational levels. It is imperative that staff selected to perform this critical function possess the requisite knowledge, skills, and abilities to deliver professional-level finished intelligence products (that is, national, regional, and transnational strategic threat-risk assessments; tactical assessments; early warning assessments; alerts).

Recommendation No. 6
Establish Intelligence Services across range states (where not already in place) having a dedicated cadre of Intelligence Analysts.11

INTELLIGENCE REPORTING AND DISSEMINATION
Only limited intelligence assessments are currently being produced across the range states. The small number of assessments that were reviewed as part of the project evaluation process indicated that the analytical assessments produced to date are highly localized and tactical in nature (that is, level of poacher(s) and local area(s) in scope). There is an absence of standard reporting procedures or national templates for assessments, whether strategic or tactical in focus. Additionally, no national dissemination protocols were noted to ensure the timely distribution of finished intelligence products to targeted clients across national, regional, or transnational partner agencies.

Recommendation No. 7
National standards for intelligence assessment formats should be established for the range of intelligence products produced by range state, regional, and transnational intelligence services—strategic, tactical, early warning product lines.12

Recommendation No. 8
Develop a national distribution system aligned to key partner community organizations at the national, regional, and transnational levels.

INTELLIGENCE EVALUATION AND QUALITY ASSURANCE
There was found to be no established intelligence evaluation and/or quality assurance process in place to formally evaluate the quality of finished intelligence products or client satisfaction levels. Current evaluation practice can best be described as an ad hoc process largely based on general management practices at the national, regional, and transnational levels.

10 The global criminal intelligence community (including INTERPOL, Europol, and a number of range states visited in the project), although not having formal standards (that is, ISO standards) in place for Information Technology and Analytical Tools, is employing the IBM i2 suite of products, including Analyst’s Notebook, iBase, and IntelliShare for criminal network analysis, event charting, pattern recognition, database needs, and intelligence sharing. The critical element is not the requirement for all intelligence services and partner agencies to employ the same information technology tools, but that the individual databases are able to share information assets across platforms, thus enabling aggregate datasets and an ability to perform more holistic analyses.

11 A more detailed discussion related to intelligence analyst requirements is contained in appendix A under People, Source, System, and Knowledge Assets.

12 This recommendation aligns with Recommendation No. 4 regarding the development of a comprehensive Information Management Strategy and accompanying Standard Operating Procedures to ensure national, regional, and transnational consistency in the overall collection, evaluation, collation, and management of information and intelligence across the multiplicity of agencies responding to the threats posed by elephant poaching and ivory trafficking (as well as the full spectrum of threats posed by serious and organized crime).
Recommendation No. 9
Establish an Intelligence Review Board process at the national, regional, and transnational levels to ensure all finished intelligence assessments adhere to national, regional, and transnational policies, standards, and security requirements.

Recommendation No. 10
Establish a national Intelligence Requirements Management System—a database set up to track all finished intelligence assessments with the client base that received the assessments to measure client satisfaction levels and quality assurance in reference to the value-added and utility of the intelligence products and services.

PEOPLE, SOURCE, SYSTEM, AND KNOWLEDGE ASSETS

The four key components of an intelligence service are centered on people, source, system, and knowledge assets. The findings of the intelligence system capacity evaluation across the range states underlined both the strengths and weaknesses of current national-level abilities to implement effective intelligence systems to respond to the growing threats posed by elephant poaching and ivory trafficking (and by extension, the interrelated spectrum of other serious and organized crime).

PEOPLE ASSETS

The introduction of a fully functioning and effective intelligence system relies on a solid foundation of dedicated staff knowing their particular roles and responsibilities in relation to the mandate of the intelligence service. Key intelligence staff fall within three core areas of responsibility: intelligence collection, the domain of intelligence officers; analysis, the domain of intelligence analysts; and information management and exchange, the domain of information management/information technology specialists.

As noted above in the review of the six steps within the Intelligence Process, the domain of criminal intelligence is highly limited across range states; and where there is a service in place, the capacity levels are limited and almost exclusively centered on local-level intelligence collection. However, there is a critical gap in the number of trained dedicated intelligence analysts. The other shortfall is in trained dedicated information management/information technology/quality assurance specialists.

Recommendation No. 11
Develop a national Human Resource Strategy for all three categories of intelligence service specialists (intelligence officers, intelligence analysts, and information management/information technology/quality assurance specialists) to ensure recruitment of qualified candidates that meet the core competencies of each category of employee. The HR Strategy should also focus on employee retention as well as career training and development. Thus, the HR Strategy should include Work Descriptions for each of the three core categories of intelligence staff; Competency Profiles for each of the three core categories of intelligence staff; and a Training and Development Strategy for Intelligence Staff together with Training Templates for each of the three core categories of intelligence staff.

SOURCE ASSETS

For an intelligence service to work effectively, information is its “lifeblood.” Source assets, therefore, refer to a broad spectrum of information sources that can be classified as both overt and covert. Primary examples include direct observations of intelligence staff, witnesses, forensic information, open source information, partner agencies, and confidential human intelligence sources.

The project evaluation interviews across range states underlined that there exists an information-rich environment, with a multiplicity of databases and sources in place; however, critical shortcomings were noted in the availability of “target-rich” nominal data as well as a present inability to aggregate or link up datasets to fully capitalize on the information-rich environment.

The other key gap13 surrounds the absence of a comprehensive Information Management Strategy and accompanying Standard Operating Procedures to ensure national, regional, and transnational consistency in the

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13This critical gap is addressed under Recommendation No. 4 that centers on the development of a national information management strategy (see 1.4, Collation—Information Management and Technologies). A fundamental principle that should be followed is that information is a corporate asset and not a personal or sector asset and its value lies in its sharing and availability to all staff who have a “need to know and a right to know” that information.
overall collection, evaluation, collation, and management of information and intelligence from all sources across the wider partner community environment.

Recommendation No. 12
Develop Human Source Development Policy and Standard Operating Procedures together with a Training Program for Intelligence Officer staff to ensure maximum exploitation of confidential human source information as a key Source Asset within range state intelligence services.

