


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SOCIAL CAPITAL INITIATIVE

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**THE NEXUS BETWEEN
VIOLENT CONFLICT,
SOCIAL CAPITAL AND
SOCIAL COHESION:**

**CASE STUDIES FROM
CAMBODIA AND RWANDA**

By Nat J. Colletta and Michelle L. Cullen

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and Rwanda (by Nat J. Colletta and Michelle L. Cullen)**

FOREWORD

There is growing empirical evidence that social capital contributes significantly to sustainable development. Sustainability is to leave future generations as many, or more, opportunities as we ourselves have had. Growing opportunity requires an expanding stock of capital. The traditional composition of natural capital, physical or produced capital, and human capital needs to be broadened to include social capital. Social capital refers to the internal social and cultural coherence of society, the norms and values that govern interactions among people and the institutions in which they are embedded. Social capital is the glue that holds societies together and without which there can be no economic growth or human well-being. Without social capital, society at large will collapse, and today's world presents some very sad examples of this.

The challenge of development agencies such as the World Bank is to operationalize the concept of social capital and to demonstrate how and how much it affects development outcomes. Ways need to be found to create an environment supportive of the emergence of social capital as well as to invest in it directly. These are the objectives of the Social Capital Initiative (SCI). With the help of a generous grant of the Government of Denmark, the Initiative has funded a set of twelve projects which will help define and measure social capital in better ways, and lead to improved monitoring of the stock, evolution and impact of social capital. The SCI seeks to provide empirical evidence from more than a dozen countries, as a basis to design better development interventions which can both safeguard existing social capital and promote the creation of new social capital.

This working paper series reports on the progress of the SCI. It hopes to contribute to the international debate on the role of social capital as an element of sustainable development.

Ismail Serageldin
Vice-President
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THE INITIATIVE ON DEFINING, MONITORING AND MEASURING SOCIAL CAPITAL

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THE NEXUS BETWEEN VIOLENT CONFLICT, SOCIAL CAPITAL AND SOCIAL COHESION: CASE STUDIES FROM CAMBODIA AND RWANDA

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THE NEXUS BETWEEN VIOLENT CONFLICT, SOCIAL CAPITAL AND SOCIAL COHESION: CASE STUDIES FROM CAMBODIA AND RWANDA

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The Cambodian and Rwandan studies were part of a World Bank Social Capital Initiative (SCI) funded by the Danish government. Guidance was provided by Christiaan Grootaert, SCI task manager, and Thierry van Bastelaer, SCI coordinator. The research project was designed and managed by the authors, Nat J. Colletta, manager, Post-Conflict Unit (PCU), World Bank, and Michelle L. Cullen, postconflict consultant, PCU.

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We gratefully acknowledge the contributions of those mentioned above and especially Markus Kostner, Peter Uvin, and Michael Woolcock for their insightful input and suggestions. While the field studies were carried out by select research teams in each country, the basic study design and analysis has been shaped by the authors’ experience over the past several years promoting the social and economic reintegration of war-affected populations. We take sole responsibility for the analysis, findings and recommendations presented in this chapter. Finally, this work would have been impossible without the many individual respondents who were willing and courageous enough to tell their stories about the human dimensions of violent conflict in their societies. We hope that this modest exploratory endeavor provokes further research, policy analysis, and programmatic action to enable war-wounded societies to heal and re-knit the social fabric upon which reconciliation can be nurtured and enduring peace and development achieved.

I. INTRODUCTION

The Cold War, in which superpowers sought to maintain a global balance of power without resorting to nuclear arms, masked many local, intrastate conflicts by internationalizing them. What in actuality were civil wars among indigenes contending for local power were turned into "virtual" international conflicts fought by proxy. Externally financed economic growth and outside support for authoritarian regimes concealed deeply rooted internal ethnic, religious, social, and economic cleavages. With the end of the Cold War, this virtual bubble burst, leaving an unprecedented number of civil wars. Of the 96 violent conflicts between 1989 and 1995, 91 are considered to be intrastate (Wallensteen and Sollenberg 1996). Consequently, peacekeeping and peacebuilding have taken on new prominence as tasks for the United Nations. In the first 45 years of its existence, the UN spent 23 percent of its budget, or about US\$3.6 billion, on peacekeeping. In the past 10 years this has increased dramatically, 77 percent of the budget (roughly US\$12.1 billion per year) has been allocated to maintaining peace within rather than across national borders (Martin 1996a).

Unlike inter-state conflict that often mobilizes national unity and strengthens societal cohesiveness, violent conflict within a state weakens its social fabric. It divides the population by undermining interpersonal and communal group trust, destroying the norms and values that underlie cooperation and collective action for the common good, and increasing the likelihood of communal strife. This damage to a nation's social capital—the norms, values, and social relations that bond communities together as well as the bridges between communal groups and civil society and the state—impedes communal and state ability to recover after hostilities cease. Even if other forms of capital are replenished, economic and social development will be hindered unless horizontal and vertical social capital stocks are restored. Ideally, this restoration of vertical and horizontal social capital will support bonds, build bridges, and link vertical and horizontal relations, thus strengthen the overall cohesiveness of society.

A growing body of research has examined the phenomenon of social capital in an attempt to define the concept and the forms it may take and to describe how it may influence and improve the development process. Efforts have also been made to develop indicators for measuring social capital and to provide recommendations on how to encourage and support this dynamic. Few studies, however, have actually analyzed social capital and how it interacts with violent conflict, an important issue considering the rise in the frequency of intrastate conflict and social capital's importance to social and economic growth and development (Grootaert 1998; Collier 1999; Rodrik 1999). Such an understanding could enhance the abilities of international actors and policymakers to more effectively carry out peacebuilding—reconciliation, reconstruction, and development.

To further this understanding, the authors conducted a study on the dynamics of violent conflict and social capital, under the auspices of the Post-Conflict Unit, World Bank, and funded by the World Bank's Social Capital Initiative (SCI). The data for this paper have been drawn from extensive literature reviews and community level studies conducted in Cambodia and Rwanda. In an experimental study design, two communities were selected from each country, one a high intensity conflict area and the other a low intensity conflict area. Though difficult, all efforts were made to select match pairs of communities holding constant community size, ethnic mix, dominant mode of subsistence, and socio-economic status. The findings are clearly limited by modifications in the methodology between countries and the uneven quality of data collection in each community. This was largely in part to the differing capacities of the field research teams and the general difficulties in undertaking research in war-torn communities, especially on such socially and politically sensitive issues as communal trust and social relations, and civic and state perceptions and dynamics. The severity of conflict experienced can be evidenced by the

fact that both were officially declared cases of genocide (crimes against humanity) by the United Nations. On the basis of the exploratory investigation, this chapter discusses changes in social capital resulting from violent conflict; the interaction between social capital, social cohesion, and violent conflict; and how governments and international actors can foster the socially cohesive relations necessary for conflict prevention, rehabilitation, and reconciliation. Findings and recommendations from these studies are preliminary, as each case study was conducted on an exploratory basis only. Study results are specific to those countries analyzed, although some broad generalizations may apply more globally. Further research is needed to confirm and solidify results.

Social Capital Conceptual Framework

Categorizing and analyzing social capital is difficult, for there are many definitions of the term and what it encompasses. In general, social capital refers to systems that lead to or result from social and economic organization, such as worldviews, trust, reciprocity, informational and economic exchange, and informal and formal groups and associations. Although there is much contention over what interactions and types of organization constitute social capital, there is little disagreement about the role of social capital in facilitating collective action, economic growth, and development by complementing other forms of capital (Grootaert 1998).

Woolcock's 1998 model of social capital facilitates analysis across various levels by presenting a comprehensive framework that incorporates four dimensions of social capital and describing their interrelations. According to his model, "integration" represents what Granovetter (1973) refers to as strong ties, or those primordial links within the family or a tightly knit community that are defensive. (See also Gittel and Vidal 1998 on the concept of bonding social capital.) "Linkages" encompass intercommunity and intergroup ties, or Granovetter's weak ties. The concepts of "organizational integrity" and "synergy" are respectively the state's effectiveness and ability to function and the state's links to the community. An advantage of Woolcock's model is that it integrates vertical and horizontal forms of social capital and their relationships, thus facilitating analysis and the targeting of policy and project recommendations at the macro, meso, and micro levels.

The definitions and indicators used in the Rwanda and Cambodia case studies focused primarily on informal and local horizontal relationships such as trust and cross-cutting networks, and to some extent on certain aspects of vertical relationships, particularly state and market penetration, as important factors in fueling conflict and influencing the formation and transformation of social capital. The concepts and definitions of social capital used stem primarily from the works of Putnam, Coleman, Fukuyama, and Uphoff.

Putnam's seminal work on social capital elaborates on the nature of horizontal relations. Social capital consists of "the features of social organization, such as networks, norms, and trust, that facilitate coordination and cooperation for mutual benefit" (Putnam 1993: 36). Communities with positive economic development and effective governments are those supported by "networks of civil engagement," or citizenry linked by solidarity, integrity, and participation. These civic networks foster norms of reciprocity that reinforce sentiments of trust within a society and improve the effectiveness of communications and social organization. Trust, improved communications, and the flow of information improve the efficiency of institutions (36-37). In this way, social capital is "a resource whose supply increases rather than decreases through use and which (as contrasted to physical capital) becomes depleted if not used" (37-38). Thus, unlike conventional forms of capital, social capital is a public, not a private, good. According to Woolcock's model, Putnam's work mainly refers to integration and linkages.

Coleman's (1988) definition of social capital is broader, including vertical associations that can be characterized by hierarchy and an unequal distribution of power among members. Consequently, social

capital can be beneficial to some and useless or harmful to others, depending on its characteristics and application. Social capital “is not a single entity but a variety of different entities with two elements in common: that all consist of some aspect of social structures, and that they facilitate certain actions of actors—whether persons or corporate actors—within the structure. . . . Like other forms of capital, social capital is productive, making possible the achievement of certain ends that in its absence would not be possible” (S98). Coleman’s work transgresses various dimensions of Woolcock’s model, including integration, linkages, and to a smaller extent state and market synergy with the community.

Fukuyama (1995) sees trust within a society as a primary factor in its prosperity, inherent competitiveness, and tendency toward democracy. Trust, in his view, is a key measure of social capital and is accumulated through norms of reciprocity and successful cooperation in networks of civic engagement. It “arises when a community shares a set of moral values in such a way as to create expectations of regular and honest behavior” (153). Reciprocity, civic duty, and moral obligation are essential to a successful and stable society and are the behaviors that should emanate from a thriving civil society.

According to Uphoff (2000), social capital is “an accumulation of various types of social, psychological, cognitive, institutional, and related assets that increase the amount or probability of mutually beneficial cooperative behavior that is productive for others, not just one’s self (216)”. Uphoff breaks social capital down into structural and cognitive components. Structural social capital refers to the relationships, networks, and associations, or the institutional structures, both vertical and horizontal, that link members. Horizontal relationships are those that exist among equals or near equals; vertical relationships stem from hierarchical or unequal relations due to differences in power or resource bases. Cognitive social capital is the “driving force” behind these visible forms of social capital; it includes values, norms, civic responsibility, expected reciprocity, charity, altruism, and trust. All dimensions of Woolcock’s paradigm are encompassed within Uphoff’s definition of social capital.

