2. Project Objectives and Components

a. Objectives

To improve coastal and marine environments of the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden through a range of activities under the SAP [Strategic Action Program], of which two would be carried out under the GEF / Bank administered project. The objective was not revised.

b. Components (or Key Conditions in the case of Adjustment Loans):

The overall GEF project included eight components, of which five were executed by UNDP, one by UNEP and the following two by the Bank:

Component 2: Reduction of Navigation Risks and Maritime Pollution  (Appraisal estimate: $3.5 million; actual $3.7 million *)

A. Implementation of conventions and port state control - analysis of constraints, promotion of ratification, recommendations on new PERSGA protocols, establishment of a regional system of port state control and assessment of self-financing mechanisms.
B. Traffic separation schemes - establishment of such schemes for the Northeast Side and Southwest Side of the Hamish Islands and extension of the Ras Muhammed scheme.
C. Hydrographic surveys and navigation aids - surveys of priority areas and of navigational aids.
D. Vessel traffic systems (VTS) - a feasibility study for and implementation of a VTS and a regional workshop.
E. Oil spill prevention and management - regional strategy, training and support to the regional center in Djibouti.

Component 6: Support for Integrated Coastal Zone Management  (ICZM)  (Appraisal estimate: $2.1 million; actual $1.9 million *)

A. Regional networking and training - workshops, site visits, establishment of a regional framework, and outreach activities.
B. Geographic information systems (GIS) - guidelines, regional review, technical advice and support, and applications of GIS.
C. Model ICZM plans - preparation and implementation of ICZM plans in Djibouti, Sudan, Somalia (north coast), and Yemen.
D. ICZM activities in the four southern countries - institutional strengthening and training.

The project description was not formally revised, although some adjustments were made in the course of implementation.
c. Comments on Project Cost, Financing, Borrower Contribution, and Dates

Because the Bank project constituted only two components of a broader program, the "project cost" used in the ICR is equal to the GEF grant allocated to these components and thus does not include the contributions of the Regional Organization for the Conservation of the Marine Environment of the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden (PERSGA) ($620,000 appraisal estimate) or the IMO ($232,000 actual).

3. Relevance of Objectives & Design:
The project was prepared by the Bank and the other GEF Partners (UNDP and UNEP) in close cooperation with the seven participating countries and with the implementing agency, PERSGA, and reflected the experience of several other regional seas programs. The objective was consistent with the CASs of those countries which had them and with GEF global priorities. The project design was closely based on the Strategic Action Program which the countries had adopted in order to meet their obligations under the Jeddah Convention and various IMO conventions and protocols.

4. Achievement of Objectives (Efficacy):
The project objective was Substantially achieved in both its components, although there were some shortfalls.

The ICR has a detailed narrative on Outputs by Components and this review finds this assessment realistic and well justified. ICR Ratings are:

Component 2:
2.A S
32 IMO Conventions were ratified and ship inspections are increasing and all major ports now comply with the IMO International Ship and Port Security Code.
2.B and 2.C HS New charts were developed and a traffic separation scheme implemented. A new lighthouse was built.
2.D S During the course of the project, Automatic Identification Systems replaced Vessel Traffic Systems as the industry standard and the project provided training for both systems and supported the establishment of receiving and radar stations along the coast.
2.E U A draft action plan was prepared and workshops were held but significant work remains to be done before such a plan can be adopted. Establishment of a regional Marine Emergency Mutual Aid Centre was partly achieved.

Component 6:
6.A S A regional working group was established and training workshops and study tours held.
6.B U A regional GIS database was established but countries remain reluctant to share data in GIS form.
6.C HS and 6.D U Good model plans were prepared by three of the four southern (least developed) countries (except Somalia) but little progress was made on implementation.

The ICR mentions that the start of Component 6 was delayed but does not explain why. This review would add that the concept of ICZM was not really explained in the PAD and therefore the expected outputs of this component were somewhat vague.

5. Efficiency:
Given that this is basically a technical assistance and training operation, no quantitative measures of efficiency are possible. Unfortunately, the ICR does not provide any information on the performance of consultants, effectiveness of workshops or any tracer studies to measure how much was learned and retained. It also does not state Bank costs for preparation and supervision.