SYSTEM ASSETS
Intelligence staff must be aware of all relevant policy, directives, and standard operating procedures associated with the secure access, recording, storage, and use of information and intelligence as well as the internal infrastructure required to carry out their specific intelligence roles and responsibilities. As the Intelligence Service will add a new dimension to law enforcement agencies across range states, guidance documents will need to be created to fill this gap.

Recommendation No. 13
Develop an Intelligence Service Orientation Guide to ensure all staff have the requisite knowledge to effectively carry out their duties in an effective and efficient manner from the initial date they sign on. The orientation guide will also ensure that all staff have a consistent and comprehensive understanding of all required organizational policy, directives, SOPs, and infrastructure that affect their position as well as their colleagues within the Intelligence Service and wider partner community organizations.

KNOWLEDGE ASSETS
Knowledge assets refer to the professional knowledge required by staff to enable them to work effectively and efficiently. The timely dissemination and accessibility of knowledge assets makes this possible. Examples of knowledge assets include current legislation that affects wildlife crime enforcement and organizational policies and directives. These types of assets are usually obtained through training and development, shared knowledge over organizational intranets, and access to internal and external reference libraries and other available information sources.

Recommendation No. 14
Develop an Intelligence Service Code of Practice to outline to all intelligence staff the basic principles and minimum common standards for an effective Intelligence Service; promote compatibility of procedures and terminology for the Intelligence Service; clarify the responsibilities of all core intelligence staff; ensure that observance of these principles and the standards for implementation results in a systematic program of continuous development of intelligence policy, practice, and capability; and identify and promulgate good practice across the wider intelligence and partner community.

SELECTION, TRAINING, AND CAREER DEVELOPMENT FOR INTELLIGENCE PERSONNEL
The introduction of a new, or significantly enhanced, intelligence service capacity across affected range states and in countries along the global supply chain will necessitate the development of a national Human Resource Strategy for all three categories of intelligence service specialists: intelligence officers, intelligence analysts, and information management/information technology/quality assurance specialists. As noted above in People Assets, under Recommendation No. 11, a comprehensive HR Strategy will be necessary to ensure recruitment of qualified candidates that meet the core Competency Profiles of each category of employee. The HR Strategy would also focus on employee retention as well as career training and development.

Recommendation No. 15
Develop a comprehensive training and career development program for Intelligence Service staff. As a first step, existing training and career development programs across the wider intelligence community should be explored and evaluated for applicability within a wildlife crime, as well as a broader serious and organized crime, context. This could include programs offered by established best-practice criminal intelligence programs that are currently operating in Europe, Australia–New Zealand, Asia, and North America.

Additionally, staff membership in professional intelligence associations to enhance knowledge levels, career development, and professional certification should be an
integral component of any comprehensive training and career development program. Professional associations in this domain include the International Association of Law Enforcement Intelligence Analysts; the Association of Law Enforcement Intelligence Units; the International Association of Crime Analysts; and the International Association for Intelligence Education.

INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND INFORMATION TECHNOLOGIES

The range state and literature evaluations verified that the information management and information technologies (IM-IT) available across the majority of range states do not meet the minimum requirements of an effective intelligence service. The two recommendations noted in Collation—Information Management and Technologies (Recommendations No. 4 and No. 5), focusing on the development of a comprehensive Information Management Strategy and accompanying Policy and Standard Operating Procedures, together with the rollout of a suite of analytical software tools, will provide for a solid foundation with which to build new or enhanced intelligence units.

STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIPS ACROSS NATIONAL, REGIONAL, AND TRANSMATIONAL INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITIES

A critical success factor in the establishment of an effective intelligence service capacity is the development of a diverse partnership network across the national as well as regional and transnational intelligence communities. The development of such networks will enable the broader intelligence community to best leverage limited, single-agency resources by allowing individual national-level organizations to focus on the key priorities of the organization, although using the wider external intelligence networks at both regional and transnational levels to act as “sentinels” for environmental changes that may potentially impact on national-level mandates—thus acting as an “early warning” system. Another key benefit of developing a strong network is the possibility intelligence staff exchanges with partner community organizations to complement internal staff and gain expert knowledge, skills, and abilities.

The consultant found that a number of partnerships have been established at national, regional, and international levels, of which the regional Wildlife Enforcement Networks are seen as key to more effectively responding to wildlife crime at all levels. As an example, the Lusaka Agreement Task Force in Eastern and Southern Africa, which began in 1996 and now has seven member states (Congo, Kenya, Liberia, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia, Lesotho) and three signatory countries (South Africa, Ethiopia, Swaziland), is seen as providing valuable assistance to its members in the areas of capacity building, law enforcement, partnerships, and meetings and conferences for training and development. The World Customs Organization Regional Intelligence Liaison Offices, a global Customs intelligence network with four offices across Africa, are also seen as valuable networks for information and intelligence exchange. Additionally, the assistance from INTERPOL (National Central Bureaus, Regional Bureaus, and General Secretariat), World Customs Organization, United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, and CITES—in the areas of training and development, capacity building, and knowledge development—was viewed as critical to the development and enhancement of intelligence capacity building across range states and throughout the global supply chain nations.

The views expressed across all agencies interviewed were unanimous: there needs to be a concerted focus on the continued expansion and development of a core national, regional, and transnational partnership community that would serve both to build new and enhance existing intelligence service-level capacities.