Thus, Putnam’s and Coleman’s work emphasize the horizontal and vertical aspects of social capital, while Fukuyama’s work stresses the importance to social capital formation of trust—a grossly depleted commodity during warfare. Uphoff’s work facilitates the analysis of social capital by separating its cognitive and structural aspects. To further deepen analysis of conflict and social capital interrelations, interactions at the macro level should also be considered. This broadening of the definition of social capital permits the inclusion of government, market, and development actors, which have a direct impact on the social capital environment facing actors at the local level, and helps identify measures for policy and operational recommendations. However, social capital dimensions closely affiliated with the macro environment (notions of organizational integrity and synergy) were all but briefly touched upon in the Rwanda and Cambodia case studies.

Macro aspects of social capital were well-described by North (1990) and Olson (1982), who define social capital to include not only trust, norms, and networks but also the sociopolitical environment that shapes norms and social structures. In addition to the largely informal and often local horizontal and hierarchical relationships in the concepts of Coleman and Putnam, this view encompasses more formalized institutional relationships and structures such as the government, the political regime, the market, the rule of law, the court system, and civil and political liberties (Grootaert 1998).

Narayan (1999) also emphasizes the importance of inclusion of the state in social capital analysis in her work examining the dynamics of complementarity and substitution. Narayan argues that focus must be not only on civic engagement, ideally characterized by inclusive ties that link different individuals and groups, but also on the effectiveness of the state. A strong, civil society founded on cross-cutting ties that operates in a weak state environment “substitutes” for the state’s inadequacies and hence is not a model case for growth. A high level of civic engagement, combined with a well-functioning state,

“complements” the state’s abilities and produces the fertile soil necessary for social and economic development.


Although the exact definition of social capital and the approaches taken to measure it varied slightly among the two case studies, the paradigms of social capital employed stemmed from the key concepts described above, mainly those related to integration and linkages.

Violent Conflict and its Interface with Social Capital and Social Cohesion

To better understand the emergence of violent conflict, the relationship between social capital and the cohesiveness of a society – expressed in the construct of social cohesion, or the nexus of vertical and horizontal social capital and the balance of bonding and bridging social capital – needs to be examined. As Berkman and Kawachi, (2000) note “social capital forms a subset of the notion of social cohesion. Social cohesion refers to two broader intertwined features of society: (1) the absence of latent conflict whether in the form of income/wealth inequality; racial/ethnic tensions; disparities in political participation; or other forms of polarization; and (2) the presence of strong social bonds-measured by levels of trust and norms of reciprocity; the abundance of associations that bridge social divisions (civic society) and the presence of institutions of conflict management, e.g., responsive democracy, an independent judiciary, and an independent media” (175).

Social cohesion is the key intervening variable between social capital and violent conflict, the degree to which vertical (a responsive state to its citizenry) and horizontal (cross-cutting, networked relations among diverse communal groups) social capital intersect, the more likely a society will be cohesive and thus possess the inclusive mechanisms necessary for mediating/managing conflict before it turns violent. The weaker the social cohesion, the weaker the reinforcing channels of socialization (value formation) and social control (compliance mechanisms). Weak societal cohesion increases the risk of social disorganization, fragmentation and exclusion, potentially manifesting itself in violent conflict.

Figure 2 Social Cohesion: The Integration of Horizontal, Vertical, and Bridging Social Capital



The work of Johann Galtung (1996) captures the intersection of vertical and horizontal social capital by characterizing the structure of violence in three basic social and economic phenomena: exclusion, inequality, and indignity. In many developing countries, unequal patterns of development, in terms of investment as well as access to its opportunities or fruits, have been a major source of societal cleavage. The process of globalization integrates markets and values thus facilitating growth, yet it also is also a source of increasing exclusion and marginalization, widening the gap between rich and poor within and among societies and exacerbating the conditions that can give rise to violent conflict. The consequent exclusion and inequality have been compounded by the struggle for identity in a rapidly changing world; traditional values, roles, and institutions are continually under assault as a result of the communications revolution and the penetration of markets and raising of expectations in even the most remote parts of the globe. The impact of market penetration has been intensified by the weakening of the state in the face of

dwindling resources, endemic corruption, and the rise of civil society, which can complement the state's role but can also compete with it for legitimacy. As a consequence, wars are increasingly fought over control of resources and power by social groups within states rather than by states themselves.

Conflict resulting from exclusion, inequality, and indignity does not in itself necessarily lead to the eruption of widespread hostilities. The tolerance and coping capacities of the poor and marginalized are legend and manifold. However, conflict often engenders large scale violence if various structural conditions are present, such as authoritarian rule and a lack of political rights (as in Rwanda); state weakness and lack of institutional capacity to manage conflict; and socioeconomic imbalances combined with inequity of opportunity and a weak civil society (as seen in Cambodia). The risk of an outbreak of violent conflict increases when these conditions exist concurrently or are exacerbated by other problems, such as the manipulation of ethnic or other differences (in religion, culture, and language), which can further fragment society and intensify the conflict (Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict 1997; Collier and Hoeffler 1999; Nathan 1998; Reno 1998).

Social capital can be readily perverted to undermine social cohesion and fragment society for individual and group gain, and potentially result in violent conflict. The Angka, under the guise of the Cambodian government, employed inclusionary social capital within the group to strengthen its resolve and weaken those excluded from the group. The Rwanda case illustrates that the political and economic elite often use identity to mobilize and pervert extant social capital as a ready means of achieving their own ends.

Within this complex matrix of factors underpinning violent conflict, two main features of social capital become increasingly relevant as potential kindling to fuel the fire of hostility. Vertical relations plagued by inequality and an unequal distribution of power and opportunity (and thus often accompanied by exclusion and indignity) can instigate violent conflict. Horizontal relations, or the lack of ties between unlike groups in a multicultural society can erupt into hostilities if one group is seen as monopolizing resources and power to the disadvantage of the others. And if within these groups, high levels of bonding social capital link only like members, differences in access to resources and power may further aggravate relations and heighten tensions between those in control and those excluded (Narayan 1999). Thus, violent conflict is triggered by the presence of strong exclusionary bonds combined with a lack of horizontal and vertical bridging links.

The above precepts describe the various possible underlying causes to conflict and illustrate interfaces between various forms of social capital, social cohesion, and violent conflict with several conditioning factors, such as inequality, indignity, exclusion, and poor governance. While the community studies touched on issues relating the above factors to violent conflict, the actual indicators used to assess violent conflict tended to correspond with violent conflict as manifested in social, economic, environmental, and political conditions. For instance, indicators that assessed number of people killed, loss of access to markets, damage to bio diversity, and disregard for peace accords. The indicators assessed violent conflict rather than conflict per se, which may include intrahousehold contentions or common disputes over property or legal matters.

In all communities studied, violent conflict was viewed as both an independent and a dependent variable (a cause and an effect) in its relationship to social capital. That is, social capital can be constructive and support societal cohesion and the mitigation of conflict, but it can also be perverted to hasten social fragmentation and the onslaught of violent conflict.

II. CAMBODIA: STATE ABSOLUTISM AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF SOCIAL CAPITAL

The Cambodian study aimed to assess how 20 years of violent conflict, which varied in intensity and mode, interacted with extant social capital. Throughout each phase of conflict, the state targeted communities and individuals, virtually waging war against its own constituents while concurrently destroying the social foundations that traditionally serve as the girders for state building and cohesion. To compound matters, encroaching globalization, hastened by postwar reconstruction and rehabilitation interventions, have interfaced with social capital stocks, further transforming the topography of Cambodian social fabric.

Study Methodology

The Cambodian study was conducted by Social Services of Cambodia (SSC) and included a literature review and six months of fieldwork. Field research staff consisted of an international research director and five local field staff (three men and two women). Field staff were extensively trained in research methods and skills, due to the paucity of experienced researchers in Cambodia. Field research incorporated information from over 12 weeks of village stays and participant observation. During this time, various research techniques were employed, such as participatory group exercises (village mapping, resource flow analysis, wealth ranking, and trends analysis) and semistructured interviews with individuals and groups. This approach to field research allowed good relationships to develop between staff and villagers, greatly contributing to the quantity and quality of the information obtained.

The SSC works in over 300 different villages in the Kompong Speu province of Cambodia; and from these villages, 12 were randomly chosen as potential study sites. Comparisons of the villages according to various conflict indicators showed that all had been affected by the conflict. The two villages ultimately chosen, Prasath and Prey Koh, were of the same size (populations of 651 and 654, respectively) but had different experiences of conflict. Prasath, the control village, experienced displacement only once; while Prey Koh villagers were displaced twice, and it seemed that more people had been killed there than in the control village. Prasath appeared to be a slightly poorer village than Prey Koh, providing an added dimension of analysis.

In addition to village stays and participant observation, two household surveys were implemented, one to establish baseline socioeconomic information and a second to explore social capital issues. The baseline survey examined demographic details, landholdings, household occupations, and each household member's place of residence before and during the conflict period. The survey was implemented in all households in each village—130 households in Prasath and 114 in Prey Koh. Persons under age 15 make up about 43–44 percent of the population in each village; about 33 percent of the village populations is between the ages of 15 and 35, and about 23–24 percent is over 35. Most villagers in both Prasath and Prey Koh were born in their respective villages. Only a very small percentage of the population of either village could remember details of life during the pre-conflict period.

The survey targeting social capital issues was implemented in about 30 percent of all households (39 randomly selected households in Prasath and 34 in Prey Koh). The following *behavioral aspects of social capital* in the preconflict, conflict, and postconflict periods were examined:

- Problems in improving livelihood and economic activities
- Sources of information on livelihood and economic activities
- Borrowing and lending practices

- Ownership of and lending practices for livestock, household equipment, and tools
- Labor exchange
- Participation in groups and associations
- Availability and use of services
- Sources of assistance during crises
- Participation in activities for the common good
- Welfare of vulnerable individuals and families.

The *violent conflict indicators* used in the Cambodian study assessed the impact, intensity, and duration of the conflict (see Box 1). Cambodia's experience with violent conflict was manifold, as evidenced by the fact that Cambodian interviewees discerned different conflict eras. The period of conflict as defined for the study entailed three separate eras distinguished by changes in leadership: Lon Nol, 1970–75; Khmer Rouge, 1975–79; and Heng Samrin, 1979–89.

Indicators of Violent Conflict: Cambodia

Effects on the population

- Number of people killed
- Number of people physically disabled as a result of conflict
- Number of people mentally affected
- The extent to which violence is a way of life and is used to solve problems
- Number of family members enrolled in the army
- Number of people who left the village during fighting
- Changes in composition and size of the population

Physical damage

- Extent to which infrastructure (including houses, wells, roads, trees, and temples) was destroyed
- Physical traces of war (damaged buildings, craters, and so on)
- Area of land infested with mines
- Number of times village was relocated or dispersed

Nature of the conflict

- Duration of fighting in the village
- Types of group perpetrating the conflict

Structural and Cognitive Social Capital

The definition of social capital used in the Cambodia study was based primarily on the works of Coleman, Putnam, and Uphoff. Horizontal and vertical aspects of social capital were studied, using a modified paradigm derived from Uphoff's work. Thus, structural aspects of social capital were emphasized, although inferences to underlying cognitive social capital were woven into the analysis when possible.