From a cost effectiveness point of view, the relatively modest cost of the project seems to have been outweighed by its significant outputs.

6. M&E Design, Implementation, & Utilization:
Project monitoring was the responsibility of PERSGA and Annex 1 of the PAD provides a detailed logframe for this. Annex 1 to the ICR provides an equally detailed accounting of actual results in the same format. The PAD also provided for Mid-Term and Final Evaluations to be carried out by "independent reviewers". While the ICR mentions that such reviews took place, and also a Special Review in 2001, these appear to have been Bank supervision missions.

7. Other (Safeguards, Fiduciary, Unintended Impacts--Positive & Negative):
Safeguard Issues. As a technical assistance and training project, the project was appropriately placed in Category C for the purposes of OP 4.01. However, the PAD might have explored the possible potential negative impacts of the lighthouse installed under the project. Other safeguard policies were not triggered. Because of the C rating, no follow up work was required during supervision and the lack of reference to safeguard issues in the ICR is understandable.
Fiduciary Issues. An appraisal weakness was the deferral of an agreement on accounting and auditing procedures acceptable to the Bank until after grant signing. Standard procurement provisions were made. The ICR indicates briefly that PERSGA followed the agreed procurement procedures and that financial management also met Bank standards.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>8. Ratings:</th>
<th>ICR</th>
<th>ICR Review</th>
<th>Reason for Disagreement /Comments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Outcome</strong>:</td>
<td>Satisfactory</td>
<td>Satisfactory</td>
<td>While some expected outputs were not achieved, others were achieved in a highly satisfactory manner; on balance, an S rating is appropriate.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Institutional Dev.</strong></td>
<td>Modest</td>
<td>Modest</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sustainability</strong></td>
<td>Unlikely</td>
<td>Non-evaluable</td>
<td>The ICR is perhaps a little harsh. There is some reason to hope that the recent improvement in country commitment and in PERSGA's planning and management will be sustained, as a continuing benefit of the project.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Bank Performance</strong></td>
<td>Satisfactory</td>
<td>Satisfactory</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Borrower Perf.</strong></td>
<td>Satisfactory</td>
<td>Satisfactory</td>
<td>Perhaps only marginally so, considering the early implementation period, when country financial commitment was erratic and PERSGA's management problematic.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Quality of ICR</strong></td>
<td>Satisfactory</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</table>

**NOTES:**
- When insufficient information is provided by the Bank for IEG to arrive at a clear rating, IEG will downgrade the relevant ratings as warranted beginning July 1, 2006.
- ICR rating values flagged with ‘*’ don't comply with OP/BP 13.55, but are listed for completeness.

**9. Lessons:**
1. Regional programs and projects are particularly challenging for the Bank, especially when the countries concerned are at widely differing economic and social levels and where commitment to the regional implementing organization is more rhetorical than real. Building the capacity of such organizations is a slow and painful process. Nevertheless, determined efforts from the Bank can make a difference both in strengthening cooperation and in showing results on the ground (in the sea, in this case). However, regional approaches are best reserved for those problems which are truly regional (such as navigation and oil spill contingency planning); other issues (like ICZM) might best be dealt with through a series of country projects.
2. ICZM remains a nebulous concept for most planners in the region (and perhaps also in the donor community). This may change once one or two strong pilot projects have been actually implemented.

**10. Assessment Recommended?** ☐ Yes  ● No

**11. Comments on Quality of ICR:**
Although somewhat wordy, the ICR does a very good job of setting out the project's outcomes and in assessing its strengths and weaknesses. It does not shrink from making critical judgements, though it is perhaps understandably reluctant to air the political issues that probably underlay some of the shortcomings noted. Annex 1 on performance indicators is particularly useful. The lessons learned are well drawn. As the broader project was the first GEF operation involving all three Partners - Bank, UNDP and UNEP - it would have been useful to have a more in-depth discussion of any problems of cooperation. The same goes for cooperation between the MNA and AFR regions, which were both involved with this operation. Section 10 of the ICR should have been used to discuss issues of concern to GEF, such as incremental costs (which appear to have been plucked out of thin air in the PAD). The ICR could also have said more about cooperation with other GEF projects in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aqaba and with the Bank's Indian Ocean Oil Spill Project.