Recommendation No. 16

Develop a Global Partnership Strategy across national, regional, and transnational law enforcement agencies, networks, and partner communities to break down existing barriers to open communications and enhance wildlife intelligence, enforcement, and prevention.
APPENDIX C

TERMS OF REFERENCE: ELEPHANT CRIME INTELLIGENCE SYSTEM AND GOVERNANCE MODEL ASSESSMENT

Terms of Reference
v. 2.2-2014-02-03–R. Fahlman

Elephant Crime Intelligence System and Governance Model Assessment

PROJECT BACKGROUND

The “Elephant Crime Intelligence System and Governance Model Assessment,” although a key component within the broader Global Environment Facility (GEF) MSP (medium-sized project) “Fighting Against Wildlife Poaching and Illegal Trade in Africa: The Case of African Elephants,” underscores the pressing requirement to maximize the knowledge-building capacities that intelligence systems development and accompanying good governance can provide to more effectively respond to elephant crime. The MSP encompasses a wide range of strategies to prevent the illegal poaching and trade of elephant ivory, while providing a uniquely collaborative approach to control, reduce, and prevent elephant-related crime specifically and wildlife-related crime generally. This element of the project is worth underlining, as elephant-related crime is intricately linked with other forms of organized crime, and therefore needs to be studied in this broader context. Further, elephant-related crime will be assessed within its full dimensions: as a crime against wildlife as well as a crime that undermines strong economies, healthy and resilient communities, and, in a broader context, the good governance of those countries affected by high levels of such crime. Therefore, the principal components of the assessment will include designing a framework and accompanying governance model for criminal intelligence collaboration at the local, national, regional, and transnational levels, including agencies participating in the gathering and analysis of information and intelligence related to elephant poaching and ivory trafficking along the full spectrum of the transnational crime chain. Within this broader context, the hiring of a criminal intelligence systems specialist to lead the project team is to provide a thorough and credible assessment of the key requirements to design and implement an effective criminal intelligence system and accompanying governance model to respond to the escalating threats, risks, and harms associated with elephant poaching and ivory trafficking at all levels of the poaching and trade chains.

The project consultant will assess and define an effective and long-term sustainable elephant criminal intelligence system and network that would operate at the local, national, regional, and transnational levels. Currently, a robust intelligence system addressing elephant poaching and illegal trade of ivory at all phases within the intelligence process is either missing or seriously limited in capacity (the key phases in the intelligence process are planning and direction; collection; evaluation; collation; analysis; reporting/dissemination/action). Therefore, the project will examine the need for designing and implementing a long-term sustainable elephant criminal intelligence system and governance model as well as assessing the roles and functions that key organizations could play at the local, national, regional, and international levels within such an intelligence system and accompanying governance model (see annex B, Preliminary Outline for Final Assessment Report).

The World Bank will discuss the findings of the study with key stakeholders and propose recommendations for an effective and sustainable criminal intelligence system to control, reduce, and prevent elephant poaching and ivory trafficking.

PROJECT OBJECTIVES

The principal objectives of the project:

1. Assessment of current criminal intelligence capacity levels in all phases of the intelligence process (planning and direction; collection; evaluation; collation; analysis; reporting/dissemination/action)
in key African range states as well as along the criminal supply chain, including central agencies (to include ICCWC partner agencies) and non-governmental organizations, both inside and outside of Africa, that have a mandate to respond to elephant poaching and ivory trafficking.

2. Development of recommendations to provide a sustainable, networked criminal intelligence system at the local, national, regional, and international levels to more effectively respond to the threats, risks, and harms posed by elephant poaching and ivory trafficking.

3. Design essential elements of a governance model that would enable the successful implementation and long-term sustainability of a networked community-based intelligence system to realize the objectives and goals of the country and agency intelligence system partners and, by extension, society as a whole. The governance model would be based on the UNDP’s five principles of good governance: (a) Legitimacy and Voice/Participation; (b) Direction/Strategic Vision; (c) Performance Effectiveness and Efficiency; (d) Accountability/Transparency; and (e) Fairness/Rule of Law.

TARGET AUDIENCE

The primary audiences for this assessment are the World Bank Team Leader (Claudia Sobrevila), World Bank Project Team Reviewers, the World Bank, and the Global Environment Facility. Secondary audiences include the member organizations of the International Consortium to Combat Wildlife Crime—CITES, World Customs Organization, International Criminal Police Organization, and United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime.

Recognizing the global dimensions of crimes involving elephant poaching and ivory trafficking and wildlife crime in general, the assessment is anticipated to find a wider scope of interested audiences including those from international governmental organizations and nonprofit organizations such as the World Wildlife Fund and TRAFFIC: The Wildlife Trade Monitoring Network.

TIME FRAME

December 2013 to July 2014

TOTAL BUDGET FOR PROJECT

US$100,000 (initial estimate)

TASK TEAM LEADER

Claudia Sobrevila, Senior Biodiversity Specialist, World Bank.

PROJECT TEAM

Robert C. Fahlman, Intelligence Systems Specialist, and Sara Thompson, Wildlife Crime Specialist, Agriculture and Environment Sector, World Bank.

The Project Team will also be supported by a diversity of World Bank sectoral specialists as well as the other project teams working on complementary GEF MSP activities under the broader project “Fighting Against Wildlife Poaching and Illegal Trade in Africa: The Case of African Elephants.”

REVIEWERS

The reviewers for the project’s Terms of Reference (TORs) and Project Assessment (PA) are Claudia Sobrevila, Task Team Leader, Senior Biodiversity Specialist, World Bank; William B. Magrath, Lead Natural Resource Economist, Rural Development and Natural Resources, South Asia, World Bank; Sara Thompson, Wildlife Crime Specialist, Agriculture and Environment Sector, World Bank; Valerie Hickey, Senior Biodiversity Specialist, Agriculture and Environment Services Sustainable Development Network, World Bank; Benjamin Garnaud, Environmental Specialist, Africa Region, World Bank; Simon Robertson, Head of Analytics, Senior Forensic Data Officer, Research and Analysis Unit, Integrity Vice Presidency, World Bank; Marilyne Pereira Goncalves, Senior Financial Sector Specialist, Financial Market Integrity Unit, World Bank; and Francisca Fernando, Stolen Asset Recovery Initiative (STAR), World Bank.

SCOPE, METHODOLOGY, AND WORK PROGRAM SEQUENCE


   » A broad-based literature review of reports and documentation on the scope and dimension of elephant poaching and ivory trafficking and
intelligence system capacities currently in place to respond to this issue—documentation originating from the World Bank, INTERPOL, United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, World Customs Organization, CITES, United Nations Environment Program, government organizations, intelligence services, NGOs, academic institutes, and open source information.