Social capital was measured within the study context by examining levels of *trust*, as evidenced by measures to secure livelihood and exchange (economic, informational, and so on), and of *social cohesion*, as indicated by collective action and the provision of social services and welfare. Social capital was broken down into various structural components:

- Community events
- Informal networks

- Associations
- Village leadership
- Links with external agencies.

As each structural component was examined, attempts were made to identify the cognitive social capital that buttressed these structural forms.

Within this framework, *community events* are activities that increase feelings of solidarity, strengthen social cohesion, improve communication, provide a learning ground for coordinated activities, promote civic mindedness and altruistic behavior, and through shared experiences help form a sense of collective consciousness. Weddings, funerals, and pagoda activities are classified as community events.

Informal networks are manifested in innumerable informal exchanges of information and resources within communities. The exchanges are for the most part spontaneous, informal, and unregulated and are the outcome of individual initiative and entrepreneurship. They are thought to be shaped by various factors within the communal environment, predominantly market forces, kinship, and affinity (natural bonds that exist between individuals who live close together or have shared interests and concerns). Rice-, water-, and plate-sharing groups are all examples of informal networks. On the positive side, informal networks represent efforts at cooperation, coordination, and mutual assistance and help maximize the utilization of available resources. They are highly valuable in providing individuals with support mechanisms in economic and social endeavors. These same informal networks, however, can be based on exploitative relationships in which gains are unevenly distributed. Informal networks can run horizontally or vertically.

Associations unite people, frequently from differing kin groups, who work together for a common purpose and have a visible identity. For the most part, these groups have clearly delineated structures, roles, and rules within which group members operate. Associations nurture efforts toward self-help, mutual help, solidarity, and cooperation. They are regarded as the building blocks of civil society and are usually horizontal. The main example of an association illustrated by the study was *provas dei*, an exchange group that trades goods and labor.

In this study, vertical social capital includes the relations and interactions between a community and its leaders and extends to wider relations between the village, the government, and the marketplace. *Village leadership* includes official, traditional, and informal leaders. Official leaders include the communal chief and the local government administration. Traditional leaders are usually people who are revered for their religious or spiritual attributes (*achars*) or for their age, experience, and knowledge. Informal leaders wield influence because of their wealth, special skills, or charisma. Official and traditional leaders play key roles in the political, social, religious, and welfare activities of the village, while shaping networks within the community and between the community and the outside world. The nature and quality of leadership in the community determine the level and quality of development in the village. To a lesser degree, unequal exchanges in resources or information establish patron-client relationships, adding another vertical dimension to village dynamics.

Virtually all *external links* to the villages are considered vertical. External community links include vertical relations with the government, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and the private sector or marketplace.

State-sponsored Warfare and Citizen Victimization

Thirty years of warfare all but destroyed most forms of social capital in Cambodia; yet the threads of violence predate the recent conflicts and are woven deep in the country's past. Since the fall of the

kingdom of Angkor, political disruption and successive conflicts have plagued Cambodia. Relative stability was not achieved until the imposition of French rule, which began in the 1850s and ended with the country's independence in 1954 as a new constitutional monarchy. The kingdom of Cambodia, led by Premier Prince Norodom Sihanouk, experienced political stability and economic growth as Sihanouk pushed for advances in health, education, and industry. Toward the end of the 1960s, however, the country began to destabilize as a result of economic difficulties, corruption, and the increasing threat of communism, and consequently support for Sihanouk declined (Becker 1998).

In a coup d'état in 1970, General Lon Nol overthrew Sihanouk, who then fled to China, where he publicly formed an alliance with the communist Khmer Rouge. Lon Nol soldiers terrorized the countryside, splitting and destroying villages within combat zones. Concurrently, regional issues compounded the turbulence; the U.S.-Vietnam war spilled over into Cambodia, and a growing contingent of communists continually clashed with Lon Nol government soldiers. During the Lon Nol period, American planes repeatedly bombed Cambodian territory in an attempt to oust Vietnamese communists supposedly in the area. This campaign killed thousands of innocent citizens, destroyed numerous villages, and rendered much of the land unusable because of unexploded ordnance, chemical defoliation, and landmines (Ebihara, Morland, and Ledgerwood 1994; Nee 1995).

Lon Nol was subsequently ousted by the Khmer Rouge, which in April 1975 formed Democratic Kampuchea. Under the guise of communism, the Angka ("The Organization," the secretive team of Khmer Rouge leaders), headed by "Brother Number One," Pol Pot, initiated a radical agrarian revolution. This break with the past marked Year Zero, when many aspects of Cambodian life were figuratively and literally wiped clean. People were led from their homes in the cities into rural areas, where they and their rural counterparts were organized into work brigades and coerced into forced labor. Entire villages were dissolved and relocated; families lost their homes and possessions and were often separated and assigned to different camps. People who had lived in the cities and had been affiliated with the Lon Nol government or military were classified as "new" people, as were their families. The "new" people were treated much more severely than the "old" people, rural peasants and those who had fallen under the Khmer Rouge earlier. Fragmentation between "old" and "new" split not only neighboring communities but also villages and, at times, families, thus breaking both primary bonds of kinship and secondary bridges of association. The preferential treatment given to the "old" people created much resentment, though both groups generally lived under unbearable conditions – overworked, underfed, and terrorized by fear on a daily basis. Meanwhile, opposition to the Khmer Rouge was not allowed: dissidents were tortured or put to death. The four years of totalitarian Khmer Rouge rule resulted in the genocide of roughly 2 million Cambodians, who died from political killings, overwork, starvation, and disease (Bit 1991; Nee 1995; van de Put 1997). Any remnant of vertical social capital between the state and civil society was shattered, in the wake of a perverse accumulation and use of social capital formed among select communist intellectuals and a vanguard of unemployed, uneducated youth pitted against the urban educated, professional and business segments of society and the older traditional rural peasantry.

Vietnamese troops overcame the Khmer Rouge and formed the People's Republic of Kampuchea in January 1979. The new Vietnamese government, seen as a continuation of external domination over Cambodians and following the U.S.-Vietnam war with its regional geopolitics, continued to fight the Khmer Rouge throughout the next decade, perpetuating instability throughout the country. Despite this insecurity, during the 10 years of Vietnamese rule (the Heng Samrin period), recovery gradually began as conflict and insecurity eventually waned. Progress remained slow however and was exacerbated by noncommunist governments worldwide who were wary of the Vietnamese occupiers and kept Cambodia in relative isolation (Chandler 1992; Nee 1995).

With the Vietnamese withdrawal in 1989 the state of Cambodia was formed. Prince Sihanouk returned, after 13 years of self-imposed exile. A transitional government was established until the Paris

Agreements in October 1991 that temporarily formalized the government structure. The United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) oversaw the peace process, reconstruction, and rehabilitation with mixed results (Ebihara, Morland, and Ledgerwood 1994). Elections were finally held in 1993, instituting a new coalition government headed by Prince Ranariddh with Hun Sen as co-premier. In 1997 an attempted coup disrupted the dual government leading to a strengthening of Hun Sen's control. The July 1998 elections left Hun Sen in control of the recovering state.

Social Capital, Social Cohesion, and the Legacies of Violent Conflict

During the Lon Nol regime, traditional sources of social capital were severely eroded throughout Cambodia. Many villages were forced to relocate or split due to warfare, bombings, and Lon Nol recruitment. Within villages, exchange slowed and solidarity around the temple dissolved. Some families did manage to stay intact despite massive dislocation (Nee 1995).

The Khmer Rouge ushered in another era of organized violence, which included systematic attacks on traditional Cambodian society—on norms, culture, religion, organizations, networks, and even the family. Community and family members were encouraged to spy and report on each other, destroying trust and planting the seeds of deeply rooted fear. A war against class distinctions was waged, as attempts to level economic status were instituted by making everyone unpaid agricultural laborers. By destroying all social, political, and economic institutions in this extreme communistic experiment, the brutal Khmer Rouge regime transformed and depleted what little social capital had remained from the Lon Nol period (Bit 1991; Nee 1995).

After a decade of destruction, forms of social capital gradually began to reemerge during the Heng Samrin period. This occurred despite the turmoil that continued to fester until the end of Vietnamese rule, marked by skirmishes between the guerrillas and invading troops, internal migration, and a disruption of agriculture that resulted in widespread famine. The Khmer Rouge had used collectivization as a strategy to transform the economy and had broken up families to work in cooperatives. Vietnamese efforts to rebuild Cambodia in the early 1980s paralleled this philosophy by focusing on collectivist cooperatives, such as the solidarity group *krom Samaki*, which forbade private ownership and encouraged development through communal efforts. Although some progress and recovery occurred under the Heng Samrin government, when it did end, Cambodians greeted the change with relief.

In terms of structural social capital and its composition, postconflict forms do not differ greatly from those that existed before the wars. In both of the villages studied, community events, particularly pagoda activities and religious ceremonies, mirror practices of the period before the conflict. Nor are there prominent differences in how village meetings are held.

Informal networks continue to be organized by kinship and affinity, just as they had before the fighting erupted, but they are increasingly beginning to be shaped by market forces. Nonfarm activities, particularly small business and trade, are promoting new networks that go beyond the circle of relatives and friends. These have increased the need for mobility and information, putting people in touch with the world outside their villages. Networks formally based on the concept of mutual aid are giving way to new networks based on rigid reciprocity and the need to earn cash income, as is evident in the decrease of *provas dei*. Thus, informal networks are not dissolving as a result of the ravages of violent conflict but are changing in composition in response to the power and permeating influence of external market forces.

Associations sponsored by the government or initiated by village leaders and the pagoda show no visible changes from the preconflict period, as do local associational initiatives such as rice banks, funeral associations, and water-users' groups. Of the two study villages, Prey Koh exhibits more associational

activity than does Prasath, primarily because of its higher level of economic activity and energy. Prey Koh suffered more from conflict than did its counterpart, yet here associational activity increased despite the deeper schism between "old" and "new" people and the consequent more prominent threat of the breakdown of trust among villagers. This suggests that the conflict did not necessarily diminish the willingness of people to work together as a result of the strong Buddhist tradition.

There is little difference between preconflict and present village leadership (including traditional, informal, and official leaders) with regard to type, role, and nature. In general, the role of village leaders in Prey Koh is more visible than in Prasath, primarily due to more resources and better links with the outside world, and thus creating a greater role to fill. Prasath's small resource base has resulted in poor links with the outside world, and village leaders, preoccupied with problems within their own households, are consequently less active. Pagoda activities are more or less at the same level in both villages, and elders and *achars* appear to be equally active in both.