» A 1-week intensive set of meetings at the World Bank, Washington, D.C., to meet with key World Bank sectors, NGOs, and U.S. government agencies to explore the multidimensions of the elephant poaching and ivory trafficking intelligence system project and review of the initial project Terms of Reference. Included in the weeklong visit is the delivery of a half-day workshop, “The Mission, Roles and Functions of Criminal Intelligence,” by the project consultant to World Bank and partner organization staff. Time frame: January 6–10, 2014.

» Preparation of a revised Project Terms of Reference by the project consultant for review and approval by the Task Team Leader and Reviewers. Time frame: January 13–27, 2014.

» Preparation of an Intelligence System and Governance Model Survey Questionnaire by the project consultant as a tool for systematically measuring agency capacity levels in responding to elephant poaching and ivory trafficking for review/approval by the Task Team Leader and Reviewers. Time frame: January 13–27, 2014.

2. Africa Mission 1—Site Visits (Time Frame: Week 1 and 2, March 2014)

The following countries and agencies are recommended for site visits as they are significantly impacted by the threats, risks, and harms posed by elephant poaching and ivory trafficking and have internal mechanisms already in place to respond to the problem:

**Nairobi, Kenya**

» Kenyan Wildlife Service—Mark Cheruiyot, Deputy Head of Investigations, KWS and Vice-Chair, INTERPOL. Environmental Compliance and Enforcement Committee

» United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime Regional Office

» INTERPOL Sub-Regional Bureau

» Monitoring the Illegal Killing of Elephants Julian Blanc, IUCN

» Horn of Africa Wildlife Enforcement Network members

» United Nations Environment Programme

**Harare, Zimbabwe**

» TRAFFIC/CITES Elephant Trade Information System—Tom Milliken

» INTERPOL Sub-Regional Bureau

» Zimbabwe Parks and Wildlife Management Authority

» Intelligence database on poaching syndicates (PWMA)

» Other Government Department/Agencies with Wildlife Crime mandates

**Kampala, Uganda**

» Uganda Wildlife Authority, Intelligence Unit—Dr. Andrew Seguya, Executive Director, UWA

» UWA Management Information System and other databases

» Spatial Monitoring and Reporting Tool developed by WWF

» Horn of Africa Wildlife Enforcement Network members

» Wildlife Intelligence and Leadership Development for Law Enforcement Officers, Dr. Andrew Lemieux, Project Director, UGA Queen Elizabeth Conservation Area (associated with Netherlands Institute for the Study of Crime and Law Enforcement)

**Pretoria, South Africa**

» South Africa Police Service (SAPS)

» INTERPOL National Central Bureau

» Wildlife Enforcement Network—South Africa (WEN-SA)

» Other Government Departments/Agencies with wildlife crime mandates


Project consultant debriefing on African site visit findings, issues, challenges with World Bank Task Team Leader and Project Reviewers to respond to any issues and challenges in advance of the site visits to the member organizations of the International
Consortium to Combat Wildlife Crime partner organizations and the International Union for the Conservation of Nature (IUCN) and potential second mission to Africa.

4. **Europe Mission 1—Site Visits to ICCWC Partner Organizations and IUCN (Time Frame: Week 4, April 2014; Week 1, May 2014)**

**Vienna, Austria**
- United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime—Jorge Rios, Chief of Sustainable Livelihoods Unit
- UNODC Training Program

**Geneva and Gland, Switzerland**
- CITES—Ben van Rensberg, Chief, Enforcement Support
- IUCN—African Elephant Specialist Group (AfESG)
- IUCN—African Elephant Database

**Lyon, France**
- INTERPOL—Ron Noble, Secretary General
- INTERPOL—David Higgins, Head, Environmental Crime Sub-Directorate
- INTERPOL—Davyth Stewart, Manager, Natural Resources Division
- INTERPOL—Cees van Duijn, Specialized Officer, Environmental Security Unit
- INTERPOL Analytical Criminal Intelligence Unit
- INTERPOL Criminal Information/Intelligence Databases and I-24/7 Secure Global Police Network
- INTERPOL Training Program

**Brussels, Belgium**
- World Customs Organization—Daniel Moell, Manager, Environmental Program
- WCO Customs Enforcement Network
- WCO ENVIRONET Real-Time Communications System
- WCO Training Program

5. **Africa Mission 2—Additional Site Visits if Required (Time Frame: Week 2, May 2014)**

The following countries are potential visit sites for the project and could be aligned to other World Bank projects being undertaken under the wider GEF MSP:

- Gabon
- Namibia
- Other

The Task Team Leader and Project Reviewers will evaluate the need for further site visits in Africa following the results of the African Mission 1—Site Visits debriefing at the World Bank in Week 4, March 2014.


- Project consultant to prepare first draft of Project Report and deliver to Task Team Leader, Project Reviewers, and key stakeholders at a Workshop at the World Bank.

7. **Preparation of Final Project Report and Delivery to World Bank (Time Frame: Week 4, June 2014)**

- Project consultant to make revisions to the Draft Project Report, prepare and deliver to Task Team Leader and Project Reviewers at a Meeting at the World Bank.

**KEY MEASUREMENT INDICATORS**

**Indicator 1:** A well-selected sampling of relevant stakeholders has been consulted and assessed from public, private, and academic sectors including intelligence agencies, law enforcement, wildlife authorities, NGOs, IGOs, and academic and forensic science institutes.

**Verification Measure 1:** The composition of the agencies and the individuals consulted and assessed, as well as the cases/examples used in the assessment, is well represented in terms of the overall inputs to the final Assessment Report. The project team must ensure that it obtains sufficient feedback from all relevant stakeholders on the specific topics under focus and investigation to gain a comprehensive understanding of current intelligence system and governance capacity gaps facing affected countries and organizations in responding to elephant poaching and ivory trafficking crime. Due diligence in this area will serve to ensure the final Assessment Report’s
recommendations are well informed and comprehensive and possess the potential to be successfully implemented.

**Indicator 2:** The key stakeholders across the broad spectrum of agencies impacted take ownership of the final Assessment Report and its recommendations.

**Verification Measure 2:** The key stakeholders will be actively involved in all phases of the study by providing critical country and agency data, current good practice examples, and recommendations for the effective resolution of existing problems and potential solutions.

**Indicator 3:** The Assessment Report meets World Bank quality standards and is responsive to the requirements of key stakeholders.

**Verification Measure 3:** Comments of external experts, internal peer reviewers, and key stakeholders on first draft and final Assessment Report are fully assessed and incorporated in the assessment.

**Indicator 4:** The key recommendations made in the final Assessment Report are accepted by the stakeholder community as a foundation for the implementation of an effective elephant crime intelligence system and accompanying governance model at the local, national, regional, and international levels.

**Verification Measure 4:** There is broad acceptance and support across the wider stakeholder community of the key recommendations in the Assessment Report and a demonstrated willingness from stakeholders to work together and move forward to the next, and most critical, step—the implementation phase.

**PROJECT RISKS AND RISK MITIGATION**

In conducting qualitative research and analysis regarding this topic, full cognizance has been taken of the fact that critical data may not be readily available and that even if available, it may be difficult to either obtain or establish the reliability of the sources of the information or the veracity of the information itself. Further, weak national and international governance models, unrealistic expectations across range states and internationally that quick fixes to such highly complex problems are available, and unlimited funding to respond to the problem all could damage the ability to implement a sustainable elephant intelligence system and accompanying governance model. Therefore, the project is likely to experience the following main risks:

» Obtaining the necessary cooperation, participation, and support when conducting the research and analysis phases for the project; in particular, in obtaining reliable and value-added cooperation and input from local, national, regional, and international stakeholders who have information, intelligence, or knowledge about current intelligence capacity levels in the prevention, detection, and suppression of elephant poaching and ivory trafficking.

» The lack of availability and limited quality of the information and intelligence, given the illicit nature of the subject under study.

» The limited intelligence as well as enforcement capacity and potentially weak governance structures in the region as well as internationally to provide adequate information and intelligence throughout the entire supply chain for elephant poaching and ivory trafficking.

» The lack of coordination by key players involved in the prevention, control, and suppression of elephant-related crime (range state governments, police, wildlife authorities, and international organizations).

» Unrealistic expectations across stakeholder organizations regarding the long-term commitment and cooperation required to successfully implement a sustainable elephant criminal intelligence system and governance model.

To mitigate these risks, the project team will conduct the research and analysis phases of the assessment in the broadest manner possible, by collecting information and intelligence from a wide spectrum of sources and agencies at all levels across the supply chain, and corroborating the data with multiple sources wherever possible. Additionally, the project team will be sensitive to the cultural values in affected range states, integrate existing good practices already in place, and temper expectations by reinforcing the long-term commitment and cooperation required across stakeholder communities to build a sustainable and effective networked community-based criminal intelligence system and accompanying governance model.
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ANNEX A: BACKGROUND, OBJECTIVES, SCOPE, AND METHODOLOGY FOR THE ELEPHANT CRIME INTELLIGENCE SYSTEM AND GOVERNANCE MODEL ASSESSMENT

INTRODUCTION: A CALL TO ACTION
One elephant is killed every 15 minutes.

The United Nations Environment Programme 2013 Rapid Response Assessment “Elephants in the Dust: The African Elephant Crisis” clearly underlines the serious and growing threats posed by elephant poaching and ivory trafficking in many range states across Africa. Data from the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora database Monitoring the Illegal Killing of Elephants indicates an alarming increase in the number of African elephants illegally killed since 2006, with 2011 marking the highest poaching levels since the inception of MIKE in 1997. In 2006, an estimated 5,000 elephants were illegally killed at MIKE-monitored sites alone; in 2011, this figure increased by more than 300 percent to some 17,000 illegally killed elephants, representing some 7.4 percent of the total elephant population. The continentwide figure for illegally killed elephants is estimated to be more than 25,000. The annual elephant growth rates of approximately 5 percent are not able to compensate for this level of illegal killing. Further, data from the Elephant Trade Information System indicates that the illegal trade in ivory has more than doubled since 2007, and is over three times greater than in 1998. The worst year on record for illicit ivory seizures was 2011, when some 40 tons of ivory were seized, including a record 17 large-scale seizures, each 800 kilograms or more—equating the tusk of more than 4,000 slaughtered elephants.

The sustainability of elephant populations in many African range states is now in jeopardy, and is further exacerbated by weak governance, corruption, and the growing involvement of transnational criminal networks involved in the illegal ivory trade chain—from localized poaching through the shipment of multihundred kilograms of illicit ivory to the underground ivory factories and final consumer. Although enhanced capacity building across law enforcement and wildlife conservation agencies is necessary to respond to the growing problem, the implementation of a networked community-based intelligence system is essential in moving from reactive responses to proactive long-term sustainable prevention strategies. Such a networked intelligence system would be accompanied by a governance model that would ensure the system was built on a foundation encompassing key stakeholder agencies, while responding to elephant crime at the local, national, regional, and transnational levels.

PROJECT BACKGROUND
The “Elephant Crime Intelligence System and Governance Model Assessment,” although a key component within the broader Global Environment Facility (GEF) MSP project entitled “Fighting Against Wildlife Poaching and Illegal Trade in Africa: The Case of African Elephants,” underscores the pressing requirement to maximize the knowledge building capacities that intelligence systems development and accompanying good governance can provide to more effectively respond to elephant crime. The MSP encompasses a wide range of strategies to prevent the illegal poaching and trade of elephant ivory, while providing a uniquely collaborative approach to control, reduce, and prevent elephant-related crime specifically, and wildlife-related crime generally. This element of the project is worth underlining as elephant-related crime is intricately linked with other forms of organized crime, and therefore needs to be studied in this broader context. Further, elephant-related crime will be assessed within its full dimensions: as a crime against wildlife as well as a crime that undermines strong economies, healthy and resilient communities, and, in a broader context, the good governance of those countries affected by high levels of such crime. Therefore, the principal components of the assessment will include designing a framework and accompanying governance model for criminal intelligence collaboration at the local, national, regional, and transnational levels, including agencies participating in the gathering and analysis of information and intelligence related to elephant poaching and ivory trafficking along the full spectrum of the transnational crime chain. Within this broader context, the hiring of a criminal intelligence systems specialist to lead the project...
team is to provide a thorough and credible assessment of the key requirements to design and implement an effective criminal intelligence system and accompanying governance model to respond to the escalating threats, risks, and harms associated with elephant poaching and ivory trafficking at all levels of the poaching and trade chains.