Various factors seemed to support the revival of social capital, including:

- Resilience—an inner strength that allows people to continue to cope and to rebuild their lives
- A strong drive toward self-help
- The powerful role played by the pagoda and Buddhist traditions in shaping the identity of people, and the need to reestablish this identity
- The need to restore basic village infrastructure that had been destroyed
- The knowledge that the government would not be able to provide what was needed.

It should be noted that some of the revival and restoration took place within the conflict period (under Heng Samrin rule) and has continued since in both villages.

In the preconflict period, no agencies other than the government operated in the two villages. Government-provided services and resources were very basic but may have been of better quality before the conflict than they are now, particularly in education and health. In both communities, state penetration is still weak, and the substitutional effects of emerging civil societies, particularly in the provision of basic services, are only beginning to emerge. NGO involvement in village development and in providing services is a relatively new phenomenon that began in the Heng Samrin period. The conflict in Cambodia has resulted in a highly visible and active role for NGOs, particularly international bodies, however in the study villages their role has been intermittent. A more recent phenomenon has been the increasing involvement of the business community, especially in Prey Koh. Businesses here are clearly driven by the profit motive, and are highly exploitative of the environment and villagers. At present, the development of links with external agencies in both villages largely depends on initiatives from outside.

The survey results revealed mixed findings about the relations between social capital and violent conflict. Primary-group relations of a familial nature endured during conflict (except during Khmer Rouge rule), serving as a defensive form of social capital and providing an indigenous, survival-oriented safety net. In contrast, secondary group associations—or linkages to market penetration and outward-looking, "offensive" forms of social capital that are more developmental than protective in nature—were stunted during warfare.

As the conflict waned, integrative primary-group relations were supplanted by secondary-group linkages, which increased in intensity and number. Despite Prey Koh's higher level of exposure to conflict, its proximity to market penetrating forces transformed and strengthened certain dimensions of social capital in the post conflict period, mainly those more development-oriented. Prasath, still isolated, remains marginalized from market penetration, and social capital has remained encapsulated in an

inward-looking set of kin-oriented social relations. The research team posited that this was due to deeper market penetration in Prey Koh, which is closer to the highway and has easier access to market activities. On the other hand, Prasath is located near the foot of the hills and until recently has been plagued by sporadic violence from Khmer Rouge attacks. The implication is that while violent conflict often shapes social capital in favor of primary bonding relations and an inward-looking orientation toward survival in the short-term emergency period, postconflict market penetration may easily reverse this pattern and lead to more outward-looking, associational social capital in the medium-to-longer-term transition to peace.

The Cambodia case illustrates the ebb and flow of horizontal social capital depending on the relative penetration of the state and the market forces as instruments of vertical social capital. Vertical cohesiveness in the past has been promoted by the state and been a mere result of symbolic leadership of the King succeeded by a line of oppressive, socially-fragmenting regimes, which have often perverted extant social capital (Lon Nol, Pol Pot, and Heng Samrin). If anything, while bonds of kinship remain strong, bridging social capital is now only slowly emerging, due in large part to market forces. In short, the integration of strong bridging horizontal and integrating vertical social capital to shape a cohesive society remains a challenge to Cambodia on the road to sustainable peace and economic development. Clearly, the remaining milestones on that road include the opening up of state-civil society dialogue, and steps toward an increasingly free press, a transparent rule of law perhaps through the impending war crimes tribunal, the promotion of local elections, and a more inclusive, participatory development process.

III. RWANDA: HATE, FEAR, AND THE DECAY OF SOCIAL RELATIONS

Although Rwanda seemed to instantaneously become unglued in April 1994 with the eruption of the genocide, the continual weakening of bridging social relations between Tutsi and Hutu and the increasing penetration, grasp, and span of the state over communal affairs had been occurring for decades. In an attempt to better understand the conflict and its interactions with social relations and norms, the Rwanda case study examined how social capital interacted with conflict, both in terms of the unraveling of social fabric and the strengthening of social dynamics among Hutu that enabled the genocide. While problematic vertical and horizontal relations within Rwanda led to the civil war, external factors also impacted social capital stocks, such as international interventions and changes brought about by modernization.

Study Methodology

The Rwandan study was implemented by local consultants and entailed both field and desk research. The first phase of the study, the literature review, assessed pertinent historical information and outlined traditional forms of Rwandan social capital. Field research in the selected communities was conducted by two teams, each consisting of one man and one woman, and included a three-week period of participant observation, six weeks of survey implementation, and three weeks of interviews with associations, focus groups, and key informants in the two select communes.

The two communes chosen for the evaluation were—Giti, the control site, which experienced low levels of violence and did not feel the full impact of the genocide, and Shyanda, the variable site, which experienced high levels of organized killing. Giti was spared the organized effects of the genocide due to it being an early point of penetration by the Rwandese Patriotic Front army and its own unique leadership and history of communal cooperation. Both communes are of relatively comparable size: Giti's population is 48,000 and Shyanda's is 39,000. They share the same language, religion, and culture and have similar modes of subsistence and socioeconomic status, although Giti is and has been marginally more prosperous. Intermarriage between Hutu and Tutsi was and remains common in both areas.

As in Cambodia, surveys were implemented at the household level, targeting 1.5 percent of randomly selected households in three sectors of each commune. Each household contained on average five people. In Giti, 114 surveys were conducted and in Shyanda, 144. Focus groups of 5 to 15 participants were largely made up of mixed groups, widows, orphans, politicians, intellectuals, associations, and business people. Key informants were chosen from these target groups. Question and issue guides for both group and individual interviews were derived from the initial survey findings.

Throughout the study, difficulties emerged because of the sensitivity of the topic and the recentness of the war. Unlike Cambodia where much time had passed since the genocide and few were still around to provide intimate details, the Rwanda genocide was fresh in peoples' minds and the unsettling presence of genocidaires amidst victims still left an aura of fear and intimidation. The research teams therefore made efforts to spend more time than originally scheduled in each commune to build relations, trust, and acceptance with residents. After the field teams strengthened their relations with communal members, discussions broadened to encompass details of the respondents' conflict experiences.

Social Cohesion, Trust, and Violent Conflict

The original goal of the Rwandan social capital study was to assess how conflict depleted social capital and how social capital was restored following war's end. After the initial findings from the field were

submitted, however, it became evident that conflict did not necessarily deplete stocks of social capital but instead transformed them and that new forms of social capital emerged during periods of conflict. The study was therefore broadened to encompass these various types of transformations and social capital dynamics, which were examined by assessing changes in levels of social cohesion and trust.

Social cohesion was measured by the density and nature of organizations and networks (both vertical and horizontal) and by members' sense of commitment and responsibility to these groups. The propensity for cooperation and exchange (material, labor, ritualistic, and informational) served as a proxy for *trust*. In addition, the study attempted to develop indicators and measures of both vertical and horizontal social capital that were specifically tailored for war-torn societies. Indicators for measuring social capital were based on social capital concepts as described by Putnam, Coleman, and Fukuyama and were adapted to the specificities of Rwandan society. Related measures examined as *proxies for social cohesion and trust* included:

- Channels and mechanisms for exchange of information
- Existence and nature of associations and the reason for their creation (whether based on shared interests or on prescribed commonality, such as familial relations)
- Intermarriage and extended family relations
- Intercommunity relations and mechanisms for conflict resolution
- Availability and functioning of infrastructure
- Types, nature, and organization of exchange and interdependence
- Nature and organization of assistance, mutual aid, and cooperation (including sharing of basic necessities such as water, firewood, and salt)
- Social protection and welfare; collective responsibility.

To confirm that these factors were considered representative of social capital not only by the researchers but also by those being interviewed, survey questions and focus group interviews sought to elicit what social capital meant to each participant. Throughout survey implementation and with each focus group, it became clear that participants and researchers had approximately the same definition of social capital. Although each focus group had its own interpretation, the combined concepts covered almost all facets of social capital as defined for the study. Participants in both communities viewed social capital as including mutual assistance, trust, solidarity, civic duty, collective action, protection of the vulnerable, peaceful cohabitation, and on a more macro scale, a just political system engendered by the state.

Indicators of violent conflict in Rwanda included social, economic, environmental, and political factors (Box 3). Changes in social capital due to violent conflict were assessed over varying periods of time (that is, pre- and post conflict). During the assessment, the period of conflict was defined solely by the interviewees, who equated it with the genocide of April–July 1994. However, it should be noted that violence and conflict have plagued Rwanda for decades, and that the civil war officially began in October 1990. Since the end of the genocide, widespread violence has continued with revenge killings and civil war along Rwanda's borders and within the Democratic Republic of Congo.

Indicators of Violent Conflict: Rwanda

Social factors

- Number of people killed
- Number of communities and families destroyed
- Number of people physically disabled as a result of fighting
- Number of people relocated

Economic factors

- Destruction of economic infrastructure
- Loss of access to markets
- Damage to resources necessary for production

Environmental factors

- Extent to which crops were lost and fields were destroyed
- Damage to biodiversity
- Area of land laid waste due to mass migration
- Area of land infested with mines

Political factors

- Disregard for peace accords
- Dissolution of government

The Anatomy of Genocide

The 1994 massacres killed more people more quickly than any other mass slaughter in recorded history—over 800,000 died within a three-month period at the hands of their brethren (Berkeley 1998). Historically however, ethnic hatred, which fueled this armed eruption, did not exist between Hutu and Tutsi. Predominantly during precolonial times, the two groups coexisted symbiotically, with complementary modes of subsistence (nomadic pastoralism and sedentary agriculture). They were neither similar nor equal. Distinctions between the groups stemmed from membership to different classes, not from dissimilar ethnic backgrounds. Being labeled Hutu or Tutsi simply meant belonging to a loosely defined category based on occupation or class; whereas the Hutu were cultivators, the Tutsi were pastoralists and generally belonged to the ruling and warrior classes. Most important, group membership was not static (Newbury 1988; Prunier 1997).

Relations between Hutu and Tutsi worsened under Belgian colonial rule. By supporting the minority Tutsi rule,¹ colonization further entrenched socioeconomic disparities and solidified the divide between the groups along “ethnic” (rather than class) lines. The arbitrary distinctions between the groups were sharpened by colonial mythology, which relegated the Hutu cultivators to a lower status and categorized the pastoral Tutsi as the superior ruling class. The Belgian census of 1926 forced Hutu and Tutsi to choose their “ethnic” identity. What had once been a dynamic system of classes became a static system based on “ethnicity,” which later became a (much abused) tool for manipulation of the masses by an elite ruling group (Lemarchand 1970; Newbury 1988; Prunier 1997).

In the early and mid-1950s, the colonial government, under pressure from the Catholic Church, gave the Hutu greater access to socioeconomic and political systems. The increasing liberties offered to the Hutu began to the Tutsi government, who, as a minority, feared an uprising by the majority. Ethnic politics intensified in 1959, and the Party for the Emancipation of the Hutu People (Parmehutu) ousted the Tutsi regime with the support of Belgian forces. Skirmishes between Hutu and Tutsi spread throughout Rwanda, killing thousands and forcing a massive Tutsi migration. The Hutu elite gained power in 1961 and began to focus on marginalizing the Tutsi minority. Traditional social and political systems such as the role of elders and the *gacaca* conflict resolution mechanism were replaced by the central

¹ Statistically, the Hutu comprise about 85% of the Rwandan population, the Tutsi roughly 14%, and the Twa 1%. Traditionally however, these figures have been based upon the number of cows owned and thus may not be accurate (Prunier 1997).

administration as the state penetrated ever deeper into the lives of the citizenry. Pastoral Tutsi cultural traditions were progressively banned, and exclusively “Hutu” traditions became more closely identified with Banyarwanda culture, which had encompassed both Hutu and Tutsi aspects (Lemarchand 1970; Prunier 1997).