The project consultant will assess and define an effective and long-term sustainable elephant criminal intelligence system and network that would operate at the local, national, regional, and transnational levels. Currently, a robust intelligence system addressing elephant poaching and illegal trade of ivory at all phases within the intelligence process is either missing or seriously limited in capacity (the key phases in the intelligence process are planning and direction; collection; evaluation; collation; analysis; reporting/dissemination/action). Therefore, the project will examine the need for designing and implementing a long-term sustainable elephant criminal intelligence system and governance model as well as assessing the roles and functions that key organizations could play at the local, national regional, and international levels within such an intelligence system and accompanying governance model.

The World Bank will discuss the findings of the study with key stakeholders and propose recommendations for an effective and sustainable criminal intelligence system to control, reduce, and prevent elephant poaching and ivory trafficking.

PROJECT OBJECTIVES
The principal objectives of the project include the following:

1. Assessment of current criminal intelligence capacity levels in all phases of the intelligence process (planning and direction; collection; evaluation; collation; analysis; reporting/dissemination/action) in key African range states as well as along the criminal supply chain, including central agencies (to include ICCWC partner agencies) and nongovernmental organizations, both inside and outside of Africa, that have a mandate to respond to elephant poaching and ivory trafficking.

2. Development of recommendations to provide a sustainable, networked criminal intelligence system at the local, national, regional, and international levels to more effectively respond to the threats, risks, and harms posed by elephant poaching and ivory trafficking.

3. Design and essential elements of a governance model that would enable the successful implementation and long-term sustainability of a networked community-based intelligence system to realize the objectives and goals of the country and agency intelligence system partners, and by extension, society as a whole. The governance model would be based on the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)’s five principles of good governance: (a) Legitimacy and Voice/Participation; (b) Direction/Strategic Vision; (c) Performance Effectiveness and Efficiency; (d) Accountability/Transparency; and (e) Fairness/Rule of Law.

SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY
The assessment will include a broad-based literature review of reports and documentation on the scope and dimension of elephant poaching and ivory trafficking and intelligence system capacities currently in place to respond to this issue—documentation originating from the World Bank, INTERPOL, United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, World Customs Organization, CITES, United Nations Environment Program, government organizations, intelligence services, NGOs, academic institutes, and open source information. Additionally, an intensive 1-week set of planning meetings will be held at the World Bank, Washington, D.C., to meet with key World Bank sectors, NGOs, and U.S. government agencies to explore the multidimensions of the elephant poaching and ivory trafficking intelligence system project and review the initial project Terms of Reference. Included in the weeklong visit is the delivery of a half-day workshop, “The Mission, Roles and Functions of Criminal Intelligence,” by the project consultant to World Bank and partner organization staff.

A series of missions to African range states (including Kenya, Zimbabwe, Uganda, South Africa, and other possible range states) to conduct stakeholder interviews and visit field sites will be made. Stakeholder interviews will also be conducted with all members of the International Consortium to Combat Wildlife Crime: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna
and Flora Secretariat, International Criminal Police Organization, World Customs Organization, the World Bank. Interviews are also planned with members of the International Union for Conservation of Nature, and responsible authorities for the Elephant Trade Information System, Monitoring the Illegal Killing of Elephants, and the African Elephant Database. Additionally, members of nongovernmental organizations and wildlife advocacy organizations including the World Wildlife Fund, the Wildlife Trade Monitoring Network, and academic and forensic science institutes will be consulted.

At the stage of preparation of a Draft Project Report, and prior to the final report preparation, all key stakeholder agencies will be invited to participate in a workshop sponsored by the World Bank to review, critique, and comment on the content and recommendations for the way forward contained in the document. The planned time frame for the project is from December 2013 to July 2014.

ANNEX B: PRELIMINARY OUTLINE FOR FINAL ASSESSMENT REPORT

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Overview of the current situation and trends regarding elephant poaching and ivory trafficking and key challenges to prevention, detection, and suppression initiatives; assessment scope and methodology; current law enforcement, and criminal intelligence capacity to respond to the problem; principal strategies to implement an elephant crime intelligence system and governance model to effectively prevent, detect, and suppress elephant-related crime.

INTRODUCTION

Brief outline of the conditions that necessitated the undertaking of this assessment; extent and nature of the problem; the role of intelligence and good governance in effectively responding to elephant poaching and ivory trafficking and, by extension, wildlife crime and other forms of transnational organized crime in general.

TERMS OF REFERENCE, SCOPE, AND METHODOLOGY

The focus of the assessment will be centered on seven key areas:

i) Assessment of current national, regional, international law enforcement and intelligence capacity levels to respond to the growing threats, risks, and harms posed by elephant poaching and ivory trafficking
ii) Development of a model networked community-based intelligence system to effectively respond to elephant-related crime
iii) Minimum requirements to implement a networked intelligence system in all phases of the Intelligence Process: (a) Planning, Direction and Priority Setting; (b) Information and Intelligence Collection; (c) Collation—Information Management and Technologies; (d) Intelligence Analysis; (e) Intelligence Reporting and Dissemination; and (f) Intelligence-Operations Alignment; and (g) Intelligence Evaluation and Quality Assurance
iv) Key Intelligence Asset Requirements to implement an elephant crime intelligence system: (a) People Assets; (b) Source Assets; (c) System Assets; (d) Knowledge Assets
v) Training and Development for Intelligence Personnel
vi) Strategic partnerships across local, national, regional and international law enforcement, intelligence, governmental, nongovernmental, and other support communities (for example, academic and forensic science institutes)

vii) Governance model for an effective, sustainable intelligence system

ELEPHANT CRIME AND LAW ENFORCEMENT CONTEXT

i) Elephant Poaching
ii) Ivory Trafficking
iii) Local/Regional/Global Dimensions
iv) Weak Governance—Corruption
v) Limited Capacity to Effectively Respond

CURRENT ENVIRONMENT AND KEY FINDINGS: THE INTELLIGENCE PROCESS

i) Planning, Direction, and Priority Setting
ii) Information and Intelligence Collection
iii) Collation—Information Management and Technologies
iv) Intelligence Analysis
v) Intelligence Reporting and Dissemination
vi) Intelligence-Operations Alignment
vii) Intelligence Evaluation and Quality Assurance

INTELLIGENCE AND GOOD GOVERNANCE BUILDING BLOCKS

i) Intelligence as a Building Block for Greater Effectiveness
ii) Definition/Description of Intelligence, its Mission, Roles, and Functions: Strategic, Operational, Tactical, Integrated Intelligence; Intelligence and Enforcement/Investigations; Intelligence-Led Approach
iii) Intelligence Process: Planning and Direction, Collection, Evaluation, Collation, Analysis, Reporting, and Dissemination/Action
iv) Principles of Intelligence
v) Key Intelligence Asset Building Blocks: People Assets, System Assets, Source Assets, Knowledge Assets
vi) Intelligence Systems Governance and Management, including an Intelligence-Led Operations Model

OBSERVATIONS AND ASSESSMENT OF CURRENT ELEPHANT CRIME INTELLIGENCE SYSTEMS AND GOVERNANCE MODELS

i) Strength of existing mechanisms across the key steps in the Intelligence Process: Planning and Direction, Collection, Evaluation, Collation, Analysis, Reporting, and Dissemination/Action
ii) Capacity of key agencies to effectively respond to elephant crime at the local, national, regional, and international levels in all key intelligence asset building blocks: People Assets, System Assets, Source Assets, Knowledge Assets
iii) Challenges to good governance models to effectively respond to elephant crime while ensuring long-term sustainability to prevention, detection, and suppression initiatives

EVALUATION OF THE CONSTITUENTS OF A NETWORKED COMMUNITY-BASED ELEPHANT INTELLIGENCE SYSTEM AND GOVERNANCE MODEL

A. Intergovernmental Organizations
   i) International Criminal Police Organization
   ii) World Customs Organization
   iii) United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
   v) International Consortium to Combat Wildlife Crime

B. National Government Systems
   i) Wildlife Crime Authorities
   ii) Law Enforcement Agencies

C. Nongovernmental Organizations and Systems
   i) The Wildlife Trade Monitoring Network
   ii) World Wildlife Fund
   iii) International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN)
   iv) Elephant Trade Information System
   v) Monitoring the Illegal Killing of Elephants
   vi) African Elephant Database
   vii) Academic and Forensic Science Institutes

CRITICAL ISSUES AND CHALLENGES

Recognition of critical issues and challenges to the successful implementation of an elephant crime intelligence system and governance model including: capacity levels across key range states as well as international support mechanisms; availability and quality of key elephant crime data; weak governance; corruption or weak support for new initiatives (such as an intelligence system); unrealistic expectations and/or belief that unlimited funds available to launch an elephant crime intelligence system.

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Synopsis of main assessment findings and rationale for implementing an elephant crime intelligence system and governance model to more effectively prevent, detect, and suppress elephant-related crime.
Recommendations for next steps will be made in the following areas:

i) Development of a model networked community-based intelligence system to effectively respond to elephant-related crime

ii) Minimum requirements to implement a networked intelligence system in all phases of the Intelligence Process: (a) Planning, Direction, and Priority Setting; (b) Information and Intelligence Collection; (c) Collation—Information Management and Technologies; (d) Intelligence Analysis; (e) Intelligence Reporting and Dissemination; (f) Intelligence-Operations Alignment; and (g) Intelligence Evaluation and Quality Assurance

iii) Key Intelligence Asset Requirements: (a) People Assets; (b) Source Assets; (c) System Assets; (d) Knowledge Assets

iv) Training and Development for Intelligence Personnel

v) Strategic partnerships across local, national, regional, and international law enforcement, intelligence governmental, nongovernmental, and other support communities (for example, academic and forensic science institutes)

vi) Governance model for an effective, sustainable intelligence system
## APPENDIX D

### INTERVIEWS AND MEETINGS: ELEPHANT CRIME INTELLIGENCE SYSTEM AND GOVERNANCE MODEL ASSESSMENT—JANUARY 6 TO APRIL 28, 2014

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<td>Claudia Sobrevila</td>
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<td>Paul Muya</td>
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<td>Denis Simon</td>
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<td>Shamini Jayanathan</td>
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<td>Julian Blanc</td>
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<td>Rob Malpas</td>
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<td>Conservation Development Centre</td>
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<td>David Angell</td>
<td>Canadian High Commissioner</td>
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<td>Mamadou Kane</td>
<td>Program Officer, Project Manager Coordinator</td>
<td>Capacity Building for MEAs in ACP Countries, UNEP Regional Office</td>
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<td>Arnold Kreilhuber</td>
<td>Legal Officer, Division of Environmental Law and Conservation</td>
<td>African Elephant Fund illegal trade in wildlife and timber, UNEP Regional Office</td>
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<td>14-03-14</td>
<td>Tom Miliken</td>
<td>Director of TRAFFIC, Coordinator for ETIS</td>
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<td>Louisa Sangalakula</td>
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<td>Raoul du Toit</td>
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<td>Africa Program Coordinator</td>
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<td>Natasha Anderson</td>
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<td>Leonard Nhidza</td>
<td>Manager, Investigations and Security</td>
<td>Zimbabwe Parks and Wildlife Management Authority (PWMA)</td>
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<td>Mashange Chamu</td>
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<td>14-03-19</td>
<td>Kurt Heyenreich</td>
<td>President</td>
<td>JSC Consulting: The Investigation and Training Specialists</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Former member of “Scorpions,” National Prosecution Authority, Department of Justice and also South Africa Police Service</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Flip Vanhuysstwen</td>
<td>Law Enforcement Specialist</td>
<td>JSC Consulting (former member SAPS)</td>
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<td>Jacques Meyer</td>
<td>Desk Officer, Environmental Crimes Desk</td>
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<td>Ken A R Maggs</td>
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<td>Sandra Snelling</td>
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<td>Dr. Michelle Henley</td>
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<td>Dalene Duvenage</td>
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<td>Craig Spenser</td>
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<td>Nicholaas Noornhof</td>
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<td>14-04-02</td>
<td>Dr. William Moreto</td>
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<td>Patrick Byrne</td>
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<td>Diane Skinner</td>
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<td>Gerard Doret</td>
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<td>Andrea Crosta</td>
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<td>Daniel Moell</td>
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<td>Agnes Butrym-Bielatko</td>
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<td>Erich Kieck</td>
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<td>Anja Korenblik</td>
<td>Programme Management Officer, Studies &amp; Threat Analysis Section, Policy Analysis &amp; Research Branch</td>
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<td>Jenna Dawson-Faber</td>
<td>Research Expert, Statistics &amp; Survey Section, Research &amp; Trend Analysis Branch</td>
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<td>Michelle Gadd</td>
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<td>Fiachra Kearney</td>
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<td>Christian Braun Dietrich</td>
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APPENDIX E
THE WORLD BANK ASSESSMENT SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE:
EVALUATION OF INTELLIGENCE SERVICES AND GOVERNANCE CAPACITY
IN RESPONSE TO ELEPHANT POACHING AND IVORY TRAFFICKING,
V 1.1–JANUARY 22, 2014 (FINAL)—R. FAHLMAN