Soon after Hutu elite took power, Tutsi rebel groups based in Burundi, Tanzania, Uganda, and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC, or the former Zaire) began targeting Hutu officials. Tutsi-led incursions into Rwanda initiated a cycle of violence, massacres, and Tutsi flight into neighboring countries. This tragic pattern continued over the next 30 years. Consequently, the government became increasingly repressive against Tutsi, abridging their rights and institutionally excluding them from educational and employment opportunities.² Sinking commodity prices, increasing debt, and government corruption led President Juvenal Habyarimana's regime to deflect attention from the compounding crises by fueling the flames of ethnic hatred (Prunier 1997).

Tutsi rebel forces of the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) invaded northern Rwanda in October 1990, unleashing increased insecurity and killings in the area. In response, Rwandan security forces distributed arms to local civilian officials, and the national army was expanded to roughly 50,000 men. Many Tutsi businessmen, teachers, and priests were arrested and accused of collaborating with the rebels on the basis of their ethnicity, even if they had no connection with the rebels. The RPF continued its attacks within Rwanda's borders throughout 1991 and 1992, exacerbating hate politics and rhetoric against Tutsi. Concurrently, President Habyarimana took small steps toward liberalizing the political system, mainly in an effort to maintain his power. More strident steps to retain control were implemented in late 1992 when the Habyarimana regime began to train Hutu extremist militia groups known as the Interahamwe and the Impuzamugambi, while it contradictorily also pursued peace talks with the rebel forces in 1993 and early 1994 (Prunier 1997; Uvin 1998).

On April 6, 1994, President Habyarimana's plane was shot down over Rwanda's capital, Kigali. Government forces and militia immediately began attacking Tutsi and moderate Hutu. Within the next three months, brutal killings of Tutsi erupted throughout the country. While some Hutu willingly participated in the massacres, others were ordered or forced to kill. A campaign of Tutsi elimination (“clearing the countryside”) targeted individuals, neighborhoods, and (by focusing on universities and hospitals) professions. Roughly 2 million refugees were forced to leave the country, and around 1 million people were internally displaced. During the genocide, Rwandan society collapsed completely: business and agricultural activities ceased, skilled people and the intelligentsia were slaughtered or fled, the infrastructure was purposefully destroyed, and government operations, including legal, educational, and health activities, completely dissolved (Des Forges 1999).

After the RPF forces took Kigali in July 1994, hundreds of thousands of Hutu fled to neighboring countries, many of them destroying everything in their path as they left. Refugee camps set up for these Hutu masses inadvertently supported the radical groups responsible for organizing and perpetrating the genocide (primarily, the Interahamwe). Meanwhile, Tutsi refugees, from both the 1994 tragedies and the 1959 flight, spilled back into Rwanda. Chaos ensued during this massive return, and much looting, pillaging, and squatting took place. As time passed, government attempts to repatriate Hutu refugees were unsuccessful, for many feared widespread reprisal killings.³ Finally, in 1996, the RPF grew impatient with the security threat within the bordering refugee camps and forced the return of refugees in neighboring

² This repression against the Tutsi lessened somewhat however under Habyarimana in the 1990s.

³ Many revenge killings did take place throughout the genocide and in the period immediately following, as Tutsi slaughtered Hutu in retaliation for deaths in their families. Although the exact numbers are not known, the numbers of Hutu murdered by no means match those of Tutsi killed (Des Forges 1999; Prunier 1997).

Zaire. Soon afterward, over 1 million Hutu returned home from neighboring Burundi, Tanzania, Uganda, and the DRC (Prunier 1997).

Throughout the five years since the genocide, Interahamwe forces have kept united, mainly hiding in DRC territory. Their incursions into northwestern and southwestern Rwanda have kept these regions relatively unstable and caused them to lag in development. The March 1999 local elections were a major step forward for the government, for they helped alleviate criticism of its legitimacy. Although Rwanda has made much progress since the war, many Rwandans are still haunted by its terror. Securing food and shelter has been difficult for many survivors. As a legacy of the genocide, homeless orphans wander the streets, and widows and wives of men in prison struggle to make ends meet. Widespread poverty and severely damaged infrastructure hamper growth and development. Despite this all, the Rwandan people in general seem to have hope for the future, but worry about Interahamwe activities in the DRC and about the security of Rwandan areas along the border with the DRC (Gourevitch 1998; Prunier 1997).

The Perversion of Social Capital

During the genocide, social capital atrophied, as the country, communities, and families fell prey to hatred and violence. Yet, integrative forms of social capital increased within families fighting for survival, among individuals attempting to save or rescue Tutsi, and in the small Muslim community within Rwanda, which never took part in the genocide. Strong, exclusionary social capital also emerged within Hutu extremism, with very negative ramifications for those excluded, revealing that violence can coexist with, or be the result of, the existence of strong bonding social capital among its perpetrators.⁴

As the formal Hutu government dissolved, a primary operating unit emerged that coordinated the genocide. Communities split as orders calling for Hutu to kill Tutsi originated from the central government and were spread throughout Rwanda by way of local leaders, who helped mobilize the masses. Of the nearly 60 percent of the Rwandan population under age 20, few had hopes of obtaining land or jobs. This bleak reality facilitated the recruitment of Hutu and their acceptance of Tutsi hate propaganda. Once the killing began, Hutu killed not only Tutsi unknown to them but also their neighbors and, in some cases, even family members. These indiscriminate yet intimate killings led to the disintegration of communes and families and fragmented social cohesion in general. Yet, this violence to some extent also followed from the breakdown of these societal structures brought about by previous hate propaganda and ethnic strife. Although there were numerous Hutu who hid and saved Tutsi, many participated in the killings out of a sense of perceived ethnic duty, loyalty to the Hutu-controlled state, and due to outright threats against their lives or their families' lives. To make matters more complex, some Tutsi with Hutu physical characteristics killed Tutsi to save themselves (Des Forges 1999; Gourevitch 1998).

In various ways, the genocide was a powerful communal-building exercise, at least among participating Hutu. Seeking to preserve their control and resources, Hutu power groups achieved their ultimate success by mobilizing exclusionary and divisive social capital that bonded (primarily) unemployed, uneducated Hutu youth to form the Interahamwe. High levels of social capital existed both vertically and horizontally among Hutu ranks, while bridging social capital to link with the Tutsi was all but eliminated. Within Hutu extremism, state-driven vertical social capital fueled communal-level Hutu groups' success by providing excellent information networks, reinvented past traditions, and a sense of solidarity, obligation, and civic duty (Prunier 1997). Social capital within the groups increased, as links

⁴ For a similar conclusion on social capital dynamics within militias, gangs, and guerrilla groups, see Moser and McIlwaine (1999).

between them waned, further splitting society. The former bridging social capital that had existed between the diverse communal groups, albeit weak, was rapidly transformed into solely bonding social capital founded on fear and survival as Hutu and Tutsi groups coalesced on each side of the divide.

In the initial weeks of the genocide, precise lists of Tutsi and details of their residence helped expedite the killings and ensure thoroughness. The media were used to spread hate propaganda against Tutsi. For example, Radio et Télévision Libre des Mille Collines broadcast lists of Hutu in each commune who had not participated in the killings, publicly pressuring them to join the genocide. These excellent information networks kept the Interahamwe informed on who had been killed, who had not yet been removed, and who had helped facilitate the killing process. By spreading hate, fear, suspicion, and greed, the Hutu extremists were able to whip the Hutu masses into a murderous frenzy (Des Forges 1999; Gourevitch 1998).

Extremist Hutu also gained a following partly by invoking tradition. They appealed to precolonial Rwandan society and coopted preexisting value structures by reinventing precolonial traditions and applying them in a new vein. For instance, the nomenclature for extremist Hutu groups was similar to that of precolonial militias and blood brotherhoods. The propaganda utilized to fuel Hutu actions referred to traditional social capital in the form of cooperative labor (*umuganda*), which had evolved into forced labor and was seen as abusive to Hutu. The slogan of the 1959 massacres was renewed: *tugire gukora akazi*, "let us go and do the work" (Gourevitch 1998, Prunier 1997).

Génocidaires were united by the collective action of killing, which helped create feelings of collective consciousness, commonality, shared goals, and solidarity. For example, in Kinyarwanda, Interahamwe means "those who attach together," and Impuzamugambi means "single-minded ones" or "those who have the same goal." The manipulation of fear and hatred against Tutsi created solidarity among Hutu. For those who joined in the killings, the hate propaganda against Tutsi was attractive because it justified their actions and eased their consciences. Furthermore, mass participation in the killings made it tremendously difficult to assign guilt to individuals. In the words of a participant in the genocide, "no one person killed any one person" (quoted in Des Forges 1999: 770).

The success of the genocide depended in part on civilians' sense of civic duty and on the historical strength of the central government. Vertical social capital, manifested in almost absolute state power, historically penetrated Rwandan society so deeply that it superseded horizontal relations or loyalties. Officials from the police, local administrations, and military forces went door to door requisitioning men to partake in their "national duty" of eliminating Tutsi, and Hutu voluntarily or begrudgingly followed these orders. Killing Tutsi was portrayed as a Hutu civic duty; such phrases as "do your work" or "it is your duty to help clear the field"—eradicate the *inyenzi* (cockroaches), meaning Tutsi—were current. The image of killing as a means of self-defense against the RPF invasion was also employed, with the resounding urgency of kill or be killed (Prunier 1997).

Although this perverse manipulation of social capital made possible the mass recruitment of Hutu, real social and economic gains proved an added incentive to Hutu involvement. Population density in Rwanda had attained incredible heights; in Shyamba for instance, it had reached 668 people per square kilometer by 1989 (Prunier 1997). As land became scarcer, drought and poor crop prices compounded the economic crisis. Tutsi elimination would benefit the Hutu who participated in the killings by decreasing the number of competitors for land, homes, cattle, and other possessions.

Cooperation without Trust

Before the genocide, potentially bridging social capital existed in the form of exchange, mutual assistance, collaborative organizations, and reciprocity. Typically within Rwandan society, there were

five types of associative groups: cooperatives; farmers' organizations (smaller, less formal cooperatives); tontines (rotating savings and credit associations) and other informal associations; foreign and local development NGOs; and churches (Uvin 1998). Though these groups may have been numerous and widespread, the relations created by these groups were largely exclusionary and tended not to bridge group divides. This was especially true of NGOs supported by external aid. A missed opportunity to manage diversity and prevent violent conflict was perhaps missed as the economic ends of development overshadowed social goals of strengthening societal cohesion.

Many international efforts to support and encourage the growth of civil society in Rwanda were made in the 1980s and early 1990s, and many new organizations and NGOs appeared, thanks to these efforts. The mere existence of NGOs and other civil society organizations however does not necessarily promote democracy or pluralism, nor does it automatically form bridging social capital to link different groups. For the most part, NGOs in Rwanda were apolitical, service oriented, and closely affiliated with the state. Moreover, there was not enough social or political space for civil society to truly flourish. As Uvin (1998) notes, extreme poverty, inequality, clientelism, and poor information networks, compounded by the social, economic, and political marginalization of the rural populace (the majority of Rwandans), made the emergence of an autonomous, highly developed civil society all but impossible. Thus, despite the abundance of these associative groups, the social capital present was not sufficiently inclusive or potent to counter-balance the hate politics generated by Hutu extremists.

Since the end of the genocide, attempts have been made to place Hutu in government positions to balance political power, and space has been created for the reemergence of civil society actors. Yet the new social fabric of Rwanda is complicated, laden with subgroups and schisms. For example, there is the contentious issue of the resettlement of large numbers of returning Hutu and Tutsi. The latter are divided both by the duration of their stay abroad and by where they sought refuge. Those returning from Uganda are perceived as being more elitist than those from Burundi, who have a higher status than returnees from the DRC. Tutsi who stayed in Rwanda and survived the genocide are suspected of collaboration with the *génocidaires*, for it is doubted that any Tutsi could have survived on their own. There are also divisions between Hutu who participated in the killings, those who are suspected of being involved, and those who did not participate. The genocide, while reinforcing the split between Hutu and Tutsi, also created various kinds of new social cleavages that run within ethnic groups. Cross-cutting social capital should be nurtured to link not only Hutu and Tutsi, but also those within the subgroups (Gourevitch 1998; Prunier 1997). Overcoming the new schisms and reconciling old differences may take generations.

Violent conflict and the political and economic disintegration of the Rwandan state profoundly destroyed whatever broad-based forms of social capital that had previously existed. The conflict deeply penetrated various forms of horizontal social capital, such as exchange, mutual assistance, collective action, trust, and protection of the vulnerable. During the conflict, vertical relations were reinforced, while in post conflict years, these have suffered (see Table 4). Thus, postconflict social capital, although somewhat mirroring preconflict conditions, has undergone change in different ways.

The use of credit in exchanges was common in preconflict Rwanda. This practice has diminished over time, in part due to decreased levels of trust as a consequence of warfare but also because of increasing poverty and the value placed on money and individualism. In general, those interviewed felt that people have become more reluctant to give gifts and provide for the needs of others, for they have less confidence that these acts will be reciprocated.

Environmental degradation, isolation, and scarcity have also caused exchange to dwindle. Diminishing soil fertility and scarcity of land and water in Giti have hurt the productivity of both agriculture and cattle herding. These conditions have led to a decrease in secondary or associational social capital by diminishing the ability to exchange goods and services. During the genocide, Giti isolated itself

from neighboring communes out of fear. It has remained somewhat distant, with limited external market penetration, which has hampered economic activity. As a result, poverty within Giti is increasing, causing even further reductions in exchange, mutual assistance, and gift giving.

Extreme and widespread poverty in Shyanda, along with a decline in the availability of goods and labor, has hampered economic activity, primarily because of loss of or damage to resources and weakened social capital during the conflict. Agriculture is now almost the sole economic activity, but the ravages of war have decreased crop productivity and made fewer people available to work in the fields. There are also fewer men to contribute to the financial and physical needs of the community, as many have been killed or are currently in prison. As a result, the burden on women and children has increased tremendously.

This increased burden has not been offset by cooperation and mutual assistance, both of which have decreased in the communes. Giti, although not directly affected by the fighting, experienced much damage during the war. Large numbers of refugees sought refuge in the commune, destroying and damaging buildings and straining resources. Now, high levels of poverty have made commune members less able to provide for the needs of others, and increasing monetization within the society has made them less likely to give gifts and assistance.

The existence and nature of associations and the reason for their creation (whether based on shared interests or on prescribed commonality, as in familial relations) were dramatically affected by the genocide and the perversion of social bonds. During the conflict, especially in 1994, farming activity stopped across the country (except, perhaps, for small efforts by individual families), and the cooperative associations that oversaw these activities disbanded. Since the war, these associations and other informal networks have revived out of necessity. These organizations, which primarily deal with the legacies of the war, are geared toward vulnerable groups and help supply their own members' basic survival needs. Whereas prewar associations strove to better the welfare of people internal and external to the group, the new organizations are predominantly exclusive, yet they comprise both Tutsi and Hutu. For example, widows' and orphans' associations have emerged in both communes to assist each of these vulnerable groups. A few orphans' associations have arisen to provide funds for schooling of orphans in Giti. And in Shyanda, despite its genocidal experience, both Hutu and Tutsi cooperate in widows' and orphans' associations to help meet basic needs. Still, there is an underlying feeling of mistrust and resentment. In one widows' association that includes both Hutu women whose husbands are in prison and Tutsi women whose husbands were killed during the war, members interviewed stated that they worked together, but only for their survival. They do not feel that they can deal or speak with each other openly. This guarded or limited cross-cutting secondary social capital has emerged out of shared circumstances, isolation, and new social cleavages, not trust.

Many interviewed felt that the dissolution of families, which has occurred in both communes, has led to the creation of the new types of association. To some extent, people have turned to associations to make up for their lack of family ties, which were at times strengthened during the conflict, but overall were greatly harmed due to the insidious depth to which violence was perpetrated. Respondents also noted that the relationship between families joined through marriage has been greatly weakened; in-laws can no longer rely on each other for support and assistance. Even the nuclear family has failed to a degree. Fathers and brothers are dead or in jail, and mothers, struggling to fill their role, often cannot meet the needs of their children. Some children are sent away from home to live with extended family or to wander the streets in hopes that aid or religious organizations will be able to assist them.

According to respondents, intermarriage still occurs between Hutu and Tutsi in Giti and Shyanda, but it is often criticized in the wake of the genocide. Commune members in Giti are reluctant to marry those outside their own commune for fear of marrying into a murderous family.

Thus, most dimensions of horizontal social capital were negatively affected by the war, yet in the postwar period they are being revived in various forms to help regain some sense of normalcy. Exchange has reemerged within and between groups but has been reduced and transformed due to the conflict, its legacy, and modernizing factors. Feelings of solidarity, as evidenced by acts of mutual assistance and collective action, have also dwindled, and when they do persist, their motivations have changed. Vulnerable groups are protected, but more by self-help than through a community effort to support them. And trust, a key element in social capital, is still lacking to a large extent in both communes, or if present, is tenuous and rather fragile.

Vertical Influences and External Factors

Vertical relations in Rwanda have traditionally had great influence over society. Tutsi kings neared divinity and were revered and followed faithfully. With independence in the early 1960s, this vertical control continued with the consolidation of Hutu power in a strong central government. The traditional and informal local leadership that had previously existed dissipated, replaced by national government appointed administration. While strong vertical influence may have helped spare Giti during the genocide, thanks to the actions of its burgomaster (communal head), who forbade killing in his commune. Conversely in Shyanda, which initially escaped violence and in fact served as a Tutsi refuge, killings began soon after orders were dispatched by the acting prime minister, a Hutu from the region, who visited the commune due to its lack of genocidal response. In this case, strong vertical alliances overpowered horizontal allegiance with tragic results (Des Forges 1999). Since the war, the official communal leadership has maintained high levels of control over the communes. Local leadership remains under central control, although the national government is making strong efforts to decentralize.

According to those interviewed, social capital has also been transformed by factors external to warfare, mainly those related to modernization: market penetration, monetarization, and individualism, and more indirectly changes issued by colonialism and the Catholic Church. Study participants felt that there had been a decrease in the level and a change in the nature of both primary integrative relations and secondary associational linkages in both communes. The majority of those interviewed viewed “traditional” social capital as localized, primary relations among extended family and small communities that provided welfare mechanisms and social protection. Participants in the study felt that moves toward developmental and economic linkages with those outside of the community had weakened the primary levels of social capital. Interestingly, participants did not consider the strengthening of intercommunal relations and trade and the rise of new forms of associations as the continuation of social capital, albeit transformed; rather, they viewed these changes as an erosion of Rwandan social fabric. Increasing monetarization and individualism, as well as widespread and worsening poverty, according to those interviewed were to blame for the decrease in mutual assistance and gift giving within communes. Overall, external factors to the conflict, and the conflict itself, were considered reasons for the many transformations of social capital in Rwanda since the prewar period.

The shaping of social capital in Rwanda is clearly at a cross-roads. The challenge is to balance economic development with social development in a manner that simultaneously enables a nation to find its way out of the darkness of poverty, while encouraging social relations which cross class, ethnic, and gender divides, and yet preserve the primary ties that serve as the foundation of societal life. Inclusive state institutions and conflict management mechanisms need to be encouraged and supported for a cohesive society to thrive. Many positive signs of steps in this direction have already emerged, such as the cross-cutting widows and orphan associations; government moves toward decentralization and increasing participation; the revival of *Gacaca*, a traditional form of dispute mediation and distributive justice; and a more accountable civil administration.

IV. CIVIC, MARKET, AND STATE ENGAGEMENT

Civic, market, and state engagement under conditions of violent conflict have varying effects on overall social capital formation and societal cohesion. The degree to which the overall social cohesion of Cambodia and Rwanda is realized will be a function of integrating both horizontal social capital, in the form of a thriving civil society and strong primary relations, and vertical social capital, in the form of dynamic, inclusive state and market engagement. This nexus, in turn, will lay the basis for lasting peace and sustainable development in case-study countries. In each case study, civic engagement emerged both during and immediately after the conflict in terms of mobilizing social protection or activities for growth and development. Market activities emerged in more stable regions of countries plagued by conflict or in the immediate aftermath period, and enabled bridging, intercommunity relations. State interface with social capital and conflict is complex, in both countries the overpowering presence of the state led to the disruption of most social relations.

Coping with Conflict: The Role of Civil Society during Warfare

Manifestations of social capital emerged during conflict or immediately after the cessation of hostilities in the form of local, internal coping mechanisms that provided welfare and social protection in each country studied. In this regard, conflict seemingly spurred integrative social capital geared toward mitigating risks within the community. Interestingly, this occurred not only within nuclear and extended families, but also within the broader community, also encompassing civil society actors. This social capital, based on primary associations, resembled what had existed in the preconflict period, but did involve slight variations of the previous forms.

Both bonding and bridging social capital emerged among civil society in terms of moves toward welfare and social protection, and to some extent growth and development (such as efforts to expedite the peace process). During the Heng Samrin period in Cambodia, as the conflict began to wane, traditional types of social capital (for example, pagoda and funeral associations) revived, relatively similar to their preconflict forms. New associations of widows and orphans emerged to provide mutual assistance in Rwanda shortly after the genocide ceased, replacing the traditional roles of families in caring for these vulnerable groups. These various types of civic reactions to the conflict and its legacies, or coping mechanisms, varied by country and type of warfare. Overall, coping mechanisms can be internal or external and traditionally range from horizontal social capital relations such as family, extended family, or clans, to more bridging formal, and sometimes vertical, organizations such as religious groups, local government, and markets.