INTELLIGENCE PROCESS QUESTIONS

1. What are your current practices in respect to intelligence planning, direction, and prioritization (planning processes, Standard Operating Procedures, intelligence, and enforcement priority-setting mechanisms)? What key areas are missing or you would like to see enhanced or in place (policy, standards, doctrine, and/or a governance model)?

2. What information-intelligence collection, evaluation, collation, storage-retrieval, and management do you have in place (Collection Plans, 4X4 or 5X5 system for information-source evaluation, Records Management System (RMS), and/or intelligence database)? What key areas are missing or what you would like to see enhanced, created, or in place (policy, standards, SOPs)?

3. What are your current capacity levels of intelligence analysis (tactical, operational, and strategic)? What key areas are missing or what you would like to see enhanced, created, and/or in place (training, development, and/or a network)?

4. What is the current level of your production of intelligence assessments and dissemination protocols (alerts, national and regional assessments, strategic early warning, and tactical-operational support)? What key areas are missing or what you would like to see in place or enhanced?

5. How is intelligence (finished assessments) applied in a tactical, operational, or strategic manner in your agency, unit, and region (driver for targeting, priority setting, policy and/or strategy development)? What key areas are missing or what you would like to see in place or enhanced?

6. What evaluation and accountability processes do you have in place to ensure intelligence value for investment (intelligence review boards, intelligence management steering committee(s), regional and/or national integrated operations council, governance model)? What key areas are missing or what you would like to see in place or enhanced?

PEOPLE, KNOWLEDGE, SYSTEM, AND SOURCE ASSETS

1. Do you have the people in your agency, unit, or region with the professional skills and abilities to meet your needs (analysts, intelligence officers, information managers, others)? What key staff is missing or what you would like to see in place or enhanced?

2. Do your people have the professional knowledge needed to enable them to work effectively (training, development, internal intranets, and professional association membership)? What key areas are missing or what you would like to see in place or enhanced?

3. Do you have the systems in place to ensure staff is fully aware of organizational policies, SOPs, security standards and technical equipment (governance model, doctrine guidebook, information management-information technology)? What key areas are missing or what you would like to see in place or enhanced?

4. Do you have the source assets in place to enable staff to work effectively (overt-covert capacity, source development-management, Human Intelligence, Imagery Intelligence, Signals Intelligence, Open Source Intelligence)? What key areas are missing or what you would like to see in place or enhanced?
SELECTION, TRAINING, AND CAREER DEVELOPMENT FOR INTELLIGENCE PERSONNEL

1. What training and development programs/opportunities do you currently have in place for staff (entry level, intermediate, senior, management)? What key areas are missing or what you would like to see in place or enhanced?

2. What selection processes are currently in place to ensure the best candidates with the requisite knowledge, skills, and abilities are entering the organization (testing methods, internships, secondments cross-organizational selection boards)? What key areas are missing or what you would like to see in place or enhanced?

3. Do you have any professional certification programs in place to ensure requisite KSAs as well as ongoing organizational requirements (internal understudy programs, training courses, professional association certification)? What key areas are missing or what you would like to see in place or enhanced?

INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND INFORMATION TECHNOLOGIES

1. What structures, processes, and technologies do you use to process information in your agency, unit, or region (policies/directives, information technologies)? What key areas are missing or what you would like to see in place or enhanced?

2. What information technologies are available to intelligence and/or enforcement staff to enable their day-to-day analytical, collection, and information management requirements (RMS, intelligence database(s), major case management, collaborative tools—for example, Microsoft SharePoint Workspace, analytical tools—for example, i2-Analyst’s Notebook)? What key areas are missing or what you would like to see in place or enhanced?

STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIPS ACROSS THE DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITIES

1. What strategic partnerships are currently in place to enhance overall agency, unit, or regional capacity both on the domestic and international fronts (for example, other LE agencies, INTERPOL, World Customs Organization, CITES, United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime)? What partnership opportunities are missing or what you would like to see in place or enhanced?

2. What outside agencies do you partner with to enhance staff capacity (secondments, internships, exchanges)? What partnership opportunities are missing or what you would like to see in place or enhanced?

3. What professional associations do your staff have membership in for ongoing professional training and development (for example, International Association of Law Enforcement Intelligence Analysts, Association of Law Enforcement Intelligence Units)? What professional association opportunities are missing or what you would like to see in place or enhanced?

Note: If you would like to further discuss any of the questions or have additional input, suggestions, or recommendations you’d like to contribute, please feel free to contact me directly via telephone or e-mail as per contact information:

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