Internal mechanisms include social units, local religious institutions, local political organizations, and economic systems.

- The social unit, which includes nuclear and extended families, is the strongest, most basic of all internal coping mechanisms. In crises, families first help themselves, then their relatives, and then their neighbors. During the transition from war to peace, the family is the social unit that is most looked to for emotional recovery.
- Religious institutions (churches, mosques, and temples) often provide leadership, comfort, and emotional support in disasters. During reconstruction they are an excellent entry point for external actors, since they allow direct access to the community through preexisting knowledge, relations, and communications channels.
- Local political organizations may provide leadership, supervise external intervention during a crisis and, may assist with planning and implementation during reconstruction.

- Economic coping mechanisms fall into three types: informal, interpersonal economic relationships; patronage; and mutual assistance organizations such as cooperatives and labor unions. Mutual assistance organizations such as cooperatives should be sought out as natural counterparts in the delivery of emergency relief and in longer-term reconstruction (Cuny 1994).

External mechanisms include nonlocal organizations such as NGOs, religious groups, political organizations, economic institutions, social and economic development organizations, and, in some cases, the national government. “The effectiveness of external mechanisms depends largely upon their ability to understand and deal with cultural constraints within the host society, their view of development, and their ability to communicate effectively with the victims” (Cuny 1994: 84). These groups may become involved during the disaster, in the transition phase, in reconstruction, or in longer-term development. Although this group of external mechanisms does not directly include civil society, it does interface with many civil society actors.

In a crisis, people usually turn to that which is most familiar, and this can enhance coping mechanisms’ efficacy and ability to operate. In general, less complex societies, such as rural cultures, have shorter recovery periods. In rural settings, external mechanisms are more effective and efficient if they operate through existing internal mechanisms. Overly intrusive external interventions may inadvertently injure or displace internal coping mechanisms or decrease their effectiveness or ability to function. In more complex urban settings, the less likely it is that internal coping mechanisms will be utilized. External mechanisms then become more appropriate for intervention.

Crises may severely strain indigenous coping mechanisms, whether informal or formal, but they do not destroy them. Often, conflict and disaster act to only reinforce these mechanisms and forces local organizations to improve their abilities. A major concern is that external interventions may ignore local, spontaneous coping mechanisms, disrupt the internal groups’ ability to function, and, in some cases, damage the local coping fabric, undermining the credibility of local efforts within the community (Cuny 1994). Additive rather than substitutional strategies are the preferred course of action during the transition from emergency to development.

Various forms of survival-based social capital did emerge from within the civil society during or immediately after the conflict – and these varied according to the nature of conflict that plagued each country. Efforts toward reconstructing social capital in the postwar environment must build from these indigenous, spontaneous coping mechanisms, which are already in place and functioning, often in terms of both bonding and bridging social capital.

Market Forces, Modernization, and Violent Conflict

Soon after hostilities ceased, new secondary levels of bridging associational social capital emerged, forging the links necessary for growth and development. Cambodian transportation entrepreneurs facilitated new business ties between haulers and vegetable producers. In the immediate postconflict period, linkages external to primary groups tended to proliferate, encouraged by the potential involvement of a diaspora, the absence of state regulation and control, and the disruption of the traditional constraints or overly taxing group loyalties.

The findings from the Rwanda and Cambodia studies suggest that modernization has also affected the transformation of the structure of social capital. Overall, local perceptions of social capital focused primarily on what was deemed “tradition” (traditional norms, values, and customs) and the social capital concepts affiliated with integration, or primary social capital. Interviewees’ definitions of social capital, for the most part, did not extend to external linkages (nor to the state’s effectiveness, capacity to function, or connectedness to the community). Participants viewed moves toward establishing linkages as

a weakening of their social capital. Villagers in Prey Koh and Prasath and commune members in Giti and Shyanda all felt that market penetration and monetarization had eroded local levels of trust and mutual assistance. In other words, as they saw it, moves toward globalization and modernity had dissolved traditional social, political, and economic structures. Many stated that they thought market penetration had affected social capital in their societies more than had conflict, in terms of the shift of focus from familial and intracommunity ties to intercommunity relations.

The transformation already set in motion by trends toward globalization in each country was accelerated by conflict and the resulting break in the normal functioning of social capital systems. Secondary relations and linkages—as a result of diminished trust, weakened social cohesion, and the intrusion of external interventions such as humanitarian relief and NGOs—stepped in to provide the traditional protection and service-supplying roles typical of primary social capital relations to varying degrees in each country.

State Failure and Civil War

A lack of organizational integrity and synergy of the state, or poor vertical social capital relations, were key causes of each conflict examined. In each case, the government lacked the ability to perform standard state roles and was remote from its constituents, whether because of anarchy or authoritarian rule. In Cambodia and Rwanda, state penetration was sometimes ideologically driven, but its consistent goal was the retention of power by the political elite under conditions of increasing inequality, exclusion, and indignity. Both the Lon Nol and Khmer Rouge regimes were distant from their constituents yet sought to control and regulate them. In Rwanda the disconnect between the highly centralized, authoritarian government and the subjugated masses—the lack of synergy—led to the dissolution of stability and the eruption of hostilities.

While conditions that led to the conflict led to and resulted from diminishing social capital – in terms of weakening primary relations, dissolving secondary associations, and the absence of state organizational integrity and synergy, perverse social capital seemed to flourish under these adverse conditions. The same social dynamics that enable actors to engage in integrative relations or linkages for positive end-outcomes can also result in the formation of groups with very negative effects, such as youth militias, or in the specific study instances, the Angka and the Interahamwe. Strong social dynamics and bonding within these groups, primarily manipulated and mobilized by the government, enabled the groups' success. The negative effects of this strong social capital were evidenced through exclusion, hate propaganda, repression, and eventually slaughter.

In Cambodia after the war and in Rwanda before the war, external forces of modernization led villagers to initiate more external linkages, in the course of efforts to nourish civil society. As conflict erupted in Rwanda, hate propaganda generated by the state encouraged Hutu to band together against Tutsi within their communities and families. Hutu power thrived on the resulting amoral individualism, which placed allegiance to the state above any community or familial loyalties. Thus, civic, market, and state engagement, and how it interrelated with conflict, had vast ramifications for the transformations of all four social capital dimensions. Ideally, a balance should be obtained between civil society and state and market penetration, a balance that nurtures primary bonds, encourages bridging cross-cutting ties, and supports state functioning and relations to its people. For these form the basis of true social cohesion.

V. POLICIES AND PROGRAMS FOR STRENGTHENING SOCIAL CAPITAL AND SOCIAL COHESION

Social capital can take many forms and serve diverse functions, depending on its nature and use. It can either contribute to social cohesion or spur social fragmentation. It can be a source of mutual aid and protection in the face of violent conflict, or, just as readily, it can be perverted to mobilize unemployed youth into militia and bring about horrendous acts of genocide. Social capital can help bridge and mitigate the exclusive relations that create the conditions for conflict, or it can reinforce highly exclusionary bonds such as those that exist within gangs or extremist ethnic groups. It can substitute for state and market failures or complement their successes in the provision of basic protection or safety nets.

Thus, social capital is a double-edged sword with regard to conflict and development. Violent conflict can destroy primary bonds, thus undercutting indigenous social capital as a form of social protection. But by weakening such primary bonds, conflict can create opportunities for bridges to other networks and can displace relations that tend to build dependency, limit access to new information and opportunities, and retard change. Under such conditions, social capital can serve as a key source of reconciliation and reconstruction in divided societies through the formation of broad and diverse networks. The development of civic institutions that cut across traditional bonding social capital to form new links which cross ethnic, religious, age, income, and gender lines can provide the basis for the mediation, conflict management, and conflict resolution mechanisms that all societies require to sustain peace and development. Finally, a new government presents the opportunity to improve government ability and deepen community relations. For development assistance to be successful, it must focus on building such social capital as an integral part of any conflict prevention measure or people-centered reconstruction effort.

Policy and operational recommendations for international actors concerned about strengthening social cohesion by building social capital in relation to the state, the market, and civil society can be drawn from the country studies in regards to specific interventions geared toward each state.

Cambodia: Nurturing Associations for Economic Growth and Development

The destruction of the Cambodian social fabric caused by the various conflicts is tragic and has had devastating effects, yet the communities have remained resilient even while in exile in refugee camps in neighboring countries. Reconstruction efforts should build on the existing primary relations and coping mechanisms that emerged during the war. External interventions should seek to facilitate additional linkages geared toward economic growth and development and to intensify civic engagement among groups and between local groups, the government, and market forces.

Attempts to support cooperation, participation, and group solidarity may not be immediately appropriate during initial development efforts. The dissolution of trust within Cambodian society was a direct consequence of the societal fragmentation brought about by the Lon Nol government and by the Khmer Rouge's campaign to manipulate people and retain control through coercion, suspicion, and fear. In the postwar era, if this dissolution of trust is not acknowledged and addressed, true reconstruction cannot take place. Until trust is rebuilt, attempts to encourage solidarity and group cooperation may backfire by reminding Cambodians of the Khmer Rouge's communal works and the collectivism of the *krom Samaki* under the Heng Samrin regime (Nee 1995). External interventions must be sensitive to these matters and allow cooperation to occur spontaneously, supporting that which networks people and builds a responsive and responsible civil society.

Efforts to encourage participation by convening meetings in villages may also inadvertently be counterproductive. Villagers may attend meetings, but often they do so because of perceived coercion, not out of free will. Meetings called by external actors are reminiscent of Pol Pot days, when villagers expected to listen to political propaganda, not participate. Furthermore, these types of meetings tend to alienate the poor, who spend the meeting thinking how they will get their next meal and resent this use of their time (Nee 1995). Ownership of initiative is critical to building sustainable cross cutting social capital.

Development organizations need to recognize and act on such threats to social capital as acute poverty, increasing population pressure, degradation of resources, and the emergence of a market economy in the absence of proper regulation, the rule of law, and safety nets for poor households. Any external development efforts in these areas should be designed to enhance the state's capacity and its ability to relate with citizens and communities in a democratic manner.

Overall, Cambodians lack the economic and social infrastructure needed to crack the shell of poverty. To build this infrastructure, community participation and grassroots institutions are needed, but for the most part, Cambodian society lacks these features. Both could be facilitated by the strong presence of secondary social capital linkages. Decentralization, local ownership, and participation work only if communities are socially cohesive, appropriately organized, and democratic. Development actors should capitalize on the existing pagoda networks, which are organized and cohesive. Self-help groups are also increasing in popularity and number (Cambodia 1999).

Current forms of social capital related to the village economy ensure basic survival and a livelihood for some people (social protection) and allow exploitation of people and resources by others (economic development). This role should be encouraged to mature into a more responsible management of available resources, based on principles of equity and sustainability. If possible, development actors should avoid or minimize interventions that reinforce the negative elements of existing social capital. This implies shunning efforts that focus on vertical planning and that implement structures without putting in place accompanying horizontal structures and accountability to lower levels. Currently, it is more important to strengthen Cambodia's horizontal social capital, encompassing both familial and associational relations, than to focus on vertical social capital such as efforts to strengthen government capacity—although work in this area is needed, particularly on the democratizing front.

The current role of social capital in the realm of social services and welfare is geared toward meeting the community's own needs, but to a very small and inadequate extent. External agencies must step in to supplement this role and, in the process, allow social capital to effectively use and shape services, moving from social protection to service delivery. The United Nations Development Programme's Carrere Project and the World Bank-financed Northeast Village Development Project (NVDP) are good examples of efforts to build local capacity and social capital into the development process. These are second-generation community fund or social development approaches in which community resources are managed not through intermediary agents but by the village itself, building on existing institutions and relations and creating new ones. The aim is to connect to markets and create a form of social capital that arises from community traditions and cultural and familial solidarity but also creates and is created by repeated and predictable economic and social exchanges connecting people of diverse backgrounds to each other in numerous overlapping and reinforcing relationships.

Rwanda: Rebuilding Family, Community, and State Interrelations

Since the end of the war in Rwanda, the government has made great strides toward reconciling groups and taking initiatives to encourage growth and development. However, much work remains to be done: the country is impoverished, and Rwandans openly assert that justice toward those responsible for the

genocide has not been done. Although Hutu and Tutsi have banded together to rebuild their lives, they do not have a great deal of trust toward each other. Recommendations from the study include improving the state's organizational integrity, linkages, and, most important, government synergy with the community level. A priority in social capital development in Rwanda must be to dilute the potency of ethnic, tribal, and religious identities by creating meaningful relations between individuals, civil society organizations, and the state.

Owing to the perceived ineffectiveness of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda and the common view that it will be unable to administer justice, efforts have been made to reinstate *gacaca*, a traditional system of justice exercised by a group of community elders, to help process genocide crimes. The specifics of how this mechanism would work in conjunction with the tribunal are still under discussion. Many Rwandans see this procedure as the only hope for reconciliation, and it would provide a much-needed venue for both Hutu and Tutsi to relate their experiences and voice their concerns. International actors should find some means of supporting this process—but with caution. Elders and sages chosen from the commune may be better able to handle rulings and sentencing of the *génocidaires*, since they know the situation and the people firsthand. There is, however, a danger of subjective rulings and inability to conduct fair trials in certain communes. Nevertheless, attempts should be made to seek individual accountability, thus helping diminish the tendency to ascribe collective guilt to all Hutu (Des Forges 1999).

As in Cambodia, there was much sensitivity to the manipulation of traditional collective action, in this case *umuganda*, or traditional cooperative labor, which had been transformed into forced labor and which many felt had been perverted by the Habyarimana regime. Trust in collective organs such as cooperatives will have to be gradually built from the ground up so that these organs are seen as “people's cooperatives” that the people themselves, rather than the government, initiated.

Another key factor in the reconstruction of intra- and intercommunity relations is the establishment of a free and objective media. The genocide was able to spread so quickly and effectively because of propaganda issued by biased, extremist radio programs and journals or weekly papers. Efforts to ensure effective and fair media may help prevent a recurrence of violence by linking Hutu and Tutsi once again in a cohesive Rwandan identity and may thus help keep the government in check.

Efforts to build civil society in Rwanda failed in the past, as the rapid explosion of genocidal killings showed. Many groups and organizations supported by international agencies failed because of these efforts were over-funded, created to rapidly, artificially imposed, and had poor information networks and accountability (Uvin 1998). Facilitating the creation of NGOs is not just a matter of freeing the space necessary for their existence but also of using these groups to go beyond the boundaries of family, ethnic group, and location as the basis for group cohesion. The state—authoritarian and permeating most aspects of civil society—was unable to flourish in a democratic, inclusive manner. Social learning and social change, not just the presence of numerous types of organization, are required to make up a healthy civil society.

The process of developing social capital within communities and between constituents and the state takes a long time. It must be initiated internally, and it requires the a gradual increase in the ability and willingness to shape the political sphere. Pluralism and democracy must be promoted along with social capital initiatives. Through this process, people gain confidence in their ability to operate within the public arena. As society becomes more open, networks of communication and cooperation arise between and among communities, while divisions based on ethnicity, religion, gender, and region are overcome. Knowledge of politics and political workings increase, as do skills in conflict mediation, compromise, and negotiation. This type of growth requires space and time, neither of which were available in Rwanda. The way civil society emerged earlier in Rwanda, almost wholly guided by external mechanisms and goals,

most likely hurt rather than helped social and political growth and development. Because civil society groups were not held accountable for promoting democratization, their existence often worsened rather than improved Hutu-Tutsi relations. Civil society's strong links and ties to the government meant that what did develop in Rwanda was rather exclusive (Uvin 1998).

Projects that decentralize state power and increase participation by civil society actors and individuals should be implemented to help rebuild faith in the central government and encourage cooperation among constituents. Community-based reconstruction approaches such as the World Bank Community Reintegration and Development Project are attempting to create the space for development of social capital that can transcend "ethnic" lines through increased participation and that not only unite groups within communities but also link communities to the state through decentralization. Joint community decisionmaking to assess and prioritize community needs and determine and manage the allocation of resources to address these needs can be a powerful source of reconciliation through reconstruction. One main goal is to build local institutions that promote inclusive development by giving people a voice and that are capable of creating the social infrastructure necessary for conflict mediation.

VI. ENSURING HUMAN SECURITY: MANAGING CONFLICT BY CONNECTING AND EMPOWERING PEOPLE

What conditions reinforce exclusionary bonding social relations, and what conditions nurture inclusionary bridging social relations? How can societies cope with normative conflicts under conditions of pluralism and diversity? How does the ebb and flow of social capital work to hold a society together or fragment it? These critical questions are key to understanding the role of social capital in promoting social cohesion and conflict management as a basic source of economic development and human progress. Connecting and empowering people are basic transformative actions that emerge from our analysis to shed light on these questions.

Connections. Physical rehabilitation and reconstruction hinge on social reconciliation, which successfully connects adversarial groups. In Rwanda, for example, since the end of the genocide attempts have been made to place Hutu in government positions to balance political power. Meanwhile, space has been created for the reemergence of civil society actors. Yet the new social fabric of Rwanda is complicated, with subgroups and schisms that will take generations to heal. Cross-cutting social capital needs to be nurtured to link not just Hutu and Tutsi but also those within subgroups. But hope prevails as associations of widows and female heads of households bridge ethnic lines to form new social capital. These connections need to occur within civic and market spheres horizontally, but also vertically to link the government to communities, ensuring to responsiveness to continual needs and changes.

Empowerment. Decentralization and participation can empower people to take over development and give them a sense of control over their future. To dismantle the legacy of centralized decisionmaking and begin to forge these bridging links, the Rwandan government initiated an inclusive community-level approach to development founded on the concepts of participation and decentralization. This approach is designed to involve Rwandans closely in the management of their own affairs and to give local administrative structures the primary responsibility for development activities, thus not only empowering the groups but also encouraging them to work together to build their connected futures. Efforts by international actors to build and strengthen civil society must be accompanied by efforts to improve respect for pluralism, tolerance, and participatory, democratic principles. Equality among social groups that promotes ties cutting across ethnicity, clans, gender, age, religion, and political ideologies is necessary if quality civic engagement is to flourish. Such civil society binds together potentially disintegrative elements, building new, cohesive social identities while keeping bonding elements of communal identity in balance.

While cross-cutting ties are being established, assessments must also be made of existing bonding social capital bases, and care must be taken that external efforts do not erode them. Once these local coping mechanisms are identified, they must be incorporated into the reconstruction process. External interventions need to be sensitive to indigenous organizations and be careful not to wipe out the groups' own efforts and their tendencies toward self-reliance. Rather, they should strengthen indigenous capacities, especially to bridge to new roles, functions, and relationships.

International actors, while in endeavors to foster socially cohesive relations, should ensure that their development efforts do not nurture or encourage dependency through the manner in which leadership, money, know-how, or materials are provided. Local actors should not be inadvertently undercut by external funding for government projects already being handled locally, nor must confidence in local internal and external coping mechanisms be undermined. External intervention should not become a disincentive to self-help, nor should project design and implementation weaken the authority and prestige of local leaders. The goal of building capacity at the local level should be to improve access

to information and transparency in decisionmaking and to enhance local leaders' skills in obtaining information, empowering decisionmaking, building local alliances, resolving conflicts, and implementing projects so as to facilitate decentralization efforts.

VII. FROM PEACEBUILDING TO NATION-BUILDING: DESIGNS FOR SUSTAINABLE PEACE AND DEVELOPMENT

The challenge of nation-building remains a pressing issue for the new millennium as new states preside over old societies and unyielding social divisions. The process of decolonization continues; national elites that only recently achieved their own independence from foreign rule have to deal with dissenting communities that now demand autonomy or even independence. The task of drawing on old traditions, values, and myths to create a new nation is complex and fraught with difficulty. Yet such newly formed “imagined communities” somehow have to set aside primordial loyalties of bonded social capital manifested in religion, clan, ethnicity, and locality, to be transformed into socially cohesive, functioning nations (Anderson, 1994; Shoemith 2000). Like nation-building, social cohesion has to be built brick by brick, from the bottom up, perhaps horizontally first and then vertically. By at first overtly tackling “safe” subjects such as the community management of basic services— schools, health centers, and so on—it is possible to address the building of cross-cutting social capital by “stealth” (Khin-Sandi Lwin 2000: 3).

Anticipatory thinking based on the willingness to listen and learn and to make few, if any, assumptions, is the key to success for those working in conflict-affected countries. Measures of civic engagement, along with human security and government efficacy, transparency, and stability, are fundamental social capital indicators for comprehensive reconstruction. Social networks and organizations are essential assets in the portfolio of resources drawn on by the war-affected to manage risk and take advantage of opportunities. Peacebuilding involves not only economic reconstruction, or the rebuilding of physical infrastructure and economic stabilization, but also the fundamental revitalization of positive social capital and the strengthening of social cohesion. The solutions to conflict prevention lie not only in demilitarization and in jump-starting the economy, although these are important. They lie also in good governance—the rule of law, justice, and human rights—and in strengthening social capital at every level. The crucial challenge is to build societal capacity for managing diversity and preventing social capital from being transformed into an instrument of exclusion and violent conflict. This integral component of rehabilitation, reconstruction, and reconciliation can be accumulated only over years of support and nourishment. It thus requires long-term, flexible approaches that allow adaptation to interim change.

In the end, the voices of the war-affected cry out for a new kind of security, a human security free of oppression and fear, free of hunger, and rich with opportunity, that empowers them to take decisions that impact their own lives. Resilient communities rely on all forms of social capital: bonding primary ties for protection and survival in time of crisis; bridging links for action and development in time of hope; efficient and functional bureaucracies and transparent norms and rules; and synergistic government-community relations that allow civic engagement to thrive as the ultimate guarantee against violent conflict. Support needs to nurture and transform social capital in order to create and maintain the mechanisms and institutions necessary for strengthening social cohesion, managing diversity, preventing violent conflict, and sustaining peace and development.